




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Studies in theology



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Studies in Theology.—I

PROLEGOMENA



PHILOSOPHIC BASIS OF THEOLOGY; OR, RATIONAL
PRINCIPLES OF RELIGIOUS FAITH

BY

✓
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ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟ ΦΩΣ



NEW YORK: HUNT & EATON
CINCINNATI: CRANSTON & STOWE

1891

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P R E F A C E.

IN this book-making age one must be careful to select his reading. There is a plethora on all subjects. Only those of the best class on a given topic should be selected, always providing that a just representation of divergent views is fairly met, so as to put the mind in the best posture for a final judgment.

Whether any book will be helpful to the student will depend on several things: the book itself, its adaptation to the needs and capabilities of the reader, and the manner and spirit of the reading. Reading may be, and often is, a mere physical exercise in which the zero of mentality is used; or it may be both a highly intellectual and ethical exercise, in which the higher and highest attributes of the whole mental and spiritual nature are employed. In the former case, of course, no appreciable advantage can possibly result—no increase of knowledge or cultus of any kind: whatever the book, the reader will rise from its perusal essentially the same he was before. In the latter case, if the book is worthy of the reading, the exercise cannot fail to enhance the personal values of the reader both as to improvement of faculty and increase of knowledge.

Time is too precious to be wasted on any discussion, or in the reading merely of any book, that is wanting in respect of intrinsic merit. If weak or frivolous or commonplace, the reading cannot but impair vigor and faculty. If false or dubious, it will inevitably misdirect energy and mislead the

life. If indelicate or inelegant merely, it will debauch both the intellectual taste and the moral sense. It is only as it is elevated in tone and theme, careful and painstaking in its research, cultured and pure in its style, correct and true in its teaching, weighty and important in its subject-matter, and fully abreast of the last results of educated thought and scientific research that it can impart strength, grace, and nobility to the reader. Any book that is less than helpful to these ends is hurtful.

For the best results it is indispensable that there should be affinity between the book and the reader—if possible, a friendly sympathy between the author and the student. The want of this will pretty surely be fatal. It is not necessary that there should be perfect accord, in the mind of the student, with either the reasonings or the conclusions he finds. With robust, healthy, and honest natures there will always be more or less disagreement, and the friendly collision will tend to elicit clearer and fuller knowledge. But in order to this there must be friendliness and appreciation—a sort of kinship of noble natures. If one will receive the highest good or help from another respect is indispensable, but in no case should the reader give himself up wholly to the author. However delighted with the trend and manner of the discussion, or with the style, spirit, and general form of the reasonings and conclusions, the reader will fail of greatest good if he fail to maintain his own individuality. He must both think and inwardly digest for himself.

Great truths are never mastered without earnest endeavor, nor can they be received and passed along without reciprocal earnestness and endeavor on the part of those who receive them. The reader must work with the author with cordial heartiness, and coming thus under the spell of his inspiration, and entering into his strivings, he will be likely to improve upon and

surpass him. Thus co-working he will find the best and deepest meanings. It is a profitable experience for any mind to feel the throb of a kindred mind. Life propagates life. A book whose mental throbbings are not felt, whatever truth it may have, is too nearly dead to quicken other minds, and can be read with but little profit. Mental quickening is the great end to be achieved. The book that has value in it is the book that awakens thought, and creates in the mind thirst for deeper knowledge. The truth itself which is communicated may be of the greatest possible value, but the nearest equivalent to the truth imparted, or perhaps that which is better, will be the mental quickening which attends it. The great thing to be acquired is thirst for knowledge. When fully aroused the mind will find truth for itself.

The author seeks to put himself in communication, not simply with the eye, but with the mind, and also, if possible, with the heart and conscience of the reader. He does not aim to do his thinking for him, but rather to lead him to think for himself on the greatest themes. He does not assume the role of a dogmatist, but that rather of a fellow-student and associate inquirer—that of a truth-seeker. He would associate himself with kindred minds in the pursuit. He seeks such to enter into the fellowship of his thought-life, hoping to inspire them to push inquiry and investigation into regions beyond. His chief aim is to inspire noble minds to the loftiest exercise of their powers in the search for truth. If he shall contribute something to guide some struggling mind, or to help some troubled inquirer in any measure, he will have reached his highest ambition.

The mental poverty of the majority of people arises from the utter absence of all mental life, seen in nothing more than in the books they read and the aimlessness of their readings. Most reading is done without the idea of any real profit, or

that there is any thing to be gained—simply for passing entertainment. Most books propose no valuable end, and those which do aim at something often have nothing to give but inane common places that really signify nothing. They are read without aim, or any more worthy aim than the occupancy of the moment, or, something still worse, the unwholesome excitement which their fiction or narrative produces. It is hopeless, perhaps, to expect any thing better than this of the masses who live but a vegetative existence, or who are too busy about practical matters and the struggle for existence to give time to any solid mental exercise. The intervals of business pursuits naturally find the mind relaxed, and leave it in too enfeebled a condition to attempt robust and sustained effort of any kind.

Books which deal with great questions in the nature of the case must be confined to a comparatively limited circle of eclectic readers, who constitute the van of the great movement of progress. But even such gifted souls do not always read wisely or well, either as to the choice of their reading or the manner of it. There is immense waste in what seems to be real work by ill doing what might and ought to be well done.

“Studies in Theology,” the running title of a series of volumes of which this is the first, is the outcome of fifty years of earnest endeavor to master theological science. The outcome is far from satisfactory to us, but the belief that it will be of some advantage to those who are to carry forward the investigation in the future is deemed a sufficient reason for giving permanent form to the thoughts herein expressed, and to the reasonings and conclusions which are contained in the treatises which follow.

The subjects discussed are the most difficult and obscure in theological science, as they are also the most fundamental.

The titles of the series are as follows: "Prolegomena; Philosophic Basis of Theology; or, Rational Principles of Religious Faith;" then, in the order named, "Theism: Cosmic Theism; or, The Theism of Nature," "The Supernatural Book: Evidences of Christianity," "Biblical Theism," "Scope and Plan of Creation," "Primitive Man, or Man in his First Estate," "Man in Sin, or the Fact and Doctrine of Human Sin," "Man Under Redemption, or the Fact and Doctrine of Atonement in Christ," "Man a Spiritual Being," "The Man of the Resurrection Age," "Immortal Destiny."

It will be observed that all the great theological issues, and philosophical as well, of our disturbed and earnestly inquisitive age emerge in this series of discussions. They are perplexing problems with which we have long wrestled as earnestly as ever ancient athlete wrestled for the victor's wreath. They are the subjects with which the men of the coming age will continue to wrestle. The final result involves the deepest interests of the world.

The present volume, as indicated, involves the preliminary questions and principles which underlie all systems of thought. It begins with a discussion of the question, "What is truth?" Not what is true, but what is the precise idea which the term expresses? The discussion of this point, it is believed, places the reader in an advantageous position for the investigation of the more practical question which is the usual starting-point of discussion—Is a given proposition, doctrine, theory, or teaching true? Having in the mind a clear idea of what is implied in the term, we are prepared for the right direction of the reasonings and for the application of tests.

Truth is treated under several aspects: as truth of being, which makes the term the equivalent of reality, or objective truth; truth of idea, which denotes the correspondence between the idea which the mind has in any given case and the reality itself, which we denominate subjective truth; truth of

sign, which denotes the adequacy of any symbol to convey the idea which one mind entertains to another mind, or to convey the idea of any reality.

The discussion next considers the term knowledge—what it is to know, the condition of knowing, criteria of knowledge, the real contents of human knowledge, and the limitations of the knowable. We beg close and thoughtful attention to this part of the general discussion.

Then follows the differentiation between knowledge and belief, and also the differentiation between kinds or grades of beliefs. To this part of the discussion also we solicit the special attention alike of Christian believers, theologians, and those who repudiate faith.

The function of reason with respect to matters of faith is carefully considered, and, it is hoped, so put as to aid in the solution of the great problem, "Have we a divine religion," and have we the right to employ our reason in interpreting and understanding it?

Theology, throughout this treatise, is regarded, as, like every other science, amenable to the law of reason—namely, that its facts and conclusions must always have for their support the adequate reason, or otherwise be rejected as furnishing no basis for faith. It differs from natural sciences only as its subjects differ, and as its methods and proofs vary, not at all as to the law of the sufficient reason. A thing is known by perceiving it. The sufficient reason for affirming its existence is the perception. A feeling is known by experiencing it. The sufficient reason for affirming its existence is the consciousness of it. An idea is known by consciousness. The sufficient reason for affirming its accordance with truth is the proof, derived from whatever source, which compels the mind to affirm that accordance.

It is the doctrine of the present treatise that theology is a

progressive science. Its sources and principles are eternal, and forever the same, but the human mind is progressive. New knowledges emerge; the sum of human experience increases; by more careful observation new facts and laws are discovered; the result is a deeper and truer insight. Just as in every other department of human research improved facilities bring improved results, so in theology like causes will secure like advance. We know more to-day than our fathers did a thousand, or even a hundred, years ago. We have truer beliefs than they had. The sciences, theology among the rest, take on truer forms along with the advance of the age: some things are left behind, some things are added. Truth is eternal, but the view we acquire of it is variable, and may constantly, and to the finite must, be forever enlarging and improving. Let us rejoice that it is so.

If the reader should find in these pages—as he will—some phases of thought and some forms of statement a little out of the ordinary line, it is our hope that he will not take needless alarm, nor hastily conclude that something serious is out of joint because of the novelty. Read and consider. The slightly varying putting may be helpful. Where any thing appears out of the ordinary course scrutinize it carefully. If after giving it careful attention you shall feel called to doubt or reject it, the study leading to that result may have been most useful and helpful. There are minds that always see danger in a phrase or sentence which suggests a new idea, and which discover fatal error in divergence from platitudes. It is not the wisest nor safest type of mind certainly. Receive nothing on mere statement. Reject nothing simply because it differs from your accustomed thought or formularies. Keep an open door. Be fair. Use your mind. Think for yourself. Resolve to accept nothing but the truth. Be alert. Read and digest.

The utmost advantages to be derived from general progress

come only to those who are at the pains to seize them with the utmost freedom and use them with the utmost diligence. If we will, the light may flood the universe and no ray penetrate the dungeon of our minds. If we will, we may share in the beauty and comfort of the advancing day. It will be as we will.

We covet the attention of the coming men—the young. The clock strikes the age of ages. The battles of to-day usher the millennium. Ideas lead on the advancing hosts. Truth is the glorious goal. It is a privilege to live in such a time. Come with us to a survey of the field and choose the banner under which you shall enlist. Who knows, possibly to you is reserved the honor of leading the victorious column. Gird yourselves and “quit you like men.”

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“OMNIA autem probate; quod bonum est tenete.”—PAUL.

“Die Wahrheit ist in Gott; uns bleibt das Forschen.”—VON MÜLLER.

“O Truth, Truth! thou knowest how the inward marrow of my soul longeth after thee.”—AUGUSTINE.

“Whatever is against right reason, that no faith can oblige us to believe. For though reason is not the positive and affirmative measure of our faith, and our faith is larger than reason, and takes something into her heart that reason can never take into her eye; yet in all our creeds there can be nothing against reason.”—JEREMY TAYLOR.

“He who begins by loving Christianity better than truth will proceed by loving his own sect better than Christianity, and end in loving himself better than all.”—COLERIDGE.

STUDIES IN THEOLOGY.

PROLEGOMENA.

SECTION I.—AIM, SCOPE, AND METHOD PROPOSED.

THE present volume is the first of a series of monographs on important theological questions, and stands in essential relations to the entire series. It is properly Place and purpose of this volume. prolegomena—an introductory study to the study of the subjects themselves, in which principles and presuppositions, which are governing in subsequent discussions, are propounded and established.

The series takes the general title of “Studies in Theology,” rather than the more assumptive form of “Treatises in Theology;” not as implying uncertainty or tentativeness, Reasons for the running title of the series. but rather to indicate that the matters discussed are treated as any other subjects about which the mind inquires, in which critical examination takes the place of dogmatic statement. The subjects are regarded not as mere matters of faith, or as standing in authority alone, but as matters of rational inquiry, amenable to the common law of the sufficient reason.

The series of monographs covers almost the entire field of theological thought usually comprised in works on “systematic theology;” but, not assuming that style, the writer feels permitted to omit any references to some phases of Christian doctrine of

interest only or chiefly to sectaries, and others which are so plain, and universally accepted in substantially the same essential forms, as to require no special attention, which yet would demand full expression in a treatise on systematic theology. The Object of the work. object is really to confine the range of discussion to fundamental questions and points which are in dispute between earnest thinkers, and which, from their intrinsic obscurity, need a somewhat more scientific statement, and in some cases a modified expression—the deepest questions which underlie the whole structure of religious and philosophical thought, and, this side of these, questions touching the grounds and some of the more accurate meanings and interpretations of Christian faith.

The author declares himself free from any purpose to make a mere creed pronunciamiento, or to be bound or limited by a creed, and especially by popular and traditional interpretations of any particular creed view of Christian doctrine. The discussions have absolutely no other inspiration than the simple desire to arrive at the best conception and expression of truth and the removal of hinderances and obstructions from the path of honest and earnest inquiry. This statement is not intended to convey the idea that the author is a disbeliever in creeds, or that he is without a creed, or that he holds his creed loosely. Every honest, intelligent man has a creed. The views advocated in these monographs are in essence the creed we hold on the subjects treated, but they are not put forth as exponential of any extant creed, or for the defense or furtherance of any sect-statement or theory of doctrine; no authorized standards are acknowledged; there is no effort or desire to placate tradition; authorities are not evoked or recognized as determining questions in dispute; the questions are put upon their merits, and the simple and only aim is to find what conclusion untrammelled reason arrives at. The right of doubt, dissent, and antagonism is fully and cordially recognized, and as far as pos-

sible self-represented, and always treated with respect when couched in terms of thought. Narrowness, cant, bigotry, intolerance, find no place in these pages, whether paternized by religion or irreligion.

As Introductory the following pages are concerned with preliminary matters, such as: the proper spirit of inquiry; the end or aim of inquiry; right method; what is truth; what is knowledge; grounds of knowledge; limits of the knowable; what is belief; laws which ought to determine beliefs; differentiations of essence and grounds of knowledge and belief; authority of belief as a rule of action; sources of truth in matters of faith; absolute right and duty of mind to demand and have a reason; authority of human masters and of an assumed revelation; right of reason to test and examine and so to reject or accept; reason final umpire; personal responsibility for opinions and more stable forms of governing beliefs.

The subjects to be discussed are not new. Some of them descend to us as heir-looms from the remotest antiquity, others are comparatively ancient, none of them are recent. In some form they have engaged the thought of ages, but they are ever changing. Chased out of one form they have appeared in another. Essentially the same, each generation presents them in a somewhat new phase.

Our own age has given them greater prominence than any preceding. The last decade has been prolific of treatises of ripe and varied learning, and of great value. Scholarship was never so busy, thought never so active, and the demand never so great as at the present moment. The liberation of mind, evoked from the germ of Protestantism, which is now practically universal and inextinguishable, has relegated all questions to re-examination. The new age of science, of the same paternity, has poured such a flood of light that discussion is irrepressible. The interests are, however, so vast and the field of research so

extended, and there are so many new phases of thought and new modifying environments constantly emerging, that no investigation, however complete at one time and in some aspects, suffices permanently, or even for the present does away with the occasion for further statement. And if nothing new be added as to the substance of truth, it sometimes happens that a slightly different putting is helpful:—the angle of vision is changed; there is a slight variation of the refraction; and so the object stands in a somewhat different, and to some minds improved, light. The ablest mind, after the most painstaking research, fails to perceive all the sides and bearings of any subject of thought, especially of subjects so involved and intricate as those deep questions which arise in theology:—there are some points left in shadow; some aspects of the problem are overlooked; some unobserved obscurity remains; the setting is not absolutely complete. That it is so is the inevitability of the finite, and furnishes the reason for re-examination and restatement. The ever-flowing and ever-growing river of thought, as it traces its course down the ages, touched and modified by varying human experiences and observations, will perpetually create for itself new channels and new banks as it works its way to the measureless and infinite ocean of truth.

In some points the writer will be found to differ, not, it is believed, with substantial or essential orthodoxy, or the commonly accepted doctrinal conclusions held by evangelical Christians as taught by the earlier and the more recent theologians and expounders, but still, in somewhat important phases, as bearing on some matters of dogma, but more especially on formal expression and interpretation. Any departure from the popular and traditional expression, however small or non-essential, will be scrutinized. This is as it should be. There are dangers which vigilant conservatism should

guard against ; but there is also a certain liberty which should not be interfered with. Changes of time and environment, with some actual progress in thought, create a demand and furnish the means for some improvement of view and construction. Conservatism to be commended.

It is important to keep alive the spirit of earnest investigation, and to encourage scholarly effort in the endeavor to reach the highest ideal both of truth and expression. As Some modifications to be expected. in the past, surrenders and modifications have been required which did great violence to strong traditional preferences, but which were greatly to the advantage of truth, so we may expect that similar demands will continue to occur in the future. Any error or dangerous defection will always The proper remedy against error. find its proper check, not in the demand for fixedness, but in the enlightened and sufficient answer. What is wanted in these times of earnest thinking and improved scientific research, as well as of that loose and hasty generalization which on occasion threatens to uproot things most sacred and venerable, is earnest and patient study, and the charity which never faileth. If we should avoid giving the reins to adventurous rashness, we must also be careful not to permit them to be wrested by inexperience and ignorance.

The two errors to be avoided are, slavish adherence to inherited traditions, merely on the ground of their wide prevalence and long continuance, or because they Two errors to be avoided. seem plausible and are agreeable to our feelings ; and, a blind haste to change from established formularies simply from the desire of novelty, or on any other ground than that of convincing argument.

The principle to be adopted is, that we allow the largest liberty of investigation, and admit unreservedly and thankfully any new light that may be furnished from whatever quarter, whether as the outcome of our own diligent research or of the

examination of others. The gravity of the subjects and the intrinsic importance of the doctrines of which we treat, impose upon us the duty that we make ourselves intelligible, and that we furnish adequate reasons for the acceptance of our teachings.

Nothing could be more fatal to the claims of religion than an attempt to shelter them behind mere traditions or mere authority, however high or venerable, when either its facts or the reasonableness of its doctrines are called in question. We need to keep forever in mind that we can arrogate to ourselves personally only the position of equals in any controversy. We must not fall into the mistake of supposing that the divine authority of our sacred books is established merely by our affirmation or belief of it, or that any such authority attaches to us or our opinions. This is a common fallacy which we must be careful to avoid. We need to keep constantly in recollection that our creed-formularies are only human, and, therefore, always possibly imperfect. However they may contain essential truth, we cannot assume safely that they will admit of no change. The fathers were not infallible. There has been advance. There is room for improvement. There will be modifications. More and more every increment of Christian teaching will be searched. We must have the wisdom to discern between the shell and the kernel, and to avoid the mistake of periling the latter by attempting to give permanence to the former. The past is full of suggestions on this line which we may profitably study.

We have entered on a time of manifold peril, which makes a demand for wise and skillful, as well as profoundly honest, investigation. The best brain and the best heart of Christendom is, and will be, needed to guide and pilot through the breakers, so as to avoid the dangers which threaten us on every side. It is no time for the shallow and inexperi-

enced to stand at the helm; no time for the clamor of ignorance and sciolism to dictate measures of defense or advance, or to determine doctrines or methods. Need of skillful guides.

Calmness, moderation, laborious research, candid treatment of questions, and brave and honest devotion to truth, are the need of the hour; bigotry, narrowness, and shallowness, its greatest peril.

We must recognize the fact that there are honest doubters with respect to the most sacred verities, and a still Honest doubters. greater number who differ with us on minor questions, and that in many instances they give proof of as much sincerity and love of truth as we can properly arrogate to ourselves. Many of the most scholarly and truth-loving go even to the verge of skepticism. We must not be guilty of the folly of underrating either their loyalty or intellectual ability. We only shame the principles we profess if we permit such to excel us in the manly virtues of patient industry and the honest and brave avowal of their convictions, or if we seek to shelter our weakness behind unfriendly and unchristian epithets.

There are those who, by their manifest disloyalty to truth, and their evil *animus* against all that is holy and noble, and especially against Christianity, as such, deserve no Assailants who may be unnoticed. respectful attention, and therefore no attention at

all. Their vituperation may well be left to perish by neglect. To mention their names, even, is to give them the undeserved prominence which they covet. Let us not imagine that the similar vice of mere denunciation, when practiced by us, deserves, or will meet with, a dissimilar fate. The great mass of thinkers who are leading the advance movements of the mind of the race to-day are not of this description. They are learned men. They are lovers of truth. They General worthiness of scholars. mean to do honest work for humanity. Many of them are not Christians, some are even disbelievers in revela-

tion, and a few are bewildered about the deeper questions. Let us not permit honest infidels to put us to shame. Our only hope of counter-working their influence is in fair and honorable treatment, and in making it appear that we have the truth in the matters in dispute. Any want of appreciation, or any evasion or subterfuge, will infallibly react upon us, and upon the doctrines which we hold sacred, while manly candor will gain from opponents similar treatment, and from all others confidence and esteem. The quality of the respective combatants signifies something; but after all it is a question of truth, and the reasons are the determining factors. Mere superiority of character, or learning, or social influence, however deserving of consideration, will weigh nothing against the sufficient reason, on which side soever it may be.

Let us settle it once for all, that in determining what is true, any man's opinions or more stable beliefs, as such merely, are not to be accounted as of decisive evidential value, and the same is true of the opinions and beliefs of any number or any quality of men. If the holder of the opinion be a man of high repute for learning and sound judgment, that circumstance may give, and ought to give, a certain weight to his belief, on the subsumed ground that such a man must have good reasons for the holding of it; but after all, the reason of it must be that which determines its quality, and not the fact of his holding it. There is no *prima facie* evidence that it is true because he holds it. There is more probability that an opinion held by such a man is according to truth, than there would be if he were of an opposite character. The probability increases if men of such character in large numbers come to substantially the same conclusions; and that circumstance gives them a certain dignity, and should predispose us to accept them as correct. The ground of probability is the assumption that there must

be reasons for such unanimity of such minds, or for the opinions which they hold. The reasons, however, after all, will be the determinative factors. What the inquirer after truth, therefore, has the right to demand, is not who holds any opinion in dispute, but the reason why he holds it. If that be adequate, it matters nothing who holds it, or who doubts it, it must be accepted; and if it be inadequate, it must be rejected or held in abeyance, no matter who stands sponsor for it. High authorities give such respectability to opinions as to entitle them to candid and careful examination and favorable consideration—nothing more. The reasons in the case must finally determine.

We fully recognize the fact that the Christian system is still on trial, and in a certain sense will be so permanently, or until all mind, if that time shall ever come, becomes Christianity still on trial. rationally and unchangeably convinced of its truth.

It is perfectly obvious that the momentous debate is not closed, and that it never can be by a mere dictum of authority. Doubt still hangs heavy over the field in the judgment of many sincere inquirers, and may yet for a long time to come. The great mass of minds are not yet informed of the reasons; and until they are, the verdict in their case cannot be rendered. That the Christian cause will win we do not doubt, both because we unwaveringly believe that there are ample and convincing reasons, and because we have the sure word of promise; but its friends cannot safely rest, or assume the victory won. The greatest peril to truth is not in the strength of its adversaries, though that is not contemptible, or in the insufficiency of its supports, so much as in the weakness of its friends, or their failure to do the earnest work which the situation demands.

We must keep in mind that the environments of New environments. to-day are new. All systems stand now, as never before, face to face. New factors are in the field. Dissent is

popular. There is haste and rashness in the air. There is danger of confusion and panic and temporizing policies and experiments. Let the Christian camp hold steady and make no haste. We may be calm, but must be vigilant. The sifting process will winnow the chaff and separate the wheat, and the great cause will stand more firmly for the temporary strain.

In all the following discussions we write from the Christian stand-point—the stand-point of faith—but we do so with the recognition of the unchangeable right of the reason to question and even doubt; and we claim no more honesty or love of truth than we freely accord to others who furnish the same proof of loyalty that we do. We attach no importance to any position *simply* because we hold it, or because many others agree with us, or because it is called Christian, or because those who refuse it are called infidels, or atheists, or agnostics, or skeptics of any kind; but all importance to the question Is it true? and to the grounds of reason which determine the conclusion. Truth is truth, no matter who holds or doubts it; and that which is not true is worthless, no matter who stands sponsor for it. Belief is better than disbelief only when truth is with it. Doubt is better than faith when faith can be shown to be misleading, or mere credulity.

Christianity, by its assault on all other systems—by setting itself up as an exclusive system, by appealing to reason, and by awakening the spirit of inquiry and free discussion—has made itself amenable to the same tests which it imposes. It claims the right to dominate the faith of the world on the sole ground that it is true. It must both furnish evidence and answer objections. Having opened the way to progress, and created a new era of thought and discovery, it must not, to protect itself, call a halt or find fault with the bearings of

newly discovered truths on its own dogmas. If they cannot stand the light they must consent to perish with the common rubbish of other fables and superstitions which it has refuted and demolished.

Another has well said : "Our duty is to make our faith credible to living minds ; reasonable first to our own reason, and then to the reasons we seek to persuade. Must make our faith credible.

No man or Church has any right to ask men to believe what they cannot rationally conceive, or what contradicts ascertained and certain truths. If the truths of religion are eternal, they must be in harmony with the no less eternal truths of nature and mind, and this harmony it is the business of the religious teacher to prove. Faith could not have lived so long as it has done had its fundamental truths stood in manifest contradiction to reason. It has lived because it has been necessary to reason, its complement, not its contradiction. The former religious teachers of the past eras showed their respect for reason by doing their best to answer the doubts it started : that is, to make their faith seem agreeable to reason. Had they not done so, their faith had died. Authority cannot keep alive Impotence of authority. what the intellect dooms to death. To be authoritative, authority must be rational ; and an age of faith simply means an age when faith satisfies reason. And what has ever been necessary to religion is the prominent religious necessity of to-day. If religion is to live, it must live in harmony with living thought, and win over it a rational authority. Only as its teachers speak to the new spirit in language it cannot refuse to hear, shall they preserve for posterity the old faith, transmitting it not only unimpoverished, but improved and enriched." . . .

"The men who would teach man must respect him, speak to him as to a rational being who, whether he questions or accepts the faith, only exercises the inalienable rights of his

reason. Ours is in a high degree a reverent age, and much of its doubt has come, not from its dislike, but from love of truth. It is not always the men that love her best that find her most easily. Our foremost thinkers are men of most noble spirit, honest alike in intellect and conscience, anxious to find and follow the truth. If they doubt what is to many as sure as it is holy, they do it through loyalty to what is held to be true. It ought to be remembered that if faith has its rights, so has the intellect, and those who require man to believe ought to present their truths in forms that shall command his belief. A living religion can never so repose on the past as to be satisfied with its actual and achieved history; it must be ambitious to live a vigorous and progressive life. It is not enough that the Christian faith has done well; it ought to show that it is doing, and can do, still better. The old and feeble live by retrospect, the strong and active live by deed and endeavor. A living may be thought better than a reasoning Christianity, but in these days the life is impossible without the reason. We have no right to ask men to spare our faith for its past services; but the best right to require their belief of it, if it can be proved to be the highest truth for the intellect, the surest light for the conscience, the purest life and love for the heart." *

It is assumed in all discussion that there is a realm of truth, which means simply that there is a realm of reality, and that it is possible to men, by the right use of their faculties, to find out, at least to some degree, what that reality is and what it is not—what may be predicated of it and what may not. To determine that has been the effort of the ages, and is the struggle of to-day; and, if we may prophesy, will continue to be the endeavor for all time—may we not say to all eternity? Every inquiry that will aid to the discovery is

* Fairbairn, "The City of God," pp. 5, 6.

legitimate, and every inquirer who is successful at any point in bringing into light any part of the field is helpful to all the rest. Truth is a unit, and in its wholeness is a perfect and beautiful and beneficent harmony. No one increment is inimical to any other one part, or irreconcilable with the whole.

All inquiry legitimate.

Truth a unit.

The pursuit of truth, in the effort to acquire knowledge of all reality to the extent to which such knowledge is attainable, has been regarded by the wise and good of all ages as the noblest employment of the faculties of man. Thus it is that he, at the same time, attains his own highest personal perfection of power and character, and most completely subjugates all environments in nature, and all possibilities of every kind, to his present use and permanent advancement; thus, also, he most honors and best qualifies himself to serve the great Being whose image he alone, of all terrestrial creatures, is permitted to bear. To this end his faculties were bestowed. By this means only can the true ends of his existence be realized. To him permanent error is deformity, and avoidable ignorance is sin.

The pursuit of truth.

The capacity to acquire knowledge, and the importance of its attainment to personal worthiness and enlarged usefulness and happiness, make its pursuit not only the noblest occupation, but the highest privilege and most absolute and immutable duty. Among all the other duties arising from our complex and multiform relations, whether to our Creator or our fellows, there is not one of which this is not a complement. It heightens and gives dignity, significance, and completeness to all the rest. Knowledge imparts worthiness to love, dignity to integrity, grace to honor, beauty to meekness, comeliness to faith, and sheen and glory to all the virtues; it honors worship, adorns faith, and enriches the everyday conduct of life with the beauty of wisdom and consistency;

The duty of acquiring.

it gives weight and force to the influence of example and character.

He who enlarges the sphere of knowledge by a better apprehension of truth and a clearer statement of it, or corrects error, or removes doubt or uncertainty by making more plain what was obscure, or in any way, on any subject, and especially the important problems of life, contributes to the cure of ignorance and establishment of truth, helps forward the race, and is a true benefactor of mankind. The good he does adds to the real wealth of the world and is immortal. Progress toward the ideal is simply progress in the knowledge and practical application of the truth.

Truth is the great evangel—the struggle of the ages has been to acquire it. Our Lord assumed to himself no higher title than that he was the Truth. It is the mighty lever by which the world is to be lifted into its millennium of peace and blessedness. No difference what goes if truth comes. Blessed are they who unveil the mysteries of nature and put the race in possession of her hidden wonders, every opened secret of which is a revelation of the Infinite Author and a ministry of beneficence to her children! Blessed are they who guide to the discovery of those ineffable laws which underlie and pervade the universal system, putting us in possession of the philosophy of all material and mental movement! Thrice blessed those who unfold the deeper moral significance of our human life, and aid to clearer apprehension of the divine thought and purpose concerning our own spiritual duty and destiny; who purge religion of superstition, and the holy doctrines of revelation of the imperfect meanings which incompetence and human rashness have woven about them, and lift into clearer light those majestic truths which alone can ultimately bring us to our highest destiny. Blessed are all

the workers in all fields who hasten the millennium of the hallowed reign of Him who is the Truth !

It is the exclusive aim of these studies to aid in setting the right direction to the pursuit of knowledge, or, broader still, where knowledge is unattainable, to point out the grounds of rational belief, and the right method to its attainment.

The one thing sought is truth. It matters nothing what it is, or what surrenders it requires, the truth is ^{Truth the one thing.} better than any error can be, and is that which we have a right to demand and have, and, therefore, the displacement of any error by the truth is a real gain to human welfare, and should be welcome to all. The known ^{Willful support of error a sin.} and willful support or perpetuation of an error is a crime against humanity ; and unwillingness to know the truth, or a disposition to obstruct the fullest and freest discussion in order to it, under any pretense whatever, is treason to right.

The knowledge of truth is not desirable or obligatory merely, or even chiefly, as knowledge. Knowledge is an ^{Knowledge desirable as a means.} end, and a worthy end in itself, but in itself it is not a consummate end, but a means to a higher end. Knowledge itself imparts dignity and self-respect to the mind ; there is thus in it, simply as a possession, a certain element of worth and worthiness ; but its chief value is in the fact that we are enabled by it to build our character and life according to the truth, and enter into the eternal life and fellowship of the truth, and of Him who is the sole source and fountain of truth.

Error is never to be defended or tolerated as such ; and truth must be followed wherever it leads, at the ^{Error never to be defended.} sacrifice of all things ; but to determine what is truth and what error, the mind must be absolutely free and unembarrassed in the investigation. Error itself is less an evil than enslavement or intolerance.

Every truth is a mine of wealth, either as contributing to

the conditions of material welfare, which to all other creatures is the only form of good, but to man the lowest form; or to his intellectual or moral welfare, which is greater and greatest in kind and duration. A great master has well said: "Possession of truth, by which is meant simple accuracy of knowledge and of inference, is necessarily conducive to the happiness of the human race. This is an assertion scarcely requiring, in the present day, to be either emphasized or illustrated. That mankind are deeply concerned, not only in clearly understanding the properties of the material world and of their own physical constitution, but also in having an accurate acquaintance with the operations of the human mind, the consequences of human actions, the results of social regulations, the effects of political institutions, the relations in which they themselves stand to other beings, and their real position in the universe, is a proposition so undeniable when clearly expressed, as barely to escape the character of a truism.

"What is the interest of one is the interest of all. No class can be benefited at the expense of humanity, or by the ignorance of another class, without ultimate injury to itself. The truth which lifts one would, in like manner, lift all; and, lifting all, lift each higher; and the error which is injurious to one, has in it the essence of injury to every other one. The universal diffusion of truth and the universal correction of error is the least result to be aimed at by men. It was once supposed that a dogma might be advantageous and even necessary to society, to morality, and to political institutions, although it were false; and that it ought in this case to be strenuously supported and shielded from scrutiny, even by those who were aware of its character. With such a notion there could not co-exist any conscious obligation, or any inducement but sheer curiosity to enter upon the search

after truth and faithfully pursue it. On the contrary, it unavoidably led to the employment of fallacious arguments, hollow pretexts, disingenuous connivances, and violent oppression, in order to maintain the authority of established doctrines. It could not fail to be fruitful in falsehood, hypocrisy, and despotic intolerance. 'It seems,' says Dr. Whately, 'to have been a settled conviction of most of those who had the sincerest desire of attaining truth them-

Bishop Whately, "Essay on the Writings of St. Paul."

selves, that to the mass of mankind truth was in many points inexpedient and unfit to be communicated; that however desirable it might be for the leading personages in the world to be instructed in the true nature of things, there were many popular delusions which were essential to the well-being of society.' The same policy of a double doctrine

was inculcated by Macchiavelli, and was, indeed, long acted upon in Europe prior to the Reformation. It has been well characterized by Mr. Stewart as the policy of enlightening the few and hoodwinking the many.

Macchiavelli.

Dugald Stewart.

If similar views are yet occasionally entertained among the ignorant and half-informed, they are seldom avowed. Even the hardly less revolting, but certainly less consistent principle of more recent times, maintained by many of the early teachers of the Christian Church, that a true doctrine may be rightly supported by false representations and by what are called pious frauds, is discarded professedly, if not always really, by every party, every sect, and every individual, with the slightest pretension to a name in philosophy or literature, or even to a respectable standing in society. 'Nothing,' it has been well remarked, 'can be more irrational in the pretended children of light, than to enlist themselves under the banner of truth, and yet rest their hopes on an alliance with delusion.'

Coleridge.

"There is happily a growing disposition in the world, among

the intelligent part of it at least, to prize truth of doctrine and veracity of statement ; to look with disdain on all artifice, disingenuity, and disguise, both in speculation and practice ; to regard the business of life no longer as an affair which demands unremitted intrigue and perpetual deceit ; to consider the great interests of humanity as not requiring to be supported by ignorance, hypocrisy, and superstition ; to believe that the suppression and concealment of facts and arguments can be of service except to a few at the expense of the many ; and that it is for the benefit of mankind, as well as essential to their progress in all which is virtuous and high-minded, that every important question should be fully and boldly examined. The state of feeling on the part of men of cultivated mind seems highly favorable to an impartial discussion of the conduct which we ought to observe, or, in other words, the moral sentiment we ought to cherish in relation to the pursuit of truth.” *

Valuable as truth is, it is not of easy discovery. Like costly gems, it often lies concealed in unfrequented places, and is attained only after expensive and laborious search. Perhaps the greatest difficulties of all are subjective ; and *moral*, even more than intellectual. Together with a native and genuine thirst after truth, and with a high sense of its value, and with a corresponding disgust of ignorance, there may be found, strange though the paradox be, co-existing extreme opposition to the acceptance of particular truths—an utter repugnance to them, because they differ from our present opinion, and require us to surrender plans and methods of life. It will require little short of a miracle to win for them fair play or just treatment. The mind hardens against them, and imposes unjust tests ; making it almost impossible for them to gain the courtesy of respectful attention. Prejudice, vicious

* Bailey, “ Essay on the Pursuit of Truth.”

habits of thought, pride of opinion, ignorance, suspicion, bigotry, blind following of party leaders, and such things, either benumb the faculties or sharpen them Subjective difficulties.

in ingenious methods of defending and extending what would, with a very little unprejudiced examination, be seen to be errors. They are as fatal to truth as gangrene is to life. An eye so inflamed as not to be able to endure the light is not more unfitted for clear vision than is such a mind for the perception of truth. Where there are no such subjective difficulties there are often manifold obscurities in the truth itself, Difficulties in the obstruction of truth itself. which no perfection of the instrument can overcome.

And this is equally true of objects in the physical and metaphysical realms. The most important truths often lie concealed under impenetrable mists and superincumbent rubbish of error. No amount of genius can lift the veil of mystery. And when this is not so, the warp and woof are so intricate and tangled as to make it a matter of great difficulty to so lay the strands that they may be conveniently traced and easily used. To analyze material nature to its constituents—to know the possibilities, conditions, and laws of their multiform Material nature.

unions—to find their potencies and uses—to be able to trace their history from the primal movement through all their vicissitudes and combinations—to so exhaustively master the material problems as to account for the whole of cosmic phenomena, what an endless undertaking! Yet this is but the smallest part of the problem. To press beyond the physical into the *arcana* of the metaphysical, the realm of essential life, of thought, of power, of cause—the infinite and eternal—the ideas The metaphysical realm. of being and becoming, of freedom, of responsibility—to find the truth in these deeper and more hidden *fundamenta* of reality, so as to be able to say, *this is truth*—to have power to eliminate the fables and dreams, or even to determine where the known ends and the unknown begins,—these,

and many more such tasks, make the difficulty of the problem of knowledge.

To add to the perplexity, the illusions of sense are scarcely less than those of the fancy, while the reason is often tricky and unreliable, the will feeble, and conscience obscure. Withal, we begin at zero of faculty, of experience, of ideas, and the minimum, in its weaknesses and limitations, of even a sensory system. For a considerable period of life we grope with the imbecility of infancy, amid things which amuse but do not instruct us; during which period even the consciousness is obscure, and the whole realm of mentality is shrouded in a kind of nimbus, or penumbra of half-shadow and half-light, and for the earlier period of which the most important hemisphere of reality is shut away entirely from our apprehension. When finally we come into the use of our powers more perfectly, they are so taxed with demands from the material side of our nature, which has become already imperious, that they move tardily and unskillfully in the pursuit of the more noble but more obscure realities which belong to the metaphysical side of our being--the spiritual, ethical, and mental problems.

Many truths it is impossible ever to know completely; life is too short and finite powers too small to enable us to master the infinite problem. Many have such obscure bearings on ends of practical value, and are so seemingly unimportant--many are so aside from our individual pursuits, so condemnatory of our practices, so hostile to such a life as we propose to live, so reproving and restraining--that we either weary of the hopeless task and utterly abandon the pursuit, or conduct it so feebly, so reluctantly, so undecidedly, that only failure can result. To complete the picture of discouragement, so much doubt is thrown over the whole results of investigation, that uncertainty ends in despair. What one builds

up another tears down; the theory of to-day vanishes away to make place for the theory of to-morrow. Is it any wonder if we should be ready to say, Wherefore seek to catch the protean, ever-vanishing phantom—the *ignis-fatuus*, “which leads only to bewilder, and dazzles only to blind.”

But, despite all difficulties and discouragements, truth is real. There is a realm of reality, and we can know Despite difficulties truth is real. of it; and, in part, with ever-increasing measure and certainty we can know it. It is for us; it is our heritage and life; we must have it if we would attain to the dignity of instructed and developed manhood. To stop short in ignorance and curable error is at once unworthy and criminal; and to cherish delusions after we are forced to suspect them is disloyalty to the dearest interests of humanity, and at once debasing to both the mental powers and the moral nature.

THE SPIRIT OF INQUIRY.

What is the use of our faculties by which we may attain a concept that will correspond with reality—by which Right use of the faculties. we may certainly know or rationally assume that we have the truth in any case—and by which we may, with the greatest facility, widen and extend our possessions of truth in most essential directions? *

There is a difference in the value of truths; there is a difference in the means and methods of pursuit; but, in all cases there are certain subjective conditions indispensable to success—conditions of the mind itself as to its aims and the manner of using its faculties, and conditions of its relations to the ob-

* By “correspond with reality,” we do not mean likeness of the concept and the reality, in a strict sense, but rather, the concept which the reality produces in the mind whenever the two are brought into perfect relations to each other, and so the concept which shows what the reality must be to thought. All that we can know of it is, how it appears in our thought, and that it is real outside of our thought.

jects concerning which it conducts its inquiries, in the absence of which the most favoring circumstances will be of no avail.

What are these conditions? *The mind must have an intense desire for truth.* This first. Doubtless many objects will come within the range of observation, without either desire or intention on our part, in such manner as to force themselves on our cognition. They will compel us to know them. The enforced concept will represent the reality despite us. This is so, substantially, of all our involuntary perceptions and intuitions of the common and surface objectives of thought; but it is never so of the internal constitution and philosophy even of common things, much less of underlying principles, causes, and ends of being. These must be studied and tested in the light of observed facts. They do not force themselves into the mind, nor do they come even by invitation, but are drawn in by a kind of violence. They will be sure to elude us if they be not earnestly sought. To know them in any degree, the desire of them must be masterful among the loves. The truth, *as truth*, must be the supreme object of desire. This implies more than a mental judgment that the truth is good, and to be accepted. It must be coveted. There must be a willingness to sell all to buy it. We shall find that our affections are pre-engaged by and debauched with error. A mob of idols desecrates the temple of our thought—fancies, untested ideas, traditional opinions and beliefs—a fell brood—the idols of Bacon: “*Idola tribus*,” “*idola fori*,” “*idola theatri*,” “*idola specus*.” They hold possession of the mind. They are standards by which, if not guarded, it tries all things. They open and close the doors of admission and rejection. Nothing but supreme love of truth will be able to break their usurped power; it alone will demand that even these favorites of the affections be questioned—suspected. So much

gained they will, proving to be unworthy, soon be ejected. A question becomes to error what *aqua regia*, “ni-
tro-muriatic acid,” is to gold—a solvent and a test. To be ques-
tioned.

Once give truth, as truth, the supreme place in the affections—absolute regency—and it must be, in most cases, only a question of time as to its mastery of the thought.

Its effect will be to awaken doubt, or, if not doubt, careful inquiry, the true starting-point of all knowledge. Doubt useful.

When the quality of truth is made, by the mind, the test of all conclusions—when it will resolutely think of nothing but that, accept nothing but that—it must acquire the habits of suspicion and vigilance which characterize a dealer in precious gems. It will demand that each specimen be scrutinized without favor. Only after that is done will it be set as a real gem. If it fail to bear the test it will be cast away without regret. Are cherished ideas, beliefs, prejudices to be abandoned, and others, despised, odious, hateful, to be accepted in their place: the former, endeared by the most precious memories, associated with the holiest affections, invested with all that is sacred in religion, interpenetrating our very hopes, wrought almost into the very texture of the soul itself—the latter objects only of disfavor or disgust? Nothing but supreme love of truth, and confidence in its excellence, can supply the motive to such a sacrifice. Hold on the af-
fections.

But greater even than these strains on the affections will be the strain on selfishness, and some more amiable qualities, in the direction of supposed worthy personal interests. We come to the study not alone pledged in our affections, but committed in many other ways. To pride of opinion and disposition to maintain it, right or wrong, we add a kind of feeling of fealty to ideas themselves, and loyalty to the party we have espoused. To change is to lose caste, lose place, lose self-respect, to part hands with friends, and enter upon new and untried associa-

tions. So beleaguered, independent, honest inquiry will be impossible, except as truth rises to such supremacy in our thought as to make all sacrifice easy. Supreme love of truth will render us willing to have our most cherished beliefs critically examined, and disputed with all possible strength. No truth can stand in full strength until it has had the friendly service of challenge. We especially thank all men who sincerely and honestly call in question accepted doctrines, making it necessary for their real reasons to be found and published. Accuracy will be reached only by the interaction of attack and defense.

Love of truth. Love of truth, as truth, then, is the great subjective condition of its attainment. To this must be added faculty, opportunity, right method, diligence. Faculty is an endowment, but will admit of improvement; opportunity, under high inspirations, the mind will create; right method must be learned by practice; diligence is subject to the will.

Truth infinite. After all, we must keep in mind that truth is infinite, while our faculties are finite. We cannot know all. Uncertainty must still hang around the dim and distant horizon of thought in many directions. Of the limited range of objects which we endeavor to conceive, it is important that we should conceive clearly, not confusedly or uncertainly. There is endless mischief in the habit of dwelling among half-thoughts, a medley of obscure images of what are supposed to be truths. Whatever is accepted as true should lie in the mind as clear cut and sharply defined as a perfect new coin—a confused or blurred concept is not true to reality.

Superficial habit of mind. Too much cannot be said or felt in condemnation of a superficial habit of mind. To accept a thing as true without examination, or without attaching importance to the matter whether it be true or not, is a grave fault; in fact, treason to the spirit of truth; hatching a brood

of errors, leaving an habitual uncertainty of mind as to the truth or falsehood of its ideas, begetting an unstable and fluctuating state, and sapping the integrity of the mental processes. Many things may be passed by as indifferent or unquestionable; but nothing of significance which is disputed ought to be admitted into the thought as true or false without examination. In matters that have any importance the duty is, that the examination should be thorough and perfectly honest. If a false idea of reality is error, Examination thorough. and in important cases may be fatal, so also is a false idea of what is unreal. To conceive of the unreal as real is, in effect, the same as to conceive of the real as unreal. And the habit of passing concepts along without examination leaves all in absolute uncertainty.

If a superficial habit of mind is evil, much more is an insincere habit. To antagonize, for any purpose, what we know or believe to be true, or to defend what we know or believe to be false—to pretend to know what we do Insincere habit to be avoided. not know, or believe what we do not believe—to persist in an avowal of knowledge or belief against evidence, or to refuse to weigh and consider evidence—to avoid proof, or with intention exaggerate or overstate it—to resort to sophistical reasonings by assuming false premises or drawing false conclusions, simply to achieve victory over a weak adversary, or to foist upon any mind an error,—all such insincerities impair the integrity of the mind, and undermine faith in its conclusions.

If a man affirms that *to be* which *is*, he affirms the truth. In such a case, if he knows that of which he affirms, he *has* the truth *in knowledge*. If he affirms on rational grounds, and the fact is as he affirms, he *has* the truth Has the truth. *in rational belief*. If he affirms what he really believes, and the truth is as affirmed, but without a knowledge of the rational grounds of belief, he *has* the truth in *unreasoned belief*. If he

affirms what he conjectures merely, but the affirmation is according to the truth, he nevertheless *has* the truth. In either case the truth is in his thought. If he govern himself according to the knowledge, the rational belief, the irrational belief, or the mere conjecture, in either case he governs himself according to the truth, and in the result has the practical benefits, in whole or in part, of the possession of the truth. But if he only believes when he might and ought to know that which

Mere belief,
when knowl-
edge is attain-
able, to be
avoided.

he affirms, he is guilty of a misuse of his faculties. If he believe, however implicitly, irrationally, what he ought to believe with reason, he is guilty in the same manner; and if he content himself with conjecture when knowledge or rational belief is within his reach, he outrages the law of rational being. Any mind capable of reflection experiences a sense of unworthiness and degradation in a purely voluntary or traditional or hereditary faith, and must always be subject to a feeling of uncertainty and a tendency to doubt, and hence be subject to instability and change, which weaken and finally destroy all mental and moral integrity.

A man stands at a point where his road divides. On one branch is located the point to which he wishes to go, but on which he does not know. He has no means of adequate information in his reach. So far as he can determine, take which road he may, he may be in error. He cannot attain to rational

Duty when
knowledge is
impossible.

belief. Knowledge is out of the question. If he remain he must perish. He reasons thus, "There is an equal chance that taking to the right I may be saved." Proceeding on the mere conjecture, he reaches the point of destination which he desired. Practically his conjecture answered the same end as knowledge. But suppose now that at the point where he made the election there was in his reach some information—not perfectly definite, but sufficient to make a probable clew—who would say that he acted rationally in proceed-

ing upon mere conjecture? Or if by possibility he might actually have known which of the two was the right road, who will say that he acted rationally in electing either on uncertainty?

While loyalty to truth requires that it should be diligently sought, and that the mind should embrace and hold firmly those ideas which to it seem to have the support of adequate proof, we must constantly keep in recollection, that in matters of belief all the evidence may not be in at any given time. New integers may be introduced that will All evidence possibly not present.

change the conclusion. What is really known is final; no circumstances can ever change it from reality to non-reality, or from knowledge into non-knowledge; but what is most intensely believed may possibly, with added facts or change of environments, be found erroneous, and pass into either doubt or disbelief. The discovery of truth is progressive, and the proof of to-day sets in a new light the proof of yesterday, and demands a modification of the conclusion. This does not mean that no belief is true, or that every belief may, under change of circumstance, be found false; but rather, that by possibility any given belief may be modified. If the belief have truth, as it may have, counter proof will not take the truth out of it, or be able to shake it. But if it be inadequate—not exactly according to the truth—new circumstances may discover that fact. The true position of mind with regard to all beliefs is, that having accepted them upon what seems to be adequate reasons, they are to be held firmly, and not to be driven Right position of the mind with regard to beliefs. by every wind of doctrine; but, at the same time,

candid attention must be given to any alleged new light or fact or principle; and when, if ever, it becomes clear that the new light furnished requires a change, that the mind be ready to act accordingly. This is but dealing fairly with our faculties and with the claims of truth. That which will give the greatest

stability to our beliefs, is to insist that they be always the result of, or in accordance with, the highest reason.

There are peculiar besetments and embarrassments to a Christian teacher or even student merely. The sacredness with which he invests the subjects of his thought tends to restrain the freedom of investigation which should always be maintained. He hardly knows how far it is safe and wise to push his inquiries or assert his personal convictions on points already supposed to be established. He is in danger in two opposite directions, and the sense of danger has a tendency to bewilder him, repress his personal liberty, and induce him to accept conclusions rather than to investigate them. The conscientious dread of unsettling his own faith and the faith of others becomes a kind of nightmare to his faculties. To maintain liberty, and use it as not abusing it—how far to push investigation and what value to attach to personal convictions—are delicate problems which every conscientious student and teacher must encounter. The only safe rule is absolute loyalty to truth, and sacred reverence for personal conviction. It is fortunate for truth, perhaps, that there are disenthralled minds. Error, often shielded by reverence, would never let go its hold but for the untempered blow of the cold and unsympathizing critic. We must often thank our enemies for the good service of breaking our shackles. It may be even doubtful whether Christianity owes most to its friends or to its enemies for the clearer light in which it stands to-day.

If the result of earnest investigation and honest loyalty to truth induces a change of convictions, there is no way but to accept it at whatever sacrifice. No debauchment is more to be deprecated than that of professing and teaching that which is no longer believed.

It is indispensable that the theologian should deal fairly with

modern thought in its bearings on faith. It has an audience, and must be treated with respect. It is not a mere passing phase of transient speculation. It deals ^{Must deal fairly with modern thought.} with the weightiest problems in a manly, intelligent, and earnest spirit. It has truth and knows it.

“How ought the representatives of faith to behave in its presence? How can they best be faithful to the trust they have received from the past and hold for ^{Proper method.} the future? How vindicate their principles and positions against so formidable an antagonist? These questions concern not merely the continuance of the Christian Church, but the very being of the Christian faith.

“One thing is evident, thought must be met by thought; reason alone can encounter and conquer reason. ^{Thought met by thought.} The days when authority was stronger than argument have passed, and knowledge can never be as merciless to it as it was once to knowledge. Faith is confronted by tendencies that have the spirit, the methods, and the consciousness of science, and it must be as they are if it is to prevail. When an antagonist is neither simply sentimental nor esthetic nor moral, but in the highest degree rational, he must be met by reason if he is to be met at all. And the reason that meets him must be the spokesman of a system as comprehensive as his own; must espouse principles higher, more evident, and rational than their antithesis. The thinker, when he needs to be answered, must be answered by thought, not by being prayed at or preached at; not by a command to believe, or an exhortation to repentance, or an admonition that broadly hints that a place too hot to be comfortable is prepared for him; but (to use Cudworth’s fine phrase) by an ‘intellectual system of the universe,’—a system that shall show not only that the religious idea can be expanded into an intellectual theory of things, but that it is the theory that can give the best reason for the existence alike

of itself and the universe. In short, if religion is to conquer modern thought, it must not fear to face and attempt its problems; must, without shrinking, challenge a comparison of their respective solutions, and do so in the spirit that appeals to reason, prepared to abide its decisions. In essaying this task faith is doing no new thing. It has done it before, and can do it again, certain that its continuing to do so is a necessary condition of its continued life. Yet the new work is not a repetition of the old. Human thought is ever progressing, is ever changing—‘widens with the process of the suns.’ Our religious

Religious be-
liefs to take ac-
count of new
light.

beliefs can never be dissociated from our concep-
tions of the universe; and as the latter grow larger
and truer, the former must be transfigured, that they
may live and shine in the new light. Hence it is not by affirm-
ing the faith in the forms fixed by the past that living thought
is to be penetrated and possessed by religion, but by carrying
the religious idea into regions that thought explores, proving
its right to live there—its claim to be the only rational inter-
preter of the universe. To do so, it must work along the lines
and possess the characteristics of modern thought; in a degree,
too, that will compel the confession that, while ancient as faith,
it is as thought as modern as living mind.

“Our religious thinkers, then, if they would be equal to the needs of the day, must not fear to formulate anew the truths of faith, to deepen and broaden the basis of religion, and to build from the sheer rock upward. Conservative religious thought is, as to its own claims, too simply assertive, and in its attitude to the men and systems it opposes too purely critical; progressive religious thought, on the contrary, is too fluid, too much penetrated by sentiment, too little possessed by reason, more receptive than creative in its spirit. Neither is quite satisfactory either in character or conduct. To defend our own positions by criticism of our assailants is certainly neither a brave nor a sure

method of achieving a victory. Criticism may be a greater service than disservice to an enemy; may help him to improve his position, while it does nothing to mend our own. His weak places ought to be confronted by our strong, and the thought spent in discovering where he can be assailed might be still better spent in making ourselves proof against his assaults. And an attitude too receptive is as bad as an attitude too critical. The religious man ought to be a creative thinker, not allowing his idea to be modified from without, but causing it to develop from within—using it to interpret nature and man, not merely permitting it to be interpreted by *aliases* in heart and speech. . . . The thought that is to live, must be thought in earnest about the roots and reality of things, resolved to get face to face with them, to see them clearly, and to speak plainly and strongly what it has seen.” *

Prejudices against religion in general arise, to some extent, from the character of religious teachers. Taking the world at large, it must be admitted that it is not of a high type. The Mohammedan fakir, the Rom-
ion.
 ish priest, the average teacher of religion the world through, would not be selected as a typical man or safe guide in the questions which perplex great and honest minds. This fact, and the other kindred fact, that the most absurd superstitions and revolting dogmas have been persistently put forward in the name of religion, only to be displaced by ages of struggle and resistance, even to blood, constitutes one of the most formidable difficulties which enlightened Christian teachers have to overcome. The offense has been so great that we may well be patient under the opposition which has grown in our path. To offset it we have an array of glorious names who have redeemed the cause from utter defeat and disgrace, and by such the future of Christianity is to be assured.

* Fairbairn, pp. 24–26.

Protestant Christianity has no reason to blush for its defenders. There are and will be many narrow and unlearned teachers, who, while good and true, are not the most competent expounders. Such are and will be pertinacious of traditions and of the "mint, anise, and cummin" of established customs and meaningless phrases; but candor requires the confession that even such maintain, as a rule, a high character for purity and moral integrity; but the faith is maintained by a race of conscientious scholars of large and liberal culture, the peers of the most scholarly men of this or any age. Of their purity and devotion to truth they give abundant and constant proof in the holiness of their lives, in their tireless labors, and in their freedom from mere passion and prejudice. They are the custodians and ministers of a divine treasure of the most weighty and momentous truths—truths which lift and ennoble humanity, which inspire hope and courage, which regenerate and save, which build the most noble civilizations, the divinest types of manhood and womanhood, without which the race could have no guarantee of preservation from absolute ruin. Of this history furnishes the complete demonstration, and the present condition of the world is its monumental proof.

In the name of all that is prized and worth preserving to our children and to generations unborn, between those inquirers mutually seeking to enthrone truth, there should be loyal love and generous co-operation. None have what the others do not need; none can reach the highest goal if the others be repressed.

The theologian, as distinguished from the mere traditional dogmatist, is a man of science, and the sciences form a sisterhood that may know emulation, but ought never to know either jealousy or dislike. The distinguished president of the British Association says: 'To

science we owe our idea of progress.' He is mistaken, unless theology is the science he means. The idea of progress in nature, in man, and in history, has been the direct creation of theology. That fact in the history of thought is open to no manner of doubt. Theology, too, was the first to formulate a theory of development; to attempt to interpret nature and man as a growth, though a growth that expressed the unfolding of a purpose, the action of a living will. She was the mother of all our modern sciences; made the minds that created alike the methods and the passion for the interpretation of nature. What created these created all they have achieved. Analyze as we may the mental dynamic forces in science, and we find them to be creations of religion, generated, as it were, out of her very bosom. Zeal for truth is the child of zeal for God; the modern enthusiasm for knowledge was begotten by the spirit of worship, the spirit that labored to read and know the mind of the Maker through the things he had made. The man who studies with deepest reverence studies with most success. Reverence can be only where love of truth is. . . .

The idea of progress the creation of theology.

Theology first formulated a theory of development.

"But theology has not only contributed to science the idea of progress, and the mental habits and the energies that have worked it; she has, also, proved the reality and vigor of her life by the progress she has made. Within the past fifty years she has enlarged her own province and methods. Theology has her comparative sciences; to her ancient domain there has now been added that field of wonders termed the science of religion. No religion is indifferent to her; she seeks to know all—the place each holds in history, its meaning, the work it has done, the way and degree in which it has contributed to the progress, the civilization, and the happiness of man. Then she has become more historical; knows better how to handle her

sacred books, how to get at the essence and truths of religion, how to interpret, on the one hand, the religious contents of the spirit of man, and on the other religion to man's spirit. Then, too, theology has enlarged all her conceptions; her idea of God is nobler, her idea of man is worthier; her outlook is broader; her spirit is sweeter and safer; her notion of the creative method, the divine order and way of government, of the relations of God, man, and the universe has grown at once richer and more comprehensive. . . . We speak of the science, not of the multitudes who follow it. All multitudes are of the mixed order. Even the army that marches under the banner of the associated sciences is not all vanguard. Behind it is the vast main body—always critical, often jealous, and even distrustful of the brilliant leaders—while in the rear loiter a host of stragglers whose voices now and then reach us as over the space of many years. Progress is never equal, least of all in knowledge; but we measure it from the foot-prints of the foremost, not from the trail of the last laggard wayfarer.

“ But while we thus maintain that theology is a science that has well and variously served her sister sciences, we no less cordially confess that these have splendidly enlarged and enriched her province. The sciences that are perfecting our ideas of the universe have exalted our idea of God. He has been enrobed in other and grander attributes since they extended the horizon of human thought into a boundless and peopled immensity—into a busy and immeasurable past. Our notion of the creative process has become truer and sublimer since geology carried us back into its vast successive periods, and showed us the slow and progressive method of the Creator, who fashions worlds as it were by nature without the aid of a miracle, and advances by imperceptible gradations from the meanest beginnings toward the noblest ends. Our conception of the creative action has become clearer

Science helpful
to theology.

and more real since we believed in the conservation of energy, the correlation and conversion of the physical forces, and so were enabled to conceive the causal energy in nature as a unity, indestructible, incapable of increase or decrease, every-where active, ever changing its form, yet never beginning and never ceasing to be. Then, too, the ideas of order and law in nature have made us more conscious of the unities that govern the divine action, that bind into harmony the will and method and end of God. A creation without order means that there is no ordering creator. But since science has revealed law every-where, molding the tear or the dew-drop as it molds the star; active in the great forces that guide the rivers, roll the seas, and shape the mountains, as well as in the apparently tinier forces that gather or disperse the fleecy clouds and regulate the growth or decay of the smallest flower, man has got the idea of an ordered nature, animated with a great thought and guided by a great purpose. And the unity of nature suggests the higher unity of its Author. The universal reign of law lifts us to the conception of the law-giving and law-abiding God.

“But while we acknowledge that science has been helpful to our religious ideas—specifically to our conception of God—we must distinctly mark its limits. It has, indeed, done much to ennoble the mind, gladden the life, and meliorate the sufferings of men. Science has almost infinitely enlarged Science helpful in certain directions. our command over the resources of nature and the pernicious and salutary agencies that sleep within and around us. But see how much lies beyond its province. Man has nobler instincts and impulses that impel him to seek the true, to admire the lovely, to worship the good, to feel after and find the Infinite Perfection, in which the true and right and beautiful blend into a divine and personal unity. Man has deep moral convictions of rights that are his due, of duties that he owes, of an eternal law he is bound to discover and obey. Man

has sad and remorseful experiences, the sense of unfulfilled duties, of wasted hours, of sorrows that have turned the anticipated joys of his life into utter miseries, of mean and unmanly sins against conscience and heart, against man and God, of losses unredeemed by gain, of the lonely anguish that comes in the hour of bereavement and throws across the life a shadow that no sunshine can pierce. And out of these mingling instincts and impulses, convictions and experiences, rise man's manifold needs; those cravings after rest, those gropings after a string to hold and trust, those cries for pardon, those unutterable groanings after light shed from a divine face upon his gloom, in which lie at once the greatness and the misery of man. Moments come to the spirit of man when these needs are paramount, and it feels as if nature and her laws were engines to crush the human heart by which we live. And in these supreme moments whither does man turn? To science? Does not her talk, then, of nature and law and force and invariable sequence, seem like the sardonic prattle of a tempter persuading to belief in a religion of absolute despair? These are the hours, known to many a spirit, when the soul breaks through the thin veil of words woven by the spell of man, and seeks to stand face to face with the eternal Father." *

It may, and perhaps ought to, be admitted that students in other departments of research are less liable to be trammelled by traditions; that they have greater freedom and a more tolerant constituency; that they are not so bound by pledges to a guild or sect; but it must be admitted, also, that there are offsets to these favoring circumstances. Without impeaching their loyalty to truth, it cannot be doubted that this greater liberty opens them to the undue influence of novelty, hasty generalizations, and glittering theories. History is replete with illustrations. If more free, it cannot be pretended that they

* Fairbairn, "The City of God," pp. 38-42.

are more conscientious or under motives of equal sacredness. Within their own proper lines they are worthy of all honor; beyond these they have not been found to be safe guides.

It is for the theologian to make all possible use of the results of research, giving honor where honor is due, and cordial encouragement to every effort to widen the field of knowledge in every direction, assured that all advance in truth will be helpful to the great truth committed to him. Given loyalty, let there be no stint of liberty. All honest research leads in the same direction, and at the last will infallibly come to the same goal. There are shoals and counter-currents, but the river will find the sea.

SECTION II.—TRUTH.

What is that impalpable something which we call truth? What is knowledge? What are the limits of the knowable? What are the grounds of knowledge? May the mind rationally affirm of the unknown? May it affirm of the unknowable? What is the difference between knowing and comprehending? What is mystery? What is Truth, what, etc.? the function of reason with regard to the mysterious? What is belief? Wherein does belief differ from knowledge or knowing? May truth be an inclusion of belief? May belief ever dominate the mind with the same authority as knowledge? What are the grounds of belief? What is determinative of the value of beliefs? Have we control over our beliefs? Is there ethical responsibility for beliefs? What is the proper attitude of the mind with respect to its beliefs? What are the distinctions between faith and belief? These are some of the questions which we propose to discuss in these *prolegomena*, as supplying a fit and needed introduction to the discussion of matters pertaining to Christian faith hereafter to be considered.

To those who are familiar with the history and literature of

the many-faced controversies which have been carried on for ages about the subjects to be treated, nothing need be said of the pertinence and importance of these points. The infinite

Logomachy. confusion and irrelevant and angry logomachy which to such an extent have characterized theological and speculative discussions and debates, take their rise here. If we could but clear this part of the field of confusion, and come to perfect harmony and agreement as to the meanings of terms, we should go far to clear up many questions of doubt and disagreement.

What is truth? It is not meant to raise the question here what things are true, or what among all our think-
 Truth, defini- tion of. ings is true, but this, rather: What do we mean by the term truth? If truth be viewed as a concrete something, what is that something? If it be viewed as a quality, what is the quality? When we affirm that a given object of thought is true, what do we mean by the affirmation? When we affirm that the thought itself is true, what do we mean by the affirmation? It is obvious that the affirmations are different, and that the objects about which we affirm are different. There are two different things affirmed of, and each is declared by the mind to be true. Do we in the one case mean anything different from what we do in the other? Obviously, yes. In the first case we mean that the object of thought has the reality of existence—*it is*. Truth is the equivalent of
 Truth equivalent of reality. reality. It means that and nothing else; nothing more, nothing less. In the other case, it means that the thought we have of the object is not simply a real thought, but that it is a thought which represents the objective reality: that is, that there is an agreement between the
 Truth subjective. thought which we have of the object and the object itself. In the former case the term truth is a predicate of the object of thought, and means simply that it

has the reality of existence. In the latter case, the term is a predication of the thought I have of the object, and means not simply that I do in fact have the thought, but that in the thought which I have, and which is purely subjective, there is a perfect correspondence to a reality which is objective. The truth of the thought is not simply the equivalent of its existence, but more than that, the equivalent of its existence and also the existence or reality of its object, and still further, the adequacy of the thought to the object which is given in it.

It is impossible to affirm non-existence directly. To affirm non-existence there must be in the mind itself, in the form of a thought, something of which the af- Cannot affirm non-existence. firmation is made. It cannot affirm that the thought is not, for to affirm that, the thought must exist. It can only predicate non-existence, or unreality, of an object which is in its thought, and the form of the affirmation must be that there is no reality corresponding with the concept—the concept is void in reality. The same is true of existence; the mind can form no concept of pure existence. It can only affirm existence of that which, as reality, emerges in its thought; it must be the existence of some object of which it has some conception. Its affirmation must be in form that which is in my thought, or of which I think—has real existence—is real.

The mind has power to form images or concepts which do not correspond with any reality; as of a living horse made of gold, which can both run and fly; and any number of similar unrealities: but it knows that The mind can form concepts of non-existent things. such concepts have no reality corresponding with them, and its affirmation is, these things are not; the concept is, but the object has no reality of existence. Thus it appears that a concept, to be true, or for the mind to be able to predicate truth of any given image, or concept, or thought, it must be able to affirm not only the reality of the image, or concept, or

thought, but also the real existence of the object which is conceived.

Fleming, in his "Vocabulary of Philosophy," says: "Truth
 Truth — how distinguished. has been distinguished, according as it respects being, knowledge, and speech, into *veritas entis*, *veritas cognitionis*, *et veritas signi*." By others, truth has been distinguished as *entitative*, *objective*, and *formal*, the truth of signs being included under the last.

Of *veritas entis*, which he classifies as transcendental or metaphysical, or ontological truth, he says: "The pillar and ground of all truth is in truth of being—that truth of integrity by which a thing is what it is; by which it has identity, its own nature and properties, and has not merely the appearance but the reality of being. Thus gold has *truth* of being; that is, is real gold, when it has not only the appearance but all the properties belonging to that metal. Philosophy is the knowledge of being, and if there were no real being—that is, if truth could not be predicated of things—there could be no knowledge. But things exist independently of being known. They do not exist because they are known, nor simply as they are known. But they are known because they are, and as they are when known fully." Thus it appears that truth, as predicated of things, is the simple equivalent of reality. That which is has truth of being; that which is not has no truth of being. Whatever
 Truth of being. of any kind will allow of the predicate, it is, it exists, must have the quality of reality, which is truth of being. "The words reality and existence have many meanings. In daily life we say of thoughts and feelings that they exist, and a logician would say upon occasion that they all have the common predicate of being. So, also, we speak of
 The quality of reality. existing laws and relations as real, in distinction from others which, as imaginary, are unreal. In one sense
 Extent of the term being.

every object of thought, so far as thought, exists; in another sense only things exist. In one sense reality applies to laws, relations, or events; in another sense it applies only to things—events which occur, in distinction from fancied events, which do not occur. A law or event may be real, but never in the sense in which a thing is real. Thus it appears that there may be different kinds of being or reality. There may be a being or reality of feelings, thoughts, relations, and events, as well as of things. It is important to keep this distinction in mind, and to remember the kind of reality which is possible to a given object of thought. The reality of feeling is in being felt; that of thought, in being thought; that of an event, in its oncomings; that of law, in its ruling.” *

Thus it appears that truth, as reality, is as wide as substance or entities, relations, feelings, thoughts, laws, actions, events, or whatever besides will allow of the predicate it is, or has been, or will be. These constitute the world of reality as objects of thought. Truth cannot be predicated of the unreal—the absolutely non-existent. The truth, with respect to concepts which do not represent *reality*, is simply that the concept is false, since there is nothing to ^{Concepts false.} which it corresponds. To affirm that the concept is false is not to affirm its non-existence, for it does exist, and has truth of being in it; but, while it has truth of being in it, it is a false concept, for the reason that there is no reality in the object of which it is or purports to be a concept; and since truth can only be predicated of a concept when it represents a reality, it must be affirmed to be a false concept.

The pursuit of truth is, simply, the mind seeking to know reality. When the knowledge is attained it is called truth of knowledge, or *veritas cognitionis*. “Truth, as predicated of knowledge, consists in the conformity of our ideas with the re-

* Bowne’s “Studies in Theism.”

ality of the objects known ; for as knowledge is the knowledge of something—that is, when a thing is conceived as it is—that knowledge is formally true. To know that fire is hot is true

knowledge. Objective truth is the conformity of the
Fleming.

thing or object known with true knowledge. But there seems to be but little difference whether we say that *truth* consists in the conformity of the formal conception to the thing known or conceived of, or in the conformity of the thing as it is to true knowledge.”* Truth of knowledge de-

Truth in con-
cept. notes a quality of the concept which the mind forms of reality, and may be properly distinguished as subjective truth, in distinction from reality itself, which may be denoted objective truth, or as truth in idea in distinction from truth of being. When an object of thought is conceived to be as it is in reality—that is, when the content of the thought precisely accords with or expresses the content of the object, no more and no less—we have the *truth*. In this sense *truth* is an inherence of thought, and is subjective. Truth, as a possession of the mind, thus consists in the exact correspondence of its concept with objective reality. Thus in truth of knowledge we still have in view reality—reality is its essence and ground ; and there is no truth of knowledge, or truth in the idea of the mind, without a reality of which it is simply a subjective image, representation, consciousness, or intuition.

There is often a discrepancy between the concept and the reality ; the concept is less or more ; there is agreement in some respects and disagreement in other respects, or there is
Error of con-
cept. no agreement at all. The result is either a mixture of truth and error, or no truth at all in the concept. It is safe to admit that most of our human concepts are defective, in one way or another, with regard to most of the

* Fleming, p. 533.

objects of our thought. Under the most favoring circumstances yet existing we attain to the knowledge of but parts of truth. This is especially so with regard to the deep and obscure things of the spiritual world. It was an apostle who said, "We see through a glass, darkly—now I know in part." If this was the consciousness of one of the greatest minds when lifted above its natural power by a peculiar endowment of inspiration, what must be true of ordinary mind in its common states? The best that can be said is, we, for the most part, live among the imperfect images of half-truths. In cases where there is radical discrepancy between the concept and reality we have no substance of truth whatever, but only a marred and broken fragment of a defective image.

"The term truth is used in different applications and meanings. It is used thus to denote, 1. As truth of object, the unity of congruous parts; 2. As truth of perception, the agreement between the subjective apprehension and the apprehended object; 3. As truth of thought, the identification of subject and attribute in an object of apprehension; or, 4. Truth of representation, the agreement between the idea in the mind or the object of that idea and the embodiment of it in internal or external form." *

Variety of
truth.

To *truth* of being and *truth* of knowledge, *veritas entis et veritas cognitionis*, must be added *veritas signi*, or truth of sign. "The *truth* of the sign consists in its adequateness or conformity to the thing signified. If falsity in those things which imitate another consists not in so far as they imitate, but in so far as they cannot imitate or represent it adequately or fully, so the *truth* of a representation or sign consists in being adequate to the thing signified. The *truth* and adequacy of signs belongs to enunciation in logic." †

Truth of sign.

* Day, "Outlines of Ontological Science," p. 36.

† Fleming, p. 533.

When words or other signs are employed to set forth either thoughts or things, they have truth in them, just in the degree in which their real import and understood meaning corresponds to or correctly sets forth the thing signified ; and they convey the truth to other minds, which is their intent in the degree in which their real import is apprehended. The sign may be exactly the appropriate one, as employed and understood by the user ; but if it be not accurately apprehended, or if it have a different meaning to the mind receiving it from that which it has to the mind using it, it does not convey the truth. That signs may answer the end of transferring the truth from one mind to another there must be perfect accord as to contents of the sign.

Herein appears the office of symbols or symbolism in general, and the laws regulating their use. Language is the divinely constituted organ and symbol of thought, created for its expression and conveyance. When we say that language is the divinely constituted organ or symbol of thoughts, we do not mean that words are creations of God, but that the power to invent language for the expression of thought was a peculiar endowment conferred upon man in his creation. Words are bodies of which thoughts or meanings are souls. Thoughts born in the mind clothe themselves in these vocal or written forms, and so are transmitted from one mind to another. As acquaintance with facts and things enlarges language grows, and when the facts or things are not present, the vocal or written symbol represents them and creates the concept in the mind which their presence would produce. Every new fact or thing or idea which arises in the mind by perception or reflection, or any mental thought, is immediately formulated by the mind in a word invented for that purpose, or in a peculiar combination of words already existing designed to express its mental form. To get the meaning of

words and sentences is the aim and result of study. When a number of minds come to common understanding of meanings, the sounds or written characters serve as modes of communication, and reproduce in each several mind the same concept in the same manner as the object would were it present to each mind. It must appear that, in order to accuracy of thought, there must be precise agreement as to the significance and content of the sign, whether written or spoken. An unknown language conveys no idea. A partially known or imperfectly understood language produces confusion of thought. The word may be properly pronounced or written, but the idea is not transmitted—it is a body without a soul, or with a soul which does not belong to it.

The question is sometimes mooted whether mental processes, that is, processes of thought, the formation of ideas and concepts, and the exercise of reflection and reasoning, are possible without language. It is certain that objects perceived can be thought without formulating the concept in a name. Two such objects can be thought together and compared, so as to perceive the difference without naming either, or inventing a word to express comparison and difference. But the mind, by a natural instinct, clothes its thoughts in language, and in no other way can it communicate itself. The language is the sign which expresses and carries the thought—the postman connecting separate points and bringing them into relations. Language may be either signs by motions, sounds, or characters, but in every case it must possess agreed meanings, and the communication, to be accurate, must employ the signs according to a fixed standard.

“Independent of the truth which consists in the conformity of thoughts to things, called *scientific*, or right thinking, and that which lies in the correspondence of words with thoughts, called *moral* when coupled with moral

Moral truth—
truth of intent.

purpose, but truth of sign when simple accuracy of representation is meant, there is a truth called logical, depending on the self consistency of thoughts themselves. Thought is valueless except so far as it leads to correct knowledge of things; a higher truth than the moral, in subservience to which alone the logical is desirable. The reason that we sedulously avoid the purely logical error of holding two contradictory propositions, is, that we believe one of them to be a fair representation of facts, so that in adopting the other we should admit a falsehood,

which is always abhorrent to the mind. If we call
 Logical truth. the *logical truth subjective*, as consisting in the due direction of the thinking subject, we may call this higher metaphysical *truth objective*, because it depends on our thoughts fairly representing the objects that give rise to them. Truth, in the strict logical sense, applies to propositions, and to nothing else; and consists in the conformity of the declaration made to the actual state of the case; agreeably to Aldrich's definition of 'a true' proposition, *vera est quæ quod res est dicit.*"

"*Veritas est adæquatio intellectus et rei, secundum quod intellectus dicit esse quod est; vel non esse quod non est.*" *

These definitions do not make account of truth as an ethical
 quality. That in every case relates to intention.
 Ethical truth. Its antithesis is falsehood, or the use of false signs with an intention to deceive and with a purpose not to convey truth. It pertains to the department of ethics, rather than that of correct thinking. It denotes the moral state of the subject, and, in that respect alone, differs from error. It is departure from the truth not in concept, but in the sign employed, with purpose to misrepresent and deceive. The effect of falsehood upon character is different from error of statement arising from misconception, but in both cases and alike, the truth is

* Thomson, "Outline of Laws of Thought," secs. 81, 82.

misrepresented, and the quality of truth is absent. A lie deceives with intention, an error deceives without intention. The moral law imputes guilt to the voluntary falsification of the truth, or any intentional use of symbols for the purpose of deception. Error may exist without guilt, and may, in some cases, be the inevitable outcome of thought. The moral law demands the diligent and honest use of the faculties for the attainment of truth, and failure of such use may involve guilt, and be the sure cause of evil; but where the faculties have been so employed, and because of their weakness or inadequate conditions, the judgment is at fault and error is the outcome, there can be no imputation of crime—the error must be accounted misfortune rather than crime.

It appears from the foregoing statements that non-truth, in the first case, is the equivalent of non-reality—shams, illusions, that which is not, as truth is the equivalent of that which is. Truth as reality cannot be a quality of non-existence, for of it there can be no predication, except that it is not—has no reality, no truth of being. That which once existed, but does not now exist—or that which may exist in the future, but does not at present exist—has now no truth of being or reality. To affirm truth of existence of such concept of at present non-existing things, the affirmation to make it correspond with exact truth, must be coupled with a statement which shows that at present they are not existent, but that they were, or will be at a future time.

Science is employed about truth of being; it seeks to ascertain just what is in the single realm of things, and its function is faithfully to report and properly to classify what is found to exist. It furnishes to the mind the knowledge of reality of a definite kind. It is true science when it gives reality. Properly, science can only deal with the known and with things as known. Its function is exhausted with the statement and

classification of known facts of being and relation. It ceases to be science when it becomes speculation.

In the second case, the opposite of truth is error, misjudgment, inadequate or false conception—it consists in The opposite of truth is error. imputing reality where it does not exist—in having a concept, which is supposed to correspond with reality; but which, in fact, does not, and which, therefore, represents nothing that is and is void of truth. There may be a reality, which the concept is supposed to represent, but it is a misrepresenting concept of the reality, and so represents nothing. Ideas about reality, but which are not according to reality, are not true, or have not the quality of truth in them, as there is no reality corresponding with them. There may be reality something like them, but if it is mere resemblance it lacks truth, for truth is as the reality — is either the reality, which is objective truth, or conceptual agreement with the reality, which is subjective truth, or is the right expression to represent the reality precisely as it is, which is truth of sign.

In the third case, the opposite of truth is the inadequacy of Opposite of truth is inadequacy of sign. the sign or symbol employed to represent the reality either of the concept or the object. There is a reality both objective and subjective—an object and a concept—and possibly the concept is both adequate and true, and the correspondence between object and concept, perfect and complete, but the verbal expression is inaccurate and misleading. If reality can only represent itself in thought, so no sign that may be employed can do more than represent what the thought is in communicating truth to other minds. The improper sign only conveys error. The sign is an invention of the mind for the purpose of revealing its inner thought to some other mind, in the same way that an external object discloses itself to it, by producing a corresponding concept. To make the communi-

cated concept represent the object, the sign must be adequate to convey it and not some other. Things are God's signs of his thoughts. They, by representing themselves in our concept, put us in communication with his thoughts. Words and other invented symbols body our thoughts and convey them to other minds. As in things there is a true expression of the divine thought, and as by rightly conceiving them we rightly interpret his thoughts, so it is necessary that the inventions we employ should accurately represent our thoughts; and the recipient mind, rightly understanding the sign, should thus be able to interpret our thoughts.

In the search for truth to which this discussion is devoted, it is truth in the second sense which will be constantly in view—*veritas cognitionis*—the truth of knowledge, or the Truth of concept the object of search. truth of mental concepts. But as every true concept is a concept of that which is, and not that which is not, to determine the truth of the concept the reality must be sought and found—must be known. And as no concept can be correctly represented or expressed by the mind perceiving it, without the use of the appropriate and adequate sign, we must necessarily have a vigilant and constant reference to the three forms of truth, *veritas entis*, or reality—that which is; *veritas cognitionis*—that which is cognized or conceived, and the correspondence of the two; and *veritas signi*—the adequate sign, embodying and conveying the true concept of the reality; and so reality shall be transmuted into thought, and truth shall become the circulating medium between minds. For convenience we shall call *veritas cognitionis* subjective truth, in contradistinction to *veritas entis*, which we shall denote objective truth; the first as marking an internal fact, the second objective reality, or all objectivity which the mind contemplates and makes the ground of the mental concept. The end of the investigation is to find what is true in the concepts, or

rather, how far and in what respects they correspond with reality, and to correct or reject them in the matters wherein they do not conform to reality. Agreement between the subjective and objective is the ultimatum of all mental operation. When we attain that we reach truth, and not until that can we rest.

It is inevitable to mind that it should form concepts both of itself and of other beings—that it should take note of acts and changes within and without itself—that it should be interested to find out the cause and reason of existence and change—that it should desire certain objects and propose certain ends—and especially that it should be interested in the matters of its own origin, its responsibility, and its destiny—whether death ends all, or only introduces it to another state of existence—and whether or not the deeds of this temporary life affect the conditions of the state to which it advances;—these grave problems arise early in every consciousness, and haunt it during its existence, or until complete knowledge resolves every doubt.

In this statement it is postulated that mind is, and that there is a realm of reality or of existence objective to it; in the language of the schools, that there are the *ego* and *non-ego*. This must be assumed: can it be disputed? As to the mind itself, obviously it is impossible to call in question its existence; for to dispute it is to affirm it. The affirmative of its non-existence by itself necessitates the thing denied; for how can a non-existent affirm? Can that which is not, perform an act of affirmation? Can a pure nothing know itself, or predicate of its existence and self-knowledge?

It must be conceded that the self, in knowing itself, affirms to itself not only its own existence but the existence of something objective to itself, which it invariably and inevitably posits as reality; for it only knows itself in knowing something external to itself. It is no more certain of its own

existence than it is of the reality of the object by the knowledge of which it knows itself. It may be affirmed Mind knows its own existence. that the object whose existence it predicates is simply a creation of its own imagination ; but this is an hypothesis which it rejects, and which it finds impossible to accept. Whether it think of itself and its conscious power and activity, or of externality and its phenomena, it finds itself under a strict necessity to impute actual existence in both cases.

Bearing in mind, then, that the one and sole object of our pursuit is the attainment of truth and its enforcement upon our fellow-men, it is important that, as far as possible, we free ourselves from passion and prejudice. With this divine cynosure forever shining upon our path, as the pole-star guides the mariner, we shall be led to the haven we seek. Any lower aim, or any other guide or lesser light, will not fail to confuse and bewilder, and finally leave us in the *Serbonian bog** of doubt and error, whose poisonous exhalations engender stagnation and death. It will be necessary that we inform ourselves of the researches of others, and that we examine their facts and conclusions. They will be found to differ with us, some slightly, some with the width of the antipodes. But it is with their facts and conclusions and processes that we are concerned, and in no sense with their personality. We make no advance by evasion, misrepresentation, characterization, epithets, intimidations, or effusions of temper and spleen. These create a temporary whirl and tumult, but in the end accomplish no good ; they may win the admiration of superficial minds, but can contribute nothing to the victories of truth, while they may greatly militate against them.

Ephemeral successes are not successes. That only is success which wins ground that will be permanently held by the intelligence and conscience of mankind. All else will be torn down and scattered as the chaff, as the race progresses to its destiny.

* The *Serbonis Lacus* of the ancients.

Truth inherits the ages, and has in it the dower of immortality. Its conquests are slowly won, but its reign is eternal.

NOTE.—As a rule, all discussion should be, as nearly as possible, impersonal; that is, it should to the smallest possible degree make reference to names, confining itself to the question at issue, on the simple matter of what is to be received as truth or what is to be rejected as error. When personal reference is deemed necessary the cause of truth is best served by allowing the writer to represent his own thought, as much as possible, in his own language; and, unless he may be referred to in terms of respect, no characterization should be resorted to, except that which his own utterance furnishes. The introduction of personalities in any form is calculated to excite prejudice, interject confusion, and breeds an animus unfavorable to the discovery of truth. Personalities are the resort of insincere and low minds, and appeal, not to the intelligence, but to ignorance and unregulated passion. Reproach, ridicule, and banter, and arts designed to excite odium against one whose opinions we seek to refute, are never resorted to by truth-seekers, but are staple methods with mere partisans and ignoramuses who cater to those of their own class.

When opinions are to be assailed, or controversies about facts arise, or doctrines or theories are called in question, the utmost care should be employed to present the issue fairly and meet it honorably, never appealing to the *odium theologicum*, or mere *bruta fulmina*. The effective bolt with which to shatter error, and the successful plea for the establishment of truth, will always be impersonal—argument, pure and simple. Let the argument be valorous, luminous, trenchant, but the spirit Christian and the terms free from color of spleen or passion. Even when a writer lays himself open to ridicule or rebuke—or a sentiment, or theory, or position, because of its

absurdity or malignity, merits severity of denunciation or merciless criticism—it is better to hide the culprit, if he be such, or the person whose ignorance or misjudgment is exposed, that the mind may dwell simply on the issue itself. The departure from this rule should be rare and exceptional indeed. The convincing argument loses half its value and force if couched in terms which, exciting passion, obscure the question or matter in dispute.

SECTION III.—DIFFERENTIA OF IDEA AND CONCEPT.

In the preceding discussion, in defining subjective truth as the exact correspondence between the objective reality and the subjective concept or thought of it, we assumed four things: (*a*) the existence of objective reality; (*b*) the existence of the ego; (*c*) the existence of the concept; (*d*) an exact correspondence between the concept and the objective real. The grounds of these assumptions will emerge as we proceed.

We return now to examine more carefully the term concept. We have employed it, in a broad sense, as the ^{The concept—}equivalent of the terms idea, notion, thought, or ^{what?} what we think. A more accurate analysis and differentiation of the terms will be given as the discussion advances. In general, we mean by the concept the thought-form which reality takes in the mind, or how we think it.

How do we become possessed of the concept, or how does reality, which is external and objective, pass over into the mind and assume a subjective thought-form?

This is an old question, to which no satisfactory answer has ever been given. It lies, perhaps, beyond any solution, among the things unknown, and, for the present, unknowable; but the fact itself, that reality does emerge in thought, is indisputable, and the process and conditions are, for the most part, not obscure.

The facts involved are these: (*a*) there is an external con-

crete universe ; (b) there are minds ; (c) the external concrete does become an objective of thought by or to mind or minds.

The arranged conditions are these : (a) a deft, highly sensitive, marvelously complex organism is provided. It is a part of the external concrete of things ; but it is an organic unit composed of living tissue—is a thing of life. In the external organism is found an inner organism, or special system, of more delicate mold, the tissues of which are infinitely sensitive—so delicately impressible as to respond to the slightest external impingement. A ripple of light, or wavelet of shadow, or impalpable odor even, cannot cross its disk without leaving its traces. Though shrined with infinite care to protect it from the violence of rude contact, it lies open, in five disks or foci, to receive impressions from without, and transmit them, by a unique telegraphy, to a common center, where the precise effect of impingement is registered with the rapidity of thought, and more than photographic accuracy. The external foci, which open outward to the universe, as the free avenues of approach and contact, are called the five senses. The inreaching nerves of sensation are the ducts of the impression, and the convoluted brain is the office of delivery and register. The impalpable, all-surrounding ether is the freighted highway along which impinging forces travel. Thus the objective universe plays a perpetual tune on this more delicate than æolian instrument.

In this infinitely delicate organism a mind is posited. What is the mind ? It is not the impressible nerve, which receives the impression : it is not the convoluted brain, in which the impression is reported : it is not a part, or resultant, of the organism : it is not a mere congeries of ideas : it is not a minutest material atom : but it is a something which has in it the deepest reality of existence. More attenuate than ether, more versatile and alert than electricity, it is yet more

Condition of
the concept, or
arrangements
for its produc-
tion.

Mind, what?

solid and indestructible than granite or gold. Shrining itself in the innermost core of the nerves of sensation, it feels the slightest change produced by impingement upon them, and, by a mysterious power, transmutes the sensation into thought, and sends the concrete back into idea. Not apprehensible or describable under terms of matter, it is a supersensible being, which thinks and feels and wills—an intellect, a sensibility, a volitional agent, immortal and indestructible.

The synthesis of itself with the object, reveals in consciousness simply the mind as cognizing and the object as cognized. Could it go no further, we should have nothing in thought, or possible to thought, but the self-conscious ego and the individualized object at any time present with it. But this we do not find to be the case. On the contrary, we find that when the object is removed, so as no longer to be present in sensation or as affecting the sensory organism, the Ego and non-ego in the concept. mind has power still to retain the thought-image, or concept which its presence produced—the object is gone, but the concept remains. We find, further, that after the concept has been displaced, and the mind has become occupied by some other object, or a series of objects, it has a power by which, without restoring the object, it can restore the thought-image, or concept, and thus retain its hold on concepts and objects after they have once been present; so that a greater or less multitude of these become the permanent possession of the mind.

But were this all, the mind would still compass nothing but itself in synthesis with a given number of objects, which have been successively introduced to it by impingement on the sensory organism in which it is posited. By its power to restore the vanished object, or concept, it would Concept restored when the object is absent. indeed, in a manner seem to deliver itself from the bondage of sensation, but it would still be so enslaved that it

could not transcend in thought what had been given in sensation and sensational consciousness—itself and the given number of objects. The limit of its power would be to cognize itself plus a series of objects transferred to it as pictured images. But this we find is not the case. The mind discloses a much larger power than this. To the power to restore these concepts without the medium of the sensory instrument, it adds the power to hold them as objects of study, to reflect upon them, and compare them and classify them, and note the difference between them.

From the objects themselves, as compared, classified, and judged of, certain relations are seen to arise in the mind not given in the individualized sensations or concepts arising with the sensations; by which they pass out of severalty into a coherent whole or generalized unity—they are not atoms, but a system.

If the mental process started by sensation, could go no further than to reveal the object of sensation, or restore it when absent, or hold it under attention and classify it among other sensations, the mind would be limited to external material things and mere *residua* of experience and commerce with material things. It could not rise into the apprehension of the supersensible.

But, in point of fact, starting on this low plane, the mind is found to be possessed of a power to reach a much higher range of ideas and realities. It begins in the dust, though not of the dust; but it does not stay there. In a brief time it becomes aware of a new class of objects which are not given in sensation or discoverable by sense processes. These new discoveries take their place in the mind, not as pictured images of external objects, but as ideas of supersensible realities discovered to the reason itself without mediation of sense.

Succession in thoughts, or in the appearance and disappearance of objects of sense, involves time and evolves the idea of it, and gives it a place among the fixed ideas ; form and severalty of external objects elicits the idea of space, which also becomes a fixed idea ; change and motion, together with self-consciousness, give rise to the idea of power and cause ; adaptation to ends, and consciousness, give rise to the idea of a presiding intelligence as the ground of the universe ; so ultimately mind rises to the supersensible, and stores itself with ideas of these great realities.

Contemplating the concrete material universe, ministered to the mind by sensation, it thinks it under categories of form, size, color, space relations, solidity, density, fluidity, taste, odor, resonance ; these subjective concepts represent to it the objective reality, and suggest to it other supersensible realities. When, turning from these external objectives, it contemplates itself, it has the idea of the reality of its own being ; but it finds itself incapable of thinking itself under any of these categories of form, color, space, density, odor, taste, or any sensible qualities ; and simply conceives itself as a being possessing powers of intelligence, feeling, will—a being with faculties.

But it cannot stop with these ideas of the self and concrete not-self. It discovers, in things, evidence of realities which transcend both the self and the external concrete, and which are not expressed in the categories which exhaust them. Its search into itself, and the external objects which become known to it, discovers the fact that they are finite, dependent, temporary. It discerns that that which is finite, dependent, temporary, must have an infinite, independent, eternal ground. It thus rises to the idea of eternal cause. And now emerges a new discovery ; namely, that idea antedates all finite reality. In tracing the history of the human

idea, we found that concrete reality is antecedent to the concept; and its synthesis with mind, the ground of the concept. The world of human concepts is offspring of the world of realities, and a transcript of them in thought.

But now, when we turn to the world of realities, to examine them, we find that the case is reversed: the realities are transcripts of pre-existing ideas—the idea is older than the reality.

Ideas before things. As we push investigation, we discover that the concrete universe falls within the limits of time—that once it was non-existent. But we know that had there been no reality or being of any kind, then no being could ever have existed, as that would involve the coming of all reality from the empty womb of nothing, in contradiction of the axiom intuitively perceived to be a necessary truth, *ex nihilo nihil fit*, or, more generally formulated, there can be no effect without a cause.

But now, when continuing the investigation, we pass out beyond all objective reality—that is, all dependent being, or being originating in time, and come to that antecedent, independent, eternal reality, the then only form of being, we are compelled to conceive it as possessing the idea of the as yet non-existing universe, as it is impossible it should give concreteness to ideas which it did not possess. Thus idea in its original form is seen to be, not a concept of reality propagated by it in mind, but, on the contrary, it is found to be the eternal mold into which reality is cast. The created objective is simply the expression or evolved concrete realization of pre-existing uncreated thought. The universe of real things is made after the image or pattern of invisible things—eternal ideas. It is that which makes the universe intelligible, or translatable into thought. The unmeaning cannot be explained. That which does not express thought cannot be put in the terms of thought.

An illustration may help us. The mind of man has faculty

not simply to observe existing things, but, in a certain sense, it has power to create things after a pattern of its own thought, and thus falls into analogy of the primitive creative act. The idea becomes, in this case, antecedent to reality, and the reality expresses the idea. When such a crea-
Illustration of the archetypal idea.
tion has taken place, another human mind, coming into contact with the reality so created, not only discovers its existence, but is able to detect the meaning of its several parts, and so to return it to its original thought-form, or find the antecedent idea after the pattern of which it was made. Understanding the product, it finds that which antedated it—the archetypal idea. All things that are intelligible emanate from intelligence, and have for their root an idea. Take for an illustrative case the invention of the steam-engine. The fact in the case is, that up to a fixed date no such thing as a steam-engine had any existence, either as an objective thing or an archetypal idea—it was wholly non-existent. A mind was existent, and the elements out of which the engine was to be made into objective reality also existed. Now, how did the non-existing engine find its way into being? The case is an experimental one. We know how it was, and do not have to depend on the uncertainties of speculation. The already existing mind exerted its intelligence, and formed an idea of certain modifications and combinations of known existing materials, and of results of power which would be made possible thereby. There was no pattern to follow, there was nothing from which to take the idea; it was not a concept of any objective thing propagated in the mind in any way: it was a pure product of the mind, and its first form was that of an idea or pure thought. The idea became a pattern or archetype. The next step was to exert force on material, and put the idea in concrete reality. The completed machine was the exact picture of the archetypal idea, and it was impossible that it should ever have come

into this state of concrete reality except as the image of the idea; that is, it was a strict necessity that the idea should have antecedent existence. The proof is, that mind must necessarily exist in order to the idea, and that the idea must exist in order to the machine. The completed machine is brought into relations to another mind than that of the inventor. In this mind there exists no such idea as is shrined in the machine, and out of which it was born. What now is the process by which this new mind acts, and what is the result? It is certain that it does not go through the same process as the first mind did—a process of creation of the abstract idea. It sees the machine—the concrete reality. Its reason takes the reality and forms a picture of it to itself, which is the thought-image of it, and so it returns by the operation of this faculty, or power of reason, to the image which was in the mind of the creator as an idea. The two minds have the machine in thought-form, but in one the idea existed antecedently to the machine, as an archetypal idea, and as the pattern after which it was made; in the other it exists in the same thought-form, but as propagated in it by the machine, and an exact thought-image of it.

When we say the concept is propagated in the beholding mind by the external concrete, we do not mean to imply that the mind is inactive, and a mere passive recipient of the image of the reality, as a mirror is; but this—

Meaning of
concept propa-
gation.

that the object when presented to the mind in sensation becomes the occasion or ground of a mental act by which is formed a concept of the reality; or the mind, so placed by a law of its own, thinks the reality; and the idea or thought is said to be propagated because it could not be produced by the mind out of such relations. The object plus the mind, and plus the mind's knowledge of itself as acting, are the conditions, *sine qua non*, for the existence of the concept.

We have discriminated between archetypal ideas and concepts; but there is still a further discrimination to be made, between ideas and archetypal ideas, and ideas and concepts, for the further clearing of the subject.

Discrimination
of idea, con-
cept, and ar-
chetypal idea.

The terms all represent certain acts of the mind—purely mental forms—and are of one genus, but are differentiable. The general term thought includes them all. The archetypal thought is that which antedates the concrete reality, and is the pattern after which the concrete is fashioned; the concept is the reproduced idea as a thought corresponding with the concrete reality, or is the reality returned to thought-form. But the mind is found to possess ideas which have no concrete reality answering to them, and which are, nevertheless, ideas of reality, or may be. There are realities that are not concrete. When the mind is drawn to the contemplation of these, it forms to itself defined but unpicturable thoughts. In this case, as in the case of concepts, the idea may or may not conform to the truth, but in either case it exists as an idea. The mind has the idea of truth, of right, of law, of the infinite. They are not picturable, and differ from the concept, which is propagated by contact with concrete reality. We employ the term concept as the equivalent of our thoughts about reality, whether concrete or abstract—all forms of mental affirmation. Whenever the mind performs an intellection it forms an idea or concept or thought of some kind concerning some object. The idea may be of some concrete reality, or mere reality of thought.

I subjoin a few definitions, which will suffice to indicate how the matter has been treated in philosophical speculation by the best minds: “By *conception* is meant the simple view we have of the objects which are presented to our mind; as when, for instance, we think of the sun, the earth, a tree, a circle, a square, thought, being, without forming any determinate judg-

ment concerning them ; and the form through which we consider these things is called an idea." *

A conception is something derived from observation ; not so ideas, which meet with nothing exactly answering to them within the range of our experience. Thus, ideas are *a priori*, conceptions are *a posteriori* ; and it is only by means of the former that the latter are really possible. For the bare fact, taken by itself, falls short of the conception, which may be described as the synthesis of the fact and the idea. Thus we have an idea of the universe, under which its different phenomena fall into place, and from which they take their meaning ; we have an idea of God, as Creator, from which we derive the power of conceiving that the impressions produced upon our minds, through the senses, result from really existing things ; we have an idea of the soul, which enables us to realize our own personal identity, by suggesting that a feeling, conceiving, thinking subject exists as a substratum of every sensation, conception, thought.†

"Every conception," says Coleridge, "has its sole reality in its being referable to a thing, or class of things, of which, or of the common character of which, it is a reflection. An idea is a power, *δύναμις νοερά*, which constitutes its own reality, and is, in order of thought, necessarily antecedent to the things in which it is more or less adequately realized, while a conception is as necessarily posterior." ‡

Conception is used to signify—

1. The power or faculty of conceiving, as when Mr. Stewart says : "Under the article of conception I shall confine myself to that faculty whose province it is to enable us to form a notion of our past sensations, or of the objects of sense that we have formerly perceived."

* "Port Royal Logic," † Chretien, "Essay on Logical Method," p. 137.

‡ "Notes on English Divines," 12mo, 1853, vol. i, p. 27.

2. The act or operation of this power or faculty. “*Conception*,” says Sir John Stoddart, “which is derived from *con* and *cipio*, expresses the action by which I take up together a portion of our sensations, as it were water in some vessel adapted to contain a certain quantity.” *

“Conception is the act by which we comprehend, by means of a general notion, as distinguished both from the perception of a present, and the imagination of an absent, individual.” †

3. The result of the operation of this power or faculty ; as when Dr. Whewell says : “Our conceptions are that, in the mind, which we denote by our general terms ; as, a triangle, a square number, a force.” ‡

These attempts at definition show how easy it is to confuse things that in themselves seem plain and simple, and how important it is to aim at more definite meanings of terms employed technically. We have seen that there are three general distinctions in the term *idea* : first, the distinction of the archetypal idea, or the thought which antedates the concrete, and into which it is run, and of which it is the expression ; second, the idea which the mind has of concrete reality when brought into relation with it ; third, the idea which the mind creates to itself of reality which does not take concrete mold. These three forms we reduce to the one term, *conceptions* or *concepts*, by which we mean the thought-forms which exist in the mind, however occasioned. These forms, when propagated by contact with the concrete, are picture images which represent the reality in thought ; and they are still picture images when, by a power of the mind, they are restored when the concrete is absent. When they respect realities which are not concrete, as of love, truth, doubt, law, power, and all such things, they are

* “Universal Grammar,” in “Encyclopedia Metropolitana.”

† “North British Review,” No. 27, p. 45.

‡ Preface to the “Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences,” p. 13.

ideas of realities which, nevertheless, do exist, but which, not having form or color, cannot be imaged. These include all notions, ideas, thoughts, and predicates of whatever kind, the material of which is not given in sensation, but which, nevertheless, may have been started by sensation, and, possibly, never could have arisen had no outward sensation been experienced. Sensation is the antecedent ground of human intellection.

In a certain sense, there is no resemblance between an idea and a thing—a concrete object and the concept of it. They are, indeed, utter opposites. One is material, the other immaterial. One a thing, the other a thought. And yet, as the mirror reflects the image of the object before it, so the mind in thought creates the image of the object. The image on the mirror we behold, and see the correspondence between object and image. The image in the mind it beholds, and sees the correspondence between the object and image. In what way the image is transferred in the first case we understand; in the second we do not. The concept is, without doubt, the image of the concrete reality. Touch and sight agree in their report. There is an external object, and, for all purposes, the concept represents it—it is simply the mind seeing the object, or, in the case of touch, feeling its form. There is no more difficulty in the supposition of a real material object and its exact image in the thought, than there is in accounting for the thought itself. There is no ground for inferring that the object has not external existence independently of the concept, or for inferring that it is not precisely what thought represents it to be, a thing, in the common-sense meaning of the term. There is, on the contrary, every reason for asserting that it is precisely what thought declares it to be.

Things do not exist independently of all mind, but they are

separable realities from any mind. They are a product of mind, but they are not ideas of mind. The pattern of them existed in idea when as yet they were Things not independent of mind.

not. Power made them to be real objective things after the idea. The finite mind has power to cognize them as objective realities, which, as such, existed before they were cognized, and would continue to exist if all finite mind were obliterated.

The historic order is : first, an eternal mind, the one only reality, holding in idea a universe not yet existing ; second, a creative act, by which a universe of objective, concrete being was fashioned after the pattern of antecedent ideas. Subsequent to that creative act there were and are two kinds of being—one, the uncreated, independent, which anterior to the creation was the only being ; the other, a created form of being, which, prior to the creative act, had no existence except as a thought, but which, by the creative act, became a reality and not a thought ; third, created mind—a real being or beings introduced into existence long posterior to the creation of things, which, by a power invested in it, is able to see the antecedent things as they are in reality—things expressing ideas. The three kinds of being are distinct and real, and separable in thought : the first, eternal, spiritual ; the Historic order of idea and the concrete.

second, temporal, material ; the third, temporal, spiritual : the second and third dependent on and caused by the first ; the second in no sense dependent on or caused by the third ; the third not caused by the second, but served by it ; the first and third of the same nature, but differenced as infinite and finite ; the second wholly differentiable in nature from the first and third. In the first, idea is archetypal ; in the second, idea is concrete ; in the third, idea is derivative.

In the second, the individualized parts are individualized exponents of thoughts ; the whole, is the separable thoughts wrought into rational and coherent discourse. The third, de-

fects the thought expressed in the second, and reads the meaning intended to be expressed by the first.

According to the view we take, the universe of objective reality is not a mere mass of unintelligible being evolved by power of some kind, or existing in some way, but it is an intelligible organic unity, every part of which has meaning, and the whole of which is an expression of ineffable wisdom—

Materiality not a mass of embodied concrete thought. In its cause
an unintelligi- it originally existed in idea. Power lifted it into
ble mass. concrete reality, after the pattern of archetypal ideas. The things so created express the thought of the creator. To understand them, is to translate them back into the thought-pattern, or to have the idea which was in the mind that produced them, or to find the meaning in them which the creator designed to express, and so to come into communion with the eternal thought.

Would the external concrete of things exist were there no finite created mind to perceive them? or is the act of the created perceiving mind an essential part of the ground of their existence?

There can be no rational doubt that the universe exists independently of finite mind. The sole cause of its existence is in the eternal, not in the temporal. It is a possible and probable fact, that it would not have been created had there not been a purpose to create mind; but, it was created before mind, and has
Universe not a completed existence of its own. The parts of
dependent on the universe have functions among themselves.
finite mind. Were there no finite mind to be served by it, it would still exist. Gravitation would continue to bind the spheres together if all created mind were obliterated, as it did ages before there were created minds. Chemistry performs its miracles irrespective of created minds. Vegetation blooms where no created mind beholds it. All the processes of nature were carried forward

through geological æons before finite mind knew them, and would go forward if finite mind were now wholly eliminated.

As we have reason to believe that there is a correspondence between the concrete external objective reality and the antecedent archetypal idea in the original creation, precisely as we find in the case of subsidiary creations or inventions—and, as we have reason to believe that the concept which is produced in, or by, the observing mind, when brought into relations of the concrete reality, corresponds with the reality, and so with the archetypal idea before it was put in the concrete in the case of original creations, just as is the case in subsidiary human creations—so, further, we have reason to believe that the concrete not merely represents the antecedent archetypal idea, but something deeper still in the mind which possessed it, namely, a *purpose* which gave birth to the expression—the proper end or aim of the expression. In the case of the human invention, the concrete is designed not simply to embody the archetypal idea, but to serve an end, either of satisfying the love of the beautiful, as in the case of idealized creations of art, or the useful, as in the case of machinery. The mind, by an inherent law, discovers in the end served what the moving purpose was. We detect the same facts pervading the older original creation, and have reason to believe an end of beauty or usefulness the ground or moving cause there, also. The concrete is overspread with beauty as well as utility, and utility as well as beauty. It is a just inference, and the only rational one, that the creative mind feels the emotion of beauty, or sense of the beautiful, and is actuated by the desire of the useful; and creation exists to give expression to both the beautiful and good, the deeper ground of archetypal ideas. The archetypal ideas and the concrete creation thus express both the perfection of the reason and the moral nature of the creator. He is seen to be not only an intellect, with ideas; but a will, with

creative energy; and a nature actuated by affections moving him to the realization of the beautiful and good.

In the further discussion we are to consider the veraciousness of our thoughts, and the laws and limitations of knowing and believing. The object of the present chapter has been to find out in what way we become possessed of them. We do have thoughts, ideas, notions, concepts; we have endeavored to show how they arise. The question of their value remains to be discussed.

We have found that, to begin with, the mind is void of thought—a mere *tabula rasa*. It has power to think. In thought it is self-conscious, or self-knowing. It does not come into self-consciousness until thought takes place. Thought implies an object. The object must in some way impinge upon the mind to become an object of thought or for thought. The universe of concrete things and supersensible realities are objects for thought when the mind is brought into relations with them, not before. They can be thought—but to be thought they must in some way pass into the mind, or impinge upon it; in no other way can it think them. When objects are thus brought into relation with mind, it casts them in thought-form. To it they are what it thinks them. In themselves they are what they are. The thought-form of reality is not an accident. The mind has its laws. It must think under these laws. It feels a sensation. It cannot think the sensation as something different from what it is. It cannot think itself as not having it. It cannot think itself as not the subject of the sensation. It cannot think there is no objective ground of it. It cannot change the sensation into something else. The law is a universal law of all mind, in similar circumstances. The sensation emerges in thought-form under a law. It is this, not that, in thought or for thought. A tree is a tree, a triangle is a triangle. The tree

cannot emerge as something else, the triangle as a square or circle. Under strict and invariable laws mind, as such, acts. All minds act under the same laws. Sensation mediates the same thought-form to all minds in similar circumstances. For thought the material concrete universe is the same to all minds. The sun is the sun, the earth the earth. Each individualized object emerges in every mind upon which it impinges, in the same thought-form. The mind goes forth among the infinite complex of things, and stores itself with thoughts of them. It then classifies them according to some scientific basis, or according to certain differences and resemblances which it notes. It retains the thought of them when they cease to be present in sensation, with greater or less vividness. The general agreement of all minds with respect to these objectives enables them to compare these retained thought-forms, and to communicate them by symbols which they invent for that purpose. The universe is the same for all, just in the degree in which it is thought or observed.

These thought-forms, the mind constantly affirms, have answering objective realities; that is, there is such a universe, apart from the thought of it. No form of idealism makes any permanent headway against this conviction. But with that question at present we are not concerned. The one point we have in view is this: to indicate that mind is a being, which, by a process of sensations which it refers to external objective impingement, possesses itself of thought-forms of what it assumes to be a real universe, and that these thought-forms arise under fixed laws, and are invariably the same in similar circumstances. Whether or not there are external objects, for the present is matter of no concern to us. Minds inhabit a universe, and one that is the same to all, whether it be a mere ideal or an actual external universe. So much is admitted. The mind is formed to

The universe,
apart from the
finite thought
of it.

have ideas of things not given in sensation, but which are supersensible. These are not first in the time-order of their appearance, but emerge early in the mental life—as ideas of love, truth, power, cause, time, space, existence. These the mind, by a law of reason, detects as not less real than the external objectives of its thought.

SECTION IV.— KNOWLEDGE.

The words knowledge and belief, and the phrases, I know, I believe, I think so, it is my opinion, I conjecture, I imagine, I fancy, are in common use among all English-speaking people; and their equivalents are, or have been, in use in all other languages, living and dead.

Precisely what is the force of meaning in these terms and phrases, and so what is the exact difference between them, is an important question to one who seeks to determine accurately the measure and kind of affirmation they imply. They all affirm something with respect to some proposition or thing. In many minds, without doubt, their meanings run close together, and become indiscriminate and confused; and especially this is so of all those which follow after the first term or phrase.

How determine between knowledges and beliefs? How shall we determine which of our concepts are knowledges, which beliefs, and which mere unfounded fancies?

There are certain particulars in which they all agree. They alike imply the presence in the mind of defined conceptions. They each and severally imply a degree of conviction that the concept represents some truth. They each express an affirming act or state of the mind with respect to the concept, or the object which it represents.

Wherein do they differ? It is usual to answer simply in this respect: that one term, the first in the series, expresses absolute certainty of the truth of the affirmation; the other

terms express a variable degree of uncertainty. It cannot be doubted that in ordinary this is the actual differentiation. But since the act of belief may include absolute certainty, to the exclusion of all doubt, as it often does, and the term knowledge can rise no higher in this respect, the mere feeling of certainty cannot, after all, be the adequate discrimination or differentiation, for both include it. There must be some still deeper ground.

What is that deeper ground? It often occurs that what we think we know, as well as what we believe without any conscious doubt (and there is no doubt below conscious-^{Is certainty}ness), turns out not to be true. We evidently did not ^{knowledge?} know in the case; we certainly did believe, in the very strongest sense of the term, or in the highest degree. The falsity of the conviction determines the absence of knowledge, but does not change the fact of belief. Certainty did not denote knowledge. We must find some other ground or condition to denote knowing or knowledge. It is not the equivalent of the most absolute certainty. Knowledge does include certainty, but certainty does not imply, and is not the equivalent of, knowledge.

When we affirm knowledge of a thing, we do not, then, mean simply that we have a subjective feeling of certainty, but, further, that we are in such relations to the reality that it is impossible that it should turn out contrary to our subjective certainty. The truth of the concept is a necessary concomitant of the knowing act. A belief may be contrary to the truth, but knowledge cannot be.

To determine when we have knowledge, we must go beyond mere subjective certainty, therefore, to the conditions under which that certainty takes possession of us, and the conditions determine whether or not it is knowledge.

When we define knowledge, or knowing, to be that state or act of the mind arising from its relation to an object, in which

it determines that a thing is as it appears to it to be, and may not by possibility be different, its own act being necessitated from its own nature and relations to the object, this is not, as is sometimes assumed, limiting knowledge, or the power of knowing to necessary truths. There are necessary truths, and they may be known as such. In such case the mind stands in such relations to necessary truths as necessitates it to affirm, not only that they are truths, but necessary truths. There are things which are just as true as necessary truths, but they might not have been true; there was no necessity that they should exist: the very opposite might have been true. But when the mind knows these unnecessary truths to be true, they are discovered to be as really true as if it had forever been impossible they should be otherwise: and the mind, in given relations, is as much necessitated to affirm their truth, with the certainty that it cannot now be otherwise, as it would be if it discovered that they themselves were what they are by an eternal necessity. When the act of knowing takes place, that which is known *is*, and it is *now* impossible that it should not be. It might not have been—but when it *is*, it is impossible that it should not be; for that would be the contradiction of affirming that that which is, possibly is not. This is not the same as affirming that whatever is could not have been otherwise; but, being, it cannot not be; and being known to be, it cannot not be, or be different. What has been and what is, is now fixed by eternal necessity as having been or being. A thing once known to be, becomes an eternalized fact, and it now never can be, that it was not. The thing may pass away, but it can never cease to be true that it was as known. What will be will be, though there is no present causal necessity that it should be.

“Necessary truths are such as are known independently of inductive proof. They are, therefore, either self-evident propo-

sitions or deduced from self-evident propositions." * "Necessary truths are those by which we not only learn that the proposition is true, but *see* that it must be true; ^{Necessary truths, what?} in which the negative is not only false, but impossible; in which we cannot, even by an effort of the imagination or in supposition, conceive the reverse of what is asserted. The relations of numbers are examples of such truths. Two and three make five. We cannot conceive it to be otherwise.

"A necessary truth, or law of reason, is a truth or law the opposite of which is inconceivable, contradictory, nonsensical, impossible; more shortly, it is a truth in the fixing of which nature had only *one* alternative, be it positive or negative. Nature might have fixed that the sun should go round the earth, instead of the earth round the sun; at least we see nothing in that supposition which is contradictory and absurd. Either alternative was equally possible. But nature could not have fixed that two straight lines should, in any circumstance, inclose a space, for this involves a contradiction." †

"Contingent truths are those which, without doing violence to reason, we may conceive to be otherwise. If I say, 'Socrates was a philosopher,' I assert a propo- ^{Contingent truths, what?} sition which is true, but need not have been so. There are truths of reason and truths of fact. Truths of reason are necessary, and their contradictory is impossible; those of fact are contingent, and their opposite possible. When a truth is necessary, you can find the reason by analysis, resolving it into ideas and truths more simple, till you come to what is primitive." ‡

Knowing is not the same as, or the equivalent of, not doubting, since we are conscious often of being in a state of non-doubt about a point which turns out to be otherwise. It is not simply, therefore, certainty that the thing is, as assumed, but

* Whately, "Logic," appendix.

† Kidd, "Principles of Reasoning."

‡ Leibnitz.

certainty arising from the relations of the mind to the object; in other words, it is a certainty which cannot be reversed or viewed by the mind as possible to be changed into uncertainty. It is the mind seeing, not surmising, not inferring, not believing.

The mind may be so related to a fact or thing which is perfectly contingent, that is, whose existence was at one time not at all necessary, but which has become reality, as to know its reality, or the truth that it is, as fully as it knows necessary truths. In the one case it sees that the thing is necessarily true, and was and will be so found; in the other case it knows that the fact or thing is, and affirms, with no difference of necessity, as to its own law of action, and is no more capable of taking a different view, or being made to doubt, in the one case than in the other. I know that I exist, and that the world exists, as surely as I know that a part is less than the whole. The one characteristic of knowledge holds in all knowing—it is simply the mind seeing its object in such manner that doubt is impossible. It cannot be said to know any thing of which it is possible to bring it to feel that it may be otherwise. That admitted possibility would show that it only believed, and did not know.

“Knowledge is the perception of truth. Whatever the mind perceives, whether intuitively or discursively, to be true, that it knows. We have immediate knowledge of all the facts of consciousness; and with regard to other matters, some we can demonstrate, some we can prove analogically, some we must admit or involve ourselves in contradictions and absurdities. Whatever process the mind may institute, if it arrives at a clear perception that a thing is, then that thing is an object of knowledge. It is thus we know the objects with which heaven and earth are crowded. It is thus we know our fellow-men. With regard to any thing without

Hodge's definition of knowledge.

us, when our ideas or convictions concerning it correspond to what the thing really is, then we know it.* How do we know that our dearest friend has a soul, and that that soul has intelligence, moral excellence, and power? We cannot see or feel it. We cannot form a mental image of it. It is mysterious and incomprehensible, yet we know that it is, and what it is, just as certainly as we know that we ourselves are, and what we are. In the same way we know that God is, and what he is. We know that he is a spirit, that he has intelligence, moral excellence, and power to an infinite degree. We know that he can love, pity, and pardon—that he can hear and answer prayer. We know God in the same sense, and just as certainly, as we know our father or mother. And no man can take this knowledge from us, or persuade us that it is not knowledge, but a mere irrational belief.”†

We cannot but think that this definition of the great doctor is open to serious objections. While we do not doubt that the matters herein said to be known are in themselves true, the account given of the knowing act is inconsequent, and contrary to reality.

How do we differentiate believing from knowing? We know the difference. Any intelligent child knows the difference, but it might be difficult for many, with trained minds, to express it, and still more difficult to fix a precise point of demarcation, so as to say, this is knowledge, this is belief.

As indicated already, there are several words that represent states or acts of mind which have traces of resemblance, but which are distinct—knowledge, belief, opinion, conjecture,

* A thing might correspond with our concept of it, and yet it might not be knowledge. The correspondence does not alone determine that it is a knowledge. It must be a correspondence arising under right conditions, or otherwise it may be the mere accident of a conjecture.

† Hodge's "Systematic Theology," vol. i, p. 360.

fancy. The extremes are wide apart and easy to be distinguished, but there is a certain confluence of idea throughout.

There are some things in common : in each of these states, and
 Things in com- alike, the mind has an object of thought ; in each,
 mon between the mind affirms definitely of the object ; in each, the
 knowing and believing. mind is more or less confident that its affirmation is true. These are points of resemblance. There is one point of identity—it is the same mind employed in all the cases.

Wherein, then, is the difference? (*a.*) It is not in the fact that the object is more clearly before the mind in the one case than the other. There is no doubt that matters of belief are generally more indistinct than matters of knowledge ; but this is not necessarily so. A proposition may be as unequivocal as any reality. (*b.*) It is not in the fact that the mind is more conscious of doubt or uncertainty in the one case than in the other. There is no question that doubt and uncertainty more or less attaches to beliefs, and that they neither can nor do exist with regard to knowledges ; but a belief may and often does exclude all doubt. (*c.*) It is not in the fact that what is known is true, and what is believed is not true. It is a fact that, what is believed is not always true, and what is known always is ; but, since some things believed are true, the difference is not in that which may be, and sometimes is, common to both states. (*d.*) It does not consist in that, what is known is important, and what is believed is not important. The difference is found in the following points: 1.) The mind is differently related to the objects of knowledge and belief. This difference of relation makes knowledge a necessary fact in one case, and impossible in another, and belief possible in one case and
 Difference be- not in another. 2.) Things known are necessarily
 tween know- true as known ; things believed may not be true.
 ing and believ- 3.) Things known cannot be doubted ; things be-
 ing. lieved may be brought into doubt. 4.) Knowledge cannot be

changed into belief; belief may pass into knowledge. 5.) There is no difference in the certainty which attends knowledge; there is a difference in the certainty which attends belief.

I introduce here several definitions from high authorities, that we may see the term in every possible angle of vision. It is important not simply to know the difference between knowing and believing, in a general way, but to find the precise boundary—the point where one begins and the other ends. Day, in his “*Outlines of Ontological Science*,” says: “Gradations of knowledge * are measured off in the relative strength of conviction or the knowing act when the judgment is substantial and not empty form, and when its supports are true and real. These degrees of conviction shade into one another, and allow no determinate line of separation. The lowest of these grades is conjecture, or guess.† Here the judgment has just passed out of the realm of doubt, and taken into itself a measure of real life, while at the same time it rests on solid, not illusory, grounds.

“A higher degree is opinion or belief. The conviction of the judgment here is weak because of the insufficiency of the light. The grounds are real, but not adequate to the firmest assurance.”‡ This is a statement of belief, but not of knowledge. “A still higher degree is certainty of knowledge. Here the judgment moves forth in fullness of light on substantial grounds, and, therefore, attains the strength of unfailing assurance.” This is knowledge.

“Knowledge,” says Locke, “is the perception of the connection and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy, of any of

* There are no gradations of knowledge. What is known is known. All knowledge has all that constitutes knowing—no knowledge has anything more.

† What confusion of thought is implied in a statement which makes mere guess a grade of knowledge!

‡ Day’s “*Outlines of Ontological Science*,” p. 56.

our ideas. Where this perception is, there is knowledge ; and where it is not, then, though we may fancy, guess, or believe, we always come short of knowledge ;* and in chapter xiv he says, "The mind has two faculties conversant about truth and falsehood : First, Knowledge, whereby it certainly perceives and is undoubtedly satisfied of the agreement or disagreement of any ideas ; second, Judgment, which is the putting ideas together or separating them from one another, in the mind, when their certain agreement or disagreement is not perceived, but presumed to be so." Knowledge is here opposed to opinion. But judgment is the faculty by which we attain to certainty as well as to opinion. "And," says Dr. Reid,† "I know no authority, besides that of Mr. Locke, for calling knowledge a faculty, any more than for calling opinion a faculty."

"Knowledge implies three things : 1. Firm Belief ;‡ 2. Of what is true ; 3. On sufficient grounds. If any one, for example, is in doubt respecting one of Euclid's demonstrations, he cannot be said to *know* the proposition proved by it ; if, again, he is fully *convinced* of any thing that is not true, he is mistaken in supposing himself to know it ; lastly, if two persons are each *fully confident*, one, that the moon is inhabited, and the other that it is not (though one of these opinions must be true), neither of them could properly be said to *know* the truth, since he cannot have sufficient proof of it."§ Knowledge supposes three terms : a *being* who knows, an *object* known, and a *relation* determined between the knowing being and the known object. This relation properly constitutes knowledge.

But this relation may not be exact—not in conformity with

* Locke's "Essay on the Human Understanding," book iv, chap. i.

† "Intellectual Powers," Essay iv, chap. iii.

‡ Knowledge excludes belief. What is known by the mind cannot be reduced to any kind of belief.

§ Whately, "Logic," book iv, chap. ii, sec. 2.

the nature of things ; knowledge is not truth. Knowledge is a subjective conception—a relative state of the human mind ; it resides in the relation, essentially ideal, of our thought and its object. Truth, on the contrary, is the reality itself, the reality ontological and absolute, considered in their absolute relations with intelligence, and independent of our personal conception. Truth has its source in God ; knowledge proceeds from man. Knowledge is true and perfect from the moment that our conception is really conformable to that which is—from the moment that our thought has seized the reality. And, in this view, truth may be defined to be the conformity of our thought with the nature of its object.

“But truth is not yet certitude. It may exist in itself without being acquired by the human mind, without existing actually for us. It does not become certain to us till we have acquired it by the employment of method. Certitude is thus truth brought methodically to the human intelligence—that is, conducted from principle to principle to a point which is evident of itself. If such a point exist, it is plain that we can attain to all the truths which attach themselves to it directly or indirectly ; and that we may have of these truths, however remote, a certainty as complete as that of the point of departure.”

“Certitude, then, in its last analysis, is the relation of truth to knowledge, the relation of man to God, of ontology to psychology. When the human intelligence, making its spring, has seized divine truth in identifying itself with the reality, it ought then, in order to finish its work, to return upon itself, to individualize the truth in us ; and from this individualization results the certitude which becomes, in some sort, personal as knowledge, all the while preserving the impersonal nature of truth.”

“Certitude, then, reposes upon two points of support, the one subjective—man or the human consciousness—the other

objective and absolute—the Supreme Being. God and consciousness are the two arbiters of certitude.” *

“The schoolmen divided all human knowledge into two species, *cognitio intuitiva* and *cognitio abstractiva*. By intuitive knowledge they signified that which we gain by an immediate presentation of the real individual object; by abstractive, that which we gain and hold through the medium of a general term; the one being, in modern language, a perception, the other a concept.” †

Leibnitz took a distinction between knowledge as *intuitive* or *symbolical*. When I behold a triangle actually delineated, and think of it as a figure with three sides and three angles, etc., according to the idea of it in my mind, my knowledge is *intuitive*. But when I use the word triangle, and know what it means without explicating all that is contained in the idea of it, my knowledge is blind or *symbolical*. ‡

“A thing is known immediately or proximately when we cognize it *in itself*; mediately or remotely when we cognize it *in or through something numerically different from itself*. Immediate cognition, thus the knowledge of a thing in itself, involves the *fact* of its existence; mediate cognition, thus the knowledge of a thing in or through something not itself, involves only the *possibility* of its existence.

“An immediate cognition, inasmuch as the thing known is itself presented to observation, may be called a *presentative*; and inasmuch as the thing presented is, as it were, viewed by the mind face to face, may be called an *intuitive* cognition. A mediate cognition, inasmuch as the thing known is held up or mirrored to the mind in a vicarious representation, may be called a *representative* cognition.

* Tiberghien, “Essai des Connais. Hum.,” p. 34.

† Morell, “Psychology,” p. 158.

‡ Leibnitz, “De Cognitione,” etc.: Wolf, “Psychology Empirical,” sec. 286, 289.

“A thing known is an object of knowledge.

“In a *presentative* or immediate cognition, there is one sole object, the thing immediately known and the thing existing being one and the same. In a *representative* or mediate cognition there may be discriminated two objects—the thing immediately known and the thing existing being numerically different.

“A thing known in itself is the (sole) presentative or intuitive object of knowledge, or the (sole) object of a presentative or intuitive knowledge. A thing known in and through something else is the primary, mediate, remote, real, existent, or represented object of (mediate) knowledge—*objectum quod*; and a thing through which something else is known, is the secondary, immediate, proximate, ideal, vicarious, or representative object of (mediate) knowledge—*objectum quo* or *per quod*. The former may likewise be styled *objectum entitativum*.” *

Knowledge, in respect of the mode in which it is obtained, is *intuitive* or *discursive*; *intuitive* when things are seen in themselves by the mind, or when objects are so clearly exhibited that there is no need of reasoning to perceive them, as a whole is greater than any of its parts; *discursive*, when objects are perceived by means of reasoning, as, the sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles. In respect of its strength, knowledge is *certain* or *probable*. If we attend to the degrees or ends of knowledge, it is either science, or art, or experience, or opinion, or belief.

“Knowledge is not a couch whereon to rest a searching and restless spirit, or a terrace for a wandering and variable mind to walk up and down with a fair prospect, or a tower of state for a proud mind to raise itself upon, or a fort or commanding ground for strife and contention, or a shop for profit or sale, but a rich store-house for the glory of the Creator and the relief of man’s estate.” †

* Sir W. Hamilton, “Reid’s Works,” note B, sec. 1.

† Bacon.

“Sometimes the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately by themselves, without the intervention of any other; and this, I think, we may call *intuitive* knowledge. For in this the mind is at no pains of proving or examining, but perceives the truth, as the eye doth the light, only by being directed toward it. Thus the mind perceives that white is not black, that a circle is not a triangle, that three are more than two, and equal to one and two.” *

“What we know or comprehend as soon as we perceive or attend to it, we are said to know by *intuition*; things that we know by *intuition* cannot be made more certain by arguments than they are at first. We know by *intuition* that all the parts of a thing together are equal to the whole of it. Axioms are propositions known by *intuition*.” †

“Intuition has been applied by Dr. Beattie and others, not only to the power by which we perceive the truth of the axioms of geometry, but to that by which we recognize the authority of the fundamental laws of belief, when we hear them enunciated in language. My only objection to this use of the word is, that it is a departure from common practice, according to which, if I be not mistaken, the proper objects of intuition are propositions analogous to the axioms prefixed to Euclid’s Elements. In some other respects this innovation might, perhaps, be regarded as an improvement on the very limited and imperfect vocabulary of which we are able to avail ourselves in our present discussions.” ‡

“Intuition is properly attributed, and should be carefully restricted, to those instinctive faculties and impulses, external and internal, which act instantaneously and irresistibly, which were given by nature as the first inlets of all knowledge, and

* Locke, “Essay on the Human Understanding,” book iv, chap. ii.

† Taylor, “Elements of Thought.”

‡ Stewart, “Elements,” part ii, chap. i, sec. 2.

which we have called the Primary Principles, while self-evidence may be justly and properly attributed to axioms, as the Secondary Principles of truth." *

On the difference between knowledge as *intuitive*, *immediate*, or *presentative*, and as *mediate* or *representative*, see Sir W. Hamilton, "Reid's Works," note B.

"Intuition is used in the extent of the German *anschauung*, to include all the products of the perceptive (external or internal) and imaginative faculties; every act of consciousness, in short, of which the immediate object is an individual thing, state, or act of mind, presented under the condition of distinct existence in space or time." †

"Besides its original and proper meaning (as a visual perception), it has been employed to denote a kind of apprehension and a kind of judgment. Under the former head it has been used to denote, 1. A perception of the actual and present, in opposition to the abstractive knowledge which we have of the possible in imagination and of the past in memory. 2. An immediate apprehension of a thing in itself, in contrast to a representative, vicarious, or mediate apprehension of it, in or through something else. (Hence by Fichte, Schelling, and others *intuition* is employed to designate the *cognition*, as opposed to the *conception*, of the absolute.) 3. The knowledge which we can adequately represent in imagination, in contradistinction to the 'symbolical' knowledge which we cannot image, but only think or conceive, through and under a sign or word. (Hence, probably, Kant's application of the terms to the forms of the sensibility, the imaginations of time and space, in contrast to the forms or categories of the understanding.) 4. Perception proper (the objective) in contrast to sensation proper (the subjective), in our sensitive consciousness. 5. The

* Tatham, "Chart and Scale of Truth," chap. vii, sec. 1.

† Mansel, "Prolegom. Logica," p. 9. Also see Appendix: Note A.

simple apprehension of a notion, in contradistinction to the complex apprehension of the terms of a proposition.

“Under the latter head it has only a single signification, namely, to denote the immediate affirmative by the intellect; the predicate does or does not pertain to the subject in what are called self-evident propositions.” *

SECTION V.—BELIEF DISTINGUISHED FROM KNOWLEDGE.

“Belief, assent, conviction, are words which I do not think admit of logical definition, because the operation of mind signified by them is perfectly simple and of its own kind. *Belief* must have an object; for he who believes must believe something, and that which he believes is the object of his belief. *Belief* is always expressed in language by a proposition wherein something is affirmed or denied. *Belief* admits of all degrees, from the slightest suspicion to the fullest assurance. There are many operations of mind of which it is an essential ingredient, as consciousness, perception, remembrance. We give the name of evidence to whatever is a ground of *belief*. What this evidence is, is more easily felt than described. The common occasions of life lead us to distinguish evidence into different kinds; such as the evidence of sense, of memory, of consciousness, of testimony, of axioms, and of reasoning. I am not able to find any common nature to which they may all be reduced. They seem to me to agree only in this, that they are all fitted by nature to produce belief in the human mind.” †

“St. Austin accurately says, ‘We *know* what rests upon reason; we *believe* what rests upon authority.’ But reason itself must rest at last upon authority; for the original data of reason do not rest upon reason, but are necessarily accepted by reason on the authority of what is beyond itself. These data

* Sir W. Hamilton, “Reid’s Works,” note A, sec. 5, p. 759.

† Reid, “Intell. Powers,” Essay ii, chap. xx, and “Inquiry,” chap. xx, sec. 5.

are, therefore, in rigid propriety, *beliefs* or *trusts*. Thus it is that in the last resort we must, perforce, philosophically admit that belief is the primary condition of reason, and not reason the ultimate ground of belief. We are compelled to surrender the proud *intellige ut credas* of Abelard, to content ourselves with the humble *crede ut intelligas* of Anselm." *

"To believe is to admit a thing as true, on grounds sufficient, *subjectively*; insufficient, *objectively*." †

"The word believing has been variously and loosely employed. It is frequently used to denote states of consciousness which have already their separate and appropriate appellations. Thus it is sometimes said, 'I believe in my own existence and the existence of an external world; I believe in the facts of nature, the axioms of geometry, the affections of my own mind,' as well as 'I believe in the testimony of witnesses, or in the evidence of historical documents.' "

"Setting aside the loose application of the term, I propose to confine it, first, to the effect on the mind of the premises in what is termed probable reasoning, or what I have named contingent reasoning—in a word, the premises of all reasoning but that which is demonstrative; and, secondly, to the state of holding true when that state, far from being the effect of any premises discerned by the mind, is dis severed from all evidence." ‡

"I propose to restrict the term *belief* to the assent to propositions, and demarcate it from those inferences which are made in the presence of objects, and have reference to them. I would say, we *believe* in the proposition 'fire burns,' but *know* the fact that the paper about to be thrust into the flames will ignite." §

* Sir William Hamilton, "Reid's Works," note A, sec. 5.

† Kant, "Crit. de la Rais. Prat.," p. 11.

‡ Bailey, "Letters on the Philosophy of the Human Mind," p. 75.

§ Lewes, "Biograph. Hist. of Philosophy," p. 492.

“Man knows some things and is ignorant of many things, while he is in doubt as to other things. *Doubt* is that state of mind in which we hesitate as to two contradictory conclusions—having no preponderance of evidence in favor of either. Philosophical doubt has been distinguished as *provisional* or *definitive*. Definitive doubt is skepticism. Provisional, methodical doubt, is a voluntary suspending of our judgment for a time, in order to come to a more clear and sure conclusion. This was first given as a rule in philosophical method by Descartes, who tells us that he began by doubting every thing, discharging his mind of all preconceived ideas, and admitting none as clear and true till he had subjected them to a rigorous examination.

“Doubt is some degree of belief, along with the consciousness of ignorance, in regard to a proposition. Absolute *disbelief* implies knowledge; it is the knowledge that such or such a thing is not true. If the mind admits a proposition without any desire for knowledge concerning it, this is *credulity*. If it is open to receive the proposition, but feels ignorance concerning it, this is *doubt*. In proportion as knowledge increases doubt diminishes, and belief or disbelief strengthens.” *

“The essential idea of *opinion* seems to be, that it is a matter about which doubt can reasonably exist—as to which two persons can, without absurdity, think differently. . . . Any proposition, the contrary of which can be maintained with probability, is matter of opinion.” †

“According to the last of these definitions, matter of opinion is opposed, not to matter of fact, but to matter of *certainty*. Thus the death of Charles I. is a *fact*—his authorship of Eikon Basilike an *opinion*. It is also used, however, to denote knowledge acquired by inference, as opposed to that ac-

* Taylor, “Elements of Thought.”

† Sir G. C. Lewis, “Essay on Opinion,” pp. 1, 4.

quired by perception. Thus, that the moon gives light is matter of fact; that it is inhabited or uninhabited is matter of opinion.

“It has been proposed to discard from philosophical use these ambiguous expressions, and to divide knowledge, according to its sources, into matter of *perception* and matter of *inference*; and, as a cross division as to our conviction, into matter of certainty and matter of doubt.” *

“*Holding for true*, or the subjective validity of a judgment in relation to conviction (which is, at the same time, objectively valid), has the three following degrees: *opinion*, *belief*, and *knowledge*. *Opinion* is a consciously insufficient judgment, subjectively as well as objectively. *Belief* is subjectively sufficient, but is recognized as being objectively insufficient. Knowledge is both subjectively and objectively sufficient. Subjective sufficiency is termed *conviction* (for myself); objective sufficiency is termed *certainty* (for all).” †

“What is the real distinction between knowledge on the one hand, and opinions, assumption, and beliefs on the other? Opinions, beliefs, etc., we answer, may and do change their character. An individual may hold one opinion on a given subject at one time and the opposite at another. Science may forever displace from the sphere of thought and belief an opinion which was once universally held as valid. Real knowledge, on the other hand, never changes. When you know an object, your apprehension of it, just so far as you do know it, becomes permanently fixed. Any change, enlargement excepted, would imply that the object was not known.” ‡

“Knowledge implies a subject knowing and a reality known (objective or subjective). The knowledge is the rela-

* “Edinburgh Review,” April, 1850, p. 311.

† Meiklejohn, “Translation of Critique of Pure Reason,” p. 498.

‡ Mahan, “Ingham Lectures,” pp. 111, 112.

tion between them. Both a subject knowing and a reality known are essential to knowledge; if either is wanting knowledge is impossible. This is the first law of thought.

“Knowledge is always the knowledge of reality. This is of its essence; if it is not the knowledge of reality, it is not knowledge. The validity or reality of knowledge is essential to the idea of knowledge. Knowledge is the intellectual equivalent of some reality.

“The act of the mind in knowing is a primitive act incapable of analytical definition. It cannot be explained any more than light can be illuminated. It is the inexplicable act by which the mind takes up a reality into itself as an intuition, an apprehension, an idea in some intellectual equivalent, and knows it. We can declare the conditions, physiological or others, under which knowledge arises; we can analyze the process by which the mind attains it. But the mental act itself, by which an object external and unknown suddenly stands clear and definite within the intelligence, remains a mystery. And all physiological facts as to its connection with molecular action of the brain leave it as mysterious as ever.

“What knowledge is, is known in the act of knowing, and known only in the act of knowing. That it is knowledge is known also in the act of knowing. My certainty of a reality is simply my consciousness of knowing, which, whether attended to or not, is essential in every act of knowledge. ‘I know that I know,’ means no more than I know. Otherwise every act of knowledge would be conditioned on an act preceding, and knowledge would fail in a vain regression along an infinite series.” *

If there is a radical difference between knowing and believing, there is also a difference in qualities of belief. In its highest form belief is inferior to knowledge; but there is a quality

* Harris, “Philosophical Basis of Theism,” p. 10.

of belief which rises to the dignity of knowledge in respect of authority.

Belief is that state or act of the mind which arises when it stands in such relations to objects as, while inadequate to produce knowledge, are adequate to create a conviction that the reality is this or that, and to compel the mind so to affirm. The affirmation is made with the consciousness that it is beyond what is known, but not without a degree of evidence that it is true. The evidence, while not of the kind which eventuates in knowing, may be of such quality as to compel the mind to affirm in a certain way. The af-^{Belief, what?}firmation, necessitated by the laws of the mind, may or may not be according to reality.

“Belief is the determination of the mind to accept, as actual fact or as actual existence, on the grounds of probable evidence, whatever the compulsory reason has declared to be possible; that is, has shown to be non-contradictory.” *

The mind has no such relation to the object as to enable it to predicate with absolute certainty, but it has such relations that it cannot be true to its rational nature without affirming that the reality seems to be this or that, and, to its thinking, the truth is this or that. The conviction arising, while it excludes doubt and may compel the affirmation, yet may not be according to truth. There is no possibility of knowing that a belief is true which does not lift it out of the categories of belief into those of knowledge. In the matters of belief reached by the most rational processes, that is, by the best use of the reason, the mind does not come into direct relations to the object, as in knowing, but only into direct relations with some other things which point to the reality of the matters of belief. In order to rational belief, the matter to be believed must be apprehended in thought, and there must be some other known

* Ferrier, “Institutes of Metaphysic,” p. 318.

or assumed known realities which point to the unknown object which is matter of belief. Evidence, to be of any value, must be known, and the inference logical. Thus in rational belief the mind feels outward from some known reality or realities to some unknown reality. It is *known* that the known realities indicate something—the mind sees that they do not stand alone—there are inevitable implications, but what, cannot be known, but by a process the mind construes them, and posits their existence as matter of belief. They may be so, or possibly not. The affirmation of them is rational belief, which is only saying that they seem legitimate, and the mind, acting according to its rational law, is compelled to affirm them.

An object is before the mind—a thing, a principle, or a fact—a mental process of inquiry is immediately awakened as to the what, the when, the where, the whence, the why, the how. If these can be determined in such form as to content the mind, an assured belief ensues; if not, doubt remains. The mind may not be able to reach knowledge; but, from known facts, it can reach what seems to be a reasonable inference with greater or less assurance of its probable correctness—this is belief. Say the object is a tree, the problem is its species, its habitat, its history, its uses, its nature, its availability for art or medicine or food or ornament or something of the kind; the inquiry may result in knowledge, or mere belief, or doubt; so of any reality. Thus all reality that may come before the mind, after being known in part, may suggest questions which may either be brought within the domain of enlarged knowledge, or, if not, may lead to rational beliefs, or may be beyond the boundaries both of knowledge and rational belief, and stand as mere vague conjectures, or as a *terra incognita*, over whose bosom of obscurity not even a conjecture ventures a flight.

Among the reasoned beliefs, that is, such as stand in proof, ought to be classed all that have proof, even though they may

not have been apprehended by individual minds. Ignorance in individual cases ought not to work discredit to truth itself. All truths for which proof has been found and alleged, whatever the prevailing ignorance concerning them, deserve to stand among rational beliefs. They are such beliefs as have proof for their support, and the proof has been apprehended and the rational induction has been made. Should the proofs be destroyed so as to be irrecoverable, the truth would have to be relegated to the inferior class of unsupported conjectures.

There are beliefs that are not of this high kind; they do not arise under any such conditions; the reason is not a factor of them; they may be just as strong or much stronger, and they may be true; but they are held upon entirely different grounds. There may be the same, or even more, proof in the case, but the proof has never been considered. In the former case the belief results from a rational process—the examination of certain facts which are before the mind. In the other, it is an imbibed idea, for the grounds of which the mind gives no account to itself, and for which there may be no real grounds, or no such discoverable grounds, as that it would act irrationally not to have the belief. In each case, the lower form, as much as the higher, there is belief, but the difference in the grounds carries a difference into the quality and value of the act. The truth may be in the lower as in the higher form, but this circumstance does not give to it the same worthiness, or rational or moral significance, as it would possess if the grounds or reasons of it were apprehended. But this is not saying that the ultimate value of a belief depends exclusively on the rationality of the process by which it has been reached. This would not follow. The ultimate value depends on its conformity to truth, and its possible verification by rational processes, more than upon the question whether the mind

Reasoned beliefs.

Unreasoned beliefs.

holding it has reached it through those processes. It must be susceptible of proof to give it worthiness, but it may be imbibed without the process of proof. Its contents are the same in either case, and its real grounds the same, but one mind has it as a reasoned truth, and the other as an unreasoned truth. Its beneficial influences may be substantially the same in one case as the other.

Among the unreasoned beliefs, as to the individual mind, are all such as are inherited, as rest on traditions, as are accepted on authority without examining the validity of the authority, and all others the proof of which has not passed before the individual mind. Among the unreasoned beliefs, in general, are all such as have no ground of proof, whatever, that can be alleged by any mind. These, of course, are groundless, and entitled to no consideration.

There has been a long and wordy controversy among the philosophers on the point whether knowledge is precedent to belief, or otherwise. Some taking ground with Abelard, "*intelligo ut credam*;" others with Anselm, "*credo ut intelligam*." It is not an unimportant point.

A strict analysis of the operations of the mind will show the order of mental movement to be, first, a knowing, then a believing. Before there can be belief with respect to an object of

Does knowl-
edge antedate
belief?

thought, it must be known to exist in thought; if the object is a thing it must be known to exist as a thing.

A presupposition and concomitant of every belief is knowing in some form—either knowledge of the subject or object, or both. If all knowing rested on belief, knowing, in the ultimate, would be nothing different from belief, for if belief must precede knowing, and be the ground, wherein does knowing rise higher than believing, or in any sense differ from it? In a given case knowledge is asserted, as, for instance, that I exist; what belief lies back of the knowing, and is ground of it? Is

it belief that consciousness cannot be deceived or deceive us? Then, to formulate according to the facts, I must state that I believe that I exist, for the reason that I believe that consciousness does not deceive me. Then I do not know that I exist, or, knowing is only another name for believing. But what about consciousness itself? Do I only believe that there is such a thing as consciousness? Do I only believe that I think, feel, will? Do I only believe that I, who think, feel, believe, am a real being?

The foundation of the superstructure of thought is knowledge—a knowing mind, knowing itself to be, knowing its own thoughts, feelings, volitions, and knowing other beings, facts, and first truths. On these, and out of the materials furnished by them, the mind constructs the fabric of many-sided speculations and beliefs. These primary data of knowledge are all that give any substantial basis of value to our beliefs. The theory which builds the structure of thought on the quicksands of mere belief is pure agnosticism. The order is not from belief to knowledge, but from knowledge to belief. We know some things, and from this starting-point come, by a process of reasoning, to believe much that we do not know.

This is the view of Dr. McCosh. He says: “According to this account we are said to know ourselves, and the objects presented to the senses, and the representations (always, however, as presentations) in the mind, but to believe in objects which we have seen in time past, but which are not now present, and in objects which we have never seen, and even especially in objects which we can never know, such as an Infinite God. The mind seems to begin not with faith, but with cognition. It sets out with the knowledge of an external object presented to it, and with a knowledge of self contemplating that object. I cannot, then, agree with those who maintain that faith—I mean natural faith (belief)—must precede knowledge. I hold

that knowledge, psychologically considered, appears first, and then faith. But around our original cognitions there grows and clusters a body of prime beliefs which go out far beyond our personal knowledge. Knowledge is, after all, the root; but from this stalk and mere earthly grounds there spring beliefs which mount, in living power and in lovely form and color, toward the sky." *

Dr. Mark Hopkins says: "'All knowledge,' says Calderwood, 'rests on faith.' In the very exercise of its power of knowledge the mind rests on the belief that our sense and consciousness are trustworthy, and not deceptive, witnesses. In contemplating and comparing objects all knowledge is accepted and arranged on the conviction that a thing cannot be and not be at the same time. Through all the varieties of thought, feeling, and volition we believe in our own identity.

"In these passages we have the four words, to which I call your attention: knowledge, belief, faith, consciousness. And first of the first three. In the passage quoted we have faith identified with belief, as is constantly done by Hamilton, Mansel, and others of that school. They identify faith with belief, and their knowledge is made to rest upon it. But to one using terms in their ordinary sense, what can be more confusing than this? By all ordinary usage knowledge is a stronger word than belief, and yet the stronger is made to rest on the weaker. I *know* what happened yesterday; I yet do not know that I am the same person to-day that I was yesterday. . . . Again, it is said by Dr. Calderwood, that 'the province of faith is much more extensive than that of knowledge. . . . Belief affords a foundation for knowledge, and at the same time stretches far beyond it.' In its ordinary sense belief does indeed stretch far beyond knowledge, but only as it gathers a shade of uncertainty, whereas, as used by Dr. Calder-

* "Intuitions of the Mind," pp. 198, 199.

wood, belief can stretch far beyond knowledge only as it is more certain. With this view of Dr. Calderwood many philosophers coincide. Sir Wm. Hamilton says: 'In the order of nature belief always precedes knowledge.' Professor Christlieb says: 'All knowledge is, in the last instance, conditioned by faith, and faith (that is, an act of belief) is the preliminary and the medium of every act of intelligence. . . . It is by the direct testimony of our own minds that we are convinced of the fact that we exist, think, walk, and dream, and this fact neither needs nor is capable of proof. We merely *believe* it. The certainty of our thinking depends simply on an act of belief.'

"Now it seems to me," says Dr. Hopkins, "that in all this these great men have greatly perplexed a simple subject. For what is it? I agree with President Porter, that to know is to be certain of something. I stick a stake there. I insist upon it that we must have certainty to begin with, or we can never have a right to begin. If, therefore, to know is to be certain, then whatever gives us certainty gives us knowledge, and nothing else does. We know only so far as we are certain. So far as we are certain we know. That there are different modes of attaining certainty I agree. We may be certain of our personal identity, or that a thing cannot be and not be at the same time, by the necessary action of our faculties. Than this no certainty can be greater. . . . There may also be certainty through the senses and through the operation of the understanding; but however it may come, I hold that certainty reached by a rational being in any way constitutes knowledge, and that any faith or belief or conviction short of certainty is not knowledge. In the operations of the intellect I admit of no mysticism. The result of these operations, whether necessary or under the control of the will, I divide into two classes. Of some I am certain, and in that certainty is knowledge. Of

others I am not certain, and then I have belief, or opinion with its varying shades. If I am certain, I am bound, as a rational being, to know the grounds of that certainty, and I may not rest and say I am certain till the ground is sufficient. If I hold an opinion I am bound to know the ground of this opinion or belief." *

It is obvious in this entire section that in the mind of Dr. Hopkins, as also in the minds of Drs. Porter and Calderwood, and, indeed, almost all writers on the subject, there is needless confusion on the distinction between knowledge and belief, growing out of a false definition of knowledge either implied or expressed. There is a difference recognized, and in part pointed out, but a fundamental mistake in the definition of knowledge introduces confusion. That mistake is this, defining knowledge to be certainty. Now, if certainty means a feeling of certainty in the mind—that is, a feeling of absolute assurance that the thing is as predicated, that state of mind often exists when the predication turns out false, and thus demonstrates that there was not knowledge in the case, but only a belief which had in it no doubt, for if there had been knowledge there could not have been mistake. Knowledge precludes error. Where error begins knowledge ends. Knowledge, then, is not simple certainty, but it is certainty because of cognition, that is, because the mind stands in such relation to the object as to see its reality, and not simply the ground for believing there is a reality. Calderwood evidently confounds belief of some kind with knowledge. Believing and knowing are two wholly distinct acts of the mind. They are not only not identical, but they are not similar—they cannot co-exist in the same predicate. What is believed is not known, and what is known is not believed. Knowledge describes an act of the mind standing in one relation to the object known,

* Hopkins, "Idea of Mind," pp. 34-36.

in which belief is not a possible act; and believing, describes an act of the mind when standing in a relation to the object which precludes knowledge. To mark the distinction between knowing and believing, it is absolutely necessary not simply to note divers degrees of certainty, but diverse relations between subject and object. The appropriate feeling, and the inevitable feeling for knowledge, is a feeling of certainty, as well as a fact of certainty; but to make it denote knowledge, the feeling must be produced by a certain relation of subject and object, and this relation must be taken into the definition or differentiation between knowing and believing. The feeling of certainty is appropriate also to some beliefs; but however strong it may be, the circumstances mark it as belief and not knowledge. Things believed may be as true as things known; and there may be such apparent truth, that the feeling that they are true will be as positive as if they were known; but the feeling in this case may be a delusion, while in the case of knowledge it cannot be a delusion. It is important clearly to determine what things are known and what believed; and in doing so, it is indispensable to note the circumstances in which the mind stands with relation to objects.

We have endeavored to point out the cases in which the mind knows whereof it predicates, and does not merely believe. The circumstances which determine the predicate to be knowledge make it impossible that it should take the form of belief, and conversely. When Sir William Hamilton says, "in order of nature belief always precedes knowledge," he not only contradicts truth, but contradicts the principles of his own philosophy. Evidently Calderwood displaces knowledge entirely, since he reduces primary cognition, and consciousness itself, to a mere belief. To him things which are perceived to be necessary truths are mere beliefs. What place, then, can the word knowledge have?

Let us lay it down as a principle from which we can never budge, which the mind must forever maintain, and without which it is impossible to determine the value of proof and of predicate alike—that there is a fundamental difference between knowing and believing, so that one act precludes the other. Things known *must* be as known. Things believed *may* be as believed. The assurance of the mind in matters of belief may vary from guess to absolute certainty of feeling. Knowing is always superior to believing, and must, when it takes place, correct and vanquish belief. No one can believe adversely to his knowledge—he may believe beyond it.

But when it is said that knowledge antedates belief, and is necessary as grounds of it, the statement needs to be carefully guarded.

The first act of the mind is one of knowing, beliefs come afterward. A consciousness is felt, a fact is perceived, an object is presented : in each case the mind knows, even though it be not able as yet to formulate the sentence, I know. In process of time it begins to inquire and speculate about these matters of knowledge, and of the what and why ; it has passed from the realm of the known into that of the unknown, both as to subject and object. Henceforth its predications become beliefs, and cease to be knowledges. They may possibly, indeed, be raised into knowledges by change of circumstances, but in most cases remain, and must remain, mere beliefs, based on rational grounds or resting on mere conjecture. If it should be said that in such cases as we have designated knowledges, there is a subsumed belief in the faculties, we must deny. No such mental process takes place. The truth of the faculties is implied, but the mind does not raise the question at all as to whether the faculties are to be credited—does not reason it out and reach the conclusion that they are. The idea of doubt has not entered yet. The whole act is one of assumed knowledge,

and we cannot doubt of real knowledge, proceeding on the unquestioned validity or unimagined invalidity of the faculties. And what is thus primarily known, can never be relegated to doubt or mere belief. It was knowledge at first, it remains knowledge forever. Those convictions only are susceptible of change from certainty to doubt which were hastily classed as knowledges, but which, in fact, were not. The state is one of real cognition, and the mind proceeds upon that unquestioned primary fact. No subsequent inquiry ever changes or modifies that state in any respect, and no subsequent so-called knowledge ever rises into a new or different kind of cognition. The only modification which takes place is to relegate some things supposed to be included in the knowing, but which, in fact, were not, and to open up matters beyond not included in knowledge, but arising out of knowledge as matters of speculation—of possible doubt or uncertainty, or rational belief.

After speculation has been introduced, and by various processes the mind reaches the conclusion that certain things which are consciously not known, nevertheless ought to be believed, this does not at all awaken doubt, or reduce to mere beliefs its antecedent knowledges. They stand intact, not now as inferences from the reliability of the faculties, but as immediate cognitions or deliverances which will admit of no possibility of doubt, and which will acquire no support from *belief* in the faculties, but all support in the simple use of the faculties. In fact, there is no better distinction between knowledge and belief than to say that knowledge is that state or exercise of the mind in which the faculties act directly on their objects, perceiving or being conscious of them as real; while belief is that act of the faculties, resulting from their unquestioned validity, which conceives or accepts that as true which is brought before them mediately or inferentially, and which always and necessarily presupposes knowledge as its

Knowledge
goes before
belief.

antecedent and ground. That back-lying known is not an inference, and never can take on it for a moment, in the mind's consciousness, the quality of uncertainty. It lies there clean-cut as a verity, and on it rises the whole superstructure of thought; a superstructure made up of falsehood and truth, imaginations and beliefs, strangely built together, and always open to question and doubt, and subject to modification and change. That, in all cases, which is made matter of question and review, and which will admit of change, is not what is questioned is not known. what is known, but that which is inferred. A supposed knowledge is sometimes re-examined, to ascertain whether it was indeed such, and when found to be a hasty judgment, on inadequate grounds, is discarded. Re-examination discloses to the mind what is known, and often shows that some things supposed to be known are not. It is of vast moment that utmost exactness should be observed in determining precisely what is known. This will point out just what may be questioned, and simplify the matter to be investigated.

Perfect knowledge implies the knowledge of all truth; that is, of all reality exhaustively. Such knowledge is strictly infinite, and can never be possible except to the Infinite himself, with whom there can be no increase. Infinite knowledge precludes the possibility of a state of belief; for, where all is known, there can be nothing remaining to be subject of belief. As the Infinite cannot be properly said to believe any thing, since he knows all things, so a finite-knower cannot be properly said to believe what he really knows. Knowledge in the one case, as in the other, so far as it exists, precludes belief.

All knowledge identical.

Imperfect knowledge is either the knowledge of only some things or parts of things. Such is our knowledge, limited and local, as to time and place and degree. It begins at zero, and may increase indefinitely. It may be knowledge of being as real, and yet not be knowledge of precisely what it is historically or

scientifically. We may know things of it to-morrow which we do not and cannot know to-day. But so far forth as it is knowledge, it is the same in the finite as in the Infinite, and the same forever, since in both cases it is simple knowledge. One finite has more knowledge than another; his knowledge includes a larger extent of reality, spreads over greater spaces of being, and penetrates more profoundly; he has existed longer, has had a wider field of observation, has possessed better powers, has given closer attention. There are all grades of knowledge, from that of the merest beginner to that of the most exalted intelligence. But what is known by the merest tyro is in nothing different from the same thing as known by the most advanced knower. It is knowledge in All knowledge identical. both cases alike, and is identical in all minds.

The fact that one mind has acquired the power to define what it means by knowledge, while another cannot so define, does not imply that the knowledge of the one differs from the knowledge of the other, but simply that one has power to explain more than the other of mental states and acts. In knowing, each performs precisely the same act, but one can give a more intelligent account of the act than the other.

As knowledge with the finite is more or less limited, and may increase indefinitely under suitable conditions, belief may often become a necessity where knowledge does not exist, and where, for the present, it is impossible it should exist. The truth is forever the same, whether known or unknown, believed or unbelieved, and it is infinite.

Belief is the necessity of the finite—he must believe, and the large part of his conduct must spring from and be grounded on belief. This opens the door to uncertainty, error, and doubt. Error is never a predicate of what we know, but of what we do not know, and yet of what from our nature and circumstances we are compelled to predicate. There

may be error with respect to things about which we have some knowledge, but it will be error not in what is known, but in respect to that of the thing which is not included in the knowledge. Consciousness includes what the self is, and what its present act is. Here it is impossible that there should be error. But there is much with respect to the self and its acts which is not given in consciousness, and which is not matter of knowledge. This opens the door to speculation, belief, doubt, and possible error. Possible error begins not with respect to what is known. That the self should not be, or that the act should not be as given in consciousness, is impossible. But what the self is, and how it acts, and innumerable other matters with respect to it, are not given in consciousness, but are left to the speculative reason, and any conclusions reached can never rise above beliefs, and will always admit of possible error, and must remain subject to challenge and re-examination until a point is gained where the speculative reason finds perfect content, and beliefs become unchangeably fixed.

Now if we can find the circumstances or conditions under which knowledge arises, then we find a clew which will enable us to determine absolutely which of our concepts are knowledges, and which, being matters of knowledge, are not only matters of certainty to us, but must be matters of truth absolutely. To know is to possess truth. The circumstances determine between states and acts of knowing and states and acts of believing, rather than any general feeling of certainty which may exist in the mind. We may thus find an absolute ground of distinction between all knowing and believing, and in this way only.

Circumstances which determine what is knowledge. What, then, are those definite and precise circumstances, or relations of subject and object, under which knowing takes place, and which preclude mere belief? There is no more important point than this in

fixing the distinction between knowing and believing: it is in fact the governing thing. I introduce here an extensive quotation from Ferrier's "Institutes of Metaphysics," which will commend itself.

He, in a series of propositions, presents the subject in a lucid form.

Proposition 1. "Along with whatever any intelligence knows, it must, as the ground or condition of its knowledge, have some cognition of itself."

Proposition 2. "The object of knowledge, whatever it may be, is always something more than what is naturally or usually regarded as the object. It always is, and must be, the object with the addition of one's self—object, plus subject—thing or thought *mecum*. Self is an integral and essential part of every object of cognition."

Demonstration. "It has been already established as the condition of all knowledge, that a thing can be known only provided the intelligence which apprehends it knows itself at the same time. But, if a thing can be known only provided one's self be known along with it, it follows that the thing (or thought) and one's self *together* must, in every case, be the object, the true and complete object; in other words, it follows that that which we know, always is and must be object *plus* subject—object *cum aliis*—thing or thought with one addition to it, which addition is the me. Self, therefore, is an integral and essential part of every cognition. Or, again. Suppose a case in which a thing or a thought is apprehended without the me being apprehended with it. This would contradict proposition 1, which has fixed the knowledge of self as the condition of all knowledge."

Proposition 3. "The objective part of the object of knowledge, though distinguishable, is not separable in cognition from the subjective part, or the ego; but the objective part and the

subjective part do together constitute the unit, or *minimum* of knowledge."

Demonstration. "If the objective part of knowledge were separable in cognition from the ego, or subjective part, it could be apprehended without the ego being apprehended along with it. But this has been proved by proposition 2 to be impossible; ergo, . . .

"Again, the unit or *minimum* of cognition is such an amount of knowledge that, if any constituent part of it be left out of account, the whole cognition of necessity disappears. But the objective *plus* the subjective constitutes such a unit or *minimum*; because if the objective part be entirely removed from the object of our knowledge, and if the mind be left with no thing or thought before it, it can have no cognition; so if the subjective part in itself be entirely removed from the mind's observation, the cognition equally disappears to whatever extent we may suppose the mere objective part of the presentation to be still before us. All cognizance of it is impossible without the *plus* me: proposition 1."

Proposition 4. "Matter *per se*, the whole material universe by itself, is of necessity unknowable absolutely."

Demonstration. "The whole material universe by itself, or *per se*, is a mere collection of objects without a subject or self; but it was proved that the only objects which can possibly be known are objects *plus* a subject, or self; ergo, . . .

"Again: object *plus* a subject is the *minimum scibile, per se*. But the whole material universe, *per se*, being a mere collection of objects without a subject, is less than the *minimum scibile, per se*; ergo, . . . "

Proposition 5. "All the qualities of matter *by themselves* are of necessity absolutely unknowable."

Demonstration. "The qualities of matter by themselves, equally with matter itself, are objective presentment without

a subject. But it has been proved that no objective can be known without a subjective known along with it; ergo," . . .

Proposition 6. "Every cognition must contain an element common to all cognitions and an element (or elements) peculiar to itself; in other words, every cognition must have a part which is unchangeable, necessary, and universal (the same in all), and a part which is changeable, contingent, and particular (different in all); and there can be no knowledge of the unchangeable, necessary, and universal part, exclusive of the changeable, contingent, and particular part; or of the changeable, contingent, and particular part, exclusive of the unchangeable, necessary, and universal part; that is to say, neither of these parts, by itself, can constitute a cognition; but all knowledge is necessarily a synthesis of both factors."

Demonstration. "If every cognition did not contain an element common to all cognitions, there could be no unity in cognitions; they could not be classed together. But they are classed together; they all rank as cognitions; ergo, every cognition must contain an element to all cognitions. Again, if every cognition did not contain an element (or elements) peculiar to itself, there could be no diversity in cognitions; they could not be distinct from each other. But they are distinct from each other; they rank not simply as cognitions, but as different cognitions; ergo, thus the constitution of every cognition involves an unchangeable, necessary, and universal part—a part which is the same in all—a changeable, contingent, and particular part—a part which is different in all; and there can be no knowledge of either of these parts by itself or exclusive of the other part; but all knowledge is necessarily a synthesis of both factors."

Proposition 7. "The ego (or mind) is known as the element common to all cognitions, matter is known as the element peculiar to some cognitions. In other words, we know *our-*

selves as the unchangeable, necessary, and universal part of our cognitions, while we know matter, in all its varieties, as the changeable, contingent, and particular in some of our cognitions ; or, expressed in the technical language of logic, the ego is the known *summum genus*, the known genuine part of all cognitions, matter is the known differential part of some cognitions."

Demonstration. "It is a necessary truth of reason that the ego must be known (that is, must be known to itself) whenever it knows any thing at all : in other words, no cognition in which one does not apprehend one's self is possible. Therefore the ego, or one's self, is known as the element common to all cognitions ; that is, the *summum genus* of cognition. Again, it is not a necessary truth of reason that matter must be known whenever any thing at all is known ; in other words, cognitions in which no other material element is apprehended are, if not actual, possible and conceivable. No contradiction is involved in that supposition, and, therefore, matter is not known as the element common to all cognition, but only as the element peculiar to some cognitions ; that is, the differential part of some cognitions. And hence the ego is the unchangeable, necessary, and universal element of cognition, while matter is only a portion (not the whole) of the changeable, contingent, and particular part of some cognitions."

Proposition 8. "The ego cannot be known to be material ; that is to say, there is a necessary law of reason which prevents it from being apprehended by the senses."

Demonstration. "The ego is known as that which is common to all cognitions, and matter is known as that which is peculiar to some cognitions. But that which is known as common to all cognitions cannot be known as that which is peculiar to some cognitions, without supposing that a thing can be known to be different from what it is known to be ; the contradictory ; ergo," . . .

Again: "Matter, in its various forms, is known as the changeable, contingent, and particular element of cognition. Therefore if the ego could be known to be material, it would be known as the changeable, contingent, and particular element of cognition. But the ego is known to be the unchangeable, necessary, and universal element of cognition; ergo," . . .

Once more: "The universal element of cognition is known as such, precisely because it is known as *not* the particular element; and conversely, the particular element is known as such, precisely because it is known as not the universal element; ergo, the ego, which is known as the universal element, and matter which is known as the particular element, cannot either of them be known to be the other of them; and, therefore, the ego cannot be known to be material; or, in other words, that part of every object of cognition which is usually called the subject, or one's self, cannot be known to be of the same nature with the part of every object of cognition, which is usually called the object."

Proposition 9. "The ego, or self, *per se*, is, of itself, absolutely unknowable. By *itself*—that is, purely in an undeterminate state, or separated from all things, and divested of all thoughts—it is no possible object of cognition. It can know itself only in some particular state, or in union with some non-ego; that is, with some element contradistinguished from itself."

Demonstration. "The ego is the element common to all cognition—the universal constituent of knowledge. But every cognition must contain a particular or peculiar, as well as common or universal, part; and there can be no knowledge of either of these parts by itself, or prescinded from the other part; ergo, there can be no knowledge of the ego, or self, *per se*, or in a purely indeterminate state, or separated from all things, and divested of all thoughts. It can know itself only

in some particular state, or in union with some non-ego ; that is, with some element contradistinguished from itself."

Proposition 10. "Mere objects of sense can never be objects of cognition ; in other words, whatever has place in the intellect (whatever is known) must contain an element which has had no place in the senses ; or, otherwise expressed, the senses, by themselves, are not competent to place any knowable or intelligible thing before the mind."

Demonstration. "The ego must form a part of every object of cognition, but the ego cannot be apprehended by the senses ; ergo," . . .

Proposition 11. "That alone can be represented in thought which can be presented in knowledge ; in other words, it is impossible to think what it is impossible to know ; or, more explicitly, it is impossible to think that of which knowledge has supplied, and can supply, no sort of type."

Demonstration. "Representation is the iteration in thought of what was formerly presented in knowledge. It is, therefore, a contradiction to suppose that what never was and never can be known, can be represented in thought. Repetition necessarily implies a foregone lesson. Therefore, that alone can be represented in thought which has been presented in knowledge ; in other words, it is impossible to think what it is impossible to know ; it is impossible to think that of which knowledge has supplied, and can supply, no sort of type."

Proposition 12. "The material universe, *per se*, and all its qualities, *per se*, are not only absolutely unknowable, they are also absolutely unthinkable."

Demonstration. "The material universe and its qualities, *per se*, cannot be known or presented to the mind. But what cannot be known or presented to the mind cannot be represented by the mind ; ergo," . . .

Proposition 13. "The only *independent* universe which any

mind or ego can think of, is the universe in synthesis with some other mind or ego."

Demonstration. "Objects *plus* a subject, or self, is the only universe which can be known. The only universe which can be thought is the universe which can be known; ergo, consequently, whenever any mind or ego thinks of the universe as independent of itself, it must still think of it as made up of object *plus* subject. Therefore, the only independent universe which any mind can think, is the universe in synthesis with some other mind or subject."

Proposition 14. "There is no mere phenomenal in cognition; in other words, the phenomenal, by itself, is absolutely unknowable and inconceivable."

Demonstration. "The first premise fixes the definition of phenomenon. Whatever can be known or conceived only when something else is known or conceived along with it, is a phenomenon, or the phenomenal. But whatever can only be so known or conceived cannot be known or conceived by itself; ergo, there is no mere phenomenal in cognition."

The end of our search is truth. The implications are, that we who search for truth are; that truth is; that it is possible to us to find truth. Truth, in this statement, stands for reality. The attainment of truth stands for knowledge. Knowledge implies a knower. There can be no search without a knower who prosecutes it. There can be no attainment without the object to be attained—no knowledge of truth without a knower, and without the object known—subject and object in synthesis are in the knowing. Take the object away, and there is nothing to be known, and knowledge necessarily does not exist. Take subject away, and knowledge is impossible. In knowledge, therefore, the object exists for the subject, and together with it, and the subject for the object, and together with it. Know-

ing implies the strict co-existence of subject and object, and their synthesis.

It is a legitimate question, Are the realities which may be known purely subjective, or may they be external to the subject also; and if external, how do they become known as such? Can knowledge transcend the knower?

The knowledge the subject has of itself is strictly a knowledge of its existence, of its states, of its modes of activity, of its power to act in certain ways, and be acted on in some manner. This knowledge is self-knowledge, named consciousness. It is strictly limited to the subject, and cannot go beyond it, so as to be knowledge of something external to the self. If there be any thing external to the self—any thing having existence apart from the self, consciousness includes the concept of that, but does not give knowledge of it; that is derived from another faculty. What, then, is the precise knowledge given in consciousness or self-knowledge? To this we answer, in consciousness we detect (*a*) the knowledge that the ego is a real being. The thing given is not simply certain states, and a congeries of acts, but behind these, the knowledge that it is I who act—the consciousness that I exist. (*b*) In consciousness is given the knowledge of certain feelings which I experience and certain powers or faculties which I possess; the power to think, to remember, to perceive, to will; the feelings of sensations and emotions. (*c*) In consciousness is given, what each particular feeling is which I at any time experience, and what each particular act is which I perform, whether it be a thought, or memory, or volition, or perception. Thus I know all that passes within the realm of the ego. Knowing these, I exhaust the known contents of the ego—I have so much of truth. There is much of the ego unknown, but so much is known. How it is that I exist, or use these

powers which I possess, or experience the feelings which I find myself having, I do not know; but that I am, and that I do possess these powers, and perform these acts, and have these feelings, I know in consciousness.

But in all this I do not transcend the ego. I am strictly taking note of what pertains to and passes within the one being that I am; that there is any other being does not yet appear. What I know is myself, and yet in this knowledge of the self I am conscious of a *knowledge* of other beings, but am not conscious of *them*. Consciousness *seems* to go beyond the me, and I am compelled to affirm that I do know other beings and realities outside of myself. Is this a delusion?

I have stated, that among the powers which consciousness discloses in me, that is, which I know myself to possess, is a power which I name the perceptive faculty. What is that, and what does it give? When I say, I feel, I know what that is which that term describes, that is, what is given in consciousness under that name. I know the act or state ^{What is given in perception.} to be strictly subjective. The same is true when I say I think, and yet again when I say I remember, or I will. I know myself as alone involved in these states and acts. In all this nothing emerges as external to the Self; the object of knowledge so far as given in consciousness is completely exhausted in the subjective contents of the knower. It is simply himself that feels, that thinks, that wills, that exists, that is conscious.

But now, when I predicate of this Self that it is conscious of an act of perceiving, what do I mean by this? Perceives what? That he perceives he knows—it is an act of which he is conscious. He knows that he does perceive simply in knowing himself, or in consciousness. Now, what is given in that consciousness of the perceiving act? We answer, simply the self act of perception. But what is perception? To be a perception there must be a something to be perceived. That which

is perceived is not the mind itself, nor can it be an idea which is in the mind, but it is an object known to be external to the mind and object of its action. If this be not so, there is no evidence whatever of the existence of any thing but the mind itself. This the mind is conscious of inability to assert or to believe. The mind knows when itself is object, and in the case of perception it intuitively knows that it is not the object, but that it acts on an external object. The word perception is without meaning, if we assume the non-existence of the object: to the question, *Perceives what?* we are compelled to say, *Perceives nothing*; but this is to take all meaning out of the term; and to contradict consciousness itself, since the conscious act is that of perceiving something. Thus while the external world cannot be properly said to be matter of consciousness, since consciousness is simply the note the mind takes of itself in all its modes of action—the external world emerges in conscious knowledge, as something which is perceived by the mind as external and transcendental—it is the thing known. That which is known is strictly an object which exists exterior to the perceiving mind, but which emerges in the mind as a concept, noted by consciousness. The concept is the immediate object of consciousness, but the mind intuitively knows that it, the concept, has a real object. For the mind, the object, is that which gives birth to the concept, and the concept is what the thing is in thought. The object is not created by the mind, but the thought of it is.*

Suppose the mind did not exist, would the object exist, or does it come into existence along with the thought of it? We are compelled to believe that the thing exists without the thought of it, since if it did not, it would become non-existent as soon as the thought of it was displaced by some other thought

* See Wight's "Hamilton," p. 173; also Harris's "Philosophical Basis of Theism," p. 88, and through the chapter.

of some other thing, and the universe would be resolved into a mere dance of coming and vanishing shadows of non-reality; and so there would be no coherent universe at all, if this were so. It is to no purpose to say that objects are nothing to us except as they emerge in knowledge. They are, indeed, nothing in knowledge until they are known, but they are not in fact nothings. They exist for knowledge, that they may become known, and they exist without respect to our knowledge of them.

It is to no purpose to say that their existence cannot be proved until they are known. It remains true that they could never be known, if they did not exist in order that they might be known. There is, therefore, an external universe waiting the action of mind to emerge in thought, and become transmuted into knowledge.

The truth is, that *antecedent* to the universe, which is external to us, there existed an eternal Mind. The external universe is a reality, by Him created, and which might have existed forever as product of his power and as embodying his thought, had no other mind ever existed. It would, in that case, have been as real as it now is, and would have been differentiable from its Maker as an effect is differentiable from its cause. It continues and abides, independently of any created mind. Created mind finds it in existence, and when created mind appears, it cognizes its existence, and the permanently and antecedently real is again transmuted into thought. The external, which came out of mind at first, returns into mind, not by losing its real existence, but by becoming known as real; that is, as having real existence both before, concurrently with, and subsequent to, the thought or concept of it.

Underlying all predicates as most primitive and absolute foundation, on which the whole structure, both of affirmation and doubt reposes, is the fact of consciousness. No mental

movement of any kind is possible without it. The validity of its deliverances must be assumed, as matter of absolute knowledge, and not merely of belief. Wherever there is consciousness there is necessarily a being acting, and knowing himself as acting. That is consciousness. The conscious subject affirms in consciousness, I am, and I am in this or that state of activity, or I have power to put myself into this or that state of activity—or to be affected in this or that manner. It is impossible to introduce doubt in the subject as to its existence, for to doubt is to affirm its existence as doubter. It is impossible to introduce doubt as to its activity, for to doubt is a form of its activity, and implies a knowledge of that of which doubt is affirmed as a real object of thought.

The conscious subject emerges as an object of knowledge only as active; that is, the mind has knowledge of its own existence only as it is made aware of itself as acting. "The ego, or self, or mind, *per se*, is, of necessity, absolutely unknowable. *By itself*—that is, in a purely undeterminate state, or separated from all things, and divested of all thoughts—it is no possible object of cognition. It can know itself only in some particular state, or in union with some non-ego; that is, with some element contradistinguished from itself."* "The ego is the element to all cognition—the universal constituent of all knowledge."† "Just as proposition 1 [of the foregoing series] declares that the mind can be cognizant of something else only when it knows itself, so proposition 9 affirms that it can know itself only when it is cognizant of something else."‡ Thus it appears that in every knowledge there must be a co-existence of the self and not-self as objects. In every conscious act the self emerges as an object of *de facto* knowledge. It has no power to make itself a direct object of knowledge, but can only

* Proposition IX, "Institutes of Metaphysic," Ferrier, p. 241.

† Ibid., p. 241.

‡ Ibid., p. 242.

acquire that knowledge by a movement which it discerns in itself, and which discloses itself to itself. There is no deliverance in consciousness as to the essence or substance of the conscious subject, but only that it has being, and exerts itself in a given manner. It thinks, it feels, it wills—it is.

Consciousness gives nothing except as to the subject itself. It is strictly and absolutely limited to the subject. If there is any other being, it makes no deliverance with respect to it except that it perceives it. It is conscious of the object of thought, but consciousness cannot determine that the object is a thing external to itself—it is conscious of it as it appears in thought. That there is an external reality represented is not a matter of consciousness.

It follows, that if the self-conscious subject has no power to transcend consciousness, the universe must be reduced to the ego, so far as can be known. But this the mind, the self-conscious subject, as we have seen, is consciously incapable of affirming. It persistently refuses to limit its idea of existence to itself, and can, by no strategy of logic, be reduced to that conclusion. It can give no satisfactory explanation to itself, how it is that it transcends itself, so as to cognize other objects external to itself; but no more can it explain its own internal processes, or its consciousness of them; and the certainty in the former case is no less assured than in the latter. It does cognize externality, and it gives to the conscious act by which it makes the cognition, or which is the cognition, the name perception. The perception is its own act, and the perception becomes matter of cognition by self-consciousness; thus self-consciousness becomes the ground of the knowing, but the knowledge given is of an external object. The external object is not itself a datum of consciousness, but the perception or knowledge of it is.

From these two sources—internal perception or self-conscious-

ness, and external perception, or the cognition of objects other than the self—by direct and reflective processes we build up all mental predications of the self and of the not-self, with greater or less assurance of the reality of what we affirm. The certitude of our own existence in self-consciousness is absolute. The certitude of externality in perception is also absolute. Though alike inexplicable, neither can be shaken.

Subject and object exist independently of each other, but in the act of cognition the subject must stand in certain relation to the object. The object would exist in its exact identity unchanged if the subject were obliterated, or if it never had existed. The subject does not give existence to the object. The subject also would exist, if the object were annihilated. We cannot progress a single step without these postulates. To go at all in any coherent or intelligible movement, we are under the necessity of admitting the veraciousness of consciousness as to the subjective reality and state, and the veraciousness of perception as to external reality, and resulting from their conjoint testimony, the reality of both subject and object, and their absolute independence and otherness.

But in this statement we do not mean that there is, or could be, any reality of objectivity wholly independent of any knowing subject. The object we are constrained to believe, in every case, implies a knowing and infinite causal subject. The external is concrete expression of a real subjective. This will appear in future stages of the discussion on which we now enter. But precisely what we mean at present is to assert, that our human consciousness, which is the most primitive and absolute of all our knowledges, and the permanent quantity in all, posits (*a*) our own existence as the knowing subject; and (*b*) the reality of the object known as a consciously perceived object; and (*c*) in cases where the object is a real external, not only posits the difference between the knowing ego and the

known non-ego, but that neither is dependent on the other; that is, that the knowing ego would still exist if the particular non-ego were eradicated from existence, or if it had never existed; and the known non-ego would lose none of its existence if the ego were blotted out of existence. The two come into inseparable relations in the knowing act, but they are not dependent on the knowing act for their existence. The equivalent of all which is, in the best-known and most primitive of all knowledges—that which is given in consciousness—there is integral and co-existent therein the knowledge of, and therefore the reality of, the subjective and objective, the ego and the non-ego, the self and objectives to self. While the non-ego itself is not matter of consciousness, the knowledge of it is. In self-knowledge, or consciousness, the external appears as a concept, but the concept is known to represent a real object, so that in consciously knowing the concept as a subjective fact, the object of which it is a concept is known to have real existence, and to be what the concept represents it to be. The consciousness in the case is that of a perception, or of a perceiving act, which is purely subjective, and is given as such subjectively—is of and by the mind, and is so known to be, in knowing the mind or self, but the object of perception is intuitively known to be real and external by the faculty of reason. The object is as certainly known by the intelligence or faculty of reason as the subject is by self-consciousness, and it is as impossible to throw doubt or discredit on the one knowledge as the other. In the knowledge there is a strict synthesis of subject and object; the former as matter of consciousness, the latter as matter of perception. The consciousness is of the conjoint-knowing act, inclusive of both subject and object, and of their otherness and severalty.

The contents of these two—subject and object—are the sum of all reality, and in their reality constitute the subjects of all

thought and inquiry. To know them in their relations to each other, and inter-relations with all other realities, and in their respective attributes and modes, is to know reality, which is to possess truth. It thus appears that the world of external reality is the equivalent, not simply of material objectivity, but also of all reality of every kind—thoughts, feelings, ideas, all processes, and every thing that can be an object of thought, or with respect to which it can be truthfully affirmed it is or has been. Thus mind or subject as knower, and that which is external to the knower, comprises all reality, and makes up the whole sphere of thought and inquiry.

Of course our inquiry relates to finite knowing, or, more properly, human knowing—what and how can we know?

Upon this point we cannot do better than to give the results of Sir William Hamilton's investigations. In treating this very point he says: "We are endowed by our Creator with certain faculties of observation, which enable us to become aware of certain appearances or phenomena. These faculties may be stated as two—sense, or external perception, and self-consciousness, or internal perception; and these faculties severally afford us the knowledge of a different series of phenomena. Through our senses we apprehend what exists or what occurs in the external or material world; by our self-consciousness, what is or what occurs in the inward world, or world of thought."

To exercise the function of external perception, the mind must be brought into relations with external objects. These relations are brought about by means of a sensorium, or organism, in which the mind is mysteriously posited. How it is that the sensorium mediates between the mind and externality is unknown, but that it is the instrument of sensations is known. Through it objects are presented to the mind, itself among them as the knower. The effect produced in the mind is sensa-

tion, the act of the mind is perception or cognition of the object. Thus the external universe becomes known under forms of phenomena. That which is known is, that the object exists under certain forms or appearances.

SECTION VI.—CONDITIONS OF KNOWING.

What are the conditions of knowing? One fundamental and necessary condition underlies all knowing—is postulated in it, whether finite or infinite. There must be a knowing subject, and there must be a correlate something to be known; that is, there must exist subject and object. The knower may be both subject and object, and so in his own existence furnish the necessary condition of knowing; but the subject cannot become object until it has become such by impingement of some object external to itself. Thus the subject, to be object of knowledge, or to furnish the conditions of knowing, must first be correlated with some other object. Both subject and object must have reality of existence. The subject ^{Of subject and object.} must be a real being, and, as such, must possess the power of knowing. The object must possess the reality of being, or must be some existing state or act, or relation of some being, or some possibility of being. There may be both subject and object, and the subject may not know the object: there is the being who possesses the power to know, and there is the object which might be known, but there is in the case no knowing—subject and object not being in suitable relations. Relation of subject and object is, therefore, a necessary condition of knowing. There must be interaction between the subject and object; or rather, action of the object awakening a responsive action in the subject; that is, subject and object must, in the fact, be in such relations of co-existence as to act upon each other. Knowing is impossible, except in such a case. It is a possible conception that there

should be a being who possesses power to know, and a universe of objective reality which might be known; and yet, the knower *in posse*, in reality, have no knowledge whatever—not even of himself. The knowledge of self, or the subject-object, closely as the object lies to the subject, is only possible when or after the subject is acted upon. Knowledge is a reaction of the subject upon the object, or responsively to it, and in the reaction it comes to know itself as acting. Consciousness is nothing other than the knowledge the subject thus has of itself in its activities.

Knowing is a purely subjective act, beginning and ending in the mind itself, as well as an act of the mind; but an act elicited by impingement of some kind upon the mind. Any reality, whether of the self or of the not-self, may be an object of knowledge, or may occasion a knowing, under suitable conditions. The sphere of possible knowledge is co-
The sphere of possible knowledge.
 extensive with reality; and the measure of actual knowing will be determined by the measure of reality which is brought into suitable relations to the knowing subject. All newly-made mind exists without knowledge, and might so exist forever were not the conditions of knowing supplied. Thus we find three primary conditions to all knowing—(a) a mind, (b) an object external to mind, (c) and suitable relations between them. What these relations are will be considered. If this position be true, knowing is not concreated with mind, and not a necessary, but a contingent, incident of its existence. But, since mind possesses power to know, and attains to no proper existence—that is, answers no proper end of mind without the exercise of its integrant faculties—we have no reason to suppose that any mind does exist for any length of time without knowing in some degree. The questions are, under what conditions does it know, and what does it know?

Any attempt to define what knowing is, or how it is possible,

or by what means and under what conditions it comes, contradicts the idea that knowledge is concreated, and proves that existence void of knowledge logically goes before knowing, and must be actual in the finite before any act of knowing can take place.

“Consciousness,” Sir William Hamilton says, “is co-extensive with all our faculties of knowledge, these faculties being only special modifications under which consciousness is manifested. It being therefore understood that consciousness is not a special faculty of knowledge, but the general faculty out of which the special faculties of knowledge are evolved, I proceed to the evolution.

“In the first place, as we are endowed with a faculty of cognition, or consciousness in general, and since it cannot be maintained that we have always possessed that which we now possess, it will be admitted that we must have a faculty of acquiring knowledge. But this acquisition of knowledge can only be accomplished by the immediate presentation of a new object of consciousness; in other words, by the reception of a new object within the sphere of our cognition. We have thus a faculty which may be called the acquisitive, or presentative, or receptive.

Consciousness
common to all
mental exer-
cises.

“Now, new or adventitious knowledge may be either of things external or things internal; in other words, either of the phenomena of the non-ego, or of the phenomena of the ego; and this distinction of objects will determine a subdivision of this—the acquisitive faculty. If the object of knowledge be external, the faculty receptive or presentative of the qualities of such object, will be a consciousness of the non-ego.* This has

* The doctrine herein laid down by Hamilton, that consciousness extends to the non-ego, has not been accepted, and we think cannot be. The consciousness in the case is, the consciousness of an act of perception performed by the mind. The mind is conscious of the knowledge that the object perceived is real, but it is also conscious that it knows the object by perceiving it, and not by being conscious of it. Perception is cognition.

obtained the name of external perception, or of perception simply. If, on the other hand, the object be internal, the faculty receptive or presentative of the qualities of such subject-object, will be a consciousness of the ego. This faculty obtains the name of internal or reflex perception, or of self-consciousness." *

We know, then, what is external to us, within the sphere of sense-perception, by perceiving it, and what we know of it is, that it is ; and, that it is external and of the not-self ; and we know what is internal to us, within the sphere of self-consciousness, and what we know of it is, that the self is real, and that it acts in a certain way ; that is, we know the ego as existing, and as active, and what its precise activity is, and the non-ego as existing, and as object of self-activity. By this we do not mean

The not-self
and the self in
the knowing
act.

that the mind at once and invariably makes these distinctions to itself, or even that it is able to do so. To formulate its knowledge may require time, experience, and acquired skill, but these are *de facto* elements in all knowing. Whatever obscurity may arise when we attempt explanations of the how of these knowledges, there can be no sustained doubt that we do know and do not merely believe. No possible facts or arguments can divest the mind of the complete and absolute certainty of the existence and otherness of the subject and object. Externality, or, in the significant language of Sir William and the schools, the non-ego, furnishes the primary object of knowledge. The ego is the knower ; but it does not become possessed of knowledge—does not exert its power of knowing, though it possesses it—until objectivity impinges upon it. Thus being awakened to activity by external impingement, it comes to know itself, along with externality—becomes subject-object when it grasps the external object. External reality is the condition of internal activity, and internal activity is the condition of self-knowledge.

* "Metaphysics."

External reality, in certain relations to the mind, becomes an occasion of its activity, and were it not thus awakened it would never know itself, but so moved, it knows both itself and that which moves it. Both the external and internal are conditions *sine qua non*, therefore, to knowledge; take either reality away and knowledge is impossible. The mind exists as potential—as having power—and under suitable conditions it puts forth its power, and, once awakened, has the conditions of permanent activity in itself.

There can be no reasonable doubt that were a mind, after some experience in objective perception, shut away from all real being but itself, it might, though greatly limited in the extent of its actual or possible knowledges, be eternally active and conscious, with itself as sole object—sole subject and object.

These are ascertained characteristics of the human mind; all of whose knowledge is derived and conditional. The raw material of knowledge is not created by the mind itself, but is given in the form of sensation awakened in the mind by externality, and resulting in the perceiving act, by which the external cause becomes known as existing. It cannot be so of the infinite, whose knowledge is necessary and unconditional.

Intuition is synonymous with immediate knowing—the mind seeing the object of its thought without distorting *media*—standing face to face with reality. It is purely a mental act; it is knowing. It is an important question, under what conditions it takes place, and what are the objects it is exercised upon, and what determines it to be an intuition? There is a wide-spread idea that intuition is limited to the narrow circle of necessary truths—axioms—pure intellections, whose truth lies in the very structure of thought—without the admission of which thought cannot move at all. This limita-

tion removes it from the realm of facts and experience entirely ; these are relegated to perception and consciousness, as they are internal or external, and perception and consciousness are supposed to be something different from intuition. In fact, both what is perceived and what is matter of consciousness are simple cognitions or intuitions. All knowledge is, in the last resort, intuition. A certain haze of doubt is thrown over knowledge by perception, as if it were not possible to bring it within the sphere of direct cognition, in the degree that necessary truths are—that is, things perceived are not so well-known to be true as the intuition of pure reason. Is this a just use of the term under the definition given, that intuition is immediate knowing? Has the mind no other immediate cognitions than axioms?

Are not the objects of intuition—rather, any and all objects which in given relations are immediately cognized—absolutely certain and real? Does not the mind thus intuit itself in consciousness? does it not thus intuit the external world in normal perception? Does it not thus intuit the ethical distinctions of right and wrong? When the moral faculty, the conscience, furnishes the condition—that is, when its problems are brought before the mind—is there not an intuition of them? Does not the external world become a condition of intuition, when placed in right relations to the mind, in the same manner that an axiom does when the attention, or thought, is directed to it? If, as a purely mental fact, the mind intuits that every effect must have a cause—that contradictories cannot both be true—does it not likewise intuit, that there is an external world, and also an internal world, differentiable from it? Does it have any more immediate cognition of the former facts than the latter, so as to justify the discrimination, that one set is better or more directly known than the other. In the one case, internal perception or consciousness presents the object to the mind ; in the second case, external perception

presents the object; in the third case, the pure reason presents the object: but is not the act of cognition immediate on the presentation of the object in each case alike? In one case, the mind is its own object, not as mind but as mind acting. The intuition is of itself acting, and of the kind of act it is performing it cannot be convicted of mistake. In the second case, the external world is the object, as something existing external to the mind. Again, it cannot be convicted of mistake. In the third case, the object of intuition is a law of thought, or necessary truth. Is the cognition any more absolute in this last case than in the other two, or is it only a difference in the objects? There is, indeed, no necessity that the given mind should be, or that the external world should be, while necessity underlies the axiom; but is the necessary truth any more clearly or directly perceived to be a truth, than the existence of the contingent facts is seen to be a truth? Is there any difference in the certainty of the facts, or the unalterable certainty of the mind with respect to them, and the certainty felt with respect to necessary truths? Does not the mind in each case intuitively know the reality of the object presented? Observe, we limit the intuition to the fact of a mental world, or the reality of mind and its states of consciousness, and to the fact of an external world differentiable from the mind itself; and to the truths which are discovered to the reason as necessary. We do not extend it to the speculative questions which emerge—the what, why, and how—which must be determined by processes of inquiry and examination.

We turn the question to the moral realm. Does any thing here emerge in intuition? if so, what?

Consciousness is in every case a feeling; that is, the mind has no consciousness that is not felt. No object im-
 pinges on the mind or appears within it, or move-
 ment is made by it which reports itself in consciousness, that

Consciousness
a feeling.

is not felt. The feeling may be so dim and obscure as to require an effort to discern it, or so pronounced as to shake the whole internal nature as an earthquake—may touch it as with the breath of an impalpable ether, or so as to agitate it as with the rush of a tempest—but in either case it is a feeling. Whether it be a thought, or a volition, or an emotion, or a sensation, it is a feeling of the mind as acted upon or as acting. The knowing in the consciousness is a knowing of the subject feeling and the object felt as real; what emerges in the feeling and in the knowing is the mind itself, and the object, whatever that may be. If the object be the mind itself, in some form of purely subjective activity, it feels itself acting, feels the movement of its power—as thinking, as willing, as loving, or whatever the act may be—a fancy merely stirs it. There is no thought in consciousness that is not felt, no volition, no emotion. Thus sensitivity is an ultimate of mind, and invariably constant in all its consciousness. The purest intellection, as that a triangle is a figure with three sides, is felt, not as an emotion of joy or grief, or a resolute act of will, or as a vivid imagination, or strong perception, or great thought, is felt; but still it is felt, and could not else report itself as present in consciousness. On the sensitive disk of mind no dim shadow falls that does not thus move it—its very life is feeling.

Whatever passes under our sense-perception, we know in the exact degree in which it passes under our perception, and not further. Each object perceived suggests much with respect to itself which is not perceived—awakens speculation and inquiry. These added concepts may be true or not. They are immediately known as existing concepts, but the reality of which they are predicates is not known, as to their real nature, but only inferred. The phenomena are known. The speculative reason deals with the nature and the ground of them. Intuition determines that there is a subject

Perception a
knowing.

or ground of them. Closer attention and more careful analysis may bring the reality more completely within the scope of knowledge, or it may be impossible that it should be so brought. What we do know is, the existence of the object, and that it affects us in a certain manner; but beyond the fact of its existence, and the appearance it has to our minds, and certain essential qualities intuitively cognized, we know nothing until protracted observation, experience, attention, or scientific inquiry conducts us into deeper discovery of the laws or modes of its existence and hidden parts of its being. The unknown of it remains greater than the known; and what is supposed to be known is not unfrequently illusion; but there is something known. To distinguish between the known and illusion—between what is actually given in perception and what is hastily supposed to be given, is the function of reason, and is achieved by patient investigation.

Our knowledge of externality, given in sense-perception, is limited to objects *actually* perceived. By this faculty we do not know of any externality except what is perceived—that there is any thing else—any thing beyond. Confined simply to sense, the horizon which limits it contains all that is known. But while perception makes deliverance with respect to what lies within its sphere only, it gives not simply externality and existence, and appearance, Perception limited to what is present. but it adds otherness, or difference between objects; discloses them as many, not one; as separable in thought and fact. But the known otherness and difference between objects after all, it must be admitted, is simply difference of phenomena, so far as perception is concerned. Whether the ground of phenomena is one or many, perception cannot decide. It is conceivable that the sole cause of all phenomena is simple spiritual energy. This is held by some of the ablest thinkers; but while difficult of disproof, it is evidently not true.

But this is not all that we know of externality, though perception gives us no more. There must be, therefore, some other faculty, which makes known something of externality to us not given in sense, but conditioned upon sense. First, external perception must present the object, then another faculty of the mind adds to our knowledge of that which is presented. We perceive a surface—we know that there is a reverse side, which we do not perceive. The knowledge is not a deliverance of sense, but it is an intuition or a deliverance of reason, which is no less a knowledge.*

CONSCIOUSNESS (*conscientia*, joint-knowledge), a knowledge of one thing in connection or relation with another.

Sir William Hamilton has remarked that “the Greek has no

* Our knowledge of things consists, (1) in the certainty that they exist, and, (2) that they have certain attributes or ways of working, and certain relations among themselves. When we reach any such certainty about a thing, we have a knowledge of the thing to that extent. This knowledge may be more or less, but its extent is indifferent to the definition. It is conceivable that other beings should have deeper insight into the nature of things than we have; but in such case their knowledge would not be more real, but more exhaustive, than ours. But even their knowledge would come under the same definition—the certainty that things exist and have certain properties and powers. A large part of the skeptic's argument consists in referring to the vastness of the unknown in comparison with the known. He points out that we do not know the inner nature of things, nor how things are made. We grant all this, but insist that we know sundry truths about things after they are made. The scientist does not pretend to know how the elements are made, but he claims to know something about their ways of working. Our knowledge of the soul does not consist in any insight into the soul's being, but only in the certainty that souls exist, and have peculiar assignable powers. Neither science nor philosophy has, or is likely to have, any recipe for creation. The utmost the finite can ever hope to do, is, not to create things, but to understand them after they are created. When reality has been comprehended under the forms of thought, science and philosophy have finished their work; and the result we call knowledge, as far as it goes. If this is not knowledge, what is? References to the mystery of being, and the vastness of the unknown, are quite irrelevant in discussing the reality of knowledge.—*Bowne*.

word for consciousness," and that "Tertullian is the only ancient who uses the word *conscientia* in a psychological sense, corresponding with our consciousness." *

The meaning of a word is sometimes best attained by means of the word opposed to it. Unconsciousness—that is, the lack or absence of consciousness—denotes the suspension of all our faculties. Consciousness, then, is the state in which we are when all or any of our faculties are in exercise. It is the condition, or accompaniment, of every mental operation. The scholastic definition was, *perceptio qua mens de præsenti suo statu admonetur*.

"Consciousness is the necessary knowledge which the mind has of its own operations. In knowing, it knows that it knows. In experiencing emotions and passions, it knows that it experiences them. In willing or exercising acts of causality, it knows that it wills or exercises such acts. This is the common, universal, and spontaneous consciousness." . . . "By consciousness, more nicely and accurately defined, we mean the power and act of self-recognition; not, if you please, the mind knowing its knowledges, emotions, and volitions, but the mind knowing itself in these." †

Mr. Locke has said, "It is altogether as intelligible to say that a body is extended without parts, as that any thing thinks without being conscious of it, or perceiving that it does so. They who talk in this way may, with as much reason, say that a man is always hungry, but that he does not always feel it; whereas hunger consists in that very sensation, as thinking consists in being conscious that one thinks." ‡

"We not only feel, but we know that we feel; we not only act, but we know that we act; we not only think, but we know

* "Discussions," p. 110, note. "Reid's Works," p. 775.

† Tappan, "Doctrine of the Will, by an Appeal to Consciousness," chap. ii, sec. 1.

‡ Locke, "Essay on Human Understanding," book ii, chap. i.

that we think : to think, without knowing that we think, is as if we should not think ; and the peculiar quality, the fundamental attribute of thought, is to have a consciousness of itself. Consciousness is this interior light which illuminates every thing that takes place in the soul ; consciousness is the accompaniment of all our faculties ; and is, so to speak, their echo." *

That consciousness is not a particular faculty of the mind, but the universal condition of intelligence, the fundamental form of all the modes of our thinking activity, and not a special mode of that activity, is strenuously maintained by Amedée Jacques, † and also by two American writers, Mr. Bowen ‡ and Mr. Tappan. This view is in accordance with the saying of Aristotle, οὐκ ἔστιν αἰσθησις αἰσθήσεως—there is not a feeling of a feeling ; and that of the schoolmen, "*Non sentimus, nisi sentiamus nos sentire, non intelligimus, nisi intelligamus nos intelligere.*" "No man," said Dr. Reid, "can perceive an object without being conscious that he perceives it. No man can think without being conscious that he thinks." And as on the one hand we cannot think or feel without being conscious, so on the other hand we cannot be conscious without thinking or feeling. This would be, if possible, to be conscious of nothing, to have a consciousness which was no consciousness, or consciousness without an object. "Annihilate the object of any mental operation, and you annihilate the operation ; annihilate the consciousness of the object, and you annihilate the operation."

This view of consciousness, as the common condition under which all our faculties are brought into operation, or of considering these faculties and their operations as so many modifications of consciousness, has of late been generally adopted ; so

* Cousin, "History of Modern Philosophy," vol. i, pp. 274, 275.

† "Manuel de Philosophie, Partie Psychologique."

‡ "Critical Essays," p. 131.

much so, that psychology, or the science of mind, has been denominated an inquiry into the facts of consciousness. All that we can truly learn of mind must be learned by attending to the various ways in which it becomes conscious. None of the phenomena of consciousness can be called in question. They may be more or less clear, more or less complete; but they either are or are not.

Instead of regarding consciousness as the common condition or accompaniment of every mental operation, Royer-Collard and Adolphe Darnier among the French, and Reid and Stewart among the Scotch philosophers, have been represented as holding the opinion that consciousness is a separate faculty, having for its objects the operations of our other faculties. "Consciousness," says Dr. Reid, "is a word used by philosophers to signify that immediate knowledge which we have of our present thoughts and purposes, and in general, of all the present operations of our minds. Whence we may observe that consciousness is only of things present. To apply consciousness to things past, which sometimes is done in popular discourse, is to confound consciousness with memory; and all such confusion of words ought to be avoided in philosophical discourse. It is likewise to be observed that consciousness is only of things in the mind, and not of external things. It is improper to say, "I am conscious of the table which is before me." I perceive it, I see it, but do not say, I am conscious of it. As that consciousness by which we have a knowledge of the operations of our own minds is a different power from that by which we perceive external objects; and as these different powers have different names in our language, and I believe in all languages, a philosopher ought carefully to preserve this distinction, and never confound things so different in their nature."*

In this passage Dr. Reid speaks of consciousness, properly

* "Intellectual Powers," Essay i, chap. i. See, also, Essay vi, chap. v.

so-called, as that consciousness which is distinct from the consciousness by which we perceive external objects—as if perception were another kind or mode of consciousness. Whether all his language be quite consistent with the opinion that all our faculties are just so many different modes of our becoming conscious, may be doubted. But there is no doubt that by consciousness he meant especially attention to the operations of our own minds, or reflection; while by observation he meant attention to external things. This language has been interpreted as favorable to the opinion that consciousness is a separate faculty. Yet he has not distinctly separated it from reflection, except by saying that consciousness accompanies all the operations of mind. Now reflection does not. It is a voluntary act—an energetic attention to the facts of consciousness. But consciousness may be either spontaneous or reflective.

“This word denotes the immediate knowledge which the mind has of its sensations and thoughts, and in general, of all its present operations.” *

Mr. Stewart has enumerated consciousness as one of our intellectual powers, co-ordinate with perception, memory, judgment, etc. But consciousness is not confined to the operation of the intellectual powers. It accompanies the development of the feelings and the determination of the will. And the opinion that consciousness is a separate faculty is not only founded on a false analysis, but is an opinion which, if prosecuted to its results, would overthrow the doctrine of immediate knowledge in perception—a doctrine which Stewart and Reid upheld as the true and only barrier against the skepticism of Hume. “Once admit, that after I have perceived an object I need another power, termed consciousness, by which I become cognizant of the perception, and by the medium of

* “Outlines of Moral Philosophy,” part i, sec. i.

which the knowledge involved in perception is made clear to the thinking self, and the plea of common sense against skepticism is cut off. . . . I am conscious of self and perceive the not-self; my knowledge of both in the act of perception is equally direct and immediate. On the other hand, to make consciousness a peculiar faculty, by which we are simply cognizant of our own mental operations, is virtually to deny the immediacy of our knowledge of an external world.” *

“We may give consciousness a separate name and place, without meaning to degrade it to the level of the other faculties. In some respects it is superior to them all, having in it more of the essence of the soul, and being exercised whenever the soul is intelligently exercised.” †

“Feeling and sensation are equivalent terms, the one being merely the translation of the other; but feeling and consciousness are not equivalent, for we are conscious that we feel, but we do not feel that we are conscious. Consciousness is involved in all mental operations, active or passive; but these are not, therefore, kinds or parts of consciousness. Life is involved in every operation, voluntary or involuntary, of our bodily system; but movement or action is not, therefore, a species of life. Consciousness is mental life,” ‡ or a *modus vivendi* of mind.

Again, whatever passes through self-consciousness—and consciousness pervades every form and increment of mental activity—we know at the time, that is when it is a fact of consciousness, that it is such a fact, whether it be a feeling, volition, cognition, memory, or imagination; and we also know the self, as so affected or acting. We thus know the existence of self, as differenced from externality or objectivity, and the

* Morell, “History of Speculative Philosophy,” vol. ii, p. 13.

† McCosh, “Method of Divine Government,” p. 533. Fifth edition. See Fearn, “Essay on Consciousness.”

‡ Lyall, “Agonistes; or, Philosophical Strictures,” p. 363.

entire history of its activity currently with it. We do not infer it; we know it. Furthermore we know, that while the stream of consciousness is a flow—is successive consciousnesses of successive activities ceaselessly changing, coming and vanishing—the conscious self is permanent and abiding. That it is the

The self given as permanent.

same self who has been subject of all the experiences which it remembers, and of multitudes of consciousnesses which are not recalled, is not a belief, which may or may not be true; it is a knowledge, which, like any other knowledge the mind possesses, without being able to explain or prove, it is changelessly certain is true. As it knows self in its thought, feeling, volition, as thinker, feeler, willer, it knows self as identical in all the succession. It also knows succession—the non co-existence of its experiences: that they are different: that they have an order of time: that they come and go: that they are many, while it is one: that thus, while there is an ever-changing consciousness, denoting the actual flow of experience and mutability or changefulness of activity, the subject itself changes not, or remains identical.

We venture to say further, that if consciousness discloses a subject and its forms of activity—otherness and difference in its experiences, as successive, and its own self-abidingness—it also discloses the fact of a beginning to the subject: that is, makes known to itself that there was a time when it began to be; that there was a time when it did not exist.

There may be a question whether self-consciousness includes past existence, and especially whether it makes deliverance as to the fact that that past existence had a beginning. The self-conscious subject knows himself in the self-conscious state as now existing. Perhaps it would be more strictly accurate to say that its present consciousness includes the memory of former conscious states, and thus memory rather than consciousness gives knowledge of a past with its current experiences. The

past is not present in fact, and as consciousness is confined to the present, it cannot strictly be said to include that which once was present, but is not now present. The memory of the past is now present in the consciousness, and through it we consciously retain hold on the past.

But even memory does not reach the fact of a beginning to the self-conscious subject. It would not be strictly correct to say that we are conscious of remembering a period when our existence emerged or began. We have no such memory. We have no such consciousness. All that can be said is that there is a point beyond which memory does not reach.

To determine that we did not then exist we must appeal to some other source of knowledge. By observation we know that human life here begins in infancy. That there was a prior stage of existence has been fancied, but of it there is no proof, as memory treasures no reminiscences of it, and as no other proof of any kind can be adduced in its support. We are conscious of the uneradicable belief that in that blank beyond the reach of memory and antedating natural birth we did not exist. The proof is negative rather than positive. The total absence of all remembered consciousness or experience, and the observation of the fact of a beginning to all human life in infancy furnish the stable ground of conviction that our existence began when we were born into this world.

In addition to these knowledges, which come to us by external perception of external being, and by internal perception of internal being and activ- What is known by the reason. ity, there are certain other deliverances not of internal or external perception but of the reason which we know to be true, and do not merely believe. They are truths which do not pertain to objects of sense-perception, and which do not pertain to the essence or activity of the knower, or to the realm of existences as being at all, and yet are

known as necessary truths of thought. They are called abstract truths, intuitive truths, truths of the reason, necessary truths, truths underlying existence and determination. Truths of reason. truths, truths underlying existence and determination of existence and thought—axioms; truths seen in their own light—self-evident. Many things, without doubt, are unreflectingly put in this class which do not belong to it, and in every case great care should be taken to not extend the class unwarrantably; but there are such direct knowledges. Such are the following: Every effect must have a cause; every whole must be the equivalent of its parts; absolute space has no bounds; duration is infinite; form is essential to matter; that which has form is finite; all number is finite; no number of finites can make an infinite; a straight line is the shortest distance between two points; the parts are equal to the whole; a circle is a line every point of which is equidistant from its center; a sphere is a surface every point of which is equidistant from the center; extension is a property of matter; form, place, and limitation are inseparable from matter; moral character is non-transferable; there are no proxies in morals; sin cannot be imputed where it does not exist, without falsity or injustice; there can be no responsibility where there has not been ability; freedom is essential to moral agency; law implies a lawgiver; where there is no law there can be no transgression. These and many more are axiomatic truths; intuitively known by the mind to be truths. They are known to be necessary; that is, the opposite is seen to be impossible and unthinkable. They furnish the basis of all reasoning, but need not themselves be proved, nor can they ever be doubted. These knowledges are characterized by universality, necessity, the unthinkability of the opposite. They furnish the laws of thought and conditions of all ratiocination.*

Added to these are other knowledges, as conclusions reached

* See Appendix: Note B.

by demonstrative reasoning — truths disclosed or ascertained by the discursive faculty. Such are the truths reached through axioms, in geometry and mathematics, and pure and mixed truth reached by logic. The process begins with knowledges, however derived, whether of the self or not-self, or necessary abstract truths of reason. These are used as premises, and by means of them, in the third or tenth term, a previously unknown truth becomes evolved as necessarily sequent. The truth of the premises as conjoined includes the truth of the conclusion ; the demonstration reveals it. The ground of knowledge differs from all the above, in that What is known by demonstration. the truth ascertained is not given in (*a*) sense or external perception, or (*b*) in self-consciousness or internal perception, as a mere act or state of the mind, or (*c*) in intuitive reason, but is reached by an exercise of the reasoning faculty, and in such way that it never could be reached except by connecting it with and deducing it from two or more antecedent knowledges, neither of which separately contains it, but jointly do, and when viewed, jointly discover it. The result, when reached, is not a belief, it is a knowledge. The premises which, as stated, are known to be true, bring the conclusion into such relations to the mind that its truth becomes an object of immediate cognition and necessity. The certainty in the premises carries up to inevitability in the conclusion. The conclusion is not discoverable, or does not become a knowledge alone ; it cannot be seen apart ; but when ushered by valid premises it cannot be hid—its truth, in fact, is an intuition. The reason directly cognizes it, not simply as a probable inference but absolutely an inevitable truth. $A=H$: but $H=B$, therefore, $A=B$. If the first and second be allowed, the third cannot be denied. If the first and second be known, they are no sooner seen together than the third is also seen as a necessary truth ;

but the third never could be known if either the first or second were unknown. From this principle it becomes possible for knowledge to extend beyond personal, external, or internal perception or original intuitions of reason.

DEMONSTRATION (*demonstrare*, to point out, to cause to see). —In old English writers this word was used to signify the pointing out, the connection between a conclusion and its premises, or that of a phenomenon with its asserted cause. It now denotes a necessary consequence, and is synonymous with proof from first principles. To draw out a particular truth from a general truth in which it is inclosed, is deduction; from a necessary and universal truth to draw consequences which necessarily follow, is demonstration. To connect a truth with a first principle, to show that it is this principle applied or realized in a particular case, is to demonstrate. The result is science, knowledge, certainty. Those general truths arrived at by induction in the sciences of observation, are certain knowledge. But, it is knowledge which is not definite or complete. It may admit of increase or modification by new discoveries, but the knowledge which demonstration gives is fixed and unalterable.

“A demonstration is a reasoning consisting of one or more arguments, by which some proposition brought into question is evidently shown to be contained in some other proposition assumed, whose truth and certainty being evident and acknowledged, the proposition in question must also be admitted as certain.

“Demonstration is direct or indirect. Direct demonstration is descending—when starting from a general truth we come to a particular conclusion, which we must affirm or deny; or ascending—when starting from the subject and its attributes, we arrive by degrees at a general principle, with which we connect the proposition in question. But these are deductive,

because they connect a particular truth with a general principle. Indirect demonstration is where we admit hypothetically a proposition contradictory of that which we wish to demonstrate, and show that this admission leads to absurdity ; that is, an impossibility or a contradiction. This is *demonstratio per impossibile* ; or *reductio ad absurdum*. It should only be employed when direct demonstration is unattainable.

“Demonstration was divided by ancient writers into two kinds : one kind they called demonstration $\delta\tau\iota$; the other demonstration $\delta\iota\acute{o}\tau\iota$.

“The demonstration $\delta\iota\acute{o}\tau\iota$, or argument from cause to effect, is most commonly employed in anticipating future events. When, for example, we argue that at a certain time the tides will be unusually high, because of its being the day following the new or the full moon, it is because we know that that condition of the moon is in some way connected, as a cause, with an unusually high rising of the tides as its effect, and can argue, therefore, that it will produce what is called spring tides.

“On the other hand, the demonstration, $\delta\tau\iota$, or argument from effect to cause, is more applicable, naturally, to past events, and to the explanation of the phenomena which they exhibit as effect. Thus the presence of poison in the bodies of those whose death has been unaccountably sudden, is frequently proved in this way by the phenomena which such bodies present, and which involve the presence of poison as their cause.” * The theory of demonstration is to be found in the “Organon of Aristotle,” “since whose time,” says Kant, “Logic, as to its foundation, has gained nothing.”*

Testimony may also thus become the mediator of knowledge to us. That is, from evidence we may deduce an absolute knowledge, when the evidence involves What is known by testimony. an intuition. We know intuitively that a mass of evidence

* Karlake, “Aids to Logic,” vol. ii, p. 46.

may exist which cannot be false, and, therefore, what is included in the testimony is directly seen by the mind as inevitably true. It, in fact, becomes transformed into a necessary truth, or rather, a perceived necessity that it should be true. Testimony may be either human witnessing to a fact, or facts themselves supporting other facts. The fossils in the earth bring to us absolute knowledge of the high antiquity, gradual growth, and pre-Adamic life of the world; the exhumed ruins of Nineveh bring us absolute knowledge of a long-since extinct civilization. Present known facts bring us face to face with long vanished facts, under the intuition that effects must have a cause. Thus the sphere of knowledge is pushed beyond our personal experience in time and space. We know that the ocean must have a farther shore, though we have not seen it; that our race had ancestors, though they were removed before we were born; that the pyramids of Egypt were built, though we did not witness it. Thus knowledge of facts may extend beyond sense-observation. But this does not alter the law, that knowledge is that state of mind which results from direct, face-to-face contact of subject and object of knowledge. In all these and similar cases there is a present fact before the mind, which is known; and the fact is intuitively known to require another fact. That other fact becomes object of intuitive knowledge. The obverse involves the reverse. The knowledge of this is the knowledge of that.

In effect this seems to imply that knowledge may be mediate or result from testimony, and so contradicts the position already established, that all knowledge is immediate or intuitive; but in fact this is not so. The knowledge is in this, as in every case, immediate. The fact testified to is mediated; that is, it is not itself before the mind directly, and so itself is not matter of knowledge in the same way as if it were seen, but the tes-

timony is immediately *vis-à-vis* with the mind—it is known and it is of such a kind that it is intuitively known that it must be true. Whether the subject-matter of testimony be true or not, the mind ordinarily is not in condition to know, and the result can rise no higher than a variable degree of belief or doubt, and that will be the condition in which the mind is left; but while this is the ordinary fact of testimony, a form of testimony may exist out of which absolute knowledge may emerge, and yet the knowledge will be intuitive or immediate. When a large number of minds declare that, of personal knowledge, there is such a city as London, the mass of concurrent testimony may be such in circumstance that the mind, while having no personal knowledge by actual perception of the existence of such a city, nevertheless may know that it does exist, not only in the sense of being absolutely certain, but in the deeper sense of seeing that it must be so. How does mere testimony bring it into such a state? In this way: (*a*) it directly knows the testimony—its mass and circumstances; (*b*) it intuitively or immediately knows or sees, by a law of reason, or through the reason, in the same manner in which it sees, that the whole cannot be greater than the sum of its parts, or any other axiom, that such concurrence of testimony is impossible under the circumstances without, or in the absence of, the truth or reality of the subject-matter of it. This is an intuition, and the intuition includes the reality of the subject-matter as really as if it were matter of personal cognition direct. The testimony is lifted out of mere probable proof to intuitive evidence. What the mind knows in the case is the testimony, and the absolute necessity that the testimony should be true. In this knowing it knows the existence of such a city as London, though it never personally saw it with the outer eye. A sensible object, not given in sense or by sense, is declared to the reason, or by the reason is seen

Testimony a
source of
knowledge.

to exist, and, in a sense the knowledge takes rank with self-evident or necessary truths, discerned by the intuitive reason. Sequences which flow from premises take on them the precise quality of the premises. If the sequence is known to be the only and sole sequence possible, and the premises are known to be absolutely true, the sequence becomes also an absolute knowledge. If there is uncertainty, or absence of knowledge in the premises, or if there are possible alternatives in the sequence, knowledge does not and cannot exist. The result can carry no higher than belief. On these principles repose the validity of all demonstrations and logical conclusions. Demonstration is simply a process by which a given sequence is known to flow inevitably from premises known to be true. In the outcome the mind sees that the conclusion has in it the same degree of truth which it sees to inhere in the premises. A thing not given in sense may be as really known to exist as if seen, if the premises necessitate the conclusion of its existence. It would be an inexcusable affectation for any person of ordinary intelligence and ordinary opportunities of information, to say that he did not know whether or not there is such a city as London, though he never personally saw it.

We do not doubt, however, that despite the fact that knowledge may thus be derived to the mind through a given form of testimony, on fundamental grounds the distinction should be maintained that classifies all our ideas derived through testimony as beliefs—noting the possible exceptions. The distinction is scientific and convenient, as denoting a broad margin of difference in the grounds of knowledge and belief.

Let us not fall into the mistake, that what is known by another is known by ourselves. The same statement or fact may be labeled a knowledge, or a belief, or a conjecture merely, and will be either as the personal mind stands related to it. One knows a fact, or an experience. To him they will forever

be knowledges, but to any other mind, not so related, they can never be more than beliefs on testimony, unless the testimony is such as that the mind intuitively cognizes its necessary truth.

That is knowledge to us only which we know.

Finally, the mind is conscious of knowing some past consciousnesses and some past perceptions. That which was a present experience or conscious act or affection a moment or a day ago, or in some cases a year or years ago, remains so vividly permanent in the consciousness, that it cannot be reduced to a mere belief. With regard to most memories, except in a very general way, this cannot be said. They fade out; the minute and sharp lines become obscure and partially obliterated; and, except in the most general manner, it is impossible to restore them. They remain in the mind a confused blending of a half-knowledge and half-belief. How it is that the object is held we do not know; but we do know that it is so held; some part, in some way, still lingers in the direct gaze of the mind like an object of perception in perspective. It recedes and grows dim, but is not wholly lost. With regard to the great mass of objects which have been in our minds as transient events, in some form of knowing, now that they no longer exist, except in a treasured idea or memory, we are not quite able to identify as knowledges. We have an indistinct recollection that the facts were thus or so, but we find ourselves not able to affirm that they were certainly so, and are compelled to say they seem to have been this or that. The past does not wholly vanish, it keeps along with us in unbroken continuity, and scenes of fifty years ago are present to-day—some with the vividness of assured reality and others in the nimbus of indefiniteness and uncertainty.

What is known by memory.

This brings into view one of the most interesting psychological facts of our strangely complex and mysterious nature, by which we are enabled to grow and increase in knowledge.

We live but an instant at a time ; that is, we can never have an actual possession of more than a moment of existence, so brief that it vanishes, as soon as we can think it—before we can formulate the idea—now. If what the now gives us were wholly withdrawn from us when the moment vanishes, we should never be able to hold in our knowledge more than the passing consciousness. But we are so mercifully and mysteriously constituted, that, standing or floating on that sharper-than-a-needle point, we are able to look through or back over our life-time, and see much of it as we see illuminated points of a landscape, and almost the whole of the kaleidoscopic experiences, as we see the general surface of river, plain, and hill, in the region through which we travel. Thus it is that we live

How we in- over our past happiness or sorrow, and thus it will be
crease in
knowledge. that forever we shall hold together the integrity of
our entire life in its order of successive experiences, and retain
and increase the stores of our knowledge. A moment repro-
duces a life-time, and hands it on to the next and the next,
with the increase to all eternity. This source of increase makes
the difference in the stature of a child on earth and a man in
heaven—of the wealth of the experience of one day, and the
experiences of countless millions of years. It is thus that it is
possible for us to approximate, without the possibility of reach-
ing, the Infinite in knowledge and blessedness. Standing on
some high Alps in the far-removed ages of the future, with
myriads of millenniads at our feet, we may have the wealth
of all the experiences, studies, growths of a life-time focused
in a single gaze—nay, may have it permanent and perpetual.
That this is not a mere dream, but the outcome of a law of our
mental life, is not only possible, but most probable, if not a
matter of knowledge, as will appear in future discussions.

It is important that we should be able, among our concepts, to fix their relative dignity : to distinguish which of them are

knowledges, which rational beliefs, which merely imbibed opinions, imaginations, conjectures, dreams. These terms indicate differentiable states, but they are not always discriminated. The unskilled often take the merest conjectures for knowledges. In one respect all the states indicated resemble: they each exist in the mind in the form of notions or concepts. They may also each represent a reality. Even a dream or imagination may be true. But there is a vast difference in the value of these concepts. In the case of knowledges, there is an ascertained reality corresponding with the concept. In the case of rational beliefs, there are evidences to warrant the belief of reality. In the case of conjectures, imaginations, dreams, there may or might be corresponding realities, but there is no evidence whatever that there are such. In the first case the concept is true; in the second, there is reason to believe it is true; in the third, it may be true; but there is no known evidence for believing it to be so. In the first case, the mind acts according to its nature in affirming that it certainly has the truth and knows it; in the second, it acts according to its nature in believing that it has the truth; in the third, it acts according to its nature in withholding belief for the want of evidence. In the first case, it does not believe, but knows; in the second case, it does not know, but believes; in the third case, it neither knows nor intelligently believes, nor has the right to affirm; but may disbelieve. What is known cannot be disbelieved: what is matter of belief might, in a given case, become matter of disbelief, or might become matter of knowledge; might be raised or lowered in its dignity and value, in some cases, but possibly not in all. What is mere matter of conjecture might, under change of circumstances, become matter of belief, or even, under changed conditions and relations of

Relative dignity of concepts.

Knowledges.

Beliefs.

Conjectures.

Mind acts according to its nature.

subject and object, might become matter of knowledge; that is, when truth is as the conjecture, and when the changed circumstances of the mind convert the conjecture into a cognized reality. Since there is this difference in the value of concepts, it must be important, to a truth-seeker, to be able clearly to distinguish between them, and not only be *able* to distinguish, but, in fact, always to distinguish between them. The habit of making the distinction will be of great service. It will enable us to set aside certain of our concepts,

as never to be questioned, namely, our knowledges. Importance of discriminating the quality of an idea. These are final; the truth *cannot* contradict them. It is only necessary that we certainly know in the case; but in order to do that, we must be able to decide that we do know, and what knowledge is.

This habit will enable us, also, to class certain of our concepts as rational beliefs, that is, as beliefs that have been carefully formed, by an examination of all the evidence in our reach, and so to be held firmly as true, subject only to revision and change, if we should find new and determining facts to the contrary. This will give us a body of beliefs which will be abiding, and furnish the ruling ideas of our life. It will enable us, further, to classify certain of our ideas as mere opinions, or conjectures, which we may not insist upon as fixed beliefs. These will be subject to revision, if the occasion should exist for attaching to them any practical value. Only narrow and ignorant minds attach any importance to these, and such often regard the merest dreams as absolute truths.

We have thus found five definitive fields of possible knowledge—five cases in which our concepts may be differentiated as cognitions, as distinguished from a much larger class which must forever stand in the mind as beliefs or mere fancies only. These are: (1) External perceptions, in which the object stands out before the mind as real, and as characterized by certain

phenomena mediated to us through a sensory system in forms of sensation, but given to us, in a way that we cannot explain, as knowledges, and not as conjectures or mere beliefs. (2) Internal perceptions, or self-consciousness, in which the mind stands as an object of vision to itself, in the present form of its activity. This, again, must forever rank as purest knowledge, and can never be made to take on the form of belief. (3) Direct perceptions of the reason, or intuitions, in which the mind gazes immediately on necessary truths, and knows them as such, and which can never be reduced to beliefs. (4) Demonstrated truths of mathematics and logic, which, though not directly cognized apart from premises, are, nevertheless, seen by the mind to be certain and the necessary outcomes of thought when correlated with premises. (5) A limited number and kind of memories, in which the past still stands in the present and perfect view of the mind, as when the past was itself present.*

Sources of
knowledges.

All possible forms of knowledge will group under some one or more of these five forms, and each form is a direct seeing or intuition. We have not included testimony as a sixth source of knowledge, inasmuch as when it becomes such it involves an intuition or direct cognition of the reason.

The brood of thoughts or ideas or concepts which find their way into our minds in some other way, and under some other conditions, can be *known* as existing in consciousness, but those special objects of which they are concepts can come into no other relation to us than that of belief, or some form of doubt or disbelief.

It will be observed that in all these cases the mind stands *vis-à-vis*—face to face—with the object of its knowledge: there is direct relation between subject and object; nothing intervenes as mediator. Knowledge is that state or act of the

* See Murphy, "Phil. Basis of Belief," appendix: note B.

mind which results from the mind directly looking on the object. It is always intuitive. It will admit of no doubt. It will render no reason. Its simple answer is: "There are things which seem to me true, which I believe; these I know." These are knowledges, and these only. Beyond these we know nothing. The fundamental characteristic of knowledge is, that it is that act or state of the mind which results when an object, be it internal or external, material or metaphysical, passes immediately before it, and becomes object of its direct gaze. All things known by us are, or have been, thus immediate to our contact; when we come to apply the principle, we will discover that the class of our concepts which are entitled to be called knowledges is exceedingly limited.*

If it should be said, as it is, that the mind only knows its own states and acts, and cannot transcend itself so as to know other beings external to itself, we answer, that in knowing itself it knows that it perceives other objects. It cannot explain how it does it, but it knows that it does it. This is the testimony of its self-consciousness. No pressure can enforce retraction.

Mind trans-
scends itself. The only account it can give of the object is, that it is of the not-self, and real, and is known to it under forms of phenomena or appearance. Knowledge includes subject and object. It is not knowledge if either is wanting. The object in knowledge is not some state of the subject, unless the subject be the object; but the state of the subject is the knowing; and the knowing is comprehensive of subject and object. When the subject is subject-object, the knowing is of itself as being and of its states or acts; but when the object is some material thing, as in perception, though the knowing subject may become co-object in the self-consciousness which attends the knowing act, it is not the object perceived; the perceived object in being perceived is known, as distinct from the subject-

* See Appendix: Note C.

object, and the knowledge of it is knowledge of itself and not simply of the concept which is formed of it.*

In perception there are two forms of mental action which are radically different: (a) The self-conscious act of cognition of the self as having a perception, or of the perceiving act, which is wholly subjective; (b) the act of perceiving, which the mind knows is its own act, but which it also knows has a real object as its ground which is external to itself. It does not perceive the perception. It is conscious of it. It is not conscious of the object, it perceives it. It intuitively knows that there could be no perception without an object to be perceived, as it knows there could be no consciousness of a perception without a perception and a conscious subject. It knows the object in perception as directly as it knows the perception in consciousness—in other words, the knowledge which issues is of subject and object both—of subject as conscious of the perception or perceiving act, and of object as that which is perceived, and without which there could be no perception, and so, in the case, no consciousness.†

All knowing, by whatsoever mind and under whatsoever form, is the same; that is, the knowing act is one and the same kind of an act, but each knowing is the distinct act of an individual mind.

If all that is known by all minds could become knowledge for each, much that is now mere belief would be transformed into knowledge; but this cannot be. Each mind must begin at zero, and work up its own capital; and life is so short and limited that no individual can gain much knowledge. Facilities for the intercommunication of mind have now so increased, and so many methods for treasuring up the thoughts and achievements of men have been invented, that each generation comes

* See Ferrier's "Institutes of Metaphysic."

† See Hamilton's "Philosophy," pp. 173, 174.

upon the stage of life with greatly improved advantages, and the sum of general knowledge is rapidly increasing. But while the attainment of knowledge is more easy, and the enjoyments of the results of knowledge are more accessible and universal, it still remains that each man must acquire knowledge for himself, and atom by atom. He cannot inherit it.

Knowledge is neither connate, inheritable, transferable, nor communicable. Truth may be communicated, but Knowledge not transferable. in the recipient mind it must emerge as belief, not as knowledge. To know it as truth there must be some other relation to it than that which the communication creates. So long as the statement of another is the sole ground, it can have no other effect than to procure such a degree of belief as the assumed intelligence and veracity of the author warrants. It may range from zero to entire confidence, but it will only be belief. Testimony is a ground of knowledge, and can become such only when it is of such kind as to involve an intuition that its contents must be true. In that case the subject-matter, though given in the form of testimony, becomes, in fact, a direct cognition. One mind may put another mind in the way of knowing, and so may help it to knowledge by pointing out what is true, and aiding it to come into such relations to the truth that it will not be dependent upon the statement alone, but will come to know for itself.

Individual experiences can never be matter of knowledge to any person except the person who has the experience. Thus the knowledge of each mind is knowledge for itself—a treasure which it can neither alienate nor divide with others. The utmost the knowing mind can do is to express its knowledge to others, and so put them in possession of the truth it contains, to be held by them as a verity of belief, or to indicate how it may become a knowledge to them, or how they may attain a like knowledge. Some things can never emerge as

knowledge in any other mind than the mind in which they are a private and inseparable personal possession.

As knowledge always implies the truth or reality of what is known, whatever has been known by any one mind is proved to be true, though it should forever elude the knowledge of every other mind in the universe. Having been known once, its truth is determined and is indestructible. It is not the fact that it has been known that makes it true, but being known it cannot but be true. What is real is real, whether known or not; but knowledge cannot exist without the reality of that which is known, and so knowledge is the indestructible proof of reality to the knowing mind.

The actual knowledge possessed by men is greater than that of any individual: it comprises all the knowledge of all the men that ever lived. There is thus a sort of solidarity of all the knowledge of the race, which passes over as an inheritance to the individuals, and we speak of it as that which is known, and by any easy fallacy conceive ourselves as knowing it. For practical purposes the language is accurate enough, but it is not strictly true. Things experienced, observed, and wrought out by others, so as to be knowledges to them, pass by uncontradicted report into the currency of the world's thought, and become a common possession of assured truth. No one doubts—all assert that these are things well and universally known; but, in point of fact, they are simply heirlooms of belief, resting on no other foundation than the accredited report of written history, or on common unchallenged tradition. He would be accounted eccentric or mad who should attempt to dispute them.

Knowledge of
all men greater
than individual
knowing.

For accuracy of thought it must remain that there is a fundamental difference between knowing and believing, and that difference does not consist in the simple matter of the mind's certainty in one case and non-certainty in the other,

but in the certainty or non-certainty plus the circumstances or relations of the mind to objects which give rise to its feeling of certainty or uncertainty. Whatever is mediated to it by another, or by something else than its own senses or consciousness, or intuitive reason, or demonstration, or memory, or some other form of evidence which necessitates certainty, must stand simply as belief, or so-called knowledge by report.

What is given in internal perception, or self-consciousness?

Internal per-
ception.

It gives the self as real, and certain forms of its activity as feelings: (a) sensations derived through the body, either as it is affected within itself by the processes of life and action going on in its own members and components, or as it is affected by other material objects; (b) emotions which are purely subjective; (c) passions and appetites, which are mixed, resulting from the relations of the self to the body; (d) intellections, as thoughts, ideas, reasonings, memories, and all properly mental acts; (e) volitions, motives, purposes, determinations, choices, executive acts. These consciousness gives as of the self. The self is thus known as real, as one, and as active. This is all that is given in self-consciousness, or internal perception. It does not tell *what* the self is, but that it is and what it does. It knows nothing of how it acts, or how it is acted upon. It forms no image of the self, knows nothing of its whence or why, or of how it carries forward its processes. Its sole *positum* or *datum* is the self under forms of activity, and as possessing powers to act.

The personal being is not a mere intellect with power to know and believe. In self-knowledge he knows himself as having these powers; but additionally, he knows himself as having feelings, and a power of volition, and as free. He knows himself, therefore, as a complex individualized unit, in which are synthetized intelligence, feeling, will. These are separable in thought, but one in his unitary

The personal
being not mere
intellect.

being ground. He it is that knows. He it is that feels. He it is that wills. It is a one-self that exists in all these divers states. Personality is a triformed unity.

The mind has a moral constitution—is a moral being: that is, in its nature it is ethical. It does not exist without the ethical sense. Its *modus vivendi* is ethical. It spontaneously makes ethical distinctions, and feels the imperation of ethical obligations. Thus its very existence involves the fact of moral law and the reality of a moral realm. It is so sensitively constituted that a thought, or motive, or act of a certain kind starts moral feeling, that is, a feeling of approval or disapproval, of praiseworthiness or blameworthiness. It tries itself not merely by the standard of right reason as to the accuracy of its conclusions, but also by the standard of right feeling, motive, and conduct. This moral constitution it knows is inherent, and of its very nature in knowing itself. How it came by it it does not know in self-consciousness, but it knows that it is a fact, just as it knows that it performs rational acts.

The feeling that an act is right or wrong, or the feeling of an impulse to worship, or the feeling of pain or pleasure at the contemplation of an act — the impulses or promptings or reproaches of conscience—are not the equivalents of knowledge, but they are included in self-knowledge, and they are the grounds of knowledge, as we shall see, of an objective law and authority. The self-knowing gives no more than their existence. They themselves furnish data for further knowing by rational induction. They are known to exist. When they arise in the mind they presuppose a ground. That ground is the fact of a fundamental moral nature. The mind spontaneously cognizes, so soon as moral feeling takes place, the idea of right and wrong. In beholding certain acts feeling of a certain kind is awakened, and through the feeling it immedi-

Mind has a
moral consti-
tution.

The feelings,
a ground of
knowledge.

ately cognizes that they are right or wrong, as it cognizes axioms. A feeling is concomitant or invariably synthetizes with the cognition of right and wrong. That we are so constituted as to experience these feelings is a fact of our moral nature, which points to the reality of the moral quality of the objects which awaken them. The knowing of the act, if external, is by perception or information; or in the case of internal acts, as thoughts, motives, malign or benign feelings, by internal perception or self-consciousness. The feeling which arises with the cognition is one of approval or aversion. The feeling denotes the moral quality of the act. Through it the intelligence attains the idea of right or wrong, and cognizes the act as of either this or that quality. It is this co-existence of feeling and intelligence which constitutes the basis of the moral nature, and makes man a moral being. There can be no moral nature, not even in God, without feeling. The act of the reason in assigning moral quality when such feelings appear is intuitive. By this we do not mean that the reason discerns no other ground for the idea of right and wrong, and no other ground for classifying the given act as this or that, but the feeling which spontaneously emerges on beholding it; but it detects in the feeling its own essential moral nature, and the ground for condemning or approving its acts of a certain kind. On examination of the circumstances of the case the mind may change its spontaneous verdict, and with that change the feeling itself will change; but this does not prove that there is not a moral nature and moral standard in the mind, but only that the case is not properly apprehended. The knowledge is at fault, not the feeling. That there is such a moral constitution in the mind, in its very nature, is matter of universal consciousness. The presence in every mind of the feeling of oughtness and ought-not-ness, and the verdict of the reason that these feelings are proper, is in absolute proof. The sense

of guilt, ill-desert, shame, worthiness of punishment, which universally attends certain acts and even thoughts, and the converse, are in proof.

There is a reality of right and wrong, and the mind intuitively cognizes the fact, and in knowing itself it knows this, as a primary *datum* of consciousness. Reality of right and wrong.

There is a standard which determines what is right and wrong, and the mind intuitively discerns the fact, for without this the idea could not exist, and the feeling could not arise. The defects of the understanding and the circumstances under which it renders its verdict, and the susceptibility of the feelings to be indurated or even totally obscured, are such that the judgment is often inaccurate. But these do not alter the verdict of reason and consciousness alike, that man is a moral being in the constitution of his personality. He knows this.

In every feeling there is knowledge. In every knowledge there is feeling. In every volition there is both feeling and knowledge. Feeling cannot exist without being known. Knowledge cannot exist without being felt. Volition proper cannot exist without a feeling of motive to it and a feeling of it. It cannot be exerted without both a feeling and a knowledge of it. The mind neither acts nor suffers without consciousness or self-knowing. Though knowledge and feeling are always synthetized they are not the same; inseparable, they are not identical. Feeling is not knowing. Knowing is not feeling. Volition proper is never without feeling and knowing, but is neither feeling nor knowing. Feeling and knowing may exist without volitional exercise.

Feeling is of divers kinds. Knowing and willing are simple acts. All knowing is identical in kind and degree, but of divers objects and sources. All willing is identical in kind. There are moral, spiritual, and physical feelings.

What relation has feeling to knowledge?

One class of feelings is called sensations, another class appetites or passions, another emotions, another affections.

The feeling of sensation is derived through the organism, and comprises all the affections produced in the mind through the five senses—the sense of sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. Impingement of some kind on the nerve organ reports itself in the mind, and becomes sensation or feeling, which feeling becomes occasion of cognition, or a knowing act, not of itself alone, but of the object which awakens it. The sensation is not knowledge, but it cannot exist without being known. It is thus a condition, or invariable concomitant, of certain kinds of knowledge. All sensation becomes ground of knowledge, not of itself alone, but of something external to the mind; the organism as affected, and generally of something still more external, which affects the organism. Through sensations, and the organism which mediates them, the mind finds its approaches to the external world, and becomes cognizant, not of itself alone, but of the organism and of the external world—the non-ego. Thus the sensory organism, while itself not a knowing subject, by its intimate relations to the mind becomes, through its nerve-excitation, the occasion of an act of cognition, in which the mind knows itself as knower, and the external world as excitant.

The passions are of the soul, and their action is from within, but, like the sensations, they are conditioned physiologically, and their gratification is mediated through the organism. What are known as the “lusts of the flesh,” or earthly side of our nature, are really of the soul. They effect, or originate, the mysterious excitations of the body which pertain to its preservation and the propagation of the species. The organism is made for them, even as it is made for sensation from the external world. The perception of the external

Passions of the
soul.

world is conditioned on the organism ; so here, the preservation of the body and propagation of the species are conditioned on the organism ; but both effects would fail were it not for the perceptive power of the mind in the first case, and its subjective passions in the second. They cannot be felt without being known, and known as subjective, but as related to the organism. Their presence awakens desire, distress, or subjective feeling of some kind. Knowledge of them is the invariable and necessary concomitant of their existence.

The passions are more subjective than the sensations. They are of the mind, or spring from the mind itself, Passions more subjective than sensations. and act directly on the organism, while sensations arise from external impingement. In sensations the external world is given to the mind through the sensorium. In the passions the mind goes outward, seeks and excites the organism, and originates conditions in it for their own gratification. The passions are the most intimate *nexus* between the personal soul and the external world. The organism is the necessary medium of the knowledge of externality in the one case, and the necessary medium of the gratification of the passions or animal desires in the other case. The arrangement in the organism for sensation is instrumental to knowledge, both of the subject and object, and is minister to mind. The implanted passion in the mind acts on the organism, exciting it and moving it to seek gratification. The needs of the organism for its preservation excite desire for food or craving in the mind to appease the pain which hunger creates and for the pleasing sensation of taste. The *need* is of the organism. The pain and pleasure are of the soul. Thus the soul's craving for the kind of good which the organism ministers becomes the means of preserving it from waste and destruction. The relation is intimate and necessary.

The sexual passion is subjective—an implanted affection

which has for its object the propagation of the species. Its only means of gratification is the organism, and its only function the propagation of the species. It is, therefore, properly conditioned on the organism, and exists only for time; and as it finds the conditions of its excitation in the body it probably disappears with the body.

Implanted affection.

As of close kin to the passions must be classed all sexual attractions and loves running throughout all the realm of animal life. They are not rational, but instinctive.

There is a human affection, or love of man for his fellows, which is of an entirely different kind, not having physiological grounds alone, but additionally moral and purely subjective grounds. The moral affections are subsequent to the natural and instinctive, and possibly rise out of them, but are not modifications of them, and greatly transcend them in worthiness. Though the passions are subjective, they would probably not exist were there no bodily conditions for their play and gratification.

Thus the arrangements for the feelings, which are classed as sensations and passions, are with reference to the present order, and involve physiological conditions; while the feelings of benevolence and friendship, and all the higher impulses of love for humanity and moral worthiness, wherever found, are permanent and inhere in the moral nature.

The mental, moral, and spiritual emotions are still another class of feelings. They, like the rest, exist only as they are known. They are purely subjective.

Moral emotions.

They are the pleasures and pains which attend knowing; which attend all normal mental acts; which attend external acts that are conceived to be good or bad; they are feelings to which we give the names of joy, hope, love, fear, sorrow, benevolence, malevolence, worship. The occasions of them are certain things apprehended by the mind as obliga-

tory, as right or wrong, as becoming or unbecoming, as worthy or unworthy, as working evil or good. They are the bases of religion and morality.

The process of sensation we found to be the excitation of a sensory nerve of the physical organism by impingement of a material object, which sensation is taken up by the mind in perception, and is transformed into a thought-image of the impinging object, and issues in a cognition of it.

We discover, upon careful study, another sensory system—shall we call it a spiritual sensorium?—a something which is sensitive to moral impingement—sometimes called conscience, the moral sense, the spiritual ego.

The process is this: As in perception there is an object and answering organ, so here there is an object and answering organ.

In the first case the organ is a material nerve. In this it is a spiritual nerve. In the first, the order is material impingement on the receptive nerve of sensation, which is taken up in perception and transmuted into a concept or thought of the impinging reality. The perception is cognition, the direct seeing of the mind, the bringing of subject and object into synthesis or concreteness or unity. In the second, the order is the impingement of a moral fact on the more delicate moral nerve or sensitive soul, awakening a feeling How moral emotions arise. of pain or pleasure, approval or disapproval, or the appropriate affection or emotion. The process here is either the perception of some external act or the self-consciousness of some thought or motive or purpose or feeling purely subjective. Whichever it may be, it awakens the appropriate moral emotion. If it is an act of one kind, it excites the spontaneous emotion of satisfaction. If an act of another kind, it results in a recoil of feeling. If, instead of an act, it is a mere thought or motive or purpose or desire, the sensitive soul experiences the same spontaneous appropriate affection—is moved with a

sensation of pleasure or pain. The affection is taken up by the reason or intelligence, and the object awakening it is cognized as right or wrong. It is the moral sensibility which reports it in feeling; the reason which determines its reality and quality. The moral fact thus emerges in effect on sensibility, and the moral law is discerned and applied by the reason or conscience.

As in sensation the external object is disclosed to the mind in perception, and the reality becomes known, so here, Feelings ground of moral distinctions. in the feeling or moral sensibility, the moral fact and its moral quality become disclosed, and the reality becomes known. As the mind can only reach outward to external reality through sensation, so it can only reach the idea of moral quality through the feelings produced in the sensitive soul by the moral facts which impinge on it. Mere reason, separate from moral feeling, cannot give the idea—cannot reach it—of right and wrong. In order that the quality of rightness or wrongness may inhere in an act, it must be associated with a feeling, or have a feeling associated with it, or have a normal tendency to produce a feeling. We cannot predicate right or wrong of a mere mistake of the judgment, or an external act that is without motive of any kind, or an emotion that is purely involuntary. The quality arises with an act of the will and the motive thereto. It is the presence of these that makes the ethical element, and superinduces the moral sensation. The effect is not simply a rational idea of the quality of the act, but a feeling awakened in the soul. Thus moral feeling both precedes and follows all moral action, and it is such because of these.

By external consciousness, or sense-perception, we acquire the knowledge of those objects which are perceived, and of those alone. If there are other objects of the same kind, but which do not fall within sense-perception, we do not, by means of it, know of their existence. The external universe is limited to those objects which we perceive, so far as we know,

by perception. If it is more extended, that fact can only become known to us through some other faculty, or by enlarging the sphere of perception, or by gaining knowledge of similar kind from others who have acquired it in the same way; and then it will become object of perception, and the knowledge of it thus gained will still limit it to what is perceived. But of the objects perceived what do we know? In general we know (*a*) that they are external to the self, (*b*) that they are real, (*c*) that they take on a certain appearance, (*d*) that among these phenomena some are fixed and others variable, (*e*) that they are diverse, (*f*) that they sustain spacial relations to each other. This is all that is given by perception. It gives us no knowledge of whence they are, how they are, why they are. They are as perceived at any given moment; perception gives that, and no more. When we say perception gives the object, we can mean nothing else than this, that perception is a knowing of the object. There could be no perception without an object to be perceived, and there is no perception without a knowing of the object. To find just that which is perceived is to find just that which is known of externality by sense-perception.

The limit of the known, by means of external perception, is the limit of what has come under observation of all mind by means of the senses. No single mind Limits of the knowable by perception. has mastered the indefinable sum, but aggregate mind has. The limit of the knowable by man, through perception, is the material universe so far as it can by any means be brought under sense observation. Scientific research is constantly widening the field in every direction. The earth and the heavens—organic and inorganic nature—are yielding up their long-hidden secrets with each rising and setting sun. New facts and new laws are rewarding the patient industry of toilful students. Obscurity and mystery are being cleared up.

They have already made the stones and the stars preach a new gospel. All honor to the indefatigable workers.

Thus far we have regarded perception as it respects material objects, simply as observed to exist. If we would know more of them, there is no other means of knowing but by perception. Sense furnishes us the only approach; but we may vastly increase our knowledge by increasing our perception. The analytic processes of science do no more than widen the sphere of perception, and make the knowledge more accurate. From knowing the complex, we come to know the components; we pass from the individual to the class; we detect qualities, habits, what we call laws, histories, forces, ends. These are all simple perceptions, or intuitions which rise out of them. The result is more accurate and extended observation, merely, of things and laws. All external perception is by impingement on the organism and through sensation, and thus Enlarging the sphere of perception. can only take place when there are relations of contact between the object and the organism: out of these relations there is no possibility of sensation or perception, and no knowledge of externality; in them the subject and object are joined together and comprised in our knowing.

Do we, then, know nothing of externality—nothing of the material universe, except that which we individually perceive? We answer, nothing more is given in perception. If any thing further is known, it must be in some other way, through some other organ of knowledge. What is given by sight? That which is seen. Certainly no more. What in hearing? What is heard. Certainly no more. What in touch? What is touched. Certainly no more. What in smell? What is smelled—the odor. Certainly nothing more. What in taste? What is tasted. Certainly no more. Then, so far as external perception gives knowledge, these are the limits. If there is more known and knowable of externality, it must

become known through some other medium than personal perception.

But there is more known. When a surface is perceived an object is given to the mind by perception. It may be given as solid or fluid, as round or square, as white or black, or in any of the qualities which emerge in sensation. So much is given in perception. But the mind intuitively knows that there must be an obverse side to the surface. This is not given in perception. A stick is given in perception, but the ends are not seen, or but one end; the mind intuitively knows that if there is one end there must be two, and either that there must be two ends or no end. It knows that of two perceived lines, which are parallel and straight, they cannot inclose a space. It knows that two material bodies cannot occupy the same space at the same time. It knows that a body of water with one shore must have a farther shore, though not perceived. It knows that a perfect sphere has a common center for every point on its surface. It knows that the radii of a sphere point in every direction.

Thus, while it appears that external material being can only come into cognition through sensation and perception, some things may be known of it which are not matters of perception, but intuitions made possible by, and growing out of, perceptions.

We have named as sources of knowledge memory and testimony. But the things which are known by memory are the things which we have experienced, and which, therefore, do not transcend what has been matter of self-consciousness, or the self and its states and acts, inclusive of its thoughts, its feelings, and its volitions, and the objects at any time had in perception, and its acquired learnings through perception and the reason; the sum of what it at any time has known, or such parts of

the sum as it retains. This last includes what it gains as knowledge by means of testimony, which delivers to it what has been known by others by the same process of observation and experience. Such knowledge includes the knowledge of things and events.

As yet, nothing has come into the contents of knowledge but the self, and the objects and events ministered to it by sensation and the like experiences of others made over to it as acquired learning—all lying within the limits of material objectivity and the mind itself, together with other minds. Were the mind limited to what is thus given, it would forever be shut into the narrow sphere of cognition of itself, together with like minds, and the objects and events which have been observed and experienced; and its future possible growth would forever be limited to this sphere—forever possibly enlarging, but forever confined within its own subjective states and the material objectives about it, and the events in the on-going of things—self, things, events, tendencies, laws, relations, forces—the swelling tide of the on-going of man and things. This is the theory of Positivism advocated by Auguste Comte, Spencer, Mill, and others.

Of the system of things and of the mind, neither self-consciousness nor sense perception gives any other information than that they are as found. Among the observed facts are forces and modes of operation, which make known to the reason another fact, namely, that there has been an indefinitely long on-going of things. For an indefinite period of the past, things have been going on about as they are now going forward. Geology reveals ages of immeasurable length during which the course of events has been uniform. History recites the story of man for centuries, but far back on the rims of the receding horizon it becomes lost in the mists of tradition. Of the origin of the system neither self-consciousness nor sense

perception gives any account. What matter is, whence it came, whether it is eternal, what mind is in essence, whence it came, how it performs its functions, how wide the universe extends, how long it has been unfolding, whether other worlds are inhabited by living beings and are observed and studied by minds similiar to our own, and all such questions, have no answer from self-consciousness or sense perception. Neither gives any account of any other kind of being or beings than the self and other selves with which it has come in contact, and the objects and events it has learned of by observation and experience and report.

The synthesis of external perception with internal perception gives intuitive knowledge of subject and object as perceived. From these sources no other knowledge is given. If there be any thing else, any other reality, it must be arrived at by some other power of the mind, or some other mode of cognition. But as in every act of cognition the mind is conscious of itself as the knowing subject, self-consciousness must be synthetic with any other power or act or knowing. The knowledge of the self pervades all knowing. All knowing is in self-consciousness, but it is not a product of self-consciousness. The object known is not the self, though it cannot be knower without knowing the self.

More known
than is given
by internal and
external per-
ception.

Have we a power of knowing other realities than the self, and realities given to the self, in external perception?

If to this question we were compelled to give a negative answer, the limits of the known and knowable would be the self and its activities, and the external universe lying within the sphere of perception. That there is any other reality could only be matter of imagination, or, at most, of inference. Are we shut up to this conclusion? Have we no means of transcending self and the material world? Are there no super-sensible realities? Or, if there be such, are we, by the limit-

ations of our powers, shut away from the possible knowledge of them, or even rational belief of them? To these questions Positivism returns a very confident answer, destructive alike of faith and hope. What are the facts?

We have found that there are other sources of knowledge. Other sources
of knowledge. It remains that we find their contents and determine their limits, and thus see what they bring, or may bring, within the range of cognition.

The intuitive reason is the name given to the power of the Intuitive rea-
son, what? mind by which it cognizes realities not given, and not possible to be given, in or by sensation, because not of the sensible world. This power cognizes universal, necessary, conditioning truths and laws. Self-consciousness knows of and reveals the action of such a power; but it is the reason which cognizes the transcendental realities. They are not of the self, but known by the self. They are, if the self were not. They are not in the possession of self-consciousness until the intuitive reason has cognized them.

Intuitive reason gives us a fixed number of axioms—necessary truths, self-evidencing. It gives us the ideas of infinite space and infinite duration or eternity; the idea of causation—and so of eternal being, fountain of causation. So soon as we are brought into perceptive life, and become aware of the succession of events and spacial limitations of objects, and commence a reflective life, these realities emerge as a necessity of thought. We see that they not only are but must be.

Commerce with nature, and self-consciousness, push us out beyond self and the fleeting objects about us to the all-embracing infinite—not perceived by sense, but necessitated by that which is perceived. That becomes a cognition no less than these. It is a gift of reason itself, not of sense. It is not the self. It is not the fleeting pageant which reports itself in sensation; not the limited in time or space; but

that which lies behind all time and antedates all succession, and that which includes all limits and is itself unlimited. How do we arrive at this knowledge? We have said by the intuitive reason, that is, by direct seeing of the reason. But when and under what condition does this direct seeing take place? And how do we know that there is such a seeing? We answer:

The mind knows that there is a reality of force in the universe. How does it arrive at that knowledge? It is certain that it is not given in external percep-^{The reality of force.} tion: not seen, not touched, not heard, not tasted, not smelled; no sense delivers it.

It is also certain that it is not given by self-consciousness, as a property of the mind which cognizes it. Not given either in internal or external perception, it is yet known to be a reality, pervading all being. How is it seen? Perception gives us the motion of bodies—their change of place in space. Careful observation gives us the knowledge of changes which go on in bodies—integrations and disintegrations. The mind intuitively knows that for such changes there must be a cause. It gives to that discovered reality the name force. Force not given in perception is intuitively seen by the mind^{How force is known.} to be a necessary reality to account for the changes which are perceived. Experiment enables the mind to know how to command and use these unseen agents. Can any one doubt that we know of their existence? The sensation of pressure on the organism is referred by the mind in which it reports itself to something which produces it, but the something which produces it is not itself perceived, but cognized as ground of the impression. The forces which work the changes in nature are wholly obscure, known only by their perceived effects. But in the effects they are given to the intuitive reason as necessary grounds.

The mind knows that there is such a thing as personal power, analogous to but differing from impersonal forces. It knows of power otherwise than through perception, that is, power is not itself an object of sense. It knows it in self-consciousness and by observed effects which it is consciously able to produce and which it knows itself as producing. When it seeks to find what it is that it is conscious of, it discovers that it is a something by which it can produce certain changes volitionally. It puts forth its inherent power simply by an exercise of volition. It does not know how it works changes, but it knows that it possesses such a power and that it does work such results.

The mind is rational. It knows that it puts forth that inconceivable mystery of energy to effect changes for a purpose. It works to a preconceived end. The change it produces represents a rational idea. The will and the reason are thus seen to be concrete or synthetized in the effect. When it effects a change of any kind it knows that it proposed the change, that it was conscious of power to effect it, that it exerted energy to that end. Thus it becomes cognizant of personal power.

With these knowledges of agency, personal and impersonal, productive of changes, arises the intuition that every transformation or change requires an agent, personal or impersonal, to effect it. The presence of the effect discovers the agent, without which it could not take place. The great law of cause and effect emerges in cognition, as a universal and necessary constant in every effect. There can be no effect, no change, without an agent adequate to its production. It is an intuition of reason—self-evident. The mind knows this to be a reality with the same certainty and necessity with which it knows its own existence in knowing its thoughts and acts. It is, in fact, the same law. This forthputting of a thought requiring a thinking agent is but another putting of the law, every effect requires a

cause. The thought might as well exist without a mind to think it as any change take place without an agent to produce it.

The intuitive reason knows that back of all change there is a Being in whom is underived existence. For the ultimate Cause of being and change must himself, or itself, whatever it may prove to be, be underived and necessarily eternal. The mind thus rises through the derived to the Eternal Underived being-ground of all that appears in perception and self-consciousness in the realm of finite existence.

What is known of cause?

1. Every effect necessitates the existence of a cause, and not merely the conviction of it.

2. Every thing in the effect necessitates an adequate ground in the cause.

3. Cause must have being-ground; that is, were there no being there could be no cause.

4. Causation necessitates being antecedent to causation.

5. Ultimate or primary causal being is necessarily unoriginated, and consequently eternal.

6. In the unoriginated eternal must inhere all the causal ground of all other existence, and from him must emanate all possibilities of change.

7. Primary causation requires not only antecedent existence but the antecedent existence of a free cause.

8. No causal act can be eternal, though the being-ground or agent must be.

9. Ultimate cause or causal being is known only by effects, and never in itself directly.

10. The aggregate of effects in the completed cosmos and in its ongoing are sources of actual insight into the nature and character of the efficient agent.

What is known of effects?

1. Every effect is originated, and every origination is an effect.

2. No effect can be eternal, but all effects must be in time.
3. Every effect has being-ground.
4. Every effect refers to some being-ground other than itself; that is, no effect is its own cause.
5. There can be nothing in effect not derived from cause.
6. Effects might not be—that is, there is nothing in the nature of any effect which requires that it should exist, and there is nothing in the nature of original cause which requires it to produce any effect.

What is known of cause and effect synthetized?

1. Cause and effect are not identical.
2. The cause exists antecedent to the effect. It is a quibble to say there is no cause until there is an effect. The effect cannot exist without the cause whose being antedates its existence.
3. Effects do not inhere in the being or essence of their causes, but their possibility does.
4. The cause is not in the effect essentially, but efficiently.

The supersensible world matter of knowledge.

Is the supersensible world matter of knowledge, or is it wholly matter of belief or inference merely, resting on or deduced from knowledge? The matter of this question is of prime importance.

It is common with a class of thinkers to limit knowledge to sensible objects, and to decry all thought about the supersensible as mere bootless speculation. Theology is excluded, as a science, on this ground, and is reduced to the category of a mere inference.

We assert, on the contrary, that the supersensible world is matter of absolute *knowledge*, and of the highest and most indisputable knowledge. By the supersensible world we mean a world which transcends the senses, and which is not given in sensation. We assert that we do know of the existence of such a world, and of many facts of it,

Supersensible
world known.

and do not merely infer it. It is ground of science, and must be classed as the other sciences as known reality, and dealt with as such. Let us see if we can verify this statement and fix its limits.

The mind knows itself. This is its first and highest knowledge. It has no knowledge that does not include this self-knowledge. In every knowing act it knows itself as the knower. It knows itself as a real being. It cannot predicate knowledge of any other being or thing without predicating reality of itself.

Now this knowing self is supersensible. It is, and it has the power to go among sensible things and know them, but it is not itself an object of sense perception. In knowing itself, then, it knows a supersensible being. As its knowing of this supersensible is integral in every knowledge of every other being, it is the most universal, immediate, and constant of all its knowledges. Its reality is the most fundamental and certain of all other realities known to it, or by it.

What does it know about itself? Its knowledge is not limited to the bare knowledge that it exists. In know-
 ing that it exists, it knows that it is a knowing be- ^{Self supersensible.}
 ing. It knows that it has differentiable existence from other objects of its knowledge; that it is unlike them in every respect; that it has an individualized identity. It knows that it thinks, reasons, feels, wills, remembers, knows, believes, hopes, fears, loves, hates, and that these are constants, or essential inclusions of its being and activity. Of the reality of its existence, and of these faculties, powers, modes of action, and susceptibilities, it knows absolutely. The external and sensible world is not more real, and the qualities and relations of material things are not more clearly apprehended as objects of knowledge. In the former case doubt is possible; in the latter, to doubt is to assert the existence of the doubter, and

so is a direct contradiction or absurdity. We do, then, know the supersensible world as real, and we do know its essential characteristics in self-knowing.

Do we know any thing more of the supersensible world? If not, then for aught that we know it is limited to the self. The issue is pure egoism. This has been assumed.

To this question, we answer, We know the existence of other beings like ourselves, who belong to the supersensible world—a vast and innumerable community of such beings. That we know them as real beings, and do not merely believe that there are such, is absolutely certain. The knowledge is not given in sensation, for they are supersensible.

How do we come at the knowledge. In two ways: (*a*) We perceive forms about us in the external world that resemble the forms in which we live. So much is given in perception. This in itself awakens in us the idea that the beings themselves resemble us in all respects; but were we shut up to this perception, we could not say that we know that they are like us in respect of our supersensible nature; we might believe or assume it. But as we observe these forms we find them doing those acts which we ourselves do, and which in us are caused by the supersensible ego. In their acts we detect an ego like

Other being
supersensibly
known.

ourselves. We know intuitively that such acts must spring from a thinking being, and express the same attributes which are in us, and which constitute us what we are. We know, and do not merely believe, that there is a mind behind them. Observe that in all this they, the personal thinking agents, do not emerge as objects of sense: they do not reveal any quality of objects of sense: they simply manifest themselves to our intelligence through perception, as energizing in objects of sense revealing their thought and will and feeling, which are supersensible. We find thus, by actual knowledge, that we are surrounded by super-

sensible beings. But were this our only knowledge of them we should find the isolation extremely painful and unsatisfactory, the communion would be cold and distant. (*b*) But we are not thus limited. Mind seeks mind. By a law which we detect in us we are impelled to fellowship. The result is that those beings which belong to the supersensible world have created means for close and intimate intercommunication, by means of which they hold converse. They declare to each other that they do exist, and find, upon inquiry and comparison, that they are kindred, having exactest similarity. They exchange thoughts, reveal to each other their individual feelings and experiences, become interested in each other's histories, exchange reminiscences, aid each other in solving perplexing riddles, form close and undying attachments. This converse is carried on through external and sensible signs, but the beings who carry it on, themselves elude sense. We thus absolutely know of a widely extended supersensible world, and we know that it has laws of intercommunication; that it has a common life and nature; that it is bound together by common sympathies; that the individual beings of it do not exist in isolation, but that they form communities, and propagate thoughts and feelings between themselves, and so influence each other for weal or woe; are a commonwealth bound together by indissoluble interests, are capable of affecting each other beneficently or disastrously, and of awakening in each other grief, pain, sorrow, or joy, and happiness; of tempting each other to evil, or strengthening each other in virtue.

Thus we have found that in point of fact we do know of a supersensible world. What we know is that it comprises real beings; that these beings are individualized and distinguishable; that their attributes are attributes of intelligence—power to know, power to think, power to feel, power to act volitionally, power to feel the obligation of law, power to discern be-

tween right and wrong, and things of kindred import. We know that there are such beings. We know that we are of this order. We know that there are innumerable multitudes of just such beings as we are. We know that there is a law of community and sympathy among them by which they come into contact and influence each other in various ways for good or evil.

We know that there is one Being in this supersensible realm
 The infinite who is not of our race, but whom we dimly resem-
 supersensible ble; who is eternal, and by whom we exist; who
 known. also is the author of the material and sensible universe about
 us. This we know in the intuition of the law of cause and
 effect. Thus far it is absolutely certain we are capable of
 knowing—we do know. We know this Being as the cause of
 all the system of effects which we perceive about us. The
 knowledge is intuitive, and is expressed in the maxim that
 every effect must have a cause. We know that established
 order necessitates thought and energy. We know that the
 Being who is cause is a being of thought and power—that the
 thought and energy pervasive of the perceived system are the
 thought and energy of a personal being; that, therefore, the
 fountain of the universe is a person. We know that this
 primal causative Being is eternal and unoriginated. Thus
 much we know of the supersensible world. These are not
 mere matters of conjecture or faith, they are the staples of all
 knowledge.

Is this all that we know of the supersensible world? Do we know of the existence of any other beings in it, or of it, than those who are of our race, and that one Being who is cause of all? and do we know any other facts of it than those which we find in us, and in that one Being whom we discern as primal cause?

To this we answer, As to supersensible beings, this is probably the limit of our knowledge, but it is not all that we

know of the supersensible world. What remains falls largely, but not entirely, within the realms of belief, as questions with respect to the final cause of creation; the fact and nature of moral government; the real nature, source, and fact of moral law; the divine method of disposing of moral questions and moral beings; the fact and outcome of Providence in the administration of the system; man's sin and its consequences; possibility of salvation and its methods; the immortality of the soul and its ultimate destiny; these and all the special doctrines of the Christian religion belong to the realm of faith, and are to be discussed and settled as matters of belief. This does not imply that they are left in doubt and uncertainty; but that such certainty must be the certainty of belief, not knowledge. Conclusions must be reasoned, or given by revelation from God himself; and, whether reasoned or revealed, they must, for the present, stand in the categories of beliefs, and the law determining them is the law governing rational conclusions—the law of proof, not of intuition.

Criteria of knowledge.

1. Simplicity and self-evidence, or immediacy.* Knowledge is irreducible to any thing else, being a primitive, Simplicity. original act of the mind. No reason can be assigned for it—it is simple knowing. It is impossible to induce the mind to allege any ground for the knowing other than that it knows that it knows, which is simply saying it knows. It does not know because it feels that it knows. It feels that it knows, as the result of knowing; feeling is discernible in the act, but is not ground of it, or in any sense proof of it. It will admit of no proof.

2. When the mind knows, it is impossible to think, or believe, or feel, that it does not know; the opposite is the contradictory, and is unthinkable. That which it knows might

*See Harris's First Law, p. 51; also, Second Law, "Incomprehensibility," p. 60.

have been otherwise, in the case of contingent realities, and the mind knows that such might have been the case; but now that it knows the reality it is impossible that it is not as it knows it. The opposite, or contradictory of what is known, is impossible. This includes the third law of Harris, who says, "The third criterion of knowledge is its persistence in face of all efforts of reflective thought to disprove it. By this persistence, in face of all objective ratiocination and all reflective thought upon it, the mind ascertains that it is impossible to think the contrary, and that it stands impregnable, in its clearness and evidence, as of knowledge.*"

3. Necessity. This, in one case, is simply the reverse of the above law, but in another it is a different and broader canon. In the latter case the reality itself is a necessity, known or unknown. It must be. The knowing in the case is not simply that it is; and knowing that it is, the opposite is unthinkable and impossible—the contradictory; but more, it not only is, but it was forever impossible that it should not be. It is, and it is known to be a strict necessity that it should be. That it ever was not, or might not have been, is the known impossible.

4. Self-consistency and consistency with all knowledge. Knowledge is the knowledge of that which is. That which is cannot be self-contradictory, that is, it cannot be and not be. No more can the knowledge be self-contradictory or self-subversive. All reality is consistent with each reality—so every knowledge must be uncontradicted by, or consistent with, every other knowledge. If one assumed knowledge be inconsistent with another assumed knowledge,

* See "Philosophical Basis of Theism," p. 29, and in connection read his chapter on Criteria of Knowledge. See also Hamilton, Wight's edition, pp. 47, 48, and read the entire chapter.

either one or the other, or both, must lack the quality of truth, and, lacking that, cannot be knowledge.

Each knowledge must be consistent with every knowledge. The consistency may not be readily adduced, but it must be actual. If inconsistency is known, it is known that one of the contradictories cannot be a knowledge. If one of the contradictories is known to be true, the other is intuitively known to be false if so be the contradiction is discovered. If it is impossible to reconcile two or more propositions, and neither of them is known to be true, the mind is reduced to the necessity of discarding them entirely or of relegating them to mere beliefs or disbeliefs, making the one displace the other, according to the probable evidence adducible.

These criteria apply to all knowledge, derivative no less than primitive, of contingent no less than necessary truths. Intuition and self-evidence are the universal constants and essential constituents of all knowledge. When they are wanting there is not, and cannot be, knowledge. They are usually adduced as applicable to what are called primary cognitions, or truths of the reason; but the limitation is unwarranted, and vitiates all other knowledge. Is a knowledge derived by a process of demonstration?—these criteria attend every stage of the process. The premises must be marked by all these signs; but not less must the conclusion. Is a knowledge derived from testimony? The same necessity exists—that is, the testimony must be such that the mind intuitively knows it to be impossible it should not be true. It must be such as to establish the fact in such manner that the opposite is the contradictory. Each stage of the process stands in self-evidencing light. The absence of the condition is destructive of knowledge, and issues in contradiction or carries only to belief. The same is true of knowledge given in self-consciousness, perception, and memory. In each case the cognition is direct.

We have found a definite sphere for knowledge, but an expanding one, yet limited; its contents in part are subject to volition, its limitations are determined by necessity. We have found a similarly definite sphere for beliefs which are in part subject to volition, in part not; which may be narrowed or broadened, but which has rational limitations.

Within the sphere of the known we have found included both the sensible and supersensible.

Let us now return and resolutely endeavor to ascertain precisely what in this sphere is known, and what is knowable to us, keeping in mind precisely what we mean by knowing or knowledge. And, for greater definiteness, let us note clearly what is unknown and unknowable. This will leave the field clear for the discussion of the question, What should be believed?

Among the things known, we have found that in the fact of knowing the mind knows itself. This is the primary, universal, and necessary constant of all knowing. Now, what precisely does the mind know of itself? The mind, in every act of which it is conscious, knows itself (*a*) as existing, that is, as possessing the quality of real individualized being; (*b*) what its act or state is, whether it be some mode of thought, or emotion, or volition; (*c*) that it possesses certain faculties, and that its powers are limited; (*d*) that it is not an object of sense perception; (*e*) that it is identical from day to day. Comprehensively this is all that the mind knows with respect to itself.

We know objects external to the self by perception when in suitable relations to them.

We know things and events of the past by memory.

We know things and events by testimony.

We know some necessary truths.

We know demonstrated truths.

These include the sum of our knowledges.

From the foregoing it is obvious that there are limits to our power to know, or to the knowable; and also that there is a sphere of rational belief—a realm of known reality—respecting which much will appear as matter of belief in the reason beyond that which is known, but which the mind will find itself compelled to view as no less real than that which it knows to be real. To differentiate between these and their respective metes and bounds is a primary want in seeking the truth.

There is a habit of recent date, of assuming that the knowable is limited to the sensible, and also that what is not known, or cannot be reduced to the category of knowledge, is not rationally believable, and should, therefore, at once be relegated to the non-existent, and counted out from the list of subjects about which rational beings should inquire or concern themselves—but it is impossible to rest in such conclusions.

If it were true, there could be no science, since science is a collected and systematized knowledge of things as they exist, not in sense merely, but in memory and reason also. To exist at all, science must transcend perception, and predicate of that which exists on other grounds than that of mere perception. We know more of things than we can at any moment perceive, but perception gives us, as such, only what we do perceive at any moment. That added knowledge must depend on some other faculty, or must be relegated as mere matter of belief, and so ceases to be science. We know more of reality than was ever given in the individual perception, or else reality is known by us only as we have perceived, or narrower yet, as we do now perceive it. This would reduce all knowing to that which is, at the moment, within the sphere of sensation. There could thus be no science of the universe. If to predicate of reality beyond sensation be unwarrantable, science becomes impossible.

SECTION VII.—OF BELIEFS.

The mind utterly refuses to stop with the known. Among its knowledges is the knowledge that the field of truth is much broader than its knowledge of truth, stretching away immeasurably beyond it in every direction. It cannot refrain from attempting to penetrate this vast realm. Proceeding from the known, it infers what may be or what is probable of the unknown. Thus a vast brood of concepts find their way into the mind. It is not known that they are accurate copies of the truth. They are not knowledges. If the reasoning be clear, and the conclusion logical, we feel a variable amount of conviction that the reality corresponds with the concept. We grade the probability that we have the substantial truth from certainty to zero. If the case is one of great obscurity, and the steps of the process indistinct, not much value can be attached to the conclusion; but if there is good evidence that the premises are correct, and if the conclusion is clearly deducible, there is but little difference between the tenacity with which the mind holds it and a clear and positive knowledge.

Besides those concepts that spring from the operations of reason, there are, as we have seen, others, which are propagated in us by other minds. These are of great multitude and variety. They are of things which they claim to have known—personal experiences and observations, or conclusions which they have reached, or opinions which they hold. They are recited to us orally or in books. They are speculative, philosophic, scientific, historic. They purport to be truths. They may be so, but to us, because of their source, they can only exist as opinions or beliefs. The difference in their origin carries a difference in their kind.

The term belief includes properly only and all those states of mind below knowing, varying from a feeling of absolute

certainty down to zero, or down to where actual doubt begins, which in some form affirms a supposed reality of objects of thought. While the ground of knowledge is the direct seeing of the mind, the ground of belief is some form of probable evidence, or is a mere spontaneous conjecture.

The mind knows that it believes, but cannot believe that it knows. This marks a fundamental distinction between the two states. When the mind has a belief, or is in a state of belief with regard to a fact or proposition, it knows itself to be in a believing state. So much is known; but the reality or truth of the subject-matter believed is not known. In the case of rational beliefs the mind knows why it believes as well as what, and ought to be able to assign the grounds; but this is not always the case. Many strong beliefs have no assignable ground, and the mind can give no account of them further than that it has them.

The proper foundation or condition of belief is, (1) the absence of knowledge; for where knowledge is, the grounds of belief are excluded; knowledge cuts away the possibility of belief: (2) some assignable reason why a fact or proposition should be supposed to be true; and the worthiness or validity of the belief is always proportional to the assignable reasons for it.

Facts concerning belief.

1. No mind can believe the contradictory of that which it knows to be true, if the contradictory is perceived.

2. No mind can believe the contradictory of that which it believes to be true, if the contradictory is perceived.

3. No mind can believe that which it believes impossible.

4. No mind can believe that which it knows—knowledge excludes belief.

5. No mind can believe that which is unintelligible, unthink-able—that which it cannot formulate into a thought.

6. The mind may believe that which is incomprehensible;

that is, it may believe that the exact contents of which it cannot understand and the how of which it cannot comprehend.

7. The mind may believe that which is false.

8. The mind may believe without assignable grounds for belief, but not rationally.

9. The mind may believe a proposition though there is seeming proof to the contrary which it is unable to answer, or the fallacy of which it cannot detect.

10. The mind may believe contradictories without perceiving that they are such; in this way the absurd and impossible are often matters of belief by the ignorant, and even by the learned.

11. The mere fact of belief proves nothing as to the truth of what is believed.

12. The mind must have beliefs—it cannot exist without them.

13. That which is believed may be true though knowledge that it is so may be impossible.

14. The mind may be compelled to believe in a given way; that is, with the light it has it cannot believe the opposite nor help to believe what is propounded.

15. Those things ought not to be believed which are inconsistent with themselves, or which are in contradiction with other beliefs or knowledges.

16. Nothing should be believed for which there is no adequate proof—proof which so constrains the reason that it is irrational to withhold faith.

17. Any thing possible should be believed on adequate proof.

Conditions unfavorable to the attainment of correct beliefs.

1. The mental habit of credulity is unfavorable.

2. The habit of irrational doubt is unfavorable.

3. The habit of indifference and inattention is unfavorable.

4. Undeveloped intelligence is unfavorable.

5. The moral condition of ready and persistent partisanship is unfavorable.

6. The habit of insincerity and debativeness is unfavorable.

7. The debauchment of conscience, and prevailing irreverence and wickedness are unfavorable.

8. Slavish submission to authority, and a superstitious frame of mind are unfavorable.

Conditions favorable to the attainment of correct beliefs.

1. Supreme love of truth.

2. A mind honest, alert, and free.

3. Capacity and opportunity.

4. Moral integrity.

5. Spiritualized affections, or affections guarded and purified from low, lustful, and sinful imaginings and indulgences.

6. The habit of discriminating between reasoned and unreasoned beliefs, and the determination to have an adequate reason for believing.

A little reflection will convince us how much of our staple common thought is unreasoned belief—assumption.

If we think of nature, we never think of doubting its permanence. The sun will rise and go to its setting at the appointed time. The seasons will continue their accustomed round. The laws of to-day will rule to-morrow. All things will remain as they were from the beginning. We are universally absolutely certain of these things, or to the exclusion of all doubt concerning them. Yet it were madness to assert that any man knows concerning them, or that in most instances they are conclusions reasoned out. We simply believe in the permanence of nature, and on no other ground than that the order is uniform—seems to be established. Neither the common nor scientific mind can assign any other reason. No other is necessary to win our unwavering belief. If the belief should be challenged, no ground can be assigned for the challenge.

Most beliefs
unreasoned.

It suffices that we see no reason for supposing the contrary, and we hold to the belief.

In this faith we carry on all the processes of life—plant, sow, build, form business plans for the future. Did we not act on this faith we should lapse into barbarism; in fact, could not live at all. The necessities of our being are such that we must in faith provide for to-morrow. “We must live by faith,” or in refusing so to do, must perish.

If we turn from nature to events we find the same thing. We really know but few events in the on-going of the world—simply those that have fallen under our personal observation and experience, limited to a brief period and narrow space. Yet we believe the story of the past as recited in history, and the reports of current events, oral or written. Only a few can assign any other reason for the belief, except that the story has been written and that the rumors are extant. We accept the voice of history and pass it on to future generations. We accredit the current rumor and fashion our politics and financial plans upon it. The cablegram announces that an earthquake has shaken Ischia and swallowed up thousands of people, or that the English gun-boats have bombarded Alexandria and captured the city. We believe it, and the whole world keeps on believing it, if it remains uncontradicted. We do not question the truthfulness of Cæsar’s Commentaries, or of the Greek history by Herodotus, or of the English of Macaulay.

We believe in men, institutions, laws, science, religion. Often deceived, we keep on believing, because on the whole we find the habit of belief better, more satisfactory, than doubt, and because we cannot help but believe or disbelieve.

Thus mind, thrust into existence with powers of intelligence, enters at once on its proper life. It begins by knowing its surroundings. Its spontaneous forthputting is a kind of knowing—small, to be sure, but still a knowing.

Mind is practical.

It apprehends things, and objectifies them. Instinctively it adjusts itself to the realities about it. The objects it beholds awaken desires in it. It is moved or attracted by them; not as one material atom acts upon another, but by the mysterious spell of feeling. It responds by an act of will. It volitionally moves toward the object of desire, seeks it, appropriates it. Thus its *modus vivendi* is initiated and established, and it sets up housekeeping in the universe. At first all its movements are spontaneous, instinctive, practical to the mere ends of existence. As yet it asks no questions. It does not properly think or reflect or know, but it feels and acts and lives, according to a theory without theorizing. It lives according to the law of intelligence without being self-consciously intelligent. Later, its moral nature manifests itself, and its self-conscious, reflective, free, responsible, rational life begins. Here, in these archaic moral elements, rudimental, unreasoned, spontaneous beliefs take their rise—beliefs which have their genesis in the moral affections and inchoate reason; or it may be, in some super-reason, some original spiritual instinct.

As the mind thrust into external conditions finds itself invested with a nature which acts rationally or intelligently before it acts consciously, or carries on any processes of reason with relation to itself or objects about it,—as it is practical and conforms its act to the fit and proper theory before it intelligently thinks what is proper, or before even it has the idea of the proper and fit,—so, also, in this inchoate moral realm it finds itself acting on principles which involve the deepest moral problems, and believing things implicitly of the origin of which beliefs it can give no account, which yet rule it with undisputed authority, and which the after life of rational reflection and inquiry can never dethrone. Thus out of the very constitution of the mind, its *modus vivendi*, knowledges and beliefs spring as soon as mental and moral conditions exist; and

these intelligent and moral forthputtings in the sub-rational and sub-moral inchoate state are generally found to be in accord with the highest rational and moral principles, when these are ascertained by reasoning, or determined by developed intelligence. These fundamental beliefs and cognitions, not even yet known by the mind to be such, are in the line of all sane and normal movement when the mind comes to its highest condition of self-conscious rationality and sense of ethical responsibility.*

Since those ideas only are valuable which are true, it becomes an important question—*the most important possible*—How can we sort this mass, retaining the true and discarding the false? Of course we must at once discard the third class, but what of the second? The first we cannot discard if we would. Shall we banish from our thoughts every thing but knowledges—every thing but *our* knowledges? How narrow would
Knowledge too narrow. become the world in which we live! We must exclude, substantially, all past facts; we must absolutely shut out the future; we must abandon reasoning; we must not plant nor build; we must not have confidence in our fellows; we must not act on information of any kind; we must have no hope; we must neither eat nor drink, nor go nor stay. We can hardly live upon this diet. The thing is impossible.

What, then, shall we do? We *must* believe. The field of knowledge we own is too narrow for grazing-ground for our faculties. The attempt to confine them within such limits terminates in asphyxia—death. As well undertake to nourish the body on the north wind as sustain thought on such fare! All the past is full of truth—the wide abysses of the universe are full of truth—eternity to come is full of truth—truth is infinite; we must seek it out. We must take things on credit when we cannot master them by absolute knowledge. We must believe in our own faculties—in the permanence of

* See Appendix: Note D.

nature—that the earth will still bring seed-time and harvest—that right will be rewarded—that evil will be reprovèd—that God is God—that man is immortal. It is as impossible for man to live, and retain sanity of faculties, and avoid searching into these things or having a belief about them, as it is for the processes of life to be carried on after the blood has ceased its circulation and the heart its motion.

“Only that is properly said to be known, the evidence or nature of which compels acceptance. Very little, however, of our so-called knowledge has such a degree of certainty. Rational principles, and the facts of consciousness and immediate perception, are all that can claim to be strictly knowledge. Still it does not follow that all else is delusion; for, though not strictly certain, it may be rationally probable, and thus a subject for rational belief. By rational belief, then, we mean the acceptance of any thing on grounds which, while they render it probable, do not strictly compel its admission as a necessary truth. They justify the mind in accepting it, but do not exclude the possibility of the opposite. We believe that the present laws of nature will be valid to-morrow, but we do not know it. It is conceivable that some change might occur in the nature of things which would reverse all the present orders of co-existence and sequence. The assumption of the uniformity of nature is necessary to enable us to advance a step beyond our experience, whether in space or time; but this assumption is no necessity of thought. The mind finds no difficulty in the conception that all the laws with which we are acquainted may be limited both in space and time. The physicist believes that material things are composed of ultimate atoms, but he does not know it. The entire structure of scientific theory is equally a matter of belief. Theories are never facts of observation, but inferences; and they never rise to the rank of certainty. Probability is more than the guide of daily life;

it is also the guide of science and reason itself. Were the natural sciences restricted to what is truly known, they would shrivel up to a handful of unrelated facts, of much value for practice, but of little or none for intelligence.

“A belief, to be rational, must have rational grounds. When held without grounds, it may be either a spontaneous judgment, instinctive impulse, volitional faith or fancy, notion or whim; when held on irrational grounds, it is a prejudice or superstition. But the grounds of belief may be manifold. They may be such as appeal only to the passionless understanding, and hence such as any one with common sense would recognize. The mathematical doctrine of probabilities is a great illustration. Such grounds of belief are elementary, and call no elements of character into play. They admit of calculation, and result in substantial harmony of opinion. But the grounds of belief may also be such as appeal not only to the understanding, but also to the esthetic and moral and religious nature. As such, they are no less rational than the former, though their validity would not be recognized by any in whom the esthetic and religious elements were lacking. All beliefs into which sentiment of any kind enters are of this class, whether it be of patriotism, or of duty, or of love, or of art, or of religion. We may say, then, with sufficient accuracy for our purpose, that the grounds of belief may be objective and subjective. The former are the facts of sense perception; the latter are the manifold facts of feeling and instinct: the longing for the true, the beautiful, and the good; the sense of dependence and moral obligation, the desire to worship, and the fervors of religious aspiration. Belief, on such grounds, might be defined as the acceptance of something for reasons subjectively sufficient but objectively insufficient. In every such case, the development of the subject determines, to a great extent, the credibility of the fact. Belief on objective grounds is entirely

simple; belief on subjective grounds demands some further explanation.

“ When we speak of believing on subjective grounds, the first impression is that we are advocating mere credulity; indeed, credulity consists in taking our feelings and impressions for arguments. This is plausible only when abstractly stated, or when, by feelings, whims are meant. For feeling also is a fact; it is the product of the universe, and must have some relation to it. It must further be borne in mind that when the grounds of belief are objective, they are seldom capable of formal statement. Just as we recognize a face with perfect certainty, though we might be unable to describe a single feature in detail, so in daily life we discern a belief or a course of action to be rational, even while it would be impossible to formulate the real grounds of our opinion. If we attempt it, we find that our statements do not state, but rather misstate, our reasons. This is characteristic of daily life. We constantly believe and act upon impressions which we could not put into words without seeming ridiculous, and which we could not ignore without being irrational. The merchant, or captain, knows well that one course is better than another, but he would often be sadly puzzled to justify his opinion by any thing but the favorable result. Such action and judgment partake of the nature of instinct. They are the total outcome of our past experience; and although the reasoning element has almost entirely disappeared, they are, in general, far more trustworthy than our labored calculations. The reasons for trusting or distrusting persons, also, are seldom susceptible of formulation; and that, even, in cases where the greatest interests are concerned. This is especially the case with personal influence. An impression is made upon us, and we are stirred and molded by something which we feel but cannot tell. In short, the great bulk of human belief and action rests upon grounds which admit of no

satisfactory statement; yet we cannot disallow such grounds of belief and action without declaring life to be illogical and irrational. But in that case, the practical man could retort upon the theorist, that unless he is able to do better, perhaps the mistake is with him. As a rule, no one is more helpless or more stupidly absurd in dealing with reality than the fanatical logician. As long as this is so, common sense will be more concerned to have its beliefs in harmony with reality, as tested by results, than to have them in harmony with formal logic. Experience tends to issue in instinctive action and judgment, and of such action results are the great test. We conclude, then, that it is no objection to a belief that its grounds do not admit of satisfactory formal statement, provided always that it works well."

We have now found the exact meanings of the terms knowledge and belief, and their differentiation. We have found the conditions under which they respectively arise in the mind—that when certain relations exist between subject and object they, one or the other, inevitably issue. Separated from right conditions of judgment knowledge is almost impossible. Placed away from suitable conditions for forming a correct belief erroneous belief not only may, but almost necessarily will arise. Knowledge is not wholly subject to volition. In some circumstances the mind may be necessitated to have some knowledges without any exercise of volition or choice; but, also, it has the power to seek knowledge and put itself in conditions to know what otherwise it might forever remain ignorant of, were there no exercise of will. It does not necessarily know all that it has power to know. Its enforced knowledge is extremely small. Its possible knowledge is indefinitely large. The same is true of beliefs. Belief is sometimes involuntary. From the nature of mind it may find itself in conditions in which it is compelled to believe, and may believe under compulsion what is

not true, because, while unable not to withhold either belief or disbelief, it may not have the means of knowing exactly what it ought to believe. But its beliefs are, also, in part under the control of the will. It has power to correct and broaden or narrow its beliefs, and to put itself in conditions which will affect its beliefs. Enforced knowledge is not affected by character; that is, the knowledge will be the same whether the character be good or bad. Enforced beliefs, that is, beliefs which we find ourselves unable to resist, may be determined by character. The rule, "as a man thinketh so is he," may be reversed, "as a man is so he thinketh."

Are we responsible for our knowledges and beliefs? Are they in any sense under our control?

The answer to the second question determines the answer to the first. It is impossible that we should be responsible for what is inevitable. This we hold to be an axiom. Our responsibility will be in the measure in which it is possible, under the circumstances of the case, to improve our knowl-
edges and rectify our beliefs. The law does not so Responsibility for belief.
much respect what we know or what we believe, as it does our use of the faculties and the opportunities we possess. If we might know, and do not because of culpable delinquency, we cannot be excused. If we retain in our beliefs or disbeliefs errors which there is abundance of accessible proof to rectify, and we make no suitable effort to make the correction, our ignorance and error become our own fault, and for any evil that results to ourselves or others we must be held to a just account.

A belief, in itself, does not imply simply as existing the truth of what is believed, nor, indeed, that it rests on any evidence whatever. It does imply that the person holding it supposes it to be true. That which is known is true necessarily. That which is believed may be either true or false, so far as belief determines.

The probability that a belief is true may be strong in the view of the fact that it is a belief of honest, virtuous, and intelligent persons. If the most learned and excellent hold it, the probability is heightened. If it is accepted by the wisest and best, after the most searching examination, with the best advantages for conducting the inquiry, the probability attains a strength of presumption which only universality and inevitability could increase. But ultimately its value depends on its truth, and the determination of its veraciousness, or truth of contents, on evidence, and not on the beliefs or disbeliefs of any number or kind of men.

There are concepts of the mind which fall below beliefs, which have no root or leverage of any kind except the accident of their existence—mere vagaries, fancies, conjectures, chaotic reveries, dreams, exhalations from stagnant pools of aimless thought, which have no value or significance whatever, whoever may hold them. They have no assignable value that we should sift them. As the sun of knowledge rises they vanish away, or evidence appears either to dissipate or sustain them. All that is necessary to disperse or establish them is, that the fallow and marshy acres of mind which breed them should be drained and plowed. Advancing civilization and culture will clear the atmosphere of them, and create conditions in which their recurrence will be impossible, or change them to rational inference.

The proof which issues in knowledge is immediate, and is found in the object itself. An object perceived is its own proof; so of any self-consciousness of state or act; there is no proof of a feeling but the feeling, of a thought but the thought, *et al.* So of a truth demonstrated; the demonstration is the proof. So of an intuition; the thing intuited is self-evident, and admits of no other proof. These proofs issue in knowledge, and can never be degraded

Belief acquires
value from the
persons who
hold it.

What is known
needs no proof.

to mere beliefs, or be made matter of argument or probable proof. All matters of personal experience are of this kind. The proof is the experience. The result is so far knowledge.

Proof is the only rational ground for belief. This gives rise, at once, to the question, What is proof? There are several terms which have the same general import: proof, evidence, testimony, demonstration, argument, inference, deduction, induction, experiment, observation. The general signification of proof is a process by which the mind arrives at truth. Proof is an assignable reason for a conclusion, or is such evidence as leads to a conclusion; it may be demonstration, testimony, inference, deduction, induction, experience, experiment, analogy, and may issue either in knowledge or belief. Adequate proof establishes the conclusion, that is, rationally convinces the mind of its truth, removes all doubt. Less proof produces the conviction that the conclusion is more probable than any other. That which does not admit of demonstration, and so may not issue in knowledge, but which does not involve absurdity or contradiction, is possible, and may admit of proof which will satisfy the mind of its truth. "As demonstration is the showing the agreement or disagreement of two ideas by the intervention of one or more proofs which have a constant, immutable, and visible connection one with another, so probability is nothing but the appearance of such an agreement or disagreement by the intervention of proofs whose connection is not constant and immutable, or at least is not perceived to be so, but appears for the most part to be so, and is enough to induce the mind to judge the proposition to be true or false, rather than the contrary. . . . The entertainment the mind gives this sort of proposition is called belief, assent, or opinion, which is the admitting or receiving any proposition as true upon arguments or proofs that are

Proof the only
rational
ground for be-
lief.

found to persuade us to receive it as true, without certain knowledge that it is so. And herein lies the difference between *probability* and *certainly*, faith and knowledge; that in all the parts of knowledge there is intuition; each immediate idea, each step, has its visible and certain connection; in belief, not so. That which makes us believe is something extraneous to the thing we believe, something not evidently joined on both sides to, and so not manifestly showing the agreement or disagreement of, those ideas that are under consideration. The grounds of probability are, first, the conformity of any thing with our own knowledge, observation, and experience. Second, the testimony of others, touching their observation and experience.”*

“The word probable does not imply any deficiency in the proof, but only marks the particular nature of that
 Probable evi- proof, but only marks the particular nature of that
 dence. proof as contradistinguished from another species of evidence. It is opposed, not to what is certain, but to what admits of being demonstrated after the manner of the mathematician. This differs widely from the meaning annexed to the same word in popular discourse; according to which, whatever event is said to be probable is understood to be expected with some degree of doubt. But though, in philosophical language, the epithet probable be applied to events which are acknowledged to be certain, it is applied to events which are called probable by the vulgar. The philosophical meaning of the word, therefore, is more comprehensive than the popular; the former denoting that particular species of evidence which contingent truths admit; the latter being confined to such degrees of this evidence as fall short of the highest. These different degrees of probability the philosophers consider as a series beginning with low possibility, and terminating in that apprehended infallibility with which the phrase moral certainty is

* Locke, “Essay on Human Understanding,” book iv, chap. 15. Reid, “Intellectual Powers,” Essay vii, chap. 1.

synonymous. To this last term of the series the word probable is, in its ordinary acceptation, palpably inapplicable." *

"Evidence, another word for proof, *e video*, to see and make see. Evidence signifies that which demonstrates, makes clear, or ascertains the truth of the very fact or point in issue, either on the one side or the other." †

"Evidence is the ground or reason of knowledge or belief. It is the light by which the mind apprehends things presented to it. *Fulgor quidam mentis assensum rapiens*. In an act of knowledge there is the object or thing known, and the subject or person knowing. Between the faculties of the person knowing, and the qualities of the thing known, there is some proportion or relation. The qualities manifest themselves to the faculties, and the result is knowledge; or the thing is made evident, that is, not only exists, but is revealed as existing.

"There are as many kinds of evidence as there are persons or faculties by which we attain to truth. But, according as truth may be attained more or less directly, evidence is distinguished into intuition and induction. Intuitive evidence comprehends all first truths or principles of common sense; as, every change implies the operation of a cause—axioms in science; as things equal to the same thing are equal to each other, and the evidence of consciousness, whether by sense, or memory, or thought, as we touch, or remember, or know, or feel any thing. Evidence of this kind arises directly from the presence or contemplation of the object, and gives knowledge without any effort on our part.

"Inductive evidence is distinguished as demonstrative and probable. Demonstrative evidence rests upon axi-
oms, or first truths, and from which, by ratiocina-
tion, we attain to other truths. It is scientific, and leads to

Inductive evidence.

* Stewart, "Elements," part ii, chap. 2, sec. 4.

† Blackstone's "Commentaries," book iii, chap. 23.

certainty. It admits of no degrees, and it is impossible to conceive the contrary of the truth which is established.

“Probable evidence has reference, not to necessary but contingent truths. It admits of degrees, and is derived from various sources; the principal are the following, namely, experience, analogy, testimony.” *

It is this latter kind of evidence which determines rational beliefs in contradistinction from other forms of evidence which issue in knowledge.

Theology treats, to a large extent—almost exclusively—of matters of faith, but they are subjects about which we are compelled to have ideas and entertain beliefs. We can no more escape them in our rational mental life than we can get rid of thoughts of existence and of the objective world about us. They spring unbidden, and by no process can be banished from our consciousness. Their reality we cannot permanently doubt, strive as we may, and exigencies inevitably arise in our earthly life which make it impossible that we should think them unimportant. Shadows, dreams, mere ghosts of disturbed fancy we may call them, and seek with scorn and self-chiding to drive them away, but, firm as the solid globe, they will still maintain their place. The stars rooted in the changeless heavens do not more assert their reality from age to age than do these objectives of faith—the unseen realities of the spiritual world. As the sane eye is met by the one when it opens in the light, the sane mind is met by the other when it awakes to reason and reflection. Call them chimeras, delusions, heir-looms of superstition and ignorance. There is that in mind as mind which discredits the suggestion. If we determine to shake them off, reason will still hold us to the examination. The hidden magnet attracts us, and we have no power to break the connection or

* Fleming's "Vocabulary of Phil.," art. on Evidence, pp. 171, 173.

insulate our consciousness from its mysterious spell. The generations of humanity bear unbroken testimony to this truth. Does it count for nothing? As well deny reality to objects of vision. We can no more rationally ignore the one than the other. Nature avenges herself for neglect and ignorance of the one as of the other.

The facts and laws of the material world are real. They sustain such relations to our faculties that we may, by patient study, come to know them. It is important to our present welfare that we should gain as complete knowledge of them as possible. They are found, as far as they have been explored, to contain rich sources of physical comfort and enjoyment for us of which ignorance deprives us, and they are sure to avenge themselves for neglect. They exist, whether we will be at the pains to find them out or not, and do not fail to go to their end, even if by reason of our non-observance they should destroy us.

The same is true of the spiritual realm. The laws and facts there are as profoundly and uneradicably real as in the physical, and, as we shall be able to find, immeasurably more significant. If neglect in the former case issues in retributive consequences, no less certain, and incalculably more dreadful, will be the Nemesis in the latter.

There are two questions, as we have seen, which we need to consider, each suggestive of another: What do we know? What do we believe? These two ^{What ought we to believe?} give rise to others: What may we know? What ought we to believe? That there are things which, from the nature of the case, cannot become matters of knowledge, but which ought to be matters of belief, we cannot doubt. Oughtness implies obligation, and involves ethical elements. What ought to be is possible, and when the ought is neglected guilt is incurred. There is no real oughtness that

does not involve these consequences. But if ever there was a case when the ought is imperative, it is here. The obligation to right actions, or affections, or volitions, or motives, involves the antecedent obligation to determine, as much as we may, what are right actions, affections, volitions, motives—that is, to find the underlying law. How can any act, in the matter of it, be right, if the belief which inspires and determines it is wrong? How can the stream be pure, if the fountain itself be corrupt? First, the tree must be made good if we would have the fruit good. If it is a sin to abuse and prostitute the body, is it less a sin to misuse the soul? The faculties were given for use, and to use them to their end is duty. But what is their end if it be not to find truth, that we may fashion ourselves and our lives according to the truth? If the very powers which were intended for good are prostituted to evil, how great is the evil! If an error in belief conduct to an error in practice, whereby we ourselves are ruined, and whereby harm comes to others, can it be a matter of indifference what our beliefs are? Every character and life is determined by some governing idea or ideas. Whether it will be good or bad, holy or sinful, a fountain of life or death, depends upon these. These governing ideas are self-superinduced, in part at least. They come from the use or misuse of the faculties. To this extent we must be responsible for them. If, through neglect, present disaster ensue, we may be certain that the retributive catastrophe will be greater still.

We are not unmindful that beliefs and governing ideas are not completely under our control. We have no direct will power over them. We have no such freedom that we can, by a mere act of choice, believe or disbelieve. Hence we have located responsibility for our beliefs back of them, in the antecedent use of our faculties. Our guilt or innocence with respect to them will arise from

Beliefs not under our control.

the manner in which we used our faculties in forming them.

We are not unmindful, either, that we may be so circumstanced, either by limitation of faculty or untoward surroundings, that right governing ideas may be impossible to us. Right ideas may be impossible. Christian beliefs cannot be obligatory on persons who never heard of them. Impossibilities cannot be required under a just government. Evils in character or practice resulting from absolutely unavoidable misjudgments cannot be ground of just condemnation, any more than the complexion of the skin or height of stature.

But these are not exceptions to the principle herein declared, namely, that we are in all circumstances required to seek right beliefs by the best possible use of our faculties; and if, through any neglect of this duty, we come under the governance of false ideas, for any evil that may ensue to ourselves or others we are responsible. Duty of inquiry. The principle shows that the duty of seeking right beliefs is among the most august and solemn that is imposed upon us, whether we contemplate it in the light of present or future sequences.

Success in the pursuit of truth is not what is required of us, important as it is. Unchosen conditions may prevent that. Providential allotments may make it impossible. Failure may be no sin. What is required is, in our circumstances, the honest and industrious effort. Important as truth is, its possession cannot be so important as the love of it, the desire for it, and the pursuit which springs therefrom. Great as are the evils which flow from failure to attain it, they cannot be comparable to the disasters which must overtake the willful and wicked neglect of means to gain it.

However circumstanced, some light will find its way into every honest mind. The full truth may not be gained, but a truth will spring up even in the greatest darkness. Underlying all

the rubbish of error and misbelief will be found some eternal verities, and many honest truth-seekers from the east and the west and the north and the south will come up to sit down with Abraham and Isaac and Jacob in the kingdom of God.

Nor should we be discouraged if, after all, we cannot be certain that what we suppose to be true is really so. Some of our conclusions will be true, some not. Some of our beliefs will change, some will pass away. Better faculty and better conditions will improve us. But this does not change the obligation that we should continue to seek, or the responsibility in the use of our faculties with respect to our present beliefs.

In matters presented to us for our acceptance or rejection, what, then, is the right use of our faculties?

To the question, Shall we accept or reject? this answer springs spontaneously and intuitively: If the matter be true, we ought to accept it; if false, we ought to reject it. We have no power to reverse that answer. The mind is so constituted that it cannot revoke it. The one business, then, imposed upon us is to determine the point, Is it true or false? Suppose the matter is of such a kind that we cannot absolutely know which; are we, then, excused? Let the question be, Is man immortal, and will he be required to answer for his deeds in this life, and will they be determinative of destiny in the life to come? Suppose it is impossible for him absolutely to know what the answer is? Shall he, therefore, dismiss the question? In point of fact, either he is immortal or not, and the destiny beyond will be affected or not by the deeds done here. His incapacity of knowledge in the premises will not change the result. Suppose, in point of fact, the true answer should be in the affirmative—he is immortal, and must answer, and his future destiny will turn on his deeds; it must, then, in that case, be very important that he should act with reference to it, and, as he cannot have absolute knowledge, he must act on belief. But if he must act on belief if he act

rationally, there must be some grounds for belief other than mere caprice. What shall determine his belief?

When a matter is presented to the mind for its decision, it must be one which can either be known by the right use of the faculties, or one which will furnish Must act on probability. adequate grounds of belief or rejection—grounds which enable the mind to say this or that is probably true; and, to be true to itself, it must act on the answer precisely as if it were an absolute knowledge. Rational belief dominates, in its sphere, with the same right and imperativeness over the actions of a rational being as absolute knowledge does. But, to do so, it must be rational belief—belief reached by the proper use of the faculties. Then the proper use of the faculties will lead to belief or disbelief.

For every thing which ought to be believed, there exists evidence which may be discovered, and which, when discovered, if the mind be in a normal condition—if it be not abusive of itself—will induce belief, or enable it to believe. We say, if the mind be in a normal condition, that is, be not biased by prejudice, or overslaughed with ignorance, or imbruted by vice. The condition, then, of obtaining a right belief, is the protection of the mind from abuse, and the proper exercise of its faculties in collecting and examining evidence. This is really the sum of duty with relation to belief.

Proceeding, now, upon the supposition that the mind is a mind fairly equipped with faculty—that it is Must define the matter of inquiry. honest in the pursuit of truth—that it is protected from the enslavements of passion or prejudice—that it is alert and diligent, what is the right method? That is, how shall it proceed so as most certainly to reach the truth in its beliefs? It must clearly define to itself the matter about which it inquires. That must always be the primal movement. If the subject be not distinct, the action with regard

to it will be confused and unsatisfactory. The question being distinctly put, the next movement must be to obtain all the information possible in the premises, from all sources—every witness within reach must be interrogated. Due care and industry must be exercised to find and exhaust the witnesses. None must be left out because of prejudice, or slurred because of bad repute. The information being gathered, it must then be examined and weighed; two things quite dissimilar. The examination will regard its reliability—is the thing alleged credible? This being determined, it must then be weighed as to its bearing on the point in hand—to what conclusion does it point? Finally, all possible information being gathered, examined, and weighed, each part by itself, if it point conjointly one way, the conclusion is plain, belief becomes unavoidable; if it seems to conflict, the conclusion becomes more difficult, and the belief less assured; but it does not free us from the obligation to decide one way or the other, or for the present withhold a conclusion until we shall have more light. This, indeed, we must inevitably do. Indecision involves action, and action which may be fatal. Honest decision, in such a case, may, because of our limited faculty, be in error, for we are fallible; but the error, however unfortunate, cannot be fatal, since it does not involve moral fault.

The process, in cases where there seems to be conflicting evidence or lack of information on which to act, is plain. First, the effort must be to determine whether there is real conflict, or only a seeming, and whether it affects the question in hand. If only seeming, it has no weight. If real, then the question is, Which of the conflicting sides is entitled to prevail? This can only be rationally decided by a searching examination into their respective signs of truth, and the preponderance of evidence in sup-

Where there seems to be conflicting evidence.

port of the one or the other. If the conflict is between two or more specific evidences, or what seem to be proofs bearing on the case, and there is no means of deciding between them, then the decision of the general question, What must I believe in the case? must result in a suspension of judgment, or in acting on that view of the case which, on the whole, is safest, or which seems most conducive to welfare. The mind must accept this as the wisest practical rule of action. Truth is truth, and it is reasonable to suppose that in any case where it is of practical moment, it will be possible to find better evidence in its support than can be arrayed against it.

Does all this involve labor? Unquestionably it does. But it is labor from which we cannot escape but at the price of sacrificing the truth. There is no other way by which we can come at it. If it has value, we must pay the price. Over against every truth is an error; ay, a multitude of errors, for truth is exact, and error multiform. To go to the exact mark amid so many decoys, implies a rigorous use of faculty. The most dangerous counterfeit is that which has the nearest resemblance to the real; but, though it be a *fac-simile*, if it be a counterfeit, it is worthless, and if it pass over our counter we are damaged—may be ruined. To prevent the catastrophe, there is but one way. We must make ourselves able to detect the counterfeit. We must not, by neglect or inattention, be liable to have the false passed upon us for the true—paste for diamond. There are diamonds; we must be able to know them from worthless imitations, if we deal in diamonds. Every man is a merchantman of the most precious of all diamonds, whether he will or not. He must buy or sell the truth at a high or low price.

Passing by all matters which fall within the sphere of experimental and exact sciences, which, therefore, have their established tests, and are reducible within the categories of knowl-

edge, we confine our attention to rules which ought to be governing in matters of belief—criteria of belief.

Experimental science is confined to physics; as astronomy, which treats of magnitudes, motions, distances, and harmonies of the heavenly bodies: geology, which treats of the elements composing the earth's crust, agencies of change operative therein; changes that have occurred along the ages of its history, as recorded in its strata, its antiquity, the orders of life that have successively inhabited it; science educes the facts, and declares them: chemistry, which treats of the constituent elements of things, their differences, their affinities, their uses, their compounds, the laws which determine them or their habits; science discovers and makes them known: physiology, biology, magnetism, light, heat, electricity, and all other sciences which relate to the physical universe, or which have simply to do with the facts and phenomena of physical existence—with respect to all these the function of science is to find them out, and make them known as to their facts and laws. Science does not, of right, treat or predicate of mere matters of belief: it states what is, not what may be or ought to be.

Mathematical science treats of numbers, proportion, and figures in the abstract, and enunciates and demonstrates, not what is true in the concrete—truth of things—but what must be true for ever in thought. Logic is to propositions what mathematics is to numbers and figures, but it determines nothing of the truth or content of propositions, but only shows that certain predicates necessitate others.

Passing these all by, we come to discuss questions which fall without their limits, and which may not, like them, be tested by experiment or established by demonstration; questions which, from their nature and ours, must be submitted to other kinds of tests, and be established by other kinds of evidence.

Not like physics, the questions relate to a supersensible universe ; not like mathematics and logic, they relate to actual beings and realities. They are as much questions of fact as are questions in physics, and are greatly more important ; and they involve as real truth as is found in mathematics. The difference is in the mode of coming at the truth, and in the kind of proof, and in the nature of the conclusion, all of which differences arise from the differences in the subjects themselves.

Questions of faith unlike questions of science.

In admitting that the questions cannot be brought within the tests which are applied to questions of physics, or pure science, we do not mean that they have no tests, or that the tests are less rigorous or less convincing, but only that they are different.

In placing them in the categories of beliefs, not knowledges, we do not mean that there is less of ascertained truth in them, but only that we stand in different relations to the truth, in the former case having it immediately under the gaze of the mind, in the latter case having the adequate evidence before the mind, but not the thing itself.

Before passing away from this point, it ought to be noted that to most of us, and in largely the greater number of cases, matters of science are mere matters of belief. The proofs to us are not the scientific proofs. We have never wrought out the problems of astronomy ; we have not mastered the facts of chemistry or geology. We believe on the testimony of others, and the truth contained in our belief is precisely the same as we should have if we had wrought the problems for ourselves. As to contents of truth, the knowledge has no advantage over the belief. The only difference is in our relations to the truth, or our manner of coming at it. The practical scientist, by actual experiment, finds the truth ; we believe that he does, and avail ourselves of the benefit of his labor. It would not be

Science, with most, mere belief.

perfectly candid if we did not add, that there is this difference between the case now supposed and the case of doctrines which are properly called doctrines of belief. Beliefs of the kind just mentioned are susceptible of becoming knowledges, and we rest in them, believing that we could so transform them; while beliefs of the other kind, from our relations to the subject, can never, while our present condition remains, be any thing else than beliefs.

With respect to all beliefs, this may be laid down as a maxim :
A maxim with respect to all beliefs. No belief has any right to exist which is not supported by evidence sufficient to convince the reason that the matter of it is absolutely or probably true. If there be no such evidence, the belief is groundless, and its existence is an impertinence. But this does not imply that each mind should search the evidence before it believes. That might be impossible. Each mind has the right of search, and cannot be required to believe without the proof; but any mind may forego the right in certain cases, and believe on the assumption that adequate evidence exists. This must practically be the fact with the mass of men, whose pursuits forbid them to make the requisite examination for themselves. So circumstanced, it is their best wisdom to accept the common faith of the wise and good about them, and not set up standards of their own.

It must remain for the learned few, whose tastes and facilities enable them to prosecute the pursuit of knowledge, and whose undivided time can be given to it, to extend the areas of knowledge, and purge and purify the realms of belief. On them must devolve the labor and responsibility of searching into truth, and of relegating the absurd and false to oblivion. A single mind may discover and furnish the evidence for all; or one may expose an error that has enslaved the race. Whoever has it in his power to contribute a grain to the sum of human knowledge, or strip the disguises from a single misbe-

lief, owes it to the race to do so. Meantime, while the work progresses, the beliefs which descend as heir-looms to us must continue to hold their place, and of right, until something better is furnished in their stead. Some will abide because they are true, and time will only add strength to their evidence: others will vanish as forgotten dreams, because discovered to be baseless and false.

Of this we may be certain, that intellectual forces are at work which will constantly and greatly, to the incalculable welfare of the race, widen the fields of knowledge, and, by sifting out the false and groundless, and elucidating the true and deserving in matters of belief, will give solidity and power to the whole structure of thought. Nothing will perish that ought to remain. God and humanity have too much interest in truth to permit any part of it to die.

If, as already stated, "it is a maxim of reason that no belief has a right to exist which is not supported by ^{A maxim of}adequate evidence," it is no less a maxim of reason ^{reason.} that every belief which is supported by adequate evidence has indefeasible right of existence.

What is excluded and included by this double-faceted maxim? Obviously it excludes from belief all impossible ^{What is ex-}things, all contradictory things, for of such there can ^{cluded.} be no proof. The area of belief, that is, of the rationally believable, is within the possible and non-contradictory. It also excludes all things that contradict, not that are beyond, our personal knowledge, whether it be intuitive or experimental knowledge—a knowledge delivered to us by external or internal perception or by the discursive reason. No proof can rise above these, so as to imperate belief in the contradictory proposition. What we know, we cannot believe the opposite of without doing violence to the constitution of the mind itself; indeed, if the contradiction is discovered, the mind is incapable

of perpetrating upon itself such violence. The priestly fable, that the consecrated wafer is transformed into the very body and blood of our Saviour, is a dogma which no one can rationally receive. No miracle recorded in the New or Old Testament contains any such difficulty. It is directly contradictive of the verdict of our senses, and has no other foundation than that of the dictum of a fallible man like ourselves. A proposition that should require us to believe that an effect exists without a cause, or that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts, or that right and wrong are identical, or that what we see we do not see, or what we feel we do not feel, or any such thing, can only meet with the prompt and inevitable rejection of the mind, and can, under no circumstances, be an object of belief.

Does it exclude, also, the mysterious and incomprehensible?

Mysterious and incomprehensible may be matter of belief.

So it has been sometimes thought, but assuredly without reason. In the last analysis it will be found that there are incomprehensible facets to every object of knowledge or thought. Mystery is not peculiar to any class of objects. Existence is a mystery. We can neither comprehend nor define it. There is as real mystery in an atom as there is in God. We behold changes; who can comprehend cause, which produces them? Belief, like knowledge, has to do wholly and solely with facts — facts of being, facts of power, facts of change, and not with the ultimate *how* of the facts. It accepts, but does not explain. When it is shown that a thing is inexplicable, unconstruable, it makes nothing against the reality of it, and nothing against the belief of it. Our own being is of this kind, and all of our composite powers and activities. Nothing is more obscure than the ego itself. To believe rationally, it is not necessary that we should be able to explain or comprehend what we believe, but only that there should be adequate evidence that the fact is as we predicate of it.

Does the maxim exclude supernatural or extra-natural things—miracles? It has been so asserted, but without warrant of reason. If by miracle be meant some act of God within or upon the system called nature, by which a fact is brought about which would not occur but by his immediate agency—some fact not provided for in the order of nature, or within the reach of its established laws—there can be shown no reason why such a fact is not possible, nor why, if it should occur, we might not have evidence which would warrant the belief of it. It is not *prima facie* that God, who originally created nature, and from whom alone it receives all its orderly movement, has not power to restrain or reverse its method, or do something in it which was not provided for in its orderly operations or original constitution. It is not *prima facie* that occasion might not arise, in carrying forward his administration, for such an exercise of his power. No reason can be alleged in proof that such a procedure is improbable. No proof can be adduced that such an event has not occurred. Proof is possible that it has. And on adequate proof, belief would be rational. The theory of Mr. Hume, whereby he attempts to show that the occurrence of a miracle could not be established by human testimony, will be examined at the proper place.*

The supernatural may be matter of belief.

Does the maxim exclude belief in the supersensible world, that is, in the fact of spiritual existences and the laws governing them? So some seem to imagine, but without proof of any kind. That there may be beings and orders not cognizable by sense is what no one can dispute. That if there are such, our faculties are such that evidence could not in some way be furnished to us cannot be shown. If adequate proof should be, or has been, given, it is rational to believe. There is nothing in the nature of

Supersensible may be matter of belief.

* See the discussion in volume iii, "The Supernatural Book," pp. 196-247.

the case to make belief irrational. There is no more hinderance to the idea of a supersensible universe than there is to a physical. The last analysis may show that the proof is more complete in the former case than in the latter. What sense has been able to penetrate the arcana of thought, or lay its measuring line on the factor of volitions? Who by searching has been able to find God, and bring him forth from his concealment, that he might be gazed on by the eye or touched by the most sensitive nerve? But are these inscrutable factors destitute of any means whereby to discover the fact of their existence?

Is the idea that intercommunication has been opened with the spiritual world so *prima facie* irrational that it should be denied a fair hearing? Is it *prima facie* that he that made the mind, and opened to it the gate-ways of knowledge, whereby it becomes conversant with gross and mean and perishable things, has barred his own entrance so effectually that he can in no way communicate to it knowledge of himself—no thought, or feeling, or purpose of his with respect to it? Or is it *prima facie* that if he should desire to make such a communication, he is impotent as to means of authenticating his own message? If none of these things are imaginable, and surely they are not, then he may communicate, and there may be such evidence of the fact as to furnish adequate grounds of rational belief. Within the realm of the possible every thing is believable which has the support of adequate proof, and nothing ought to be believed which has not.

It is not proof that any thing is believable simply because,
 Possibility not or for the reason that, it is possible. There are
 an adequate many possibles that are not, and never will be,
 ground of be- actual. But while possibility, standing alone, is
 lief. inadequate ground of belief; the bare possibility that a thing

may be true, may, in certain cases, furnish adequate reason for a careful examination, and especially when there is the slightest shade of probability ; and if it be a matter which, if true, would greatly affect our personal interest, or the welfare of any of our fellow-creatures, that circumstance makes careful inquiry an absolute duty.

It is not adequate proof that a thing is true, or worthy of belief, simply that many believe and declare it, or that it has been long and widely believed ; many great errors have prevailed over whole nations for ages : nor that it is sacred and holy in its teachings ; nor that multitudes have been found willing to sacrifice their lives for it ; nor that it has temples and altars built to it. There are superstitions supported by all these signs. More lives have been sacrificed, more money spent, more blind and utter zeal given, to propagate the delusions of false religion, than have been consecrated to the inculcation of the true. In all systems of error, interblending with all superstitions, underlying all fables and traditions, all through the every-day thought and consciousness of the world wherever mind is, there are glintings of divine and supersensible realities, but the power is wanting to disentangle the truth from the fable.

That and that only is worthy of belief which may be supported by proof that demands from reason its assent. The proof may be gathered from our own consciousness ; may spring from our moral nature ; may hang out from every atom or blaze in every star ; may come from lives or words or deeds of men ; may be unearthed from geological archives, or exhumed from buried memorials of past ages ; may be matter of personal experience or induction of individual reason : come whence it may, it must be adequate proof to support what is propounded as matter of belief, or the thing is not worthy of belief. *Adequate proof* is that kind and amount of proof

which convinces, or is sufficient to convince, unprejudiced
 Adequate proof reason of the truth of that which is propounded
 —what? for its acceptance. Each mind must have the right
 to judge of it for itself. If it accept the judgment of others,
 it can only do so on the assumption that such judgment is
 supported by evidence; but on whatever pretense the belief
 rests, it can have no right to exist except as there is proof
 adequate to support it.

Every thing that is proposed to the mind for acceptance assumes a propositional form; it is a this or that—a predication; and when apprehended, is or may be challenged, and can acquire no right to acceptance except as it furnishes such evidences as will induce the conviction that it is true. The proof may, in fact, be inadequate, as it often is, and the superinduced belief may be strong, but it is a belief which has no right to exist, and a better understanding of its false or insufficient grounds would at once overthrow it. It acquires no rightful status, and must ultimately perish. But the matter of belief that arises on adequate evidence cannot be overthrown, even if the belief is surrendered. It has truth for its matter, and truth adequately supported can withstand any assault—cannot be disproved. It will become more and more lustrous the better it is understood. The more strict and rigorous its examination, the more searching the criticism of its grounds, the more light thrown upon it from every side, the securer will become its hold. Error only need fear the light.

These predications are made of honest and candid mind. Prejudice and passion may offer an effectual bar to the right operation of reason, and blind the mind to the most convincing evidence; but the maxim will stand firm forever, that that which is not supported by adequate evidence has no right to be believed, and that that which is, has indefeasible right of acceptance, and for its acceptance or non-acceptance we are responsible.

What constitutes adequate evidence, and the kind of evidence suitable in support of any given fact, must be determined by the nature of the fact itself. All truths are not susceptible of the same kind of proof—not amenable to the same law. A geometrical theorem must appeal to the laws of geometry; a question in psychology must interrogate consciousness; an hypothesis in physics must be committed to the processes of scientific experiment; an ultimate postulate to intuition; an historical deliverance to historical tests; a matter of sense perception to the senses; a fact of personal experience to self-

consciousness; a conclusion of reason to the law of Diversity of
proof. induction or deduction; a moral problem to moral law; a question of religion to the nature of the soul and deliverances of revelation. No one of these can be required to answer to the law of proof required by any other. To attempt to try a moral problem by mathematical or scientific tests is as manifestly absurd as would be the attempt to apply a measuring line to thoughts, or to weigh feelings in a balance, or to subject motives to a microscope, or to paint volitions on a canvas. The realms are totally different, and can be brought under no common measures. Each should be required to answer to its own peculiar laws of verification. The mathematician will not be asked to prove his thesis by relating his experience; the theologian will not be expected to establish his conclusions by applying "the single rule of three," or by a process in algebraic equations.

The matter before the mind in all the stages of its investigations is simply, What is truth? The problem may respect astronomy, geology, psychology, ethics, religion, any thing in the range of possible queries. In each case the mind has the right to demand that the predication, whatever it may be, shall have that kind of support that will render it deserving of credence, and only that. It will not demand of a witness of a fact which transpired before his eyes, whether he understands the

process by which Newton established the law of gravitation, or whether he can do a sum in differential calculus. It will not, for the proof that prayer is a duty, that sin is punishable, that God is just, that man is immortal, demand that the proof shall be ocular. When the appropriate and adequate proof is given in any case the mind will not be slow to see it, and to feel its convincing force, always providing it be unprejudiced and simply intent on the truth.

What we have aimed at, in these *prolegomena*, has been to define clearly what is meant by the term truth; to explain the difference between knowledge and belief, or knowing and believing; to indicate the respective grounds and conditions of each; to distinguish the kinds of belief, and their respective values; to point out our responsibility for beliefs; to declare the nature and function of proof, and so to furnish criteria, by which to test the authority and veraciousness of our religious ideas. Further than this, it has been our desire to stimulate to the pursuit of truth, to develop an earnest spirit of inquiry, and to point out the proper method and spirit of conducting investigations into matters of faith.

It has appeared that the scope of our knowledges is exceedingly limited, and that most of our ruling ideas must for this life be mere beliefs—hence that the greatest importance attaches to the formation of beliefs. If the conclusions reached prove to be true, then the industrious and earnest use of our faculties in the examination of the beliefs we may entertain, and the cordial recognition of any helps that may be furnished us from any source for the most thorough examination, even though they require us to modify and change, or even to surrender or reject, the most cherished and hitherto most undoubted views, and to accept others, become not merely proper but absolutely obligatory. This is no more true with respect to common things than it is with respect to those beliefs which we nominate

sacred and religious. Indeed, as these are the more important, we should be even more anxious that any errors we may have unwittingly fallen into concerning these should be pointed out and corrected. But if it be a duty to be ready to receive any new light, and even more than that, to be constantly seeking it, and, when it shall be gained, to be willing to modify our beliefs if required, it is certainly not less a duty, and a comely and rational procedure, that we hold our beliefs with unyielding tenacity, and determine that they shall not be wrenched from us except by the most convincing proof. Belief is too sacred a thing to be held lightly. It is one of the high prerogatives of an intelligent being, only inferior to knowledge itself, which, like the truth which it is supposed to contain, cannot be surrendered at the bidding of mere caprice, or cupidity, or dictation, without moral culpability and intellectual debasement. To form a belief hastily, to hold it dishonestly, to be indifferent whether it be according to truth, and to change it on any other than rational grounds, are signs of mental weakness if not of want of moral integrity, from which every worthy and noble instinct must shrink.

In connection with this thought of the sacredness of beliefs, and the high duty of honesty and carefulness in the matter of their formation and continuance, there are two things which deserve more than the passing notice which we can bestow upon them here; the first has relation to the responsibility of men of letters as to their own beliefs, and the manner in which they influence the beliefs and resulting habits of the people.

If there be responsibility commensurate with their opportunities, on their individual and private account, for the conclusions which they reach; if error, resulting from the misuse of their powers and abuse of their special facility, even when retained in strict privacy, involve guilt, how much more must

this be so when they add to this the utterance of opinions, false because hastily formed, or conceived in egotism or prejudice; and thus, by their reputed learning, mislead those who look up to them for guidance, or unconsciously come under their influence.

The masses of men have neither time nor tastes for intellectual pursuits. If many of them have the tastes and the natural powers which, under favorable circumstances, would lead to eminence, they have not the opportunity. Whether poor or rich, the business and labor of life devolve upon them. These, in order to success, require concentrated energy. To a large extent their one book must be their ledger. In any event, the practical fact is and will be so. Such force of thought as they have must be given to their art or calling, leaving no time for any thing else, or so exhausting them and benumbing their faculties as to other things that they cannot successfully become their own teachers and guides.

They have soul hunger, and must have beliefs, and, recognizing their own inability and want of opportunity to investigate for themselves, they naturally and wisely take their opinions on all subjects, whether consciously or not, to a large extent from those who acquire the reputation of authorities. What else can they do? If a man acquires great fame, and especially if he have fame for learning, he will have a great unquestioning following. This it is which makes his responsibility for the publication or mere declaration of his opinions grave in a high degree.

It often happens that scholars are too busy in their particular pursuits, and so of professional and literary men, to give attention to subjects outside of their departments—indeed, this limitation is almost a necessity to success. The field has become so wide that specialism furnishes the only chance for eminence. But it also not unfrequently

The masses dependent.

Duty of scholarly men.

happens that these same specialists assume to be authorities outside of their lines, and in matters to which they have given no attention, and the undiscerning mass do not discriminate between them and those well qualified to decide such matters. Their influence is as great where it ought to be zero, as where it deserves to be of the first rank. There is no escape from this. Ought it not to teach such the need of carefulness in the matter of their influence, lest, while benefiting society in their proper sphere, and by their real contributions to human knowledge and culture, they inflict upon it serious injury in its most vital interests outside of their proper sphere. If there are truths of the most vital importance, which affect the deepest welfare of society, how careful they should be lest their influence be cast against these! That such are the truths of religion it is hardly possible any informed and thoughtful person should doubt. Is it just to themselves, is it just to society, that they should, for any reason, permit their influence to go against these truths by allowing themselves to be rated as unbelievers, or showing themselves to be indifferent? Especially, is it becoming such to array themselves against religion and the Christian Church without being at the pains to inform themselves in the premises? The flippant and irreverent manner in which these great interests are often treated constitutes one of the saddest chapters of reckless indiscretion. If the welfare of the world is promoted by every advance in useful learning, as it is, those favored men, who in the order of God are permitted to enjoy the ability and opportunity to make the largest contributions, and so to win for themselves the admiration and gratitude of mankind, will, in the end, prove to be but sorry benefactors if their learning and influence weaken and destroy greater interests than they subserve. Would they not greatly add to their just fame and personal worth and happiness, and at the same time augment the general

good of their fellow-men, if they universally laid the weight of their great influence on the altar of morality, virtue, and religion, as many of their most illustrious peers have done? When they look at the world as it is, and reflect on the serious aspects of human life as they know them, can they reconcile it to themselves that there should be any question where they stand? Or, rather, can they willingly consent to stand in the ranks of scorers and revilers of sacred things? More yet, can they desire to have their influence, leading and conspicuous as it is, enlisted in the unjust and cruel assaults made upon venerable and holy institutions and truths which have made them all they are, and which they cannot fail to know are indispensable to the conservation and progress of human welfare? Can they believe that by sapping the foundations of Christianity, if that were in their power, or diminishing its hold on the public conscience, as these are often able to do, they will not be committing a blunder simply, but an enormous wrong, against the present and future generations of men? If there are superstitious and religious errors to be corrected, can they imagine that there are no great and sacred verities to be preserved and defended? In the brave fight which has been waged by Christianity against sin and ignorance, and with so much success, for centuries, do they see nothing to commend? Are they ready now to join their blows with the low and vulgar and godless to strike it down? Can they suppose, that in weakening the influence of its teaching and spirit they will be doing that which will bring about a better and more beneficent state of society?

That which decency demands is, that so great a question as that of the truth or falsity of religious beliefs, and especially the truth or falsity of the Christian system, should be reverently and carefully examined, and supported if found worthy of support. Christianity seeks no immunity from the most searching

criticism, but it has a right to feel the cruelty of reckless assault, and most of all the cruelty of impediments put in the way of its great work of advancing human welfare by those who, from the benefits they have received from it, ought to be its truest and ablest supporters.

There is a wide-spread popular mistake, both among believers and unbelievers, as to the real grounds of faith. It is supposed to rest simply on a dictum without authentication—a book is to be accepted and its contents believed without question. On this ground Christians are set down as credulous dupes. It is accounted a sufficient reason for rejection that the system is called a system of faith. Nothing could be more unjust. Christianity rests upon no such foundation. It acknowledges amenability to the common laws of belief. It is to be accepted and its contents believed on proof.

To begin: the question of its veraciousness, it acknowledges, is an open and preliminary question with every mind that chooses to make it so. It rests its claim for acceptance upon its ability to furnish adequate proof, and its readiness to do so whenever demanded. Its vouchers are ample and within reach of every honest inquirer. So far as it is a system of doctrines, the proof it furnishes is, "Thus saith the Lord." This is considered final, but it holds itself answerable to further show that, while some of its doctrines thus supported are above reason, as source, none of them are adverse to reason. To the question, How is it known that God has given Christianity sanction? it holds itself ready to furnish abundant answer and proof, and recognizes the right of reason to decide. So far as it is an experience, it claims to be within the reach of every man in Christendom for himself.

There is no more justice in charging that Christianity rests on credulity than there would be in making the same charge against any experimental science. The proof it furnishes is

different, but not less conclusive. The proof is precisely the kind which the subject demands and which the reason has a right to ask. It is a Christian idea, and so recognized, that there can be no possible obligation to believe where there is not convincing evidence within the reach of the mind.

There is, then, no other ground for faith in Christian dogmas but that they are true, and shown to be true by a quality and quantity of evidence which shall be, or ought to be, convincing to honest reason. The common law regulating beliefs governs here as in every other case. The ground of belief in any contents of the Scriptures is not that it is in the Scriptures, but it is in the evidence that the Scriptures are the word of God. Take that evidence away, and the Scriptures are of no more authority than any uninspired book. The ground of belief in any words spoken by the Lord Jesus is not in the fact that he spake them, but in the evidence he furnished that he is a messenger from God, or the incarnation of God. Take that evidence away and his words have no more authority, no juster ground to command belief, than those of any other good man. The only defense Jesus ever made of himself was in the recognition of this principle. John v, 30-47, inclusive. If, then, the Holy Scriptures are authoritative in matters of Christian faith, it is on no other ground than that they are the word of God. The sole authority they have rests upon the evidence of that fact. The evidence must be adequate to establish that or the book becomes unauthoritative.

If there are spiritual truths which, like other truths, come to
The science of faith has its proper method. verification by inquiry and the use of the appropriate means, and if they are important, the mind ought not only to search for them, but to search in the right way. Every science has its proper method. Christian science is no exception. Here, as elsewhere, the powers must be trained, and subject and object be put in right relations before truth can be

discovered. The fact that there is a spiritual world—that we move amid great unseen realities — forces itself upon us, to say the least, as highly probable if less than absolutely certain. It is sufficiently certain to justify the most earnest effort of every mind to find out what may be discovered about it. If something like the Christian scheme should be true—and no man can say that it is not, and millions of the purest and most thorough minds that have ever adorned the race assert after careful investigation, and on personal knowledge, that it is, —it makes a case of the greatest possible urgency that it should be scrupulously examined by every man for himself. It cannot be rational to put it aside with indifference, nor yet to rely on false methods of inquiry. If it should be that there is a great God, and that we are his immortal and accountable children, and that what Christians believe is true, that the Bible, that most wonderful book, is a revelation from him, by obedience to which our final destiny is to be determined, the bare possibility that it may be so must, to men of reason, appear a sufficient ground for the most candid and earnest examination. The least thing that prudence dictates is, that so much be granted to the subject. The tremendous possibilities in the case are not pleaded as an argument for its unreasoning acceptance, but only as a reason for such an examination as will enable the mind to decide, as it should do, in a case where there is so much possible interest involved.

In order to such a decision, it is obvious not only that the subject should be examined, but that the right method be observed. There can be no doubt of the fact that the state of the affections has much to do with moral and spiritual perceptions. Reason, no less than revelation, declares that the natural man discerneth not the things of the Spirit — that spiritual things “are spiritually discerned.” When the life is wholly given to material pursuits, and the powers of the mind are

constantly and absorbingly employed about material interests, spiritual truths must be at great disadvantage.

The widely prevailing ignorance of spiritual things is not more on account of their intrinsic obscurity than it is on account of the almost utter neglect of culture in that direction. What might properly be called the faith faculty, or the organ of spiritual perception, is dim-sighted or wholly blind from disuse. It requires but suitable effort to bring to vivid realization spiritual realities. "Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen."

No one has dealt fairly with his spiritual nature until he has given it such care as to put it in fair relations to the truths of the spiritual world. He must feel the greatness and pre-eminence of his wants in this direction, and honestly seek to satisfy them. This is so of all truth. It must be earnestly sought, or can never be gained. The telescope reveals the stars only when turned in the right direction. A clarified conscience, pure affections, and an honest mind, turned with longings toward the invisible spiritual heavens, will not fail to bring out the star gems of spiritual truth and reality.

Belief and faith are sometimes used interchangeably, as if they were synonymous terms, and much confusion arises from the misuse. They have common elements, but they have also differences. The differences are essential. In philosophical usage they are identical. But faith is technical as a term in theological science, and properly belongs to it. Not to recognize it is to introduce needless confusion both of language and thought. Theologians are not always careful to note the distinction. There is faith simply as belief. There is *the* faith, by which is meant the body of religious beliefs, or, more technically, the coherent verities of revelation constituting the whole substance of Christian beliefs—"the faith delivered to the saints." In this sense, the codi-

Belief and faith
to be discrimi-
nated.

fied belief of a Church, in its creed, is called its faith. The term also denotes a Christian grace or virtue.

Belief is the acceptance by the mind of a proposition as true when its truth is not matter of knowledge. Were the truth known, it could not be believed, as knowledge precludes belief. It is a state of mind superinduced by evidence of some kind, either perceived or assumed. It is not properly a volitional act or subject of command. It is subject to the will only so far as the will may be active in furnishing the conditions of its existence, or in withholding them. Under suitable conditions it must necessarily exist. As the suitable conditions may in given cases be subject to the will—may be voluntarily procured or prevented—unbelief or misbelief, as result of antecedent voluntary neglect or perverseness, may be ground of guilt. The right posture of the mind with relation to matters of belief is not indifference of will, but a settled volitional state or purpose to create suitable conditions by gathering all possible light, and giving the faculties fair play in ascertaining and determining the probable truth in the case without passion or prejudice. The same law rules, whether the matter of inquiry be sacred or secular. Belief in this sense is not faith technically as a Christian grace, and is wholly destitute of ethical virtue. If the mind do no violence to itself, it will believe any truth which is brought before it with the same facility and necessity as that with which the eye will see when it is placed in right relations to the objects of vision ; and, as the eye will not see out of proper relations, so the mind will not believe according to the truth when it is not supplied with suitable conditions of faculty and environment. As the eye may be closed against the light, and the possibility of vision be cut off—or as it may be placed in a colored or insufficient light, and so see things obscurely or in distortion—so the mind may refuse or distort existing facts, and plunge itself into false conclusions of ab-

surdity, delusion, doubt, disbelief. Disbelief and belief are the reverse sides of the same mental act. To believe a proposition is simply to affirm its probable truth. To disbelieve it is to affirm the probable truth of its opposite, or its probable untruth.

Faith, in the technical sense, is both a mental and moral exercise. It is a free voluntary act, with a concomitant affectional element. It is a proper subject of command. It originates in the moral nature under mental conditions. The mental condition is a belief grounded in evidence. The moral act is trust in a being, issuing in the commitment of the soul to him and a loyal and loving acceptance of his guidance, and in loving obedience to his will and command. The mental act is the apprehension of a person, implicit belief in his existence and trustworthiness, that he is able to effect some desirable good to the soul, and will, when trusted, do so. These are doctrinal predicates which are bases of faith, but not faith—mental states ensuing upon apprehended evidence. They imply only such concurrent volition as is involved in attending to determining reasons or proofs. In order to the faith-act, these mental acts must awaken dormant affections in the moral nature—a sense of sin and desire after deliverance from its guilt and peril. These conditions being wrought, the faith-act becomes a voluntary performance or exercise, not induced without help, but still free and personal—an act of the soul whereby it grasps the hand of proffered help, and puts itself in possession of salvation. It is thus more than belief, more than desire, more than hope. It must have a person for its object, and is loving trust in him. Its very essence is this consummate act, the free, cordial, loving obedience of the heart, possible only under given conditions.

“I regard it,” says Dr. Hopkins, “as specially unfortunate

that *faith*, a term so central and vital in our religion, should be used in senses so different from that in which it is used in the Scriptures. And this is the more disastrous because the term seems, often at least, to be used in this way with an entire unconsciousness that there is any difference. Thus Sir William Hamilton, after saying that faith is the organ by which we apprehend what is beyond our knowledge, adds: 'In this all divines and philosophers worthy of the name are found to coincide.' In his chapter on the province of faith Dr. Calderwood says: 'It is necessary to premise that in treating at present of the province of faith, I refer exclusively to the exercise of faith which is found in the consciousness of our primary or fundamental beliefs. Such beliefs,' he adds, 'if they have any value at all, are nothing less than the foundation and guaranty of all our thoughts.' Here Dr. Calderwood identifies faith with beliefs, and makes it consist of those primary beliefs that are given by what Hamilton calls the regulative faculty. True, he says: 'Faith may also find exercise in connection with the facts of experience, or with inferences drawn from these.' But this is not true of faith, except as the meaning of the word is changed, and of that he gives no intimation. The faith that finds exercise in connection with the facts of experience is wholly a different thing under the same name, and neither is at all the faith of the Bible. How wholly the faith now spoken of differs from that of the Bible will be readily seen if we compare the two. The one is involuntary and necessary, the other voluntary and may be commanded. 'Have faith in God.' One admits of no degrees; the other does. 'Lord, increase our faith.' One belongs to all men; the other does not. 'All men have not faith.' One implies no previous belief; the other does. In the one there is no element of confidence in a person; in the other there is, and the faith cannot be rational unless the confidence be well founded. The faith of the Bible

always rests on a person as its object or ground, and has in it a voluntary element. It manifests itself in belief, in obedience, and in commitment; in believing what a person says because he says it, in doing what he commands because he commands it, and in committing to him without reserve all that he offers himself to us for.

“Here we have constantly trust in a person and the voluntary element. How different all this from any primitive and necessary belief that is part of our nature I need not say. The two are, indeed, in different spheres. . . . We thus see that the faith of the Bible is a principle wholly rational and practical. It is no nondescript ‘organ’ by which we apprehend what is beyond our knowledge. Nor is it a principle by which we apprehend the invisible.” *

The function of theological science is to ascertain and formulate truth of the supersensible universe, especially truths enunciated in the Christian system, and to educe the grounds or evidence which shall convince the mind that the educed doctrines are true. As a science its function ends here. It has performed its work. It has given the truth. The theologian has nothing more properly belonging to him as a scientist. But he aims all the time at a greater result than this, but a result altogether beyond him — the salvation of those to whom he gives the truth. He may convince and instruct, but he has no more that he can do. The divine Spirit, accompanying the truth, delivers it with power in the consciousness. Its office is ended until the recipient becomes more than a *mere recipient*. Salvation, which is the true end sought, is conditioned, not upon the adequacy of the argument which is addressed to his reason or conscience, but upon that personal act of submission and trust which he voluntarily renders. The theologian simply

* Hopkins, pages 37-39.

aims at the systematic development of that body of truth which has God for its object, and his method of operation in the conduct of the universe as a sovereign, particularly his dealings with man as a responsible being, as these are revealed in the Holy Scriptures, in the external world, and in the spiritual consciousness of man.

To a soul attuned and in perfect harmony with spiritual things, lifted into the serene region of a perfect faith, the unseen becomes manifest. From this high point vision is proof. The soul's eye is open. But it would be a disastrous mistake to imagine that in this region lie the original tests of theological science. These are proofs to the believing, vouchsafed to faith. But how are they attained? By *faith*. True, but what antedated faith? The conditions of faith. Faith does not begin but ends the proof. Christian dogmatics begins where every other science does. It addresses its deliverance to the cold intellect—to a mind whose spiritual receptivity even is at zero—whose spiritual eye has not been opened; it may be to an unbelieving and prejudiced, and certainly to a mind clouded by sin. To such a mind it cannot condition its proofs upon already existing faith. There is no faith, and any initial movement must be outside of faith. The science begins by announcing certain fundamental spiritual verities. The dead soul, having no consciousness of the truth delivered, is in the state of the cold intellect when any proposition is laid before it. Its first movement is to demand proof. The science, therefore, must start, if not from the stand-point of doubt, yet in the recognition of doubt and of the need of verification; must presuppose all its propositions challenged, and must address itself to the removal of the inevitable query and uncertainty which overhangs, if not the writer himself, yet the non-believing but honest inquirer. There is a difference in the degree of doubt which may exist. In some it may be not simply uncer-

tainty, but absolute disbelief, and the science must wrestle with both. If the mind were already in a high spiritual condition, spiritual verities would be at once discerned upon their presentation; but this is not its state; contrariwise, it is dead. The grounds of spiritual faith (which is nothing other than a loving trust and obedience) must be laid in a process of proof that shall produce the assent of the intellect, and awaken desire in the heart—a sense of need. This is a requirement of the science, and places it in line with every science, as a believing grounded on rational evidence.

The frequently quoted saying *credo ut intelligam*, or *credo scio* is true when properly understood, but it is a blunder when improperly construed. Evidence first verifies to reason certain spiritual truths which, when accepted and acted on, become verified in consciousness, and this second verification becomes the ground of more perfect insight. The second and deeper verification follows spiritual trust. Faith is thus the organ of knowledge, but it does not antecede rational non-doubt. Rational non-doubt is always anteceded by doubt, or, if not doubt, a sense of the need of evidence, which is transformed into non-doubt by apprehension of proof. Thus, as in every other science, doubt or uncertainty, removed by proof, is the starting-point; *belief* resulting from proof—*intellectual assent*, enforced on adequate grounds, or for which there are adequate grounds, is the second stage, or indeed the outcome in mere matters of rational belief: while in relation to these spiritual verities the outcome is a verification by *means* of antecedent faith or trust, not simple assent, to the spiritual consciousness—a knowing, a discerning. This state of faith, as spiritual sight, is essential to a true spiritual science. The inquirer who remains without this faith, influence, and faculty, can never understand *fully* the science of divine things; but no more can he be excused, since, simply as an intellect, he may acquire such

knowledge of divine things as will enable him to attain the deeper knowledge if he will. The truth of which, he is convinced in his reason, may, by being acted on, lead to the deeper insight which springs from faith.

The true starting-point of dogmatics is an inquiry into the truth of the dogma, inasmuch as we cannot be required to accept any dogma or dogmata without evidence. There must, indeed, be a certain amount of presupposition that it is or may be true, since otherwise it can gain no footing for a fair hearing. It must be examined as a belief, which presupposes grounds, and the examination must be of the adequacy of the grounds, in order that the outcome may be belief.

If we have postulated correctly as to the sources of theological beliefs, we are prepared now to consider the right method of procedure to be observed in deriving them. Every science has its method, and, to be correct, it must be determined by the nature of the science itself. There must be a starting point and an outcome. We have seen that Christian dogmatics is a science of beliefs in supersensible verities, determinable by several sources of origin and proof. They are beliefs evolved in a definite way by perfectly definite causes, and also beliefs verified by definitive proofs. In Christian dogmatics a biblical, an historical, an empirical, an intuitive, a rational and scientific element are most clearly united and related. It has been generally assumed that, unlike philosophy, which starts with doubt, dogmatics starts with faith. It is the science of faith, and must be construed from the stand-point of faith. There can be no doubt that the verities of faith come to fullest revelation only through faith, and only to faith. Faith, in its truest moment, is not simply intellectual assent. It implies a certain receptive condition of the spiritual nature, an openness of the whole mind toward the spiritual world, by which spiritual realities are seen. It is a peculiar discerning faculty,

without which it is impossible to attain clear vision of spiritual things. A science of the invisible cannot be attained without it. A blind man cannot evolve or possess a competent idea of color. There is no mind that has not spiritual faculty, but if it be weak, or undeveloped, it cannot be fully adequate to the clear knowledge of spiritual verities. But while active, living faith is the condition of clear and full views in spiritual truth, we are not to imagine that these verities are not amenable to the common law of verification. The faith organ may, indeed, and unquestionably does, in proportion as it is strong, furnish unique verifications; but it would be a great injustice to limit the verifications to this organ. Spiritual problems are addressed to the mind in the same way in which natural problems are.

The starting point of all theological inquiry, since the science is, properly speaking, the science of God, must be inquiry respecting God, and primarily respecting the existence of God. His existence is the underlying postulate. This may be assumed as an ultimate truth of faith. But it may well be doubted whether perfect content can ever be reached in this way, however unwavering the belief. The mind will demand the ground, and until made secure of this will feel a sense of weakness in every subsequent stage of its investigations. That the postulate is ordinarily unquestioned is doubtless true. This does not alter the fact that, in the last result, scientific method requires that it should be made good. And if the science cannot verify here it can verify nowhere; it is not a science; from first to last it is a tissue of assumptions, unwarranted beliefs. At this initial stage the Bible, which becomes of such supreme authority in all subsequent stages, is of no direct avail. Its deliverances settle nothing on the point. Until this is secured the Bible itself is an impertinence, and can acquire no standing in court. It acquires all its authority on

the postulate that it is the word of God. But the postulate *assumes* that He *is*. It does not and cannot prove it. Two things must antedate its authority, and give it all its potency. It must be shown that God is, and that *it* is his spoken word. The primary source of theological truth must be outside the Bible, in order that the Bible may become a source. The sources of evidence of divine existence must be either the mind itself, *intuitions of him*, or his works, as media through which he makes known his existence, or both. That is, from the constitution of the mind, it must be able intuitively to cognize him as it cognizes itself, or the external world, or axioms, which is proof so conclusive that none other can be demanded ; or it must find in the constitution of the universe evidences of his existence so conclusive that it is incapable of doubt. This discussion lies at the door of all theological speculation, and of all religious faith, as a scientific requirement, however it may be in the fact. Rising on this ground it becomes a science, on any other it may be a truth, but it has no foundation but assumption.

As scientific method requires the investigation to begin with the question of divine existence, and to be concluded by the mind itself in the normal use of its faculties, deducing its proofs from its own intuitions and experiences, and by the exercise of its reasoning powers on evidences furnished by the external world in its order and history, so it must shut the mind up to these sources for all further information with respect to his character and further purposes unless it can be shown that he has made other deliverances on these points. The postulate that such further deliverances have been made is one which must be proved before it can be admitted. It has no sufficient standing ground in mere faith. It is wholly indirect and worthless until the mind is furnished with adequate evidence of its truth. This, then, in a true scientific

method, becomes the second matter for inquiry. The new authority, being established by consent of reason, acquires a right to be heard. It may now lead in the subsequent investigations, and, conjointly with the others, build up a true theological system. The new cannot contradict the old, but may greatly enlarge the areas of knowledge and abundantly elucidate what was already given, inasmuch as a revelation may evolve, and to be such, must evolve, what was not previously given. Furthermore, the revelation may open up entirely new sources of experimental proof touching all preceding deliverances, by transforming the attested idea into an actual personal experience, which will demonstrate in consciousness that which was before a mere idea of the reason. The revelation, say, announces a scheme of mercy and pardon ; as an idea it stands attested simply by evidence which establishes the revelation itself as a truth of reason. We say as a truth of reason, not as being discovered by reason, but as being discovered to reason, in the evidence which establishes the revelation itself. Now, taking advantage of the revealed truth, a mind places itself, or is placed, under the operation of the principle of grace, and comes into a conscious experience of pardon, and becomes spiritually quickened and saved. It must be obvious that something is added by the conscious experience to the evidence which previously existed. And if the new consciousness which has arisen within it be attended with a marked quickening and increase of power to the faculty of spiritual perception, together with the new fact before it, the evidence and contents of previous deliverances may be greatly increased. That this is so is the unanimous testimony of all spiritually-minded men until now. And this testimony must be taken into the account in any scientific treatment of the problem of the spiritual world. It comes into the problem as the testimony of the wisest and best of men in vast numbers, without a dissentient

voice, on a matter of fact. It stands to the problem very much as an experiment does to a theory in science. Those who have not the experience may decline to accept it as proof, but so can the unreasoning clown refuse to accept the experiment of the scientist. Can he do so reasonably? We have, then, as the sources of theological truth, primarily, the mind, and the external universe, and the history of events; secondly, the Bible, a revelation from God, and human experience, translating the revealed idea into a conscious knowledge; and the scientific method requires of us to determine the conjoint contents of these sources and the validity of their deliverances. As these sources are neither contemporaneous nor conterminous, so they are not co-ordinate; but neither has power to contradict or override the other. They must, as emanating from the same source, be harmonious, and must be used as helping and establishing one another.

The Bible stands in the middle, and is wider than both the others in its deliverances; and as its function is specifically to make deliverances of the facts and laws of the spiritual world beyond those deliverances made to us by the external world, to aid and transcend them, and to produce effects in our consciousness with respect to the spiritual world which otherwise we could not reach, it must always be supreme as, if not the only or most primitive source of spiritual truth, still the widest and most perfect, and also most authoritative, especially as for its contents, by supposition, we have a direct "thus saith the Lord," and not merely a conclusion of our fallible reason on matters of observation or experience. While it cannot contradict or annul, it may correct and enlarge our knowledge.

How shall conformity of beliefs to the truth and reality of things be secured? This, strange to say, is one of the real questions.

With regard to questions of science, or questions of fact, in

the common affairs of life, it is well understood that truth is acquired by free and untrammelled investigation; the mind is applied to the subject, and the conclusion is reached by the diligent and proper use of the faculties. Any thing that prevents this, or any other method that may be adopted, issues in error. The end of the use of the faculties is the procurement of proof, or the putting itself in possession of all the facts which bear on the case, and the formation of a conclusion according to the evidence. The common intelligence indorses this as the right method. Adequate proof, and conclusions according to the proof, are good forever and for all minds, unless new facts should be discovered which might affect the conclusion. These would then have to be taken into the account and the conclusion formed accordingly; or, in case it should be found that the conclusion was not according to the facts, that discovery would require a change. Any conclusions not reached in this way can have no force with rational beings.

Now, is there any other principle in matters of religious faith? If so, what? The subject-matter is different, and the mind stands in different relations to it; but does this change the method of procedure? What is the function of the mind in the case? If it is a matter in common affairs to be established by testimony we call for witnesses, we examine their testimony, we apply the criteria by which to determine whether the testimony is credible or not. Can we proceed in any other way in establishing the facts of religion? If it is a matter which allows of practical demonstration or experiment, we rely on the testimony of those who have made the experiment, or we apply the practical test. Is there any other method for ascertaining the truth in matters of religious experience? Must we not here, as there, depend on the testimony of witnesses who profess the experience, apply the common tests for proof of this kind, or practically demonstrate the truth for ourselves?

What can be established by testimony must be tried by testimony. What will allow of experiment must be determined by experiment. If it is a matter of intuition, the intuition wants no other proof. It applies here as every-where else. Thus, all the way round, the verities of faith are amenable to the same laws of proof which apply to all other questions. The mind demands the appropriate kind and adequate amount of proof, and has the same function to believe or refute on the same principles here as anywhere else. There is but one law—belief should in all matters be determined by proof, and conformed to the evidence in the case.

If now we turn to the question, What ought I to believe with regard to the Christian system; or, more generally still, with regard to spiritual things? the maxim emerges as in every other case, “Believe that which is established by adequate proof.” Will any one pretend that the maxim does not apply in this case as in every other? Must I, in relation to ordinary objects and affairs, require the sufficient reason or the adequate grounds for belief before granting it, and may I in this case dispense with this precaution, and believe, without the adequate reason, whatever may suggest itself or be suggested? Something is to be believed. Say it is this proposition: “There is one true and living God, and the Bible is a revelation from him.” May I ask why am I to believe this proposition, or must I believe it without asking any question or demanding any proof? Or let it be any one of the following propositions: Man is an immortal spirit; man is a fallen being; man is responsible for his acts; man is a free moral agent; man may be lost forever; Jesus Christ is the Saviour of men—he died for all, or he died for the elect only; man must be born again; or any other proposition relating to matters of Christian faith. Am I at liberty to ask the grounds on which I am to believe these things, or must I blindly accept them? There

is an impression, not without grounds, that some Christians think it a sin to doubt, or call in question, or demand proof; but the charge is groundless as against theology itself. We must distinguish between the exercise of that right which any mind has to ask to be informed of the grounds of belief, and to exercise prudent and reasonable precautions even, and that blaspheming infidelity which simply rejects and derides. We must remember, too, that if it is possible to be over-cautious, it is not less possible to be over-credulous. The danger is here rather than there.

If the foregoing reasonings and conclusions are correct as to the laws which ought to govern in the formation of beliefs, and if for the present, and possibly permanently, matters of the gravest moment may, from the nature and limitations of human intelligence, remain matters of belief merely, then to ignore these laws by either a headlong credulity or incredulity, the one no less than the other, is, at the same time, the height of irrationality and a criminal recklessness of the gravest interests.

Credulity and
incredulity
alike dangerous.

The boastful, unreasoning infidel and the superstitious dupe are of the same class, with this difference: that the former acts no less than the latter in defiance of reason, but, arrogating to himself superior wisdom, becomes the greater fool, since he runs a greater hazard.

The better way, and only wise one in all matters of belief, is to put honor on the reason, and, allowing it full and fair play, to follow it implicitly whithersoever it leads, allowing no make-weight to either prejudice or passion.

As when a man looks outward upon the world of material things and events he immediately forms conjectures and beliefs about them which improved information and reflection will modify, and as such crude conjectures and spontaneous beliefs do not cast doubt or discredit on the reality itself of external

nature, and as it is the function of scientific method not to dismiss the subject from thought as simply a mass of delusions, but rather to awaken reflection about it and subject it to a more careful scrutiny; so, in regard to the matters of the spiritual world, there are crude impressions and hasty beliefs which will not bear the test of criticism, but will on examination pass away entirely or become greatly different from their first imperfect form; and in this case no more than in the other should these facts reflect discredit on the subject itself, or banish it as an idle and empty delusion, but simply subject it to more careful scrutiny. The facts will show that, while confessedly the spiritual realm is much more obscure to human faculties than are the gross material forms and substances about us, spontaneous and unreasoned beliefs are as uniformly incorrect in the one department as the other. The spontaneous beliefs that thus spring up indicate not a total delusion with respect to their objects, but rather a ground of reality in them; but a reality imperfectly understood, and which, therefore, requires reflection and a more thorough examination. The fact that beliefs are generally held in ignorance makes nothing against the possibility of right thinking with respect to them, or of finally reaching a right conclusion. What scientific doctrines are intelligently understood by the masses? Is there one in a thousand that can correctly state one in a hundred of them? But who thinks of making the prevailing ignorance a reason for rejecting them, or heaping odium upon them? Why shall we make an exception against spiritual problems? Simply the same kind of brave and honest work is demanded here as there, with promise of like results. Crude conjectures will give way, unable to endure the rigors of criticism; hasty and ill-judged opinions will disappear and spontaneous beliefs will be modified. The methods and tests must, from the difference in the subjects, be different, but with the

same painstaking we have a right to expect that here, as there, the truth will emerge.

The history of theological science, or speculation, if any prefer to so call it, is pregnant of suggestion, admonition, and instruction. It clearly reveals where are the hidings of its strength, and also where are the lurking places of its weakness. It emphasizes the importance of right method. It illustrates the evil of crude, hasty, and unreasoning interpretations. It shows the folly and emptiness of mere dogmatism, or dependence on traditions, or authority, or popular superstitions; the disastrousness of attempting to impose fables and whimsies of human invention for sacred and reverend verities. It demonstrates that neither cunning nor priestcraft, nor yet even honest but ignorant assumption, however they may prevail with ages of ignorance, can hold power and influence in an age of enlightenment. It establishes the fact that ideas can only acquire permanence by the inherent quality of truth; and that, possessing that, they have the guarantee of ultimate triumph, however criticised, resisted, maligned.

It is obvious, on the slightest reflection, that whether or not right beliefs are possible on obscure spiritual problems, there is no natural momentum of the human mind, or supernatural guidance perceived or unperceived attending it, which by unstudied movement will bring it to such a result. Here it is true, with the greatest possible emphasis, that "strait is the gate, and narrow is the way, which leadeth unto life, and few there be that find it;" and "wide is the gate, and broad is the way, that leadeth to destruction, and many there be which go in thereat."

The principles laid down in the preceding pages clearly point out an evil which parents most of the errors and absurdities of belief into which men have fallen. If the evil could be cured, the great mass of supersti-

Evil of ignorance.

tions and misbeliefs and disbeliefs which distress and disastrously affect the world would to a large extent disappear, and we should have substantial truth in all matters that affect human interests. The errors remaining could at most only relate to non-essential matters of speculation, without seriously affecting the practical interests of existence and life. In time general harmony would prevail, and universal human society would become regulated by laws and customs promotive of peace and welfare—the millennium predicted in the holy revelation, and the outcome of enlightened reason. To this end, let us hope, the upheavals and reconstructions going forward to-day ultimately tend, however for the present they seem to portend the destruction of much that we most highly prize.

The evil referred to is ignorance, and that stupid mental and moral condition which is both effect and cause of ignorance. Right beliefs are impossible to an ignorant and stupid mind: indeed any thing entitled to the name of a belief is impossible to such a mind. There are prejudices, baseless assumptions, irrational conjectures, mimicries of thought called beliefs; but belief implies some exercise of reason. Ignorance is irrational.

The great part of the world lies in absolute ignorance, and in a state of mental stupidity in which the rational powers are practically dormant. Take the world at large: the degree in which the proper mental and moral powers which distinguish the human from the brute life are developed is frightfully small. Even in the most enlightened states the masses are practically in a condition of intellectual torpor, with intelligence at zero. Education is the only remedy. Ignorance, from sources either within or without, must be displaced by knowledge, and the mental powers must be so trained as to put mind in possession

Right belief
impossible to
ignorance.

Prevalence of
ignorance.

of itself before rational beliefs can be attained and harmonizing truth become the possession of mankind.

The process of education, by which this result is to be reached, all experience shows must be double—including the Education the remedy. impartation of knowledge by those who possess it to those who do not, and by this means the creation in the ignorant of such a desire for knowledge as will lead them to seek it; and then, together with this, the skillful training of their powers, so that they will become successful truth seekers for themselves. There is no other way by which the evil of ignorance can be removed from the world, and rational beliefs take the place of mere prejudices, superstitions, and absurdities.

I do not forget that educated minds frequently become the most dangerous enginery of error; that therefore mere mental development is not a guaranty against error; nor do I forget that very untrained mind, mind under the sway of ignorance most dense on many lines, nevertheless often attains to most rational beliefs and positive knowledge in matters of the profoundest and obscurest truths; nor do I fail to recognize the fact that there is a moral eye—the conscience—which often aids in the discernment of the deepest truths where the eye of reason is dim-sighted, and the whole horizon of intelligence is wrapped in dense clouds of ignorance and the mind benumbed with torpor: nevertheless, it remains true that ignorance is the mother of superstition, out of whose fecund womb issue most of the deadly errors which destroy the race. It is impossible that ignorance, left to itself, should breed any thing else but error; and it is inevitable that, furnishing the conditions of easy deception which it does, it should not, in addition to its own delusions, become the ready prey of every fraud and imposition it meets: when, if the time shall ever come, that mind gets possession of itself, acquires knowledge of its rights, learns

how to handle its powers, broadens its acquaintance with the universe, becomes aware of the laws which ought to determine its beliefs, credulous superstition and unreasoning infidelity will perish together, and truth will assert its imperial and eternal sway.

Granted a supernatural revelation containing complete fullness of information, and couched in the plainest possible terms, still, to banish error, the revelation must be known and the faculties must be trained to grasp its meanings. It can never become a revelation to either the ignorant or stupid in any such way as to put truth or consistency into what they call their beliefs. What signifies the belief of any man, or any number of millions of men, with or without a revelation, in heathendom or Christendom, if the belief simply represents ignorance and moral torpor—the blind gropings of mind not in possession of itself? The spontaneous growths of ignorance are and forever must be a luxurious crop of errors, misconceptions, and absurdities, which can only be exterminated from mind by putting it in possession of itself and pouring into it the light of knowledge.

Corollary 1. Belief, merely as such, determines nothing as to the truth of what is believed.

Corollary 2. Any belief intelligently formed and rationally held is entitled to respectful consideration, and deserves to be affirmed and insisted upon with pertinacity in the ratio of its importance.

Corollary 3. All beliefs should be regarded as open to examination and subject to modification.

Corollary 4. The contents of a belief may be as absolutely true as the contents of any knowledge, and its subject-matter of equal practical importance, even if it should remain forever impossible to bring it to absolute verification.

Corollary 5. It does not detract from the value or in any

way make against the validity of a proposition, doctrine, or teaching, that because of the limitations of the human mind it cannot be matter of knowledge, or must of necessity remain matter of belief, provided, as a belief, it exists under the highest imperative of reason.

SOURCES OF THEOLOGICAL TRUTH.

Having in the foregoing pages defined what we mean by the terms "truth," "knowledge," "belief," and especially having pointed out the differentia of knowledges and beliefs, and the laws which are determinative in the formation of beliefs, we

Application of
foregoing prin-
ciples.

come now to apply these laws and principles to questions in theology, or, broadly, questions which relate to the supersensible world. It has been already stated that theology as a science or question in theology forms no exception to strict amenability to the common laws governing in all matters of knowledge and belief, and that they can claim no exemption from the common tests.

What are the sources of theological truth?

Theological truth is truth with respect to God—his existence, character, and relations to the universe and matters involved in these. The subject opens up the whole question whether there is or not any basis of truth in theology, and if so, what

Sources of the-
ological truth.

the truth is. The sources of light on the entire subject are the system of nature, including the material frame of things, with the forces and laws discoverable therein, the constitution of the mind itself both as to its moral and reasoning consciousness, the actual history of events as it has become known to man in the ordering and ongoing of the universe, the struggles and movements of human thought across the ages, and the holy Bible, a book which claims to have emanated from God as a revelation, containing an account of his creative acts and authorship of the universe, his doings

and purposes with respect to man, and a statement of doctrines concerning himself, and the principles and outcome of his administration over moral beings in general and the human race in particular.

The primary and most fundamental question in theology is, also, the most fundamental question in the whole realm of thought, which emerges in all departments of scientific research and philosophical discourse as inevitably as in theology itself; it is the question of divine existence—the question of questions, which underlies all mental movement. Primary question.

The sources of light upon this point, the very corner-stone of the whole subject, are almost entirely and absolutely extra-biblical. The question itself must be settled by the reason from other grounds before the question of a revelation can be mooted. The older revelation, nature, inclusive of man, must furnish the sole proof here, and the verdict of reason is the court of final resort.

The Bible becomes available on this question, not as an authority, but only as a witness, and as furnishing clews. If so be reason can be convinced that the Bible contains utterances which are true, and which require an infinite mind to make them, whether utterances of word or work, as in prophecy and miracle, then it becomes a witness to divine existence in the same manner in which nature does, and the same facts prove to reason that it is a newer revelation; so it becomes a source, and possibly a supreme source, of light on spiritual problems, and in the last analysis may rise, as is claimed by Christians, to the position of absolute and final authority: but all this depends on the answer which reason makes to the proofs furnished, so that reason is ultimate umpire in the whole case. Bible available.

In assuming that the Bible is a source of light on theological

questions, it is implied that it is in fact what it purports to be, a deliverance of God. It is admitted that that is an open question, which must be settled as a fact to the content of reason before it can become of any value whatever. Should reason be compelled, from the evidence in the case, to admit its claim, then it becomes at once of supreme authority in the premises; but to acquire such a controlling position all reasonable doubt must be removed.

Whatever is clearly deducible from any one of these sources becomes entitled to equal credence and respect to that which is accorded to either of the other sources, and needs not the support of any other, nor can be discredited by any other.

God, in the system of nature, in the constitution of the mind, in the providential administration of the universe, and in his inspired word of revelation, if there be any such word, must be in perfect accord with himself. He can say nothing in the one which is inharmonious with what he declares in either of the others. They are but media of manifestation of truth in severalty, in which it appears with greater or less distinctness, but with no possible contradictoriness or difference of imperativeness.

Whatever the source of the truth, the agent in its cognition in all departments is the mind itself in the normal exercise of its rational faculties. There is, and can be, no truth for the mind which the mind does not itself find to be a truth. But in this statement we do not mean that the mind is sole and unaided discoverer of truth, or that it is in no need of help or may not be helped.

Nothing is more certain than that many truths must forever remain unknown to it, if it be left to mere nature and providential movements therein, and to the operation of its unaided faculties; and, possibly, the most important truths of all. It may be found by reason that a word-revelation to help is pos-

sible, is important, is *absolutely necessary*, and has been given to supplement all other sources of truth. If it should be found that such a revelation has been given, its contents must accord with other deliverances from the same source, though transcending them. There could be no other ground for a revelation than some absolute need arising from the obscurity or paucity of other and older deliverances, and the inadequacy of reason left to itself. Revelation a need.

If, indeed, the mind might be able to reach all needed truth, but with great difficulty and uncertainty, merely by the light of nature, still it might be desirable and important that it come at it with greater ease, and have it, when ascertained, clothed with higher sanctions than individual reason could impart; but, even in that case, the conclusion must so come as to commend itself to the individual reason that is to receive it. It could only thus become authoritative. It is the verdict of the individual reason that makes it authoritative; or rather, that enables the mind to recognize its authority and at the same time not repudiate itself.

The human mind has great facility of belief, as we have seen, often jumping at conclusions without any grounds whatever; but such unreasoned judgments, however strong, signify nothing as to the truth of their contents. Theological ideas which have this irrational paternity, like similar ideas on other subjects, can have no weight, even though they be true. They are not product of mind, and have no significance for mind. The truths they contain, even though divinely enunciated, become known to be truths through the reason, and only then acquire any rightful authority. The proof furnished must be clear and conclusive.

The question of divine existence having been determined by the reason affirmatively, from the evidence deducible from all sources—that is, it having been determined by the reason that

there must be an eternal extra-mundane and ultra-mundane world-ground as cause—a *causa causarum*—it immediately becomes a question what kind of being is he? Is he personal or impersonal? What is his character?

On this point nature, including the moral and reasoning consciousness of man—that is, including the human mind—again becomes oldest and primary source of light. But the ray that comes to unaided reason from nature upon this point is so dim, and in some aspects so utterly absent, that reason finds herself bewildered, and declares that the light is not sufficient to enable her to render a satisfactory verdict. Impelled by a desire to know, and by a moral consciousness of need, she interrogates external nature, she interrogates her own nature, she interrogates history and experience, but finds the problem too deep and obscure for her. There is a dim light on some parts of the problem—she “sees men as trees walking,” but it is wholly inadequate to her wants.

It is at this point where revelation enters the field and becomes a helper, pouring new light on the perplexing problem. But it acquires, and must acquire, its authority wholly upon the antecedent verdict of reason, rendered on the ground of adequate proof that it is a revelation from God himself. Until that verdict has been rendered, and the grounds of it declared to be sufficient, it can acquire no standing as an umpire. When it is rendered it becomes supreme, but still through the reason.

The mystical theory, adopted by many honest minds, makes the subjective consciousness the source and test of truth, especially in spiritual matters. It assumes that there is an inner light which is adequate to discern truth and detect error, to which all spiritual problems must be submitted.

This is a highly exaggerated and misleading view, pregnant

with delusions and errors. There is a spiritual condition which is helpful to the right understanding of spiritual truth—a preparedness of mind for the right discussion of the problems, but there is no other organ for the discovery or reception of truth but the reason. Even when the Holy Spirit reveals truth to the soul, it must be according to a rational method; that is, the mind must, even in that case, be enabled to rationally discern what is communicated, whence it comes, and that it is not in contradiction of reason. A mere subjective feeling proves nothing but that there is a moral nature which can feel and does feel in a given way in the presence of certain facts, and that in these feelings there is indication of truth which should be examined. Feeling does not discern the grounds of its own existence. To be of any value as to its source or meaning the reason demands that it, the reason, shall be enlightened by other evidence than the mere fact of its existence as to what it means.

Conscience has been aptly styled “the eye of the moral nature,” because it seems to perceive truth. For the same reason it has been called “the moral nerve,” because it responds to supersensible realities with feeling; so it has been termed “the moral reason,” because it seems to intuit moral distinctions. All this is supposed by the mystic to imply that conscience is a cognizing faculty, and so it is made the organ of the soul by which or to which or in which God is directly known and his will directly perceived. It is, according to the mystic, the center and core of spiritual cognitions.

There is a semblance of truth in this, but a semblance which conceals a misleading error. In the last analysis, it is found that that within us which we call conscience is simply a feeling, or a something which feels, in the presence of some kind of acts or proposed actions, which we

Conscience.

A semblance of truth.

have differentiated as moral—that is, which we view as right or wrong. The act on which the feeling arises is taken up and differentiated by the reason or intelligence, and the appropriate response of feeling ensues. If the differentiation had been otherwise, the feeling would have been otherwise. This well-known fact accounts for direct contradictions in conscience, one seeing and feeling a thing to be right which another sees to be wrong. The erring faculty is the reason, the response of feeling is invariably the appropriate one to the judgment or mental act which preceded.

The conscience knows nothing, believes nothing, discerns nothing; it simply feels in harmony with knowledge, belief, or inchoate acts of reason or intelligence. But while conscience is not a cognitive faculty, it is a feeling which reveals a nature—the uneradicable moral nature of the soul. It does not discern a law even; but it reveals to reason the fact that there is a law forever present in the soul. It knows nothing of God, or right, or wrong, or reward, or retribution; but it is proof to the reason that there is a God, an eternal law, and a certainty of rewards and punishments. It is a moral phenomenon which declares to reason that there is an eternal power over or in the universe, which makes for righteousness. No verdict of reason is more discernible or more certain than that which makes the moral feeling, called conscience, a proof of moral law, and so of an ever-present law-giver. The moral nature thus becomes, as we shall see in future discussions, a ground of rational faith in the verities of the supersensible world, but itself knows nothing of the reality of that world. Whatever is in accord with the moral nature, or in discord with it, appears in and as feeling of approval or disapproval, and thus proclaims that there is such a nature, and lays the ground for inferring a Cause who himself is moral.

Conscience not
cognitive.

Reason ac-
counts for the
feeling.

We take issue with Dr. Hodge, as we understand him, when he says : *

“It is conceded that nothing contrary to reason can be true. But it is no less important to remember that nothing contrary to our moral nature can be true. It is also to be admitted that conscience is much less liable to err than reason ; and when they come into conflict, real or apparent, our moral nature is the stronger, and will assert its authority in spite of all we can do. It is rightfully supreme in the soul, although, with the reason and the will, it is in absolute subjection to God, who is infinite reason and infinite moral excellence.”

Dr. Hodge on
conscience.

With the first part of this statement we are in perfect accord, “that nothing contrary to reason can be true ;” and also, “that nothing contrary to the moral nature can be true ;” for this would be to make the author of reason and of the moral nature to contradict himself, or to set truth over against itself ; but with the other part of the statement, namely, “that conscience is much less liable to err than reason,” we join issue as a misleading statement. It implies that conscience is cognitive. This, we must think, is not true. This seems further to be his notion in the words “when they come into conflict, real or apparent, our moral nature is the stronger, and will assert its authority in spite of all we can do.” This certainly means that the moral nature, which he makes synonymous with conscience, collides with reason as a cognitive faculty, and is the superior and overrides it—its decisions are more reliable. This, to our mind, is not the proper putting of the case ; conscience never takes one view and reason another ; they do not thus conflict in the same realm, and one triumph over the other ; each is supreme in its place, and the function of each is distinct and different from that of the other. The moral nature rests on the

* “Systematic Theology,” vol. i, p. 7, ¶ 4.

rational, and is so attuned to it and dependent on it that its very existence presupposes it, and is impossible without it. There is no moral nature that does not possess reason as its conditioning ground. The soul is first rational, then moral: the cognitive power antecedes the conscience function, or the moral nature and action, as feeling. The soul is a unit; first it knows, then it feels. It becomes moral, or, if we will, a conscience, when it is brought into certain relations to law and action under law or supposed law. Let us see how this is. To make this discovery we must posit certain things; namely, (a) the infinite Creator originates a soul with powers to know and with powers to do certain things. Among the things which it has power to do are some things which its Maker approves—wishes it to do, and other things which he disapproves—wishes it not to do. (b) He so constitutes this soul that when placed in the presence of these possible actions—that is, moral actions, actions which are right or wrong—on discerning their quality by the law which is present to the reason, or in some way is made known to it, the soul immediately and invariably feels an obligation to the class of actions which its Maker wishes it to do; and *vice versa*. After it has performed an act which it feels to be wrong it feels remorse. The antecedent discerning act of the reason and the subsequent act of feeling, as described, are both requisite to the constituting the soul a moral being; but to do that it is necessary, still further, that it should act in freedom and not in necessity.

The first forth-putting is of the cognitive power, or the action of the soul as a rational being. It discerns an act to be done. It sees in the proposed action the quality of rightness, it feels the obligation, it comes under pressure; this is called conscience. It is a feeling springing in the soul on the ground of a previous cognition.

Now if it should be said that the discerning of the quality of

the proposed action is by some other faculty than reason, that would make two different cognitive powers—one, that which is exercised in common knowledges, and one, that which is exercised on questions of right and wrong; and this latter kind, or special power, is cognitive conscience. Nothing could be more confusing, or, as we think, more contrary to the reality.

When a moral act is proposed to a consciously free being which perceives itself to be under law, it asks itself, Is this proposed act right or wrong? or affirms to itself, It is right or wrong. It does this in the normal and spontaneous exercise of its rational nature; that is, it compares the act with a law, and the feeling rises spontaneously which is appropriate to its perceived quality. It matters nothing that the process is not always consciously discerned; it nevertheless takes place. There is no evidence whatever of a cognitive act outside of the ordinary exercises of the reason—the whole intelligence. The reason intuitively discerns the moral quality of free acts, or that they have a moral quality; whether such moral quality is adjudged to be right or wrong will depend on training and knowledge, or belief of some law or supposed law; not on a peculiar faculty by which the moral quality is discerned. There may be moral acts which the reason spontaneously adjudges to be wrong because of a recoil of the sensibilities in view of them. The recoil may be sole ground of the decision, while itself is not a cognitive act at all. The moral nature recoils because the intelligence sees in the act hurt or injury, and nature shudders at hurt or injury of any kind; and the intuitive reason decides that that which hurts or injures is wrong. Should it become known to the reason that harm or injury was not intended, but rather that the pain was inflicted for the sake of some good, that discovered fact would change the verdict of reason, and moral disapprobation would immediately turn to approbation.

The moral sensibilities or feelings which are experienced by every human being in the presence of certain motives, purposes, feelings, acts, show that the soul itself is moral in its nature—that is, that it is naturally fitted to receive such impressions and experience such sensibilities just as much as the optic nerve shows that it was constituted for vision; and these instinctive manifestations become the occasion of moral judgments, or judgments of the reason on moral questions—questions of right and wrong. Thus the moral nature becomes a source of light on moral questions, at the same time that it is not a special cognitive faculty. Its phenomena point to law, to a lawgiver, and to the character of the lawgiver; and the moral feelings become armed with potency to enforce as well as indicate law, and are the means of showing the character of the lawgiver. They are rectoral, or proclaim the sovereign, and they constitute a part of the means by which he maintains moral government. Reason discerns in the state of moral sensibility the signs of good or bad character: and sovereignty, by means of the sensibility, rewards virtue and punishes vice. Moral penalties and rewards are thus meted out through the moral sensibilities; or conscience approves or disapproves by the appropriate sign. The moral nature itself, in its experiences, is thus God's instrument for showing his approval of the right and disapproval of the wrong, so emphasizing his law, and making reason certain that it is his law.

Thus external nature, God's oldest revelation, in manners which will be pointed out furnishes to reason the evidence of his existence and somewhat of his character; then internal nature, or the moral and reasoning consciousness, the soul, pours further light on the more obscure attributes of his character. The external universe furnishes its light by means of sensational perceptions, which are taken up by the reason and traced to

their ultimate source, or the world ground—God as cause: then the soul, in its internal constitution, reveals further the moral character of the eternal cause of itself and all other things: then the actual history of his providential administration in the governance of the world, and especially in the affairs of men, throws still additional light upon our path: finally, revelations come to our help and supplement all the rest, to enable us to know the whole mind of God. These will be examined and unfolded as we progress in these investigations.

The Bible occupies so conspicuous a place as final authority on all religious and theological problems, that we must dwell more at length to point out the relation of reason to it.

The Bible is a book which, even if there be evidence that it was inspired by God, we cannot forget was delivered to men, and to men of like passions with ourselves, and that in the scanty and uncertain and mutable terms of human language; and which, though at first authorized, has encountered the perils of transmission over ages of change and revolution, through channels not simply uninspired but tinctured with bigotry, intolerance, and ignorance, until it reaches us in a strange and alien dialect, while the languages in which it was at first communicated have disappeared, and the races to whom it was given have perished from the land, and the customs and manner of thought current among them anciently are but imperfectly known. While it may appear that the evidences are abundant that it was a perfect revelation originally, and that it has undergone no substantial change, it must be obvious that its exact meaning and spirit may not be so clear as to be easily reached in every case, but possibly may invest some utterances in great obscurity, if not absolute uncertainty.

In seeking to ascertain its contents, we must not forget, also, that we have other communications from the same Author no

less authoritative, if clearly understood, and even more surely his than any particular word can be. Whatever proof The book must be accredited. there is that the Bible is of God, there is certainly greater proof that the universe is from him, and that we ourselves are his handiwork. These are older and more unquestionable expressions of his being and character, though they may be and are more obscure; and though on some points they may be and are entirely silent, when their meaning is plain and unmistakable they must be admitted as interpretative of the meaning of the newer revelation, and any seeming contradiction of them must awaken doubt. No authority, by the later revelation, can be acquired from any proof which sustains it, which will give it such precedence over the others as to enable it to stand in a case of absolute, or even highly probable, contradiction of them. What is true to the faculties, as they are employed about the study of these, will not be surrendered as untrue because of the apparent teaching of this. They are the same faculties which are employed in each case; and what they are constrained to admit as true here will not allow of a contradiction there. The book must be interpreted in harmony with other sources of knowledge, or it cannot stand in reason, and if not in reason, not in intelligent faith.

As the authority of the book must be accredited to the faculties, so must its contents. This is often disputed, as it is The contents of revelation to be accredited. also often asserted in a false sense. The Bible has to do with the faculties. In this respect it does not differ from other sources of knowledge. Some truths are conveyed through material nature; some, through the mental constitution; some, through revelation. They are not the same truths. Sensation gives one set, the reflective consciousness another, revelation another, but in each case the reason must apprehend them and be convinced of them before they can be accepted; and, when apprehended, and sustained by adequate

proof, they must be accepted. The mind rightfully tries them whether they come from this or that source, and accepts or rejects them as they are convincing or not to the reason. The Bible has no special or exceptional advantages here. It brings to the mind truths which are not given in nature or consciousness, or from any other source, and truths which are even too great for its faculties fully to comprehend, as also do nature and consciousness; but these can only become truths to its conviction—can only dominate its faith—as they are proven to the reason. The faculties must try them. This does not mean that when a truth is stated in the Bible it must have additional proof, the Bible itself having been proved to be from God; but this: that the statement must not contradict some other statement from the same Author made in another equally authoritative form.

Though stated in the Bible, if they contradict some other and better known truth, the Bible has no such authority as to give them a possible place in the convictions of the mind already possessed of the contradictory knowledge. Should such a contradiction be found—a hypothesis which we do not believe likely ever to become a fact—there is nothing left to the mind but to declare that truth is one: it will so declare. These facts must be kept in mind in promulgating theological systems or opinions. No doctrine or fact which con- Passages possibly to be surrendered. tradicts the knowledges of men can become matter of rational belief. The thing is impossible. Should a doctrine seem to be taught in a word-statement in disharmony with existing knowledges, the interpretation of the passage would have to be changed, or the passage itself would inevitably have to be surrendered as uninspired, or as having originally contained an idea which in some way has become obscured, or which the language as now apprehended fails to convey. Such a case might occur in the history of a written revelation without

in the least impairing its validity. Such a case has occurred in the Mosaic account of creation. The apparent meaning, or what was long believed to be the meaning, has been of necessity surrendered, and the whole section has been saved by clothing it with a new and perfectly just interpretation in harmony with the facts as found in the older record. And what has occurred in that case must occur whenever a similar need shall arise; and whenever it shall occur, it will only prove that a fallible interpretation of an infallible revelation, however plausible, must be abandoned.

It is important to keep in remembrance, further, that all the parts of the Bible are not in the same degree inspired; and though we may not select the *ipsissima verba* of the Holy Spirit in every case, we may be able to know sufficiently the substance of the revelation, so that what may be established thereupon shall be authoritative, and of obligation to faith. There is a certain liberty, however, which must be allowed to the faculties or they will utterly refuse to act. It will not be difficult to perceive the limitations imposed upon a just interpretation of the letter. While there is abundant evidence that the Bible is characteristically a divinely-inspired book, it would be the height of absurdity to suppose it inspired in every word. Nor does this affect the truth of any word; the uninspired parts may be as true as the inspired parts.

It is possible to push the doctrine of inspiration too far—so far that it will not endure the strain. It is never wise to overstate a truth. The portions of the Bible which contain revelations, doctrinal or ethical, may justly assume, on the evidence furnished, to be divinely inspired—for the substance of them the authoritative deliverances of the Holy Ghost, certainly in a manner and degree not necessary, and, so far as appears, not claimed, for the historical parts and especially for the mere drapery of the narrative and incidental

Bible not all
equally in-
spired.

Truth not to be
overstated.

portions. A truth is a truth, no matter how arrived at. Inspiration emphasizes, but does not increase, the value of truth, and ought to be claimed only when it is needed for the discovery of a truth or for giving special authentication and emphasis to it; beyond that there is no apparent need of it.

But if too much claim for inspiration may be set up, there is special danger of insisting on interpretations as if they were inspired also. The cause of truth is ^{Interpretations are not inspired.} never the gainer by such extreme measures.

The utmost that ought to be claimed for the holy book is, that it is a faithful history of what it gives an account of: therefore that it is equally true in the inspired and ^{Utmost claim for the book.} uninspired parts, the guaranty for the whole being divine superintendence; and that the doctrinal, prophetical, and ethical parts being by the authorization and inspiration of the Holy Ghost, they are not only true but divinely delivered. This is broad enough to answer all the demands of the case, and is defensible. The attempt to go further does not strengthen, but weakens the whole theory of inspiration.

It is a just question, allowing the Bible to be a revelation, what are the grounds and limits of the authority of revelation over matters of religious faith? May its dictum ever be called in question? Are there other co-determinatives ^{Grounds and limits of authority.} which may be of equal or even paramount authority?

As authoritative, does it set aside or vacate the function or supremacy of reason? Do its deliverances do away with the need or propriety of further inquiry? May the mind have grounds for beliefs which, though they should vacate some teaching of apparent revelation, would still hold? These are important questions which will inevitably arise in the prosecution of religious inquiries. Where there are two or many standards there must be one of final resort in cases of collision or the mind must exercise liberty of choice between

them; that is, it must have the right and responsibility of passing upon the value of the whole evidence which is to determine its faith. That such is the right of mind in every case there can be no question. Revelation is sometimes put forward as if it were the sole source of religious ideas and knowledges. This is not true: there are more primitive sources. There are controlling evidences on many points outside of its deliverances. It does not override or retire them; nor would it be possible so to do without changing the constitution of the mind itself. What, then, is the precise function of revelation in matters of religious faith?

By revelation we mean, in this discussion, the sacred Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments as received by Christians. We use the word revelation in its accepted sense, to denote a communication or deliverance from God. And our question is, What authority should it have, as such, over the faith of men? To have any authority at all, it must be obvious that it must first be accepted as a revelation. This is that which alone gives it any value. But to acquire this value, it must first be placed before the bar of the mind, and be required to furnish adequate evidence that it is such; that is, it acquires its authority solely by an act of the mind, which it is henceforth to dominate, in imputing to it the quality of a revelation. It holds rightful empire over the mind precisely in the degree in which it is able to furnish the evidence that it is a revelation; and it has no other right to supremacy but that which arises from the adequacy of proof that it is such, and of that the mind itself is sole umpire.

If a deliverance from God, and so evidenced as to be accepted by the mind to which it is addressed, it then acquires authority over faith by the subsumed premise that God is a God of truth. The logical formula is complete. God is a God of invariable truth. This is his word. It must

Ground of au-
thority.

be truth. The value of the conclusion depends wholly upon the utter truth of the premises. But even now the value of the conclusion must depend further on the precise contents of the minor premise. It may mean more or less. If it should be that all the words in the several books, in the form in which they come to us, are the *ipsissima verba* of the Holy Ghost with the meaning unchanged, and if we could be entirely sure that we understand the words precisely as they were intended to mean, we should then have a complete authority for faith which would preclude the necessity for further search or the possibility of doubt — the highest possible evidence of the truth. But if there is a possibility that some words ^{Possibilities of change.} have changed their meaning, or that some are added, or that some were human addenda, or that some were used in accommodation to the habitual thought and state of intelligence at the time, or that some might mean this or that, all of which are possible, and some of which are even not improbable if not highly probable suppositions, then, in construing the revelation, we should be under the necessity of giving due weight to them, and must call to our assistance other sources of evidence. Some things we intuitively know must be true, and others we know cannot be true; the evidence in the case is paramount. No proof could be furnished competent to show that any deliverance which should contradict them ^{The reason paramount in some cases.} is a deliverance from God. As, for example, sin is personal and untransferable; perfect justice cannot punish the innocent as guilty. Some things we know by experience and observation, and some by scientific induction. The evidence in either case is irresistible. Some predications the constitution of the mind renders impossible. These well-known facts cannot be ignored in determining the measure of authority a verbal revelation shall have over matters of faith. In reaching beliefs they must be recognized and influential. To set them

aside, or silence them in the interests of some supposed authority, is only to introduce schism into the mind, and to elevate to supremacy a dictum which antagonizes both intuitions and experience. This can never be required, and under no circumstances should be allowed. The claims of revelation are not advanced or strengthened by such assumptions. Revelation cannot be elevated at the expense of reason, upon the authority of which it acquires its ascendancy. It comes to us, not to vacate the use of our faculties, or to contradict them and abolish their verdicts, but to supplement and aid them by furnishing new facts for their consideration. To that which we already know it adds much that we could not else know, but it contradicts nothing, it must contradict nothing, that we do know.

FUNCTION OF REASON IN MATTERS OF REVELATION.

“Christians, in repudiating Rationalism in all its forms, do not reject the service of reason in matters of religion. They acknowledge its high prerogatives, and the responsibility involved in their exercise.”

Dr. Hodge on
the function of
reason.

“In the first place, reason is necessarily presupposed in every revelation. Revelation is the communication of truth to the mind. But the communication of truth supposes the capacity to receive it. Revelation cannot be made to brutes or to idiots. Truths, to be received as objects of faith, must be intellectually apprehended. A proposition to which we attach no meaning, however important the truth it may contain, cannot be an object of faith. If it be affirmed that the soul is immortal, or that God is a spirit, unless we know the meaning of the words nothing is communicated to the mind, and the mind can affirm or deny nothing on the subject. In other words, knowledge is essential to faith. In believing we affirm the truth of the proposition believed. But we can affirm nothing of that of

which we know nothing. The first and indispensable office of reason, therefore, in matters of faith, is the cognition or intelligent apprehension of the truths proposed for our reception. This is what theologians are accustomed to call the *usus organicus, seu, instrumentalis, rationis*. About this there can be no dispute.

“It is important, however, to bear in mind the difference between knowing and understanding, or comprehending. A child knows what the words ‘God is a spirit’ mean: no created being can comprehend the Almighty to perfection. We must know the plan of salvation, but no one can comprehend its mysteries. This distinction is recognized in every department. Men know unspeakably more than they understand. We know that plants grow; that the will controls the voluntary muscles; that Jesus Christ is God and man in two distinct natures and one person forever; but here, as everywhere, we are surrounded by the incomprehensible. We can rationally believe that a thing is, without knowing how or why it is. It is enough for the true dignity of man as a rational creature that he is not called upon by his Creator to believe without knowledge, to receive as true propositions which carry no meaning to the mind. This would be not only irrational but impossible.

“In the second place, it is the prerogative of reason to judge of the credibility of a revelation. The word ‘credible’ is sometimes popularly used to mean easy of belief, probable. In its proper sense it is antithetical to incredible. The incredible is that which cannot be believed, the credible is that which can be believed. Nothing is incredible but the impossible.* What may be may be rationally believed.

“A thing may be strange, unaccountable, unintelligible, and

* This statement is not strictly true. If there is evidence that a proposition is not true, however the thing might be possible, it is incredible to reason.

yet perfectly credible. What is strange or unaccountable to one mind may be perfectly familiar and plain to another. For the most limited intellect or experience to make itself the standard of the possible and true would be as absurd as a man's making his visible horizon the limits of space. Unless a man is willing to believe the incomprehensible he can believe nothing, and must dwell forever in utter darkness. The most skeptical form of modern philosophy, which reduces faith and knowledge to a minimum, teaches that the incomprehensible is all we know; namely, that force is, and that it is persistent. It must be unreasonable, therefore, to urge as an objection to Christianity that it demands faith in the incomprehensible.

“The impossible cannot be believed. . . . God can no more require us to believe what is absurd than to do what is wrong. That reason has the prerogative of the *judicium contradictionis* is plain, in the first place, from the very nature of the case. Faith includes an affirmation of the mind that a thing is true. But it is a contradiction to say that the mind can affirm that to be true which it sees cannot by possibility be true. This would be to affirm and deny, to believe and disbelieve, at the same time. . . . As it is impossible that God should contradict himself, so it is impossible that he should, by an external revelation, declare that to be true which, from a law of our nature, he has rendered it impossible we should believe.

“This prerogative of reason is constantly recognized in Scripture. The ultimate ground of faith and knowledge is, confidence in God. We can neither believe nor know any thing unless we confide in those laws of belief which God has implanted in our nature. If we can be required to believe what contradicts those laws, then the foundations are broken up. All distinction between truth and falsehood, between right and wrong, would disappear.

“In the third place, reason must judge of the evidence by which a revelation is supported. On this point it may be remarked that, as faith involves assent, and assent is conviction produced by evidence, it follows that faith without evidence is either irrational or impossible. This evidence must be appropriate to the nature of the truth believed. Historical truth requires historical evidence; empirical truth, the testimony of experience; mathematical truth, mathematical evidence; moral truth, moral evidence; and the things of the Spirit, the demonstration of the Spirit. In many cases different kinds of evidence concur in support of the same truth. That Jesus is the Christ, the Son of the living God, for instance, is sustained by evidence historical, moral, and spiritual, so abundant that our Lord says of those who reject it, that the wrath of God abideth on them. Evidence must not only be appropriate but adequate; that is, such as to command assent in every well-constituted mind to which it is presented. As we cannot believe without evidence,* and as that evidence must be appropriate and adequate, it is clearly the prerogative of reason to judge of these several points. This is plain from the nature of faith, which is not a blind, irrational assent, but an intelligent reception of the truth on adequate grounds. The Scriptures never demand faith except on the ground of adequate evidence. ‘If I had not done among them,’ says our Lord, ‘the works which none other man did, they had not had sin;’ (John xv, 24;) clearly recognizing the principle that faith cannot be required without evidence. The apostle Paul proves that the heathen are justly liable to condemnation for their idolatry and immorality, because such a revelation of the true God and of the moral law had been made to them as to leave them without

*This statement is not strictly true; we do believe many things without semblance of evidence even, and all erroneous belief is without evidence in the proper sense of the word. We cannot rationally believe without evidence.

excuse. On the same principle the Bible regards unbelief as sin, and the great sin for which men will be condemned at the bar of God.

“Christians, therefore, concede to reason all the prerogatives it can rightfully claim. God requires nothing irrational of his rational creatures. He does not require faith without knowledge, nor faith in the impossible, nor faith without evidence. Christianity is equally opposed to superstition and rationalism. The one is faith without appropriate evidence; the other refuses to believe what it does not understand, in despite of evidence which should command belief.” *

These judicious words give reason its right relation to matters of faith; and if the principles laid down are carefully observed, no dictum of faith will find itself in conflict with reason, and the objection to Christianity that it is mere matter of faith will be void. If doctrines have been propagated in the name of Christianity which are absurd, irrational, and impossible, it has been because the system of Christian truth has been misunderstood and revelation misinterpreted. That this has been so many times, it is impossible to doubt, and nothing short of a miracle could have made it otherwise. It is the function of the enlightened theologian and pious critic to educe that sublime faith from the written word which, purged of all misconception and delivered from constructions forced by the requirements of creeds born in times of ignorance and under the influence of partisan wrangles, shall be acceptable to advanced intelligence and unfettered reason; a faith developed in revelation, and supported by adequate evidence.

The final and supreme arbiter in every case as to what is

* “Systematic Theology,” vol. i, pp. 49-55, *et al.* This quotation is a gleanings and not the full text; but is correct in substance, and sufficiently complete to give the author’s exact meaning.

truth, is the mind itself. It may mistake, but it must abide its own verdicts. It is its function to decide for itself. The ground of the decision, when it acts Reason the final arbiter. truly, according to its nature, must be satisfactory evidence. It can never be required to act otherwise. It is sole and supreme umpire. It must decide what to accept and what to reject. It is responsible for the decision. There may be a case when it cannot decide which of several alternatives ought to be believed—that is, which is true. There may be no sufficient evidence in its possession, and none within its reach by any search possible to it. In that case it remains undecided. Thus it appears that while it may, by the right use of its faculties, conclude from evidence what should be believed or not believed in a given case, and while it is itself alone responsible in that case for its decision, there are cases which do not come within the range of its faculties, with respect to which it has no power except by self-abuse to have any belief, and with respect to which, therefore, it has a responsibility to withhold faith. Non-faith is then its true attitude; not disbelief nor yet belief.

The evidences which shall determine the mind's verdicts it must weigh and examine, and then regulate its verdict exactly so far as the evidence will enable it to do, according to Evidence to be examined. its value—believe just what it proves, nothing more, nothing less. Its function is not exhausted in judging of evidence that may be at hand. It is under obligation to go forth in the pursuit of truth. It must, therefore, seek for evidence or light by which, if possible, to reach a right conclusion in all cases in which there seems to be any practical interest involved. Its responsibility is not simply to have the truth, but to have the evidence that it has it, and on this ground alone to believe it. As it must seek evidence, so it must determine what is evidence. No other can relieve it of this function. It may accept this or that, but it must determine which, and how

much. Thus it is required by its own nature to govern its own beliefs, and to answer for them. Some truths lie close about it. It perceives them with ease—the evidence is patent—its conclusions are instantaneous. Others are removed, obscure, difficult, but still within reach. They are such as require study and careful examination; they may be of great importance. Responsibility is in the ratio of their importance, not of their obscurity, if the evidence which will make them clear is possible. In every case the mind is factor of its own conclusions—final and supreme arbiter.

This universal law is not reversed in matters of theological belief. The reason is still supreme, the source of evidence only is exceptional. A book is introduced as authoritatively dictating what the beliefs shall be. It purports to be a revelation—a thus saith the Lord. How far has the book the right to dominate beliefs in its dicta? Has the mind no function except to bow and implicitly accept without question? To this we must answer emphatically it has. Before the dicta can be received as truth, and in order that they may be so received, they must undergo a process of investigation, and there must be found evidences independent of the dicta themselves competent to establish their truth. The claim of the book must be tried.

The order of proceeding, and the only right one, is, first, for the mind clearly to understand what is set up. It must ask, What is that which is claimed for the book? Having got the sense of the proposition, it must next ask the question, Is this true? It must then, in order to determine this point, clearly define to itself the kind and amount of evidence necessary to warrant its acceptance of the proposition, or requisite to make out the claim set up. Having determined what kind and amount of evidence is required in the case, or having attained a clear idea as to the

need, it must proceed with careful and painstaking search to collect all the proofs. If no proof can be found, the claim must be discarded at once. If some supposed proof is offered, but if on examination it proves weak and insufficient, the free mind must so declare. Until the adequate evidence can be adduced the claim set up can have no force. In a word, there is nothing to make this question, or any other question of faith, an exception to the common law governing the formation of beliefs. The simple and only matters before the mind are, what is the claim set up? what are the proofs alleged? do they support the claim adequately?

If we now suppose that the inquiry has been satisfactorily conducted, and that the proof has been found adequate in the judgment of impartial reason to establish the proposition that the Bible is a revelation from God, what is the next step? It is implied in the conclusion already reached, that the contents of the book are true. The question of veracity could only be raised upon one of two suppositions—either that the book is not in all its parts a revelation, or that it has in some way been corrupted, either artfully or by the accidents incident to communication originally from the divine mind to the human, or in the transmission from generation to generation, in transcription, translation, or mutilation of manuscripts.

The initial question of the divine veracity cannot be raised at all. The mind, from its innermost nature, refuses to entertain a doubt here. It will not be put upon proof, for it sees the truth directly in its own light. On the other points the mind will entertain the question—will see it to be a real question—Is the entire book a revelation, or does it contain a revelation? The proof must here again determine. Has it been willfully or unintentionally corrupted? The proof must again be determinate. If now we suppose these points to be settled on the simple principles of truth, and

Reason determines on the claim of the Bible.

not upon caprice or prejudice or authority, we are prepared for the next step. If the conclusion is against the claim set up, as to the original fact of a revelation, that at once dismisses the case. The book being a fraud, or lacking evidence that it is not fraud, ceases to be of any value. If the proof shows serious corruptions the claim is injured, and the value of the book as an authority impaired. If the claim is made good, and corruptions are not proven, we have now, by the approval of reason, an absolute authority to which we may apply both as determinate source and standard of beliefs. The process by which we have reached this position is the plain and simple process of rational investigation. The mind, in the proper use of its faculties, has found an authoritative standard for its religious beliefs in the word of God.

How now shall it proceed? Its next step is obvious, it must find out what is contained in the word; that is, what the word Reason deter- says, and deeper yet, what the word means. The mines mean- words themselves are simple objects of perception. ings. All that is necessary is to bring them under the eye and be able to pronounce them. But the words have meanings. They are visible signs of ideas. How shall these ideas be got at, so that we may be assured that we have in our minds the same ideas which were in the mind of the author? We have already determined by previous rational processes that the ideas contained are true. This enables us to lay down these rules of interpretation: First, that no idea can be contained which is not according to truth, and hence, that no idea can be contained which is contradictory of some known truth, or which is contradictory in itself; no interpretation which would involve either of these consequences can be correct. Second, ideas cannot be found in the book which are subversive and contradictory of each other. These are necessary postulates, and must be governing.

Hence, it appears that it is a function for the mind to find out the meaning of the book under rules of rational interpretation. To do this it must depend on its own faculties, unless it can be shown that it can come at meanings in some other way. It must determine its own method, and to maintain its rationality of proceeding, whatever the method chosen is, it must be such as reason approves.

One question still remains—must the mind accept what it finds contained in the book? It would seem that it ought so to do, and we must answer without hesitation if it is a part of the revealed contents, yes, provided the meaning can be satisfactorily deduced; but any answer in the affirmative which demands the absolute submission of the mind to every word in the Bible, without right of question as to whether it is thereby right, or may be a corruption, must be rejected for the following reason, that should there be a contradiction found, it would be impossible that both members should be received as true without mental desecration or abnegation; the same would be true if any thing is contained contrary to well-established knowledge. The mind must retain the indefeasible right to determine whether such a case exists; and in case it judges itself to have found such a case, to reject so much of the record, since to accept it would, under the circumstances, be for the mind to subvert itself.

In case of an absolute conflict between any assumed revelation and the reason, faith in the revelation perishes, for the reason that faith in a revelation stands in proof which the reason admits is adequate; but it is impossible for reason to admit any proof as adequate to the establishment of that which is in absolute conflict with itself, for that would be the equivalent of saying that there is adequate proof of that which is in absolute contradiction of all proof, or of the law of reason itself. When the proof is adequate,

May the reason
reject or refuse
contents.

In case of con-
flict, what are
the rights of
reason?

the reason, by its own law, bows and gives in its adherence. Thus the reason itself enters into faith, and faith becomes rational. Reason bows to superior authority, and does so as reason on the ground of apprehended proof. It could not remain reason and withstand authority. It is impossible that a real revelation should contain any statement or doctrine against which any valid objection of reason can be alleged; for, as revelation, *it must be true*, and nothing can be true against which a valid objection can be alleged; it is impossible, therefore, that there should be real conflict. A true statement or doctrine may be falsely interpreted, and against such a conception or interpretation there may be such objections of reason that the interpretation, however justified, must be abandoned, or the doctrine, as a revealed truth, be given up. The mind, in such a case, will reason thus, (*a*) The proof is adequate that this is a book containing divine revelations which are necessarily true; (*b*) the proof is positive that this statement, as construed or interpreted, cannot be true; (*c*) therefore either the text has been misinterpreted or corrupted, or some clew to the original meaning has been lost, or this particular passage is not one of the contained revelations; and it would not be impossible, in the progress of ages, that this might arise in various ways, nor would it ruinously affect the value of the revelation if it should be shown in fact to have occurred.

This is not the rationalizing principle condemned above. It is not condemning a text or an interpretation because it teaches some truth which is above reason, but because it teaches as truth that which reason, in its legitimate exercise, determines cannot be a truth. But is it said that this, after all, is making the reason the judge of what is true or false, and so regulating faith by reason? We answer, it is not *limiting faith* to the *comprehension* of reason: it is protecting faith from *conflict* with reason. It leaves to revelation

Not rationaliz-
ing.

its legitimate function, of making known truth to which unaided reason could never attain. It leaves to reason its legitimate function of apprehending what is made known, and determining that it is proved; or in case it is a *contradiction* of truth, the liberty of discarding it as untrue, or holding the false interpretation in abeyance. This right it must forever have; or, when it is denied, it is assumed that the mind is under the necessity of believing that to be true which, by a necessary law of its own nature, it is compelled to believe is false. It is no answer to say, in such a case, the testimony of God is to be chosen rather than that of the fallible reason. The denial is, that there is or can be any testimony of God in the case. The point in issue is, can there be a testimony of God which contradicts reason? and this is denied. To assume that there may be is to assume the very point in dispute. If it should be said it makes the reason the judge of what God may or may not put in his revelation, and so exalts reason above God, and gives it the right to impose limits upon him, we answer it imposes no other limit upon him than that which we know he must impose upon himself, namely, that the matter of his revelation shall be true. This, reason can never allow is unwarranted assumption.

In postulating that reason has this right to determine whether a given content can be admitted, we are only emphasizing, in another form, what is implied in the common statement, that reason must determine whether we have a revelation; for in so determining, it must determine that it contains nothing false or contradictory of itself. Is it said that a truth might be so obscure to the reason as to seem to be in conflict with it, when in fact there is no conflict; and for it to reject it, because of the apparent conflict, would be rejecting the truth on the very grounds laid down here? That such a case is possible must be allowed. What then? Is it the remedy for this liability, to require the mind, on authority of God, to believe

what the mind cannot believe by reason of a law which God himself has put in it? How can it admit to itself the authority of God for what it cannot help but believe is not true? Suppose the assumed revelation should declare that three and seven are twelve, or that it is perfectly just to punish one man for the wrongdoings of another, or that holiness and sin are opposites and yet identical, would it be the duty of reason to accept these statements as true? The answer must be in the negative. Why? Simply because these things are known or decided by a law of the reason to be not true.

There is a difference between the statement that the reason tests and determines all matters of belief, and the statement that it originates all matters of belief. The former
 A difference. statement shows that the reason must pass upon the adequacy of the proofs of a thing before it can be required to be believed. The latter statement implies that the reason is the discoverer of the thing. Rationalism refuses to accept any thing as true which the mind is unable to discover by its own unaided processes. Faith accepts any thing as true, the proofs of which are adequate, though it may be something which the mind, left to itself, never could have discovered. Rationalism insists on explaining every thing according to the principles of reason; and what cannot thus be explained it rejects. Faith accepts a truth on proof, though it may not be able to give the rationale of it. Rationalism holds that the reason is adequate to all the demands of existence. Faith holds that there are important truths which the reason, unaided, cannot reach, and that revelation is a necessity.

Faith admits the right of the reason to determine on the proofs that are adequate to support a revelation, and to decide the question whether a revelation *de facto* exists; and further, that it is the right of reason to determine the meaning and contents of the revelation, but not its

What faith permits to reason.

right to reject contents on the ground that they transcend its understanding, but only on the ground that they contradict its knowledge. Faith imposes no obligation on reason to accept what is contrary to reason, but it obliges reason to accept on proof what is beyond or above its power of comprehending. Faith places revelation above reason as an authority, but never against reason, and never but by the approval of reason. Faith accepts as true a world of things which lie entirely beyond the ken of reason, which reason never could have discovered, and which, being discovered to it, it has no direct means of verifying, but it does not ask reason to accept these things by self-stultification and without adequate proof in their support. Faith is not a blind instinct set above reason, but it is belief born of reason, or justified by reason.

We must be careful to make the distinction between comprehending a thing and apprehending the proof of it. Our beliefs are governed by proof, not by comprehension. We are compelled to believe what we do not and never may comprehend. The tree grows. We know the fact, but we do not comprehend how it is. In order to believe a fact or a proposition we must be able to apprehend what the fact is or what the proposition predicates, but we are not required to know the how or the why of the fact, or to understand all the implications of the proposition, or explain how it can be true. Both belief and knowledge embrace realities which transcend the understanding. The failure to perceive so plain a principle as this, and withal a principle the truth of which we are acting upon almost every moment of our conscious existence, is the occasion of much of the vituperation against the Bible, and indeed against all matters of religious belief; in fact against all matters of thought to a greater or less extent, for there is nothing that we do perfectly comprehend. The demand of reason is in perfect accord with

Difference between comprehending and apprehending.

the demand of faith, that we accept and act on matters which transcend the power of reason to discover, but which are made known to it by methods outside of its own unaided processes, just as if they were within such processes, only requiring that the discovered truths be attested by adequate evidence.

If this be called rationalism, it will be simply using a much-abused word to bring into discredit an obvious truth, and to force along under the *odium theologicum* a most dangerous and damaging principle. The same mind which at first admits, on rational proof, a book to the rank of a revelation, and thus by its act makes it an authority, cannot thereby deprive itself of the right of rational inquiry, or the application of rational principles in determining its meanings. Any truth, come from what source it may, must, before it can be admitted to be a truth, present itself in a form which to the mind will seem to be true, to say the least possible; otherwise the mind will be required to believe that to be true which at the same time it believes to be impossible, or at least not to be true.

If it is wrong and absurd, on the one hand, to limit faith to matters which unaided reason has the power of itself to discover, or to those things which, when made known to it, it has the power fully to comprehend as well as apprehend, which we all perceive is so on the slightest reflection, it is certainly no less absurd to accept among the things to be believed mere whimsies and vagaries, or any thing or class of things which do not come to us with such supports as justify reason in accepting them.

More and more it becomes apparent that words are of supreme importance in theological discussions. Exact definitions would correct a vast amount of angry controversy by showing substantial agreement where there is supposed to be essential difference.

The two words *revelation* and *inspiration* furnish a case in

point. The misuse or confused and inexact use of these terms is the occasion of frequent and ill-tempered disputation. The Bible is called a revelation, it is also said to be inspired. In many minds the two propositions are received as identical; but they are not. On the contrary, they are extremely different. If a man dissents from the inspirational character of the whole volume—that is, of each book, and each word of each book—he is accused of surrendering or attacking it as a revelation. But this is not true. False and indefensible views of inspiration are propounded because they are supposed to be necessary to the claim of the revelation.

Differentiation
of the terms
revelation and
inspiration.

That *which is important is, that the Bible be true as a whole and in every part.* Untruth is the only thing that can put it in peril. This is a most important principle. To its truthfulness it is not *necessary* that it should be inspired in every part, unless it can be shown that it assumes that it is so inspired, or necessarily implies it. This cannot be shown, nor is it in any way important to be assumed; while, on many accounts, and for truth's sake especially, it may be important that it should not be assumed.

The Bible must
be true.

The fact that Christ himself, and the writers of the New Testament, quote from the Old Testament, and even recognize its authority, does not at all imply that they considered it inspired in every word, but that they considered it true. The truth of an utterance does not necessarily imply its inspiration. The assumption of inspiration in given cases might weaken the evidence of truthfulness rather than establish it. It is unwise, and even absurd, to claim inspiration when inspiration is unnecessary.

Precisely what do we mean by revelation? The etymology of the word is undisputed. It is from *re* and *velare*—to take away a veil. *Revelatio*, or revelation, is simply to disclose, to manifest, to bring into view. The Bible is a revelation of

God, simply so far as it is a self-manifestation of God, or so far as it is a medium of God's disclosure of himself—of his mind and will—to men. Such a self-manifestation or disclosure of himself—his mind and will—may be by inspiration, or may be simply in the recording of some fact which reveals him.

What do we mean by inspiration? Here again the etymology is suggestive. It is from *in* and *spirare*, to inspire—*inspiratio*, inspiration. It means to inhale, or inbreathe, or infuse. As a theological term, it means an extraordinary or extra-natural influence exerted by the Spirit of God on the mind of man, by which feelings and thoughts are directly imparted, or supersensible truths communicated.

Now, if God were limited to this method of revealing himself to men, then revelation and inspiration would be synonymous, but not otherwise. If there are other methods possible, then there might be a body of revelations without any inspiration, or a body of revelations in other methods, together with inspiration; and whether in one way or the other, the truth when known will be of the same authority—since nothing can give truth any additional authority over and above its truth.

Revelation usually is equivalent to manifestation in external act, or by means of some external act or series of actions, though it may be by a purely subjective influence. Creation was a revelation of God. The established order of nature is a revelation. Special acts of providential history are a revelation. The incarnation is a revelation. The miracles of the Old and New Testament are revelations. Every event which discovers the hand of God directly is a revelation. The Bible, which contains a true account of God's doings in creation, in providential history, in the incarnation, is a revelation. There is no need that so much of the Bible should be an inspiration to constitute it a revelation. All that is necessary to give it

such a character is, that it should be true in the same way in which any other record is true. It would be a revelation all the same if the simple story were recited, though no inspiration were supposed. The revelation in such form and in such cases is in the fact or facts. Wherefore the necessity to claim any thing more for the records than simply that they are true—a true and reliable account of God's manifestation of himself—a revelation of the unseen and eternal power? If any should deem that it is necessary to its authority that it should have been authorized and sanctioned by God, this certainly does not clearly appear, since no other authorization or sanction can surpass the truth itself; but if it should be allowed, what more could be required than that a true record be made? Why suppose inspiration in simply recording facts? May there not be much of the sacred writings, such as historical records made by the witnesses and participants, and the general framework of events, deriving their value simply from their accuracy and truth, without claiming for them the needless and embarrassing assumption that they were dictated word for word by the Holy Spirit? This does not do away with inspiration, but simply limits it to where it is needed. It leaves the Bible—God's revelation—intact, and God's inspiration when inspiration is required. (See article "Inspiration" in McClintock and Strong's Cyclopædia.)

Let us look at the case in a common-sense way, and see what conclusion must force itself upon us either as necessary or the most rational. Here is a book of so many pages, words, letters, and punctuation points. By all it is conceded that it was written by a certain number of men at different periods of time; but a question is started as to whether the men wrote as amanuenses or original authors. Now, if the book is true, it can, in fact, make no difference as to its intrinsic value how that question is answered, since the answer one way or another can

put nothing in the book that was not there before and can
 Different views and theories of inspiration. make the truth no more than true—no more important. Still, as a question of fact, it remains, were the writers amanuenses? How shall we answer that question? Have they said any thing about it themselves? Does the book contain the answer? If the book be *simply true*, and if it makes a deliverance on the point, that would settle the case. Every thing would turn on the question of the truthfulness of the book. Thus the question of truth of contents is again the question of ultimate importance. There are three views competing for acceptance, one of which must be true.

The first view is, that the entire Bible, as originally given, was inspired by the Holy Ghost in such manner that each word was given to each writer, so that each word is the very word of God. This is called the plenary verbal, or dictative inspiration theory.

The second view is, that the entire volume is inspired in this sense: that the Holy Ghost guided to the selection of the matter contained in it, and so superintended as to secure the writer against any error in the statement, leaving him to select his own words or present the truth in his own style. This is called the inspiration of suggestion and superintendence.

The third view is, that the writings are, to a large extent, human records containing a veracious account of divine history among men, with numerous inspired statements delivered from time to time directly by the Holy Spirit to holy men of old, and uttered directly by Christ himself when incarnate on the earth, differing slightly from the second view, but agreeing substantially therewith.

All the views agree in this, that the Bible is a revelation in its substance, and that it is veracious in its statements; but they differ in the matter of its inspiration, one part claiming that it contains inspired revelations, the other contending that it is, *en bloc* and entire, inspired. The supernatural element in the

first case is recognized as occasional, and the volume itself is viewed as a record of the supernatural though not supernaturally indited; in the other case the supernatural element is pervasive in its content, and every word is supposed to be supernaturally delivered.

Inspiration can only be needed for those special doctrines and facts which could not be known in any other way, or were not communicated by God in any other method. Inspiration only needed in certain cases. For such portions of Scripture inspiration becomes legitimate, and so much of the volume may, with reason, claim to be the *ipsissima verba* of the Holy Ghost. This view does not take away an atom of authority from any part of the Bible. The only authority it can by possibility have, in any case, is in its truth. A statement, if true, is no more true when inspired than uninspired. If not true, no assumed inspiration could give it any value. If known to be true without inspiration the inspiration could give it no new quality of better truth. But is it said that this view makes it impossible to determine what is inspired and what is not? We reply in two parts: first, suppose it does; if the whole be true, it matters nothing whether the truth is simply a recorded truth or an inspired truth, since truth is the one thing of importance—*truth which reveals God*; but then, second, it is not true that such view would make the inspired part uncertain in any damaging sense. It is said, then, at least it makes it impossible to know what part is true, since the uninspired portion may be untrue. It is true that what is inspired must be true, and proof of the inspiration of the whole would be proof of the truth of the whole; but when inspiration is unnecessary it might be unwise to assume it, even though it were a fact, as adequate proof might be difficult or even impossible, and the claim become rather a weakening than a strengthening of the portion. The highest claim that should be made, or that needs

to be made for any purpose, is that the contents of the book are true, and that it is marked by a pervasive inspiration, and so authoritatively sets forth the divine doctrines.

Dr. Pope, in his recent work on theology, has given a careful statement of the doctrine of inspiration, which we quote at length :

“Inspiration,” he says, “is a distinct element of the supernatural order of revealed truth—one of its laws and characteristic attributes. As such it simply means that the sacred documents are worthy of the divine Author, and that they are not unworthily described as *God-breathed*. Strictly speaking, only the writers are inspired, but the last word on the subject in the New Testament gives the epithet to Scripture itself: Πᾶσα γραφὴ θεόπνευστος. What we have agreed to mean by inspiration is therefore the fact that God has interfered to keep a continuous and abiding record of truth in the world. This, throughout all the ages of the world’s religious history, has been the divine method of imparting and preserving the knowledge of God among men. The beginning of this interposition, so far as concerns the written documents, is lost in the distance of ages ; but none of its fruits can be supposed to be lost. Inspiration is, in a certain sense, one with revelation, as meaning the divine bestowment of knowledge that could not otherwise be acquired. It does not, however, entirely coincide with revelation ; being either less or more : less, since much that has been revealed has not been transmitted ; more, since much is recorded and transmitted that was not given by direct revelation. But, whatever may be its limits, it indicates a specific intervention in human literature, through which there has always been in course of production, and has been finally produced, the permanent and authoritative revelation of His mind and will to man. And this may fairly be regarded as a credential of the whole system of revealed

Dr. Pope on inspiration.

truth ; it is worthy of the divine wisdom, and what might have been, humanly speaking, expected, that He whose power has been known in miracle, and his knowledge in prophecy, should declare his wisdom and fidelity in giving revelation to mankind, and in making it an abiding heritage. Now revelation makes this its universal claim ; and appeals to the manifest evidences of the presence of God as its author and indwelling spirit, in holy Scripture. Such is the overwhelming demonstration of this, that the whole weight of the cause of Christianity might be made to rest upon it, if it be rightly stated and exhibited. The entire scope and contents of the volume of inspiration justify its pretension to have come direct from heaven." *

"Inspiration, distinguished from revelation, as we have employed the term, denotes the specific agency of the Holy Ghost in the creation and construction of Holy Scripture ; this is the biblical conventional use of the word which strictly limits its meaning." †

"Scripture uses the terms interchangeably ; or, rather, adopts the same form of expression to exhibit the methods of both. 'God at sundry times and in divers manners spake in times past unto the fathers by the prophets.' This includes the revelation of all truth to the minds of the prophets, and the inspiration by which they received and administered the truth." ‡

"On the other hand, the Scripture authorizes the conventional phraseology which distinguishes between revelation of truth and inspiration to record it. The Son, in the unity of the Father and the Holy Spirit, is the Revealer. The Spirit, in the unity of the Father and the Son, is the Inspirer. . . . The disclosure of the mind of God to man is revelation when viewed in relation to the truth unveiled, and inspiration when

* "Compendium of Christian Theology," vol. i, pp. 92, 93.

† *Ibid.*, p. 156.

‡ *Ibid.*

viewed in relation to the methods of its impartation and transmission to posterity. And as revelation must, in its highest meaning, be limited to the unfolding of the scheme of redemption, so inspiration is limited to that one kind of contact or intercourse between the Holy Spirit and the spirit in man which produced the written word for all ages and generations." *

Theology may be viewed as the science of dogmatics simply, or as a higher science including the science of dogmatics. In the former case, it would discuss simply the contents of the Bible, and would content itself with finding these as subject-matter of faith: it would be purely Christian, and find its entire root and substance in revelation, and stand solely upon authority of revelation. In the latter, it would go beyond revelation, and discuss the preconceptions of revelation; and would include these contents also as primary subject-matter of belief. In the former case, the whole proof would be deduced from the revelation: this would be sole and sufficient and final. In the latter case, beginning outside of revelation, sufficient proof would be extra the revelation in part, and would construct the basis for admitting revelation. It would take its beginning from nature, and find its complement in revelation. But coming to revelation it would find in that complete and perfect system all its contents authoritatively delivered, with important additions, so that even these would be taken up in the dogmatics. Nevertheless, it would have been wiser to have grounded them upon other proofs than the dogmatic statement, which, indeed, would be no proof without the antecedent grounding, since the dogmatic deliverance supposes that, and derives all its authority from that. Many things which are put forward as matters of belief on authority of dogma become authoritative as such because of

* "Compendium of Christian Theology," vol. i, p. 157.

these antecedent determinatives which are not at all derived from nor established by dogmatics.

The primary ground of belief in spiritual truth is not biblical, but extra-biblical; but upon these antecedent grounds the Bible itself arises and becomes authoritative and all-embracing, so that there is no spiritual truth worthy of belief which it does not include, and which may not be completely deduced by it or from it, while there are many truths in its contents deducible from no other source.

Ultimate
ground of
belief.

“In Christian dogmatics, a biblical, an historical, and a scientific element are most closely united. The first comes naturally from the stand-point of dogmatics; *first* in order, the question of questions is, ‘What does God’s word teach us in the holy Scriptures?’—‘*Non nisi Dei lumine potest Deus cognosci et coli ad salutem, prouti nec sol a nobis videri aut possideri potest nisi per proprium ipsius lumen*’ (Maresius). Nothing may be accepted as a part of a Christian doctrine which cannot be proved to rest really, whether *κατὰ τὸ ῥητόν*, or at least *κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν*, upon the word of revelation.” * This statement of Van Oosterzee is true; Christian dogmatics makes the Bible first, but it does so because the Bible has first been authenticated.

It is not simply requisite that the Bible should speak, but equally so that we should not mistake its meaning. We must be able to synthetize a complete and perfect harmony of its teaching. Each part can only be known by the light of the whole. In opposition to atomic criticism, which neglects the tree for particular branches, and the whole body for its several limbs, we must unite and harmonize the whole. “Dogmatic propositions are like the cross-beams of a roof, of which the separate balks could be easily loosened, but which,

Bible must be
understood.

* Van Oosterzee, “Christian Dogmatics,” vol. i, p. 62.

when all are joined together, mutually support one another, and as one vast structure defy the winds." — *Van Oosterzee*. Many a truth or fact, in itself strange or offensive even, has a very different character when it is considered as part of a well-constructed whole.

Any given doctrine stands not alone. It is part of a system of correlated doctrines, and must be construed in accordance with the system, or so as to be harmonious with the whole. The process is that of all science—an induction from all the known facts.

They must be gathered with faithfulness, and the induction must be such as will fairly flow from them without discrediting other parts of the system. Truth cannot be discordant, and no induction can stand at the expense of another equally sound.

How to get at the truth. No more can an induction from the facts and statements of the revelation stand, at the sacrifice of some other equally well or better known *datum* of consciousness, or sense-perception, or reason. The demands of the system must be its entire integrity. Until this is met it is not a system, and must be reconstructed. The science must take in and account for all the parts separately and collectively, and must not collide with other knowledges.

We have spoken of theology as a system. This it undoubtedly is. It is a unity composed of definitive parts in an exact order of relation and harmony—as a tree is the composite whole of root, trunk, branches, and foliage. Each part has subject-matter of its own, but it also enters into and partakes of the whole, and must be capable of being synthetized with the whole in its definite place and order.

Employing the simile further for elucidation, we remark: the tree of theology has for its root God. It is nothing without him. Right method requires that he should first be object of inquiry. And the primary question is: Is there a God? If

it is impossible to affirm the answer, it is impossible to proceed; there is an end of inquiry. As already said, the answer here must be ante-biblical, and from extra-biblical sources. The Bible itself assumes it, but frequently alludes to the extra-biblical evidence on which it rests. *Psa. xix; Rom. i, 20.* The existence of God being ascertained, before further subjects are introduced his nature and character must, at least in part, be determined by extra-biblical proof.

If, now, it can be shown that the Bible is a revelation from God concerning himself, it becomes competent to introduce it, and important to interrogate it. Its whole value will depend on the completeness of the proof that it is of such an origin. But the inquiry must still be concerning him, and the effort must be to find any additional light touching his nature and character until a definite and full idea is obtained. It will involve a thorough examination touching his personality, his attributes, mode of existence, and such other questions as are personal to himself as set forth in the revelation. This properly constitutes the first part of theology. The evidence bearing on the subject, beginning outside of the Bible in its progress includes it; but whether from without or within, it must converge to one point—be mutual and conclusive—to be of any value. The origin, laws, and ordering of the universe are involved in that discussion as furnishing proof of his existence, and illustrations of his character and attributes.

The next object of theological inquiry is, man. The discussion involves the whole matter of his relations to God, and Biblical predicates with respect thereto. Hence-<sup>Man in theolo-
gy.</sup> forth the Bible becomes, if not the exclusive, yet the chief guide. But its deliverances are so far amenable to reason that they must not be contradictory thereof, but helpful and contentful thereto. This department of the system is in logical sequence, and is properly called anthropology. It

treats of the origin and nature of man as a moral and responsible being—his primitive condition, his rupture with God, his sinfulness, the nature and consequences of sin, and his undone and ruined condition. Again, the chief source of light is the Bible; but its deliverances are amenable to reason in that they may not be in conflict with any known principle or fact at any point, or such that reason may not be constrained to admit as possible; and further, such as all the known facts will corroborate.

Then follows in logical order the redemptive economy, with its involvements, appropriately called soteriology — God's method of saving men. The Bible, more than ever, is the source of the entire discussion. It is a question as to what the Bible teaches about the source, the necessity, the idea, the end and effects of atonement; the person, incarnation, ministry, and priestly office of the Son of God; salvation, its grounds, means, and results, with all matters in the divine economy which relate to this general subject.

Following this in natural order, and growing out of it logically, comes the doctrine concerning the last things — death, judgment, immortality, the final destiny of good and evil beings. Here, again, the Bible furnishes the subject-matter of the whole scheme of doctrine, and the single inquiry is, What does it teach? With regard to these two divisions we are especially dependent on revelation.

Ecclesiology, or the constitution, function, sacraments, or-
 dinances, and discipline of the Church, completes
 the circle.

This plan exhausts all the demands and all the possibilities of the science, and, properly treated, puts it in line as a science. Its corner-stone—the doctrines concerning God—requires to be laid in absolute proof, as it involves the whole system of verities which is evolved from it. So far as the truth can be

derived from all sources, in our present state, it opens the spiritual world and brings us into the fellowship of it.

There is a difference between the reason of a thing and the reason for believing that it is. By the reason of a thing, we mean the why it is. It is not necessary that we should know the former in order to the latter. So, when we predicate the absolute need that the mind should have ground of faith in a given truth contentful to reason before it can exercise belief, it must not be supposed that we mean that we must have a perfect understanding of the ground of the existence or complete contents of the thing itself. This is not at all necessary, nor indeed is it possible in many cases. The fact of an atonement may be believed without understanding the ground in the divine nature for it, or the occult reason for it; but it cannot be rationally believed without evidence of the fact which satisfies the reason that it is a reality that there is an atonement; nor on the other hand can it be rationally believed, as a fact, in any form which contradicts other knowledges or beliefs which reason holds to be true. The reason adequate for faith is not at all the reason of the thing, that is, the ground or why of it, but the ground or why we should believe it. “Two extremes must be avoided—the exclusion of reason and the admission of nothing but reason.”—*Pascal*. The science of dogmatics carries us beyond the possibility of independent reason in its disclosures, by bringing to our knowledge facts which unaided reason is impotent to reach, but it furnishes rational grounds for admitting them as facts when made known. It aids, but does not debase or vacate, the function of reason. Its subject-matter belongs to the realm of faith; but its entire contents stand only in adequate proof.

When the doctrines of faith are embraced and acted upon they verify themselves to consciousness. The believer finds not

Reason of a thing, and reason for believing, different.

only external proof to move him to faith, but internal subjective proof that that which is believed is truth and life. He is not, indeed, able to comprehend the mysteries of the infinite problem on which his faith acts, but he comes to assured grounds of confidence in its utmost reality. Even as he knows himself he knows God as a rational object of faith, and enters into his fellowship; and by a vivid personal experience verifies the deliverances of the revelation concerning himself. His sin, his salvation, and his hope of immortal happiness through the redemption that is in Christ, he finds no more room to doubt than any other facts of his being or experience.

THEOLOGY NOT A COMPLETED SCIENCE.

Theology is not a completed science; perhaps never will be. It is the science of God, and especially of his administration over moral beings, and is practically infinite; and from the nature of the case will continue to open new mysteries of wonder forever to sanctified intelligence. Every new discovery will in some way illustrate some aspect of it, and may modify some imperfect conception of it. All the light has not been gained; and no theological *Sorbonne* is authorized to close up the investigation. Revelation may be closed and nature finished; but has our science exhausted either of them? Is there no hope, not to say possibility, that quickened mind and far-extending research in these fathomless mines may yet bring us nearer to the great infinite, or in some measure make more plain some elements of the manifold obscurity? The history of the science evinces abundant possibilities of growth, and rebukes the presumption that would fix it in the immovableness of a crystallized and changeless thing. Progress in any department of knowledge, with that increase of faculty which comes from use, will not fail favorably to affect this with every other subject of thought.

Truth is one, and advance anywhere is advance in the whole realm.

“The belief in progress,” says Van Oosterzee, “is, in this domain, as well as in every other, a need, a duty, and a blessing. But it is important, in order that no one should be misled by great words, to ask as to this, In what sense, on what grounds, how far, and by what path?”

Van Oosterzee's view of possible perfectibility.

“At the very outset we must distinguish sharply between the perfectibility of the doctrine and that of Christian revelation. The doctrine of the objective perfectibility of Christianity which, proclaimed in the early times by the Montanists and afterward by some of the Mystics of the Middle Ages, was enounced in the commencement of the preceding century by a number of Rationalists, is, properly understood, nothing else but a denial of the historical and supernatural character of saving truth. The case is, however, different when we consider the proposition that dogmatics, as such, is capable of perfection, and has a constant need for it. Truth is eternal, but the insight into truth may be made clearer, extended, and even in some respects changed. Thus far we can admit for Christian dogma the attributes of perfectibility both in the objective and subjective meaning.

“The ground for this proposition lies in the nature of saving truth itself, which is not revealed in the form of an accurately defined system, but rather in that of a principle of living which is gradually showing itself more clearly. Hence we find in holy Scripture so many exhortations to growth in the knowledge of faith. In all ages there have been Christians who, in consequence of painful deception, listen with mistrust to the demand for progress and development in this domain. Their dogmatizing, as far as we can speak of it, is nothing but an endless repeating and reiterating of the faith which has been once delivered. They are like the man who is always

counting the coins which he has inherited, and is satisfied if only the number remains undiminished, without troubling himself about their intrinsic value. It is plain that such a conservatism is devoid of all spirit; but it is also in conflict with all Protestant principles. From the Romish stand-point men must of necessity cling to a church doctrine which is considered infallible; but a true son of the Reformation, an advocate of freedom of investigation, must, also, as such, believe in the possibility of development. The 'Not that I have already attained' is for him, even in a higher degree of the knowledge of faith, the expression of a deep consciousness, and at the same time of a grand want. At best dogmatics is the expression of the consciousness of belief, as it has actually and for the present moment developed itself, by the light of the Gospel and in the bosom of the Church, to a defined and clearly measurable height. We all stand on the shoulders of our predecessors; others will raise themselves on ours and strive to see farther. We are ourselves constantly correcting our conceptions, and show thus that our former ones did not completely satisfy us. It is not, therefore, a real eulogium when any one says of himself that his convictions during twenty or thirty years have not changed in the slightest degree. Though our knowledge through faith is the same as before, yet a conscious faith, after such a lapse of time, will know the same continually in another and better degree. 'Faith must be in every point entire and firm; more finished, but always susceptible of further development.'—*Schaff*.

"Besides, the whole history of dogmatics shows us not only a restless striving after, but a constant though somewhat slow approach to greater perfection. Even in the first apostles a constant increase in Christian insight cannot be denied. During the first four centuries we hear the Christian consciousness, as to the person of the Redeemer, proclaiming truth constantly

with greater firmness and clearness. The sixteenth century adds to the development of soteriology that which has not been supplied by any one before; perhaps the same may hereafter be said on the subject of eschatology of the nineteenth century. Every side of the truth, which is now better understood than before, casts at the same time a light upon other sides which are still in shadow. How could the perfectibility of dogmatics be still disputable, when the promise of the Lord is understood, believed, and fulfilled? John xvi, 12-15. But to contemplate that fulfillment we must look back not merely for years but for centuries, and never forget that the *patiens quia aeternus* is of constant application to the operation of the Spirit of truth in the Church.

“The distinction between evolution and revolution must by no means be passed by, when the question is asked, How far must this progress extend? We must here look for amplification, and not for alteration. It occurs whenever that which is virtually contained in principle in the word of truth is brought gradually into light, just as in the growth of a child, who does not get any new limbs, but sees those which it already has slowly increase and strengthen. We see development in the opening bud, which opens according to its nature; it would be degeneration if the rose-bush were to become gradually a thorn. ‘*Ad profectum pertinet ut in semet ipsam unaquaeque res amplificetur; ad permutationem vero, ut aliquid ex alio in aliud transvertatur.*’—*Vincentius Lerinus*. Christianity is an historic religion, and where this is evident it can never be welcomed as progress when this, its character, is first neutralized and then denied. Progress presupposes that we remain on the path in which we have hitherto been, not that we all at once choose an opposite one (*μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος*). Thus dogmatics as a science is conservative as to its principles, progressive as to its development.

“After all that has been said, it is not difficult to point out the path by which we may approach always nearer to the idea of the progressive character of dogmatics. We must welcome it as progress when the chief subject-matter of the doctrine of salvation is described with constantly increasing accuracy. Dogmatics has to take account not merely with facts of the Christian consciousness, but with the very deeds of God for saving mankind (for example, revelation, incarnation, inspiration), the true conception of which must always remain defective. Now the claim cannot be, that what has thus far been only believed should henceforth be thoroughly known—in that case we would no longer call dogmatics a science of faith; but that we conceive something, and that, as far as it is conceivable; and also, that we know *why* we cannot go any further. Our business is with a dogmatics freed from the dust but not from the learning of the schools; from the thorns, but not from the sharp definitions of the old systems; a scientific exposition of faith, according to the golden words of Da Costa, ‘in its essence the fruit of ages, in outward form of these our days.’ And that which is thus more accurately defined ought, also, to be continually vindicated. The history of apologetics has attested that the good cause has been defended more with awkward weapons than with a faulty strategy; such lessons must not be lost on the dogmatics of the present time. It advances when it looks more closely into the nature and strength of its so-called proofs, which it not only counts, but also weighs; while, through paying special heed to the historical, it never loses sight of the psychological mode of argument. Moreover, it must always ally itself more frankly with each element of truth which it finds even beyond its own proper bounds, and apply the ‘all things are yours’ without any fixed limits. Thus it acts by its own nature, so that its object may be always developed more thoroughly and fundamentally.

That which really can be understood by faith it must not only desire but also attempt to know, remembering that it has first to do with the *ita*, but then, also, with the *quare*, of spiritual matters. Not merely a deeper knowledge of each of the parts, but, above all, a more accurate and thorough estimation of the whole, is the boundless task to which the science has to devote its powers. Finally, the more science is applied in various ways the better it fulfills its duty. The light which rises on her domains must also cast its beams over the surrounding country. True theology will the more approach its ideal as it more fully contributes to the solution of the various questions of the day, and to the healing of the reigning diseases by setting forth and maintaining the eternal truth. So far each period requires its own elaboration of the doctrine of faith, and no single method can be said to be constantly adequate to the changing wants of different centuries.

“Always perfectible, it is never perfect. To understand and express thoroughly the truth we ought to be morally perfect, since truth and life are one. Nevertheless, the object of dogmatics need not remain absolutely unattainable.” *

It is not a matter to be regretted that dogmatics is being more and more put to severe tests, both as to the general validity of the science, and as to its particular contents. The greater the strain the more certainly we shall get at the truth. Doubtless some things will be eliminated as false which have been made much of, and some things will rise into importance which have not been accounted of much. Science in other departments will not fail to influence in this. The law in the two realms is in no respect different. The science of to-day has to do with the same facts as aforetime; it does not make new facts, but it interprets the old and permanent ones better. It creates no new facts, but it reaches

* Van Oosterzee, vol. i, pp. 69, 70, 71.

a better understanding of the old and abiding. It reads the same old nature differently by unsealing and deciphering pages and chapters which were not opened before, but which were always lying there and waiting to be interrogated and examined. The discovery changes and modifies, but does not abolish, the science. It denotes progress, and only encourages to new and more painstaking methods. What has to be surrendered is not so much deplored as what is gained is rejoiced over. It must of necessity be the same in the theological domain. The same erring and fallible faculties have been and are employed here as there, and not without abundant proof and consciousness of their weakness and failures. With improved conditions they will do better. More skill and larger experience will bring out new results* or improved results. Thanks to all explorers, whether friends or foes, who furnish lights by which we may be able to see better and further whatever restatement may be necessitated. "Godspeed" to the workers in all mines who bring us the precious nuggets—ingots of truth! They will take nothing from us, but only enrich us by what they bring, and by the richer treasures they will enable us to find.

In matters of spiritual truth, as in matters of general science, there are no infallible human *interpreters*—no *masters* authorized to pronounce the final word—no ultimate
No infallible human guides or tests. *earthly tribunal* having power to close the case. The domain is before us—nature and revelation—full of exhaustless riches, and we are permitted, commanded, to *dig*, to *assay*. The only requisition put upon us is, that we should observe the true finger-boards and follow their pointing; that we should not follow false methods, and should not permit ourselves to be imposed upon by taking pyrites for gold, or, what is even worse, attempt to put on the market the worthless metal for the genuine. Observe these rules, and honest

research, aided by deeper learning, and not less earnest piety, will purify our science, correct its hasty generalizations, its inadequate formula, its fallacious assumptions, and present it with new and more convincing attestations; the pseudo and degenerate progeny of crude and inconsequent reasonings will vanish, leaving us the eternal and changeless as rewards of our toil: if not the perfect now, the more and more perfect. The individual errs, the particular school of thought errs; it takes humanity in its entirety to lead humanity. The river runs to the sea despite the eddies.

Theological science has for its end truth with respect to the spiritual world, but not this alone. It is a practical and not merely a speculative science. It is not so much an end to the intellect as it is a necessity to the heart. Mind must be theological.

It includes a morality for the life as well as thought for the reason. It springs from and answers the demand of the religious nature of man. Were it merely a body of truth for the speculative reason, without serving any practical end, it must long ago have perished. But it is not more a truth for, than a necessity to, the nature of man. It meets not simply a need and demand of the inquisitive faculty in its search for truth, and unappeasable hunger for truth; this it does, but, more than this, it ministers to the sensibilities, satisfies the affections, and supplies moral needs in the practical struggles of life. In the region of the moral and spiritual nature it finds its stronghold. The truth it contains has not its highest value simply as truth; there could, indeed, be no value in it were it not true; but being true its greatest value consists in its practical relation to our welfare, in guiding us to right living, and in supporting us with its quickening and consoling helpfulness amid the emergencies, and many times sharp trials, of the life of to-day and the terrors of what seems impending in the life of to-morrow.

It is impossible to divest mind of theological thought with-

out utterly defacing, and in fact obliterating, its faculties. Its nature necessitates it. Consciousness itself might sooner be extinguished than these uneradicable and inevitable cravings. The religious nature, as much as reason itself, bears down and overcomes all attempts at eradication. There in the center of the soul, in the inappeasable cry of its affections, in the very laws of its existence, it makes its home, and maintains its seat, growing stronger amid the very ruin of death, which seems to overwhelm all. The atheist finds no refuge from it; the bold offender against law, who, hardened by crime, has wrecked his moral nature and debauched all his nobler sensibilities, escapes not its avenging presence; closer than our shadow, like an appealing angel or some restless Nemesis, it presses us all and always. If at any time we imagine it has been laid, at an unexpected turn it confronts us again. The universe, in all its extent, furnishes no spot in which to hide from its presence. We cannot escape it but by escape from being itself, and even that door is closed against us. We might in sheer madness plunge into non-existence, but we cannot; an unseen hand holds us, and death refuses a shelter. We must live, and we must encounter the thought of God wherever we fly. He darts upon us from behind each atom. If we go forward we meet him, if we go backward he confronts us; if we turn to the right hand or the left—ascend or go into the fathomless abyss—there is no escape from him. It is as the royal poet puts it: “Whither shall I go from thy Spirit, or whither shall I flee from thy presence? If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there: if I make my bed in hell, behold, thou art there. If I take the wings of the morning and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea; even there shall thy hand lead me, and thy right hand shall hold me. If I say, Surely the darkness shall cover me; even the night shall be light about me. Yea, the darkness hideth not from thee; but the night

shineth as the day: the darkness and the light are both alike to thee."

No man is a sufficiency for himself. All humanity combined is not a sufficiency for the human soul. The entire universe of things is not sufficient. His own assured immor- Man is not a sufficiency for himself. tality is not sufficient. The assured immortality, if that were possible, of all other souls is not sufficient. The highest conceivable bliss, endlessly extended, but excluding God, is not sufficient. He must have God. Being, however invested, is a desert without him. He can construct no ideal destiny that includes not despair, if God be left out. The vast splendor is a mockery. He roams amid its magnificence, gnawed with unappeased hunger, driven about from rim to rim of its empty grandeur in quest of that which it is not, and which it cannot give. Empty of God, it is no palace for him. His very sin demands an altar of confession. His woe will have an Ear into which it must pour its anguish. His helplessness creates an Omnipotence for its refuge. His Must have God. incommunicable secrets are a burden he cannot bear until he finds One who reads them. He will have God. It is the deepest necessity his soul experiences. He might endure exile from the society of his fellowmen, might subsist in a dungeon, might even cling to life though banished to some lonely and desolate spot, where neither man nor beast would afford him companionship—a gloom of solitude where he should hear no voice—a very desert of death—alone, helpless, friendless, joyless—he might endure all this, and yet live; but he must have God. In that desert he will build an altar. Out of that awful silence he will send up a prayer. The necessity is in the nature of man. Does it mean nothing? Suppose we should so reason, can we escape it? Our arguments will be impotent. They cannot drown the cry!

What, then, is wisdom? Is it not rather to seek to know him,

whose being haunts us, as the necessity of our thought? Shall we not essay to find out what this mysterious presence is? There are two ways open to us: one is to attempt to construct doubt, or, if this may not be, to ignore the inevitable instinct as a matter of thought—leave it out of our rational investigations, and leave ourselves to the unsatisfying influences of the half-formed idea; the other is, to take it up and endeavor to ascertain its meaning. Which is the better? To a rational being there can be but one answer to the question. We must follow the instinct. Have we ever known an instinct that points not to a good? Does all nature furnish a single example of an indiscreet original impulse? Does it mislead the stork or the young lion or the infant when it nestles for the mother's breast? Why, then, shall it mislead us? This mighty Presence which ever draws us, why shall we not follow? Our greatest inevitability, why shall it not prove our greatest good? This all-embracing current, which sweeps on from the cradle to the grave, why shall it not bear us to the sea, the limitless ocean, of our desires? Why shall not our souls, wise as irrational things, with the sagacity of the day-old infant, go straight to the breast where its nourishment lies? The panting roe hunts the water-brook; even the sunflower turns to the sun. Are they deceived? A deeper impulse draws us. Shall we alone, of all things living, follow to find but a phantom—a fountain without water, a breast without nourishment, a sun without beams, a mirage of illusive promise! Or, following the matchless instinct, shall we not rather find the inexhaustible, perennial, infinite Fountain of all good at its end? that that which is our necessity is also our sufficiency? that the God whom we cannot escape is also the God who will satisfy all our longings, and fill the boundless measure of our desires? Coming at last to him, and laying our weary souls upon his breast, as the hungry infant puts its lips to the maternal fount-

ains, shall we not find appeasement of the thirst which drives us thither, and rest in the enfolding arm which mysteriously attracts us? If the needle no more certainly points to the magnet than the magnet attracts the needle, the latter discovering itself by the invisible action of the former, may we not affirm, with equal show of reason, that the invariable and inevitable turning of the soul in its affections and thoughts to the Unseen proclaims the power and reality of the mysterious magnet which draws it? The tendency is inexplicable without this end.

These yearnings proclaim the essential and ineradicable religious nature of man. Religion is not an invention or cunning device artificially imposed, and theology a framework wrought for its support; it is native to ^{Man essentially religious.} the soul of man, and theology, as truth and practice, is its expression and fruit. As subjective, it is an immanent power in the soul, which invests God with such attributes and relations as to inspire reverence and worship, love and fear. Objectively, it consists in those acts and forms which are invented to express the subjective states. Its essence is an aspiration after communion with and the favor of God. If viewed as having its source in God, it descends upon the soul as a law. It commands an inward and outward life as condition of favor. If viewed as having its origin in the soul, it is a recognition of dependence, and an effort to propitiate.

It must be obvious that it will be variable in its expression, and that its character must depend on the concept of God which the soul may have. If a false concept, the expression will be false; if true, the expression will be true; but in both cases the root-principle in the soul is identical. It is the soul aspiring to its God. It is the same principle, whether it sends the Mohammedan to his mosque, the Brahman to his temple, the Jew to his altar, the Christian to his cross, or the coarse

heathen or pagan to his idol shrine or meaningless fetish. But, while springing from the same root-principle, it would be a most disastrous mistake to imagine that there is no difference of value in the multiform expression. As from the root of the affections may spring either a pure and holy love or a base and corrupt passion, so from this root of religion in the nature of man may spring a beautiful and sublime faith, full of all holy and divine fruits, or a corrupt and corrupting superstition, full of impurities and sins. There is a true and false expression possible in the affections and in the life, and which will be determined by the idea of the object of worship. See "Philosophy of the Plan of Salvation."

This universal fact shows the importance of a right creed now, and also the absolute need of a revelation. Under the influence of depraved affections and degenerate moral consciousness the mind, if left to itself, will fashion itself a god after its own likeness and lusts—a distorted image of the true God. To this source may be traced all the gross and hideous systems of religion that have distressed the ages. Any true idea of God must descend from himself into the soul of man in some way of supernatural deliverance—some way that will control the tendencies of degenerate faculties. The true religion must be heaven-born, must come into the soul capacitated by its nature to receive it, but incompetent, by reason of its fall, to originate it. If the true be not given, a distortion will spring up spontaneously. It is not a question whether man shall have a religion; that is inevitable. The question is, Shall it be true or false? "You may see towns without laws, or coins, or literature, but no one has ever yet seen a people without a God or prayer; without religious ceremonies or sacrifices." "This phenomenon has been pointed out by numberless writers of antiquity, and the testimony has been contradicted, but never confuted, by those of later inquirers." It is

not sporadic, it is universal. "With full confidence we call man a religious being, just as he may be called a social being. We do not thereby declare that all men are *actually* religious, but that man is so *potentially*, and, as such, is originally designed and born for religion. He has a native feeling of religion, just as he has a feeling of beauty or truth. The spiritual *vis vitalis*, the central function of personal life, is religion. Religion is the deepest, or the absolute, relation of man." This ineradicable religious sense, or consciousness, is an everlasting and universal proclamation and attestation of God.

Religion, founded on the nature and corporate in the very essence of mankind, occupies a place quite peculiar in the inner life of man. The seat of the religious principle is not either exclusively the reason, or the will, or the feelings, or the conscience. In the inmost sanctuary of the soul, where these are still originally one and undivided, is found the fountain-head of the spiritual life, and especially the God-life, of mankind. Starting from this center, religion embraces, penetrates, and directs in the truly religious man his entire internal and external existence. It is in this central position which religion occupies that the secret of its power, the cause of its conflict, the warrant of its imperishable stability and future triumph, lies.

"The heart is the seat of religion. Therein lies the secret of its power; for that which is the most deeply seated, and from thence embraces and penetrates the whole life, of course exercises the most powerful influence. Heart the seat of religion.

Consciously or unconsciously the religious question lies at the bottom of every question, for 'really the conflict between belief and unbelief is the deepest, the sole problem of the history of the world.'—*Goethe*. Here, then, we find the reason for that conflict which has been carried on in the heart and the world by religion more than by any other thing. Religious hate is the bloodiest and deepest of all, and no wonder, since no other

discord seizes thus directly and powerfully on the most hidden principle of life; man only struggles then for that which is the very highest life of the soul. Here is the warrant for the duration of religion and its future triumph. The religious principle cannot possibly be entirely blotted out of the heart of mankind, for, if so, man would lose that which distinguishes him from other creatures. If, in the conflict of the present century, religion were to be finally defeated, superstition would always have at least one chance of life more than unbridled unbelief. Take away from man his God, and he will not rest until you have given him a godhead back again—it may be in the form of an idol.

“The result thus gained has a very varied importance. It is of importance for pædagogics. The religious feeling cannot be instilled, but must be called out as much as possible. The want of it generally arises from this, that while the brain suffers from hypertrophy, the life of the heart is not sufficiently developed. Of importance to apologetics, religion cannot be proved to demonstration, nor be recommended by mere intellectual motives. ‘The heart has its reasons which reason does not know.’—*Vinet*. Of importance for dogmatics. It will be treated in a thoroughly different manner, just as the question as to the seat of religion is differently answered. A faulty psychology will be injurious to the whole of theology. On the contrary, the deeper we dig into the domain of the inner life the more certainly we attain the spot where we cannot touch religion without wounding the tenderest sensibilities. ‘In a certain sense the expression consciousness, soul, etc., avails for an allowed, though only a provisional escape from the conflict.’—*Nitzsch*. On the other hand, it is ever more and more seen that that which is the finest and deepest can never be anatomized and sounded. It is, therefore, doubly necessary to see that while we continue our investigations into the

essence and seat of religion, we never lose sight of its final object.

“Every manifestation of the religious sense is either consciously or unconsciously founded on a striving after an object, which, however, is differently conceived according to different degrees of development. The object at which the truly religious man of God aims can be as little to render God a service, in the literal sense of the word, as merely to seek in the communion with him profit and enjoyment to himself. The final object of this communion with God is personal union with him, whereby he is glorified, and the heart of man is completely satisfied. The object, however, is only really attainable in connection with a theistic conception of God.

“Every sound manifestation of religious life seeks *personal* union with God—that is, one in which our individuality is not lost in the contemplation of God, but, on the contrary, is preserved, emancipated, and purified. . . . Communion is only conceivable when the individual life of those between whom it is held is retained, and so personality ought not to be considered as a hinderance, but, on the contrary, as the *sine qua non* of the highest of all religious life. The warmest love, even, will only lose itself in the loved object to find itself soon again in that beloved object; the contrary would be the death of love, which (Plato) is nothing less than the striving after immortality. The religious man is in relation to God, not as the dew-drop which is dried up by the sun, but as the sunflower which turns toward and opens itself before its light. This, indeed, is the glory of God, that he demands the sacrifice of our heart, but not of our individuality; and only accepts the first to give it back again, at rest and purified. Inasmuch, however, as this object is only imperfectly attained here below, is life in communion with God the pledge of an eternal future, in which he will be all indeed, but in all—that is, without destroying their personal life.

“Although we may, while starting from a different conception of God, be striving after the same object, this by no means will be attained from every stand-point. When a deistic conception of God is professed, we cannot properly and consistently speak of a constant communion with God. God is here not only raised too far above the creature, but is separated too far from him. As little is real religion conceivable where pantheistic principles are professed, because then the personal distinction between Creator and creation is done away. Only when, from a theistic stand-point, we do justice alike to the immanence and transcendence of God, can the highest object of religion be sufficiently accurately defined and properly realized. While this observation is itself true, it likewise offers a measure by which to determine the unequal value of the different forms of religion.” *

We have laid down the maxim, “that the only rational ground of belief is adequate proof,” and have defined adequate
 Maxim. proof to be a reason or reasons apprehended by the mind, which, to its conviction and in fact, establishes the truth of what is believed. In answer to the question, “Why do you believe?” the mind would immediately recur to the reasons, with the implied understanding that these reasons are adequate proof, and do show that the belief raised upon them is precisely according to truth. When such reasons or proofs exist belief is rational, and the mind acts according to the laws of reason—acts rationally in believing. If the reasons did not exist, belief would be irrational.

The sufficient reason for believing in the existence of an object is that it exists, and attests its existence in some manner to some mind; it is its own proof. The apparently sufficient reason is some fact which seems to demand its existence, and is so forcible as to induce belief. When we personally perceive an

* Van Oosterzee, vol. i, pp. 84–87.

object, or witness an event, or have an experience, we have the really sufficient proof or ground of knowledge. When several persons whom we know, and whose honesty we have no reason to doubt, and who are intelligent, testify to a fact or event or experience, we have what, to the reason, must appear to be sufficient proof, and we are compelled to believe, if we are in possession of no counter facts. In the first case, of the really sufficient proof, we cannot be deceived, in the latter, with the utmost care it is possible we may be deceived, but to be governed by rational principle we must believe in the last case even as in the first.

A necessary condition of real proof is the truth and reality of that which is proved, as it is impossible there should be real proof of that which is not true; the ^{A condition of proof.} proof not only makes the truth appear, but is itself conditioned by the truth.

There is, therefore, a distinction to be made between real and apparent proof, as of true testimony and false testimony. Real proof establishes the truth, at the same time that it is ground of knowledge or rational belief. Apparent proof does not establish the truth, or issue in knowledge, though it may issue in rational belief. It is impossible that we should be able in all cases to distinguish real from apparent proof. The result is that, acting on the most approved principle of reason, or in most perfect accord with our rational nature, we may be led into unavoidable error. Things may appear to be what they are not; testimony may appear to be true when it is really false; the conclusion which the mind is compelled to draw under the circumstances will, of course, be contrary to the truth. For these reasons the most perfect honesty and the greatest care and the use of perfectly rational methods cannot always insure us against error, though they may in most cases, and are always necessary to that end.

It would be most irrational to refuse to believe any thing,

because we are liable to be unavoidably deceived in some things. We must act still according to our best reason, though it is possible we may occasionally be led astray when so acting.

So long as Christian teachers and leaders of Christian thought are able to present unanswerable proof of their faith, and return a reasonable reply to objections old and new, the masses will be held to faith; but once let the line be broken, and it is only a question of time, and of brief time at that, when it will take its place as an obsolete and effete system. An error once detected must immediately perish, and of right should. No possible elements remain to give it vitality. A stroke of Luther's pen was sufficient to disintegrate the structure of Romanist superstition. In less than a quarter of a century discoveries in geology were sufficient to demolish the Christian cosmology of all the past ages; and had it not been that the error was found to be one of interpretation, would have shaken the whole citadel of faith. There is no greater mistake than that of supposing that the masses are not affected by argument. Unable to formulate for themselves, they understand well when an argument goes to the point. They are quick to discern when vulgar opinions are shattered. Christianity stands solely because its adversaries have not been able to make a breach in its proofs, and will stand only so long as its evidence remains invincible. Liberty of speech and thought are guaranteed to the race, and will never be surrendered. If our holy faith shall live it must show itself able to stand in the open ways of the world, and receive blows and knocks from all sorts of adversaries, and by the equanimity and sublimity of its spirit and the unanswerable logic of its replies put them to silence, and forever reassure itself, and so convince all of its intrinsic virtue and truth.

While it is true that no belief can be established or acquire the right to exist unless supported by adequate proof, it cannot

be made to appear that it is practicable or necessary that each mind should be required to pass the proof under its individual observation, and be able to adduce it or even know what it is. This would be to require impossibilities of the average mind. No man living is able to verify all ^{Many believe without examining proof.} his verifiable beliefs. We are compelled to accept many things, the proof of which we do not personally know. If we become discontented with our ignorance and refuse faith, and insist on doubt, we must expect to be branded as knaves or fools, or be at the pains of personal examination of the proof in such manner as to be competent to judge and render the adequate reason. There are men who will insist on the doubt that the earth is spherical, but they cannot escape being classed as ignoramuses by their neighbors, not one of whom could adduce the proof that the earth is round, or be made to feel that it is important that they should be able to verify the statement. They have an indefinable knowledge that there is proof, and that suffices. They escape the just imputation of ignorance by accepting the common belief. So we all do in a thousand matters which we have not the time or disposition to examine for ourselves, and no one considers this irrational, provided there are good reasons to believe that competent persons have made the requisite search, and that we could possess ourselves of the proof if we chose. On such grounds and no other the masses constantly accept the results and conclusions of experts in the various matters of science. Their intelligence is not challenged until they venture upon dissent, and thereby proclaim their stupidity. The same law obtains in matters of religious faith. But few men have examined the various inclusions of faith for themselves. They ^{Some lack ability to decide what is proof.} have neither the time nor learning to do so. As in the cases already referred to, they find good reasons for accepting the common faith, without being at the pains to go

through the process of personal search. Here, as there, ignorant dissent proclaims only the egotism and effrontery of the doubter, and awakens only the contempt of the thoughtful. No one would think of attaching importance to such doubt, or of attempting to reason it away, as its existence is a proof of sheer incapacity which is incurable, or of criminal inattention; and, as such, opinions of ignorance have no significance for mind. These remarks with respect to the examination of proof apply, however, only to the masses who cannot, for want of time and means, become technical, but who are intelligent and well informed, and rationally, though not technically, grounded in faith. They may well and wisely be content without the personal labor of critical inquiry, so long as their faith is firm; but should doubt obtrude, there would then arise a necessity to put themselves in the way of a thorough search into the proof, or, failing to do that, they would become guilty of rejecting truth, and their unreasoned disbelief might involve the greatest possible guilt, since it might put in peril their own greatest interests and the greatest interests of others who should be influenced by them.

But in making this statement we do not mean to be understood that all dissent is of this low kind. If there are learned defenders of the truth there are also learned assailants. Their arguments and doubts must be answered. They demand the proof—it must be furnished. It is no answer to treat them as cavillers not deserving attention, or to affect indifference to them. They have a right to be heard. They will be heard. The answer must be furnished, it must be adequate, it must be respectful.

The only legitimate method of dealing with men, with
Only legitimate methods. respect to their beliefs or ignorance, is to correct error by presenting the truth; and the only proper way for the removal of mental and moral darkness is by

introducing the light. It is impossible to establish beliefs by force, or to suppress error by the gag. Freedom of thought and freedom of expression are the normal conditions of all true mental life and progress. All forceful and repressive measures must inevitably work evil.

Religious truth, like all other truth, is amenable to the laws of rational investigation, and has no other support than that of rational proof. Is it said that the heart and conscience furnish a sufficient ground? We reply that they furnish no ground whatever, except as their impulses indicate to reason that there is a real reason for them. Reason will so declare, and so disbelief will become irrational. Beliefs, to be of any worth, or entitled to respect, must be accredited; and it is the function of the religious teacher to silence objections to the doctrines he teaches by proofs rather than by assertions. He can have no other authority than that with which the truth invests him, and no claim to be heard and revered except that which comes from the truth and sacredness of his message as made to appear. To have this he must be able to make it appear. We can set up no claim for ourselves which we deny to others, as to liberty of investigation and expression.

Theologians are not infallible. They have taught great errors. They have no immunity from the common frailties of men. They have often enforced their beliefs with unsound reasonings. Many times their methods have been unfair and tyrannical. Their faults have been the common faults of the ages in which they have lived, and the humanity they share with all. These facts weigh nothing with sensible men, who make small account of the teacher but all account of the truth—nothing of who says it, but every thing of what is said.

But if some great and grave errors have been taught by the spiritual guides of mankind, proving their fallibility and

justifying dissent when there are real grounds, it should also be remembered that the great substance of their teaching has come down to us with constantly increasing verifications and vaster volume of evidence as new light has been poured upon the great themes of their sciences; and if they have sometimes resorted to unsound methods under the spirit of the times, they have, nevertheless, always, as a rule, been the advanced men of the time; the guides and pilots of advance and of true progress.

While the right to challenge is to be maintained, it is well that we keep in mind that disbelief is amenable to the same law as belief; it becomes an impertinence when it is groundless; it is neither a mark of wisdom, nor title to respect, simply as dissent. The normal state is one of belief until doubt is suffered to find some adequate cause. Captious doubt is the idiot's asylum. There is truth; the great and good who have left their thoughts with us, while not infallible, and many times in error, are deserving of some respect; or at least of so much consideration as to secure to their beliefs candid attention. It is no mark of superior wisdom to pass hasty and vituperative judgments on conclusions into which they have wrought the gravest thought through lifetimes of labor. It is no mark of superior wisdom to dissent even from unreasoned beliefs without reasoned grounds, especially when, if it should be so, the unreasoned beliefs—instinctive, it may be—have produced better fruits than have sprung from their rejection.

What is the province of reason in matters of religious faith? In determining the function of reason in matters of religious faith we must have a definite idea of what we include in the term reason. By the reason we understand the whole intellectual nature of man, that is, the power to apprehend, to reflect, to consider, to compare, to differentiate, to remember, to under-

stand, to reason, to doubt, to disbelieve, to believe, to know. We give it this broad meaning because all these are forms of intellection, and pertain to the power to acquire right ideas, which we understand to be the function of reason. The term reason is not exhausted of its full meaning until we take into the account all these forms of intellection. It is another name for mind itself. It may be called intuitive, inductive, deductive, perceptive, conceptive, reproductive, cognitive, or by any other name that represents mental activity, but in every case it means the same thing, namely, power to acquire ideas and to attain to knowledge, or come to a knowing state. The different terms simply indicate phases of reason connoting its relations to the matters about which it employs itself. Let it be understood, then, as being the equivalent of mind itself.

Taken in this comprehensive sense, to the question, What is the province of reason in matters of religious faith? we answer, Its function is to determine religious faith. But when we say this we do not mean that it is the function of reason to create, or by its own unaided effort discover even, all the true contents of religious faith. This undoubtedly is a task too great for it. Indeed, left to itself it can do but little in this direction. The mind has strong religious impulses—instinctive religious yearnings. It has a dim perception and obscure consciousness of divine things; but it has no adequate power to arrive at exact and complete apprehensions of religious truth except as it is aided by supernatural help.

The function of reason is to examine and test, to sit in judgment and decide on what shall be the contents of faith. When propositions are submitted, or facts made known, or experiences felt, or arguments propounded, or duties enjoined, or any thing offered as counsel or doctrine, or any impulse is felt of any kind, whether relating to things secular or religious, whether pertaining to time or eternity, whether purporting

to come from God or man, in the one case as much as in the other it is the function of reason to sit in judgment on it, and determine whether the thing proposed shall be accepted or rejected, or what shall be its treatment.

It may be objected that this is a dangerous enlargement of the prerogatives of reason with regard to the matters of religious faith ; that in effect it makes man the determiner of his own law ; that practically it releases him from any obligation except to what suits him ; that the right to reject or accept implies the power to determine ; that it makes revelation of no effect ; that it places man above his Maker, and practically makes the subject the lawgiver and judge ; that it is the most extravagant form of rationalism. A superficial view might seem to justify these allegations, but a more careful study corrects the hasty judgment.

The allegations named come from those who are jealous of the rights of revelation, and who feel it important to abase the arrogance of reason and humble the pride of man. In a proper degree we sympathize with that feeling. We are reminded that man is a creature of limited intelligence ; that many truths are so obscure as to elude him entirely ; that withal he is fallen, and his moral powers crippled by sin ; that his judgment is biased, and that on all grounds he is incompetent to decide in matters of such grave moment ; that, therefore, the function of reason is simply to approve and obey orders—that what is communicated is to be accepted. Now all that seems to be in direct contradiction to the foregoing, and it also seems reasonable. Is there then contradiction ? If we should discover contradiction the duty will be to determine which of the contradictories shall be rejected, which accepted. But in that case how is the contradiction to be discovered ? Is it not by the reason ? What is it that determines or decides which of the contradictories shall be accepted ? Is it not the reason ?

Suppose its decision were the reverse of what it is, in any given case, what then would be duty? Is it not this decision of the reason that furnishes the indispensable condition for the determination of duty? Could the decision be disregarded and the man retain his self-respect as a rational being, or his sense of worthiness as a moral being? Would obedience to a rule be a virtue if performed in the unalterable decision of reason that duty was precisely the opposite? Must not the persuasion of the reason be that the thing is right before its performance can become a duty, or be morally right? Can a case be conceived in which any thing can become a duty to man on mere command? Will he not in every case have the right and the prior duty of determining who it is that commands, and the right he has to command? And if this be admitted is not reason first consulted before duty becomes duty?

Nor does this arrogate to reason any thing dangerous or extravagant, or in any wise oppose man's reason to his Maker's authority, or leave him to invent and determine his own law. It simply demands that he shall act out his nature as a reasonable being; that he shall act as a man, not as a thing; that he shall act from discernment, not from force, not from fancies, not from superstitions, not from traditions, not from blind impulses, not from self-will or pride or arrogance, but from the perception that a thing is right, either because it is level to his capacity to see that it is right or because he feels or discerns within him a command which he calls conscience which will not permit him to doubt that it is right, or because he has received a command which he cannot rationally doubt is from a higher authority, who must have reason on his side in issuing the command; and whether one or the other, in all these cases alike, duty is imposed upon him by the authority and sanction of his own reason, and without this could not become duty.

If it should be said, Yes, but in the case supposed reason

only accepts and interprets, we answer, This is all we claim for it. In doing that it determines what shall be believed and what rejected ; that is, it determines that this or that proposition shall be accepted as true, and that it means this or that, as the case may be ; and, in accepting it, it does so as reason. The whole process is one of reason in precisely the same sense as in determining what ideas we will accept and what reject in the every-day affairs of life, or with respect to matters and things with which we have to do. The difference in the cases is not that one demands that it should be treated rationally while the other makes no such demand, but it is a difference simply in the subjects themselves and in the kind of proof on which the reason is called to act in determining whether it will accept or reject.

To see that this is so it is only necessary to bring before the mind two actual concrete cases, one in the department of religious faith and one in the realm of common affairs.

Take the last first. Any proposition will do ; we select this : "The earth is a spherical body." The first function of reason in this case manifestly is to grasp the proposition as such, and then to determine the meaning of the terms. Having done that, the case may be treated in either of several ways. It may be simply ignored, or it may be promptly rejected, or it may be instantly accepted and finally decided, or it may be examined and a conclusion be reached by experiment or some logical process. Each of these modes of treatment is common. If called to render a reason, one man would say, Well, really, I do not know any thing about the matter, and I am too busy to give it attention. I must pass it for the present ; it may be round, it may be square, for aught I know ; it looks neither round nor square, but flat : but I must dismiss it for the want of time, or in fact, for the reason that I do not think that it is a matter of any great importance, or that if I were to give it

attention I probably could not find out any thing about it. Now there is a semblance of rationality in that treatment. Nothing is professed ; there is no belief, because the person has no known reason for belief.

Or another man would promptly reply, I don't believe a word of it. You ask him to reason. He replies, What is the use to reason? I have eyes. I have common sense. Now this is raving—as irrational as frenzy or as a clap of thunder. Yet the man believes himself a rational being. There may be a dim streak of reason running through his vaunting ignorance. Calmed down he would say something like this, perhaps : I never heard of such a thing ; nobody ever believed such a thing : my eyes show me that the earth is flat ; if it were round the inhabitants on the other side would fall off, and houses and all loose substances. Thus he would go on assigning what he calls reasons, showing that he was so far rational as to understand that a man ought to have a reason for his beliefs. His trouble is not that he might not become rational in his procedure, but that through the egotism of ignorance he does not act rationally. The defect is moral—a perversity of will which leaves him without excuse. Where there is really no importance in the matter his egotistic ignorance may do him no further harm than simply to degrade his manhood. But if the matter were of importance it might bring serious consequences, and as his conduct is irrational he, of course, alone would be responsible.

In the third case, another as promptly replies, Yes, of course, I know it ; the earth is a spherical body—there is not the least doubt of it. To be sure, it does not appear to be so, but of course it is so. Now if your object were for any reason to convince this man that the earth is round you are pleased to find him so easy a convert, or in so proper a frame of mind. If you should, however, inquire why he believes it you might

find him without any reasons. In that case his faith would be just as irrational as the raving disbeliever's non-faith; the only difference between the two being that one happened to be right and the other happened to be wrong—both alike irrational, but not, possibly, both alike harmful, nor, perchance, alike in moral quality. If asked the reason of his ready assent he might say, It is generally believed; or, I read it in a book; or this or that, having no significance whatever as proof. But in this case, as in the other, the attempt to allege some kind of a reason, however absurd, has in it a faint hue of reason. It proclaims the law of rational existence. It shows that the mind demands a reason—that in any belief which it entertains it supposes there is a good reason, something that justifies it, and that it could not tolerate an idea except as it assumes that there is proof of its truth.

But there is still another case—that of the man who does not dismiss the subject, who also does not believe, neither disbelieve. He neither denies because he is ignorant of the fact, nor accepts because others believe or affirm. He says, I do not know; I am open to proof. When I have all the evidence in the case, or sufficient evidence, I will declare my position.

Now let us change the proposition from the realm of common affairs to that of religious belief. Will the change of subjects change the law? Let the proposition be, "Jesus Christ by the grace of God tasted death for every man," or any other essential doctrine of the Christian religion. The question is, What relation has reason to this proposition? On what ground must it be accepted or rejected? What is the function of reason with regard to it? Precisely the same four attitudes of mind might, and certainly often do, appear here as in the former case.

The subject must be approached precisely as in the other case, and, so far as we can perceive, precisely the same process

must be observed. The first thing to be done is to apprehend the proposition, and then to fix exactly the meaning of the terms or of the proposition itself.

There is a peculiarity in the matter propounded as compared with the matters of daily occurrence or the common affairs with which we have to do. In the case of matters in the common affairs of life we can by inquiry have personal knowledge, or we may obtain information on testimony of those who know. The subject is within our reach. The process is simple. In the former case this is not so. We have no means of personally knowing the truth of the matter we are required to believe. It confessedly lies beyond us. We have no means of establishing it by testimony of those of our fellow-men who could have personal knowledge. This must be admitted. Then on what ground are we to receive it? The enthusiastic believer deems it a sufficient answer to say, The book says it; that is enough; to doubt or refuse is to be damned. "He that believeth shall be saved, and he that believeth not shall be damned." The underlying assumption is, that the book is God's declaration, and that man has no right to go behind that, or demand proof of it, or even wait to understand it—there is nothing to do but without questionings of reason to accept it. God is sovereign, and human pride must bow. We deny that this is the proper answer. On the other hand, we affirm that, allowing that God is the author of the declaration in question, that circumstance does not remove the venue from the court of reason—it does not demand that reason shall have no voice, or that its voice shall not be final—it does not demand that faith shall stand on mere authority.

The demand is precisely the same as in any other case. Man is a rational creature, and he may never be treated in any other way than as such. His Maker so framed him, and he

cannot outrage his own work. He must recognize and honor the constitution himself has founded. His creature cannot be required to act in contravention of the nature he has given him. What, then, is the proper answer? It is this: A proposition is laid before the mind; the function of the mind is to become aware of the proposition and then to find its meaning. Until that is done nothing further can be done or required. The mind cannot be required to act on a subject wholly unknown to it. It cannot be required to accept or believe a proposition to which it attaches no meaning, or the meanings of which it cannot determine. That which is matter of belief, by a law of the mind, is some meaning which it attaches, and it is impossible that belief should be any thing else.

The subject-matter thus brought before the mind raises this question: How shall it be treated? Who must answer that question? The mind itself as reason, that is, according to reason, and not unreason. Its decision is not made for it, or enforced as the action of a thing is forced. The function of reason is to take note, to acquaint itself with data on which its conclusion should be reached. This is what it is for. This is that which differentiates it from things and inferior creatures. This is written in its constitution as its maker's law, binding both it and him. No law can ever reverse or override this demand.

Becoming acquainted with the data which are to enter into the grounds of its conclusions it, the reason, now advances to the question, How shall the matter be treated? Shall it be ignored? Shall it be accepted? Shall it be rejected? Or shall it be examined, and shall the final disposition of it be determined according to reason? Who must decide? The reason. In reaching its decision as to the final disposition of the matter, the reason must examine all the facts which are within its

reach having any bearing on the case. If it finds itself unable from any known data to reach a conclusion, it must so affirm. If help is offered it from what purports to be some superior reason, it must examine and decide for itself what the proposed help is, and whether it deserves acceptance, and in both cases its decision must be final—that is, the mind cannot go against its decision without treason to the law written in its nature. The reason must answer the question, Why am I to believe that the help offered is from some superior reason? If his reason decides that there is no adequate proof, he must so affirm; and to maintain his status as a rational being his conduct must accord with this decision of his reason. If all the facts, duly weighed—facts of his need, facts of his moral nature, facts attending the deliverance—all the facts in the case tend to the conviction that it is certain, or even highly probable, that the matters which he could not himself unaided determine have been answered by a superior reason, then his reason must decide that the answer so rendered must be respected. His faith becomes, in this case, rational in the same degree as if the doctrines were of his own discovery. The ground of his belief is the adequate reason, as in every other case. Not to believe would declare him irrational, because it would show that in discarding the doctrine he discarded reason itself.

The finding is, that Christianity is a system of doctrines superior to human reason in its source, but attested to human reason by its evidences, and obligatory on human reason, not on any *ipse dixit* merely, but on proof, and, therefore, binding as a faith and authoritative as a law.

Suppose its teachings should be rejected and its precepts disregarded, what then? How does the theory we have advanced affect this question? A hasty and superficial judgment might be offered to the effect that in such a case no guilt is incurred, inasmuch as the reason was but exercising its indefeasible right

in the rejection and refusal to obey. In any event, it might be alleged, the position taken loosens up the sense and fact of obligation and unsettles the foundations of morality—in effect, vacates the divine law. That were a grievous result indeed. Is there any foundation for the charge? A little reflection will show that it is entirely groundless.

The facts are these: The infinite and glorious Founder of the universe made man a rational being—that is, endowed him with power to discern truth when brought into right relation to it, and so constituted him as to feel obligation to the proper use of his faculties and to be constrained to respect and accept the decisions of his reason. He also made him a free being, self-determining, so that failing to act according to his rational nature he should incur a sense of guilt and unworthiness and should be held to answer. He also instituted definite laws for the government of his life, regulating his relations to his fellow-creatures and his Maker, and imposing duties upon him. These laws were, a part of them, indicated by invariable natural impulses, which were so plain and explicit as to be impossible to escape observation; parts were more obscure and dim, requiring thought and reflection; parts, and the most important of all, were too obscure for his unaided reason, and for his most perfect development required more explicit expression and publication in an added revelation. The general law under which he held his existence was, and is forever: that under whatever circumstances he might be providentially placed he should sincerely desire to find out what was truth and duty, and should use all possible diligence to that end, and then should obey implicitly the last dictate of his highest reason in view of all the light given. That is the constitutional law of the moral universe, never revoked and never to be changed—the very foundation of the divine government, the eternal compact between God and his moral creation, perennial in

the divine nature, and forever voiced in the conscience of man; the one perpetual ray that lighteth every man that cometh into the world, and the one law by which every man shall finally be judged, and which must continue to prevail over all moral beings in all possible exigencies and in all worlds from eternity to eternity.

Now, it will be observed that under this divine constitution God is the infinite source of all truth, whether in nature or revelation. Man makes no truth; his function is to discern and obey, not to originate. Religious faith is the belief of the truth with respect to man's moral and spiritual relations to his Maker. That truth is contained in nature and revelation; God is its author and source. It is man's duty to find out what it is and obey it. His reason is the God-given power by which he is to make the discovery. Its dictate as to what is truth and what not is final for him. His responsibility is to be sincere, honest, and diligent. This met, whatever his mistakes may be, he stands acquitted; this violated, whatever his right opinions, he stands condemned.

Thus, in the final analysis, we find the source of truth is God; the judge of truth for man is human reason; that which gives authority to truth is its author; that which is required to give sanction to truth so as to make it obligatory on faith and practice is the discernment of reason.

The relation of reason to a revelation, if our position is well taken, is, then,

First: It needs a revelation; because of the fact that it is inadequate without a revelation to the complete demands of a moral and spiritual being in that it cannot, of itself—by the mere light which nature furnishes—come to the knowledge of facts and principles which are required to be known in order to the completest perfection of such a being; revelation is as needful to these higher wants as nature is to the common and

lower wants of existence; it is necessary that it should furnish the data on which reason is to act with respect to some things.

Second : The truths of revelation, to be of any value to man, must, as in every other case, come with appropriate signs and tokens that it is a revelation. The revelation is of no value without these. Its voice is impotent and its authority *nil* in their absence. The function of reason is to discern them, and give its sanction to faith.

Third : Without this discernment and sanction it is impossible that the so-called revelation should be known to be such, or that it should be rationally received or virtuously obeyed.

Fourth : The duty of the reason is to honestly aim at truth, to be diligent in its pursuit, to use its utmost vigilance not to be misled, to examine impartially all the known or knowable facts bearing on the case.

Fifth : The duty of reason, having accepted the revelation on what it deems adequate proof, is to interpret the revelation and find its meanings; that is, it must determine what it teaches.

Sixth : It is the duty of reason to receive whatever it finds to be the meaning of the revelation, however mysterious or inexplicable, always with the provision, first, that that interpretation shall always have the preference which is least objectionable to reason if the text and general tenor of the revelation will permit it, even though some other interpretation of the words might be possible or even more natural; second, provided nothing shall be obligatory which is absurd, or, according to the best judgment of the reason, a contradiction, or for any reason impossible or even so highly improbable as to appear to be absolutely irrational.

If any part of these functions of reason be neglected, a strict accountability will be demanded. It will serve no purpose of excuse or exculpation that the disbeliever and disobedient plead that they did not know, or that their reason was not convinced,

unless they are able also to show that they were sincere lovers of truth, sincere and diligent seekers of truth, that they were not indisposed to receive the truth, and that their unbelief was not self-superinduced by disinclination to its demands.

We affirm that it is both a law of the mind as rational, and of ethics, that faith can never be required without the adequate reason being furnished to the person on whom the obligation is imposed: the adequate reason may be either the evidence directly furnished to the mind that the proposition is true or the thing required proper in itself, or the proof that one who has the right to command is the author of the command or teaching. The highest reason is religious. Religious faith is the embodiment of the highest reason. God's law is addressed to reason. Reason apprehends the law as God's law. God's law becomes binding on men when, and not until, it is apprehended by reason, or might be if the reason were properly exercised. If it were not apprehensible by reason it never could become man's law by mere command. There is a strict and perfect harmony between human reason and divine revelation. One never collides with the other. Man may accept the law without knowing the reason why he does or should accept it; but it is never without a reason why it should be accepted.

Whether man has a revelation or not, man must decide. Whether man will accept what purports to be a revelation, man must decide. For his decision he will be required to answer to the author of his reason, and of the revelation. He will not be condemned because he did not believe and obey a revelation of which he had no knowledge, but for disobeying a revelation of which, had it not been for some criminal neglect, he might have had knowledge; or, for rejecting and disobeying a revelation of which he either had knowledge, or of which there was ample means of knowledge in his reach, and which, if he had acted rationally, he would have found abundant and ade-

quate reason for accepting and obeying. His condemnation will be because in rejecting and disobeying he acted in unreason. All sin is in its essence abuse or misuse of reason; and all willful or voluntary misuse of reason is of the nature of sin, and when it leads to immoral practices is of the essence of sin—is itself a violation of the moral law which imposes obligation to the right exercise of reason for the determination of the beliefs of the mind and practices of the life. To this law man is strictly amenable, and for its neglect, as much as for its direct violation, he is responsible. That this is a just law no one can doubt with reason. The duty it imposes is for adequate reasons, and it is neither unduly rigorous nor capricious. It exalts reason to the function for which it was created, and it holds it to equitable obligations and accountability.

The only possible ground in opposition to this is to assume that reason is to be ignored entirely in matters of religious faith. Either it is to apprehend and pass judgment or it can have no function. But if it is to be ignored, that is, denied any function, see into what a dilemma we are plunged. If we ignore reason, how are ideas to be apprehended? If it might be possible that we should be able to receive commands or become aware of propositions, how can we come at the meanings of either? But if it is the reason which supplies the meanings we are to put in the terms, and which we are to accept as true, is it not the reason that determines what the contents of our faith shall be—the very things we are to accept and believe? That is, does not faith become faith by the sanction of reason?

From the nature of the case all questions remain open, and must so remain. Each mind has its own individual and in-
 Questions re- feasible rights. No rational being can, as rational,
 main open. accept any creed except on some supposed adequate
 ground. What that adequate ground is, it must decide for
 itself. There can be no authority until the authority has been

established in the individual reason. The only service one generation can do to another is to hand over its best thought to its successor, to be reintegrated by being the best thought the new generation can attain, or to be refuted or modified as the discovered need may be.

It is thus that all progress has been attained in the past along lines of human endeavor. It is thus that all progress will be made in the future in every department of thought. There are no breaks in the ladder which ^{How progress is attained.} lays its top against the highest sky. It must be ascended rung by rung, and there is no rung reachable by man that has not another above it.

It has been necessary in times past often to return upon the rungs up which we had labored long and hard; finding ourselves on the wrong track, we had to begin again. Motion is necessary to progress, but motion is not always progress. Better go wrong in the honest endeavor to go right than stand still in error. There is hope in effort. There is only stagnation and death in unaspiring ignorance. It will be in the future as in the past. It may be we will find backward motion necessary to advanced position. If true to reason the outcome will be, after all returns and changes and struggles, onward movement and final elevation.

Is nothing, then, established? Are all beliefs to be looked upon with suspicion and doubt, liable to be reversed and changed by each new age, or each individual mind? Must the assault and defense be perpetual? Can there be no finality reached? These anxious misgivings spontaneously arise in every mind. We weary of debate. We have the feeling that some things ought to be considered settled beyond further questioning. A little reflection will be helpful and quieting.

Truth is settled. It is not uncertain. Nothing ever changes it. "The eternal years of God are hers:" the unrest is ours.

In the nature of the case it must be perpetual for the race,
 what is estab- however it may be otherwise with the individual.
 lished.

We are not born into truth: it must be acquired. Each mind must make the acquisition for itself. It is impossible that it should be otherwise. The questions, What must I believe, and why must I believe? meet each new mind at the threshold of life; and the same process must be repeated as long as the world stands and men are born into it. The same old questions will emerge in some form determined by the age every time, and the same answer and counter answer will have to be wrought out. New elements will constantly be coming into the controversy, which may be either disturbing or relieving. The struggle implies nothing of uncertainty in truth, and nothing necessarily of the invalidity of conclusions reached, but simply denotes the normal want of finite mind in the pursuit of truth.

There will always be idiot believers and idiot unbelievers decrying each other, putting forth travesties of truth, uttering rash, foolish, and absurd ideas, repeating old saws and fables. These are perennial incidents in such a world as ours. It must be expected that folly will sometimes get the advantage of wisdom. Fools will vex and trouble the wise and outvote them. Truth will often be trampled down and draggled in the mire. What happened to the Prince of truth will still happen to truth itself: it will be crucified, now by this party now by that, but the truth will not suffer by crucifixion. It still lives, and will be sure to have a resurrection.

In conclusion: availing ourselves of all possible sources of light, interrogating all facts, prying into every open and un-
 Conclusion. locking or breaking open every closed door, rummaging every secret drawer of universal nature and rifling her of her most hidden secrets, plundering every realm of existence of its treasures of truth and tearing away as much

as we can its enswathments of mystery, calling to our aid all helps of possible revelations, gathering up the best results of all former labors of the world's best and ablest minds and disencumbering ourselves of all rubbish of superstition and prejudice and bigotry and ignorant cant, it is for us to go forward in the glorious pursuit of truth, emulating each other, helping each other, encouraging each other, rejoicing in all successes, at whatever cost of surrenders, never wearying, never doubting of the outcome. There will be advance. It will be slow. In the far-on ages the world will be insphered in light.

APPENDIX.

NOTE A. P. 87.

ESSENCE (*essentia*, from *essens*, the old participle of *esse*, to be—introduced into the Latin tongue by Cicero.

“*Sicut ab eo quod est sapere, vocatur sapientia; sic ab eo quod est esse, vocatur essentia.*”—AUGUSTINE, “*De Civ.*,” lib. xii, c. 11.

“*Totum illud per quod res est, et est id quod est.*”—CHAUVIN, *Lexicon Philosoph.*

“*Essence* may be taken for the very being of any thing, whereby it is what it is.”—LOCKE, “*Essay on Human Understanding*,” book iii, chap. 3, sect. 15.

Mr. Locke distinguishes the real and the nominal essence. The nominal essence depends upon the real essence; thus the nominal essence of gold, is that complex idea which the word “gold” represents; namely, a body yellow, heavy, malleable, fusible, and fixed; but its real essence is the constitution of its insensible parts, on which these qualities and all its other properties depend, which is wholly unknown to us.

“The essence of things is made up of that common nature wherein it is founded, and of that distinctive nature by which it is formed. This latter is commonly understood when we speak of the formality or *formalis ratio* (the formal consideration) of things; and it is looked upon as being more peculiarly the essence of things, though ’tis certain that a triangle is as truly made up in part of figure, its common nature, as of the three lines and angles, which are distinctive and peculiar to it.

“The essence of a thing most properly and strictly is what does first and fundamentally constitute that thing, and that only is strictly essential which is either the whole or some part of the constituent essence; as, in man to be a living creature, or to, be capable of religion: his being capable of celestial happiness, may be called essential in the way of consequence, or consecutively, not constitutively.”—OLDFIELD, “*Essay on Reason*,” p. 184.

“Whatever makes a thing to be what it is, is properly called its essence. Self-consciousness, therefore, is the essence of the mind, because it is in virtue of self-consciousness that the mind is the mind—that a man is himself.”—FERRIER, “*Inst. of Metaphys.*,” p. 245.

“All those properties or qualities, without which a thing could not exist, or

without which it would be entirely altered, make up what is called the essence of a thing. Three lines joining are the essence of a triangle; if one is removed, what remains is no longer a triangle." *

The essential attributes, *faciunt esse entia*, cause things to be what they are.

The Greeks had but one word for essence and substance, namely, *οὐσία*. The word *ὑπόστασις* was latterly introduced. By Aristotle *οὐσία* was applied—1. To the form, or those qualities which constitute the specific nature of every being. 2. To the matter, in which those qualities manifest themselves to us—the substratum or subject (*ὑποκείμενον*). 3. To the concrete or individual being (*σύνολον*), constituted by the union of the two preceding.

In the scholastic philosophy a distinction began to be established between essence and substance. Substance was applied to the abstract notion of matter—the undetermined subject or substratum of all possible forms, *τὸ ὑποκείμενον*; essence to the qualities expressed in the definition of a thing, or those ideas which represent the genus and species. Descartes defined substance as "that which exists so that it needs nothing but itself to exist," a definition applicable to Deity only. Essence he stripped of the logical signification, and made it the foundation of all those qualities and modes which we perceive in matter. Among the attributes of every substance there is one only which deserves the name of essence, and on which the others depend as modification—as extension, in matter, and thought in mind. He thus identified essence and substance. But extension supposes something extended, and thought something that thinks. With Leibnitz essence and substance was the same, namely, force or power.

Essence is analogically applied to things having no real existence; and then it retains its logical sense and expresses the qualities or ideas which should enter into the definition; as when we speak of the essence of an equilateral triangle being three equal sides and three equal angles. This is the only sense in which Kant recognizes the word. In popular language essence is used to denote the nature of a thing. †

* Taylor's "Elements of Thought."

† "Principles of Philosophy," par. 4, sec. 1.

NOTE B. P. 140.

The attempts to prove that reason is essentially self-contradictory have never proved any thing but the philosophical incompetency of those who made them. It is very easy to find contradictions in the spontaneous metaphysics of common sense; but reason itself always suffices to detect and correct such errors. In the failure of this method the skeptic adopts another. He claims that rational principles cannot be proved even in the mind; still less can they be proved to have objective validity. He admits that they must control our thinking, and that we cannot conceive them false; but he urges that this proves only a subjective necessity, and does not prove an objective necessity. He suggests, therefore, that these principles do not hold for the external world, or for what he is pleased to call "things in themselves."

This skepticism seems fair and rational; let us look at it more closely. And first, we examine the demand for proof of first principles. If by proof the skeptic means deduction, it is clear that he is right in saying that rational or first principles cannot be deduced, for deduction implies something more fundamental than the conclusion. Since Jacobi wrote the "Faith Philosophy," there is no reason for calling this truism a discovery. But if the skeptic means that what cannot be deduced is, therefore, uncertain, we shall find it necessary to inquire what proof is. Now the essence of logical proof consists in so combining propositions which we know that we finally see some other proposition to be a necessary admission, which was not seen as such before. That is, we reach a feeling of certainty in affirming the proposition which we did not have; and then the proposition is said to be proved. But the essence of the proof consists in just this certainty, and not in the number or nature of the steps taken. If now the proposition should be directly seen at the start to be necessary, we should need no proof: (1) because we should have the essence of proof—the feeling of certainty; (2) because the longest argument could give us nothing more than this feeling; and (3) because the certainty arising from a logical demonstration can never be greater than that of the principles on which it rests. If the mind is able to see some truths to be self-evident, or to know some things without a process, it is mere logical pedantry to demand further proof. It is more than pedantic; it is absurd. The self-evident, in its very notion, is that which is able to stand alone. To demand proof of it is to declare that it is not self-evident. It is plain that the ultimate test of truth must be the mind itself, and its faith in its own power to know. The skeptic is unwilling to admit the dicta of reason, and insists on having their validity in some way established. But it is plain, again, that these dicta can be tested only by assuming some more ultimate dictum as a standard; and this final standard, can be known as such only by the self-

evidence with which it appeals to the mind. But the demand for proof can be repeated here with equal justice, and the same senseless round might be renewed forever. The skeptic's demand for proof, beyond the feeling of self-evidence and certainty, is one which in its very nature cannot be met by any intelligence whatever. Angel or archangel would be in exactly the same condition as we are, in this regard. The skeptic is commonly supposed to be of all men the most acute, but surely there is nothing very brilliant in making an irrational demand, and then triumphing because it has not been met. When asked, then, for the ultimate warrant of rational principles, we do not hesitate to declare it to be reason itself. Whatever appears as truly self-evident and necessary, the mind will always feel justified in regarding as true. It is clear that it must come to this at last, not only for human intelligence, but for all intelligence. Every rational being must at bottom trust his rational insight. To call this a circle, and quibble over it, is mere pettifoggery. The trust of the mind in itself can be shaken only by showing inconsistency in its intuitions. The complete test of truth, then, might be stated as self-evidence and necessity at the beginning, with consistency in the outcome. The skepticism which is based upon contradictions in details is rational and valuable for details, and the course of the mind in such cases is to go over its work in the light of rationality, and bring the warring details into harmony. But a skepticism of reason itself, based, not on inner contradiction, but solely on the possibility of verbal denial, is something which busy and sincere men may justly ignore. To ask some questions is a proof of mental power. To ask some others is a proof of mental weakness and confusion. To the latter class belong all skeptical demands for proof of rational principles.

But the skeptic rejoins that if the rationalist's argument were allowed it would only prove the subjective, not the objective, validity of these principles. He declines, therefore, to believe that they are objectively valid. It is plain that a skepticism of this sort is forever irrefutable, resting, as it does, solely on the possibility of stating a verbal doubt. Whatever objective necessity there may be can appear in the mind only as a subjective necessity, an impossibility of thinking otherwise, etc., and even objective reality exists for us only as it is conceived. We can test the value of this objection by applying it. A straight line is the shortest distance between two points; things respectively equal to the same thing are equal to one another; every event or change must have a cause. The rationalist says that such principles are as valid for things as for thought; but the skeptic objects, because the necessity with which they appeal to the mind produces only a subjective necessity of admitting them; and a subjective necessity is no proof of objective fact. It is evident that reason runs no serious risks from attacks like these, for while the declaration of the doubt is forever possible, it is forever equally baseless and barren. It appeals not to reason, but from reason, and may

rightly be left to its own irrationality. One grave disadvantage of language is that it allows men to speak without saying any thing. There is no difficulty in framing such phrases as square circle, straight curve, and the like, but there is a strict impossibility of thinking any thing under them. We are persuaded that skepticism would play a much less prominent part if the skeptic were forced to make his hypothesis intelligible. This he always neglects to do, but furnishes himself rather with phrases which cannot be construed in thought, as if the first demand upon a hypothesis were not that it be at least thinkable. When Mr. Mill suggested that two and two may make five in some other world, it was an oversight not to tell us why five, instead of fifty or five thousand, or three only, or even nothing. We are clear that in the same world four might equal five. It might also equal three. It might equal any thing. It might also equal nothing. Indeed, it might equal any thing and nothing at the same time. Any of these propositions are just as rational as the far-famed one of Mr. Mill. Unfortunately, a certain half-heartedness on Mill's part leaves us in doubt whether his proposition is any thing but a truism expressed in a most extraordinary form. He was not prepared to deny the law of identity, or $A=A$. Hence four equals four, and five equals five, but four does not equal five. But as two and two do equal four, and four is not five, it follows that the five which in some other world they equal is not five as we understand it, but is really what we mean by four. Either this fantastic platitude, or the law of identity must be abandoned. But here, again, we are puzzled by the fact that at times Mill seems to have meant by five what we all mean by five; for he quotes approvingly the hint of a barrister who suggested a way of conceiving that two and two should really make five. The barrister said, that if there should be some law of association whereby, whenever we add two and two an additional unit should be suggested to the mind, then the sum of two and two would always seem equal to five. Both Mill and the barrister fail to see that in that case not two and two make five, but two and two plus the new unit. Here, then, it would seem as if Mill meant to deny the law of identity. If a theologian should utter such wisdom, no one would hesitate to pronounce him imbecile; but as no theologian has ever won such glory, let us recognize the utterance as that of a great and accurate and candid thinker. It is also suggested by the skeptic that there may be worlds where the law of causation does not hold. We are quite clear that in those worlds things create themselves, and vanish into the void whenever they tire of existence. By hypothesis, nothing produces an event or change, and yet the event and the change do come to pass. They arise from nothing, and vanish into it. No one can tell whence they come nor whither they go. There is no whence and no whither. Things are and are not, and probably both at once. These propositions again are just as rational as the denial of causation. If reason be repudiated, there is

no longer any thing irrational. The one measures the other. The skeptic, then, ought to stop at nothing in the way of absurdity. There is nothing to forbid any notion except reason itself; and as the skeptic has victoriously overcome reason, the road is fully open to any and every whim and superstition. A half-way skeptic is a sorry sight. But the trouble with the propositions we have mentioned is, that mental palsy results from any attempt to construe them in thought; and as long as this is so, we shall hold that skepticism of rational principles is really credulity or bravado. In either case, it belongs to the department of mental pathology.

But it may be asked, in mitigation of this severe judgment, did not Kant deny that rational principles, which are at bottom only rules of mental action, apply in any way to things in themselves? He did, and thereby destroyed his own system. He first proved that there are forms of thought which are regulative in the mental life. This was his great service in philosophy. Then, without any warrant of any sort, he concluded that these forms were not also valid for things. In this way he transcended his own premise, which would never warrant any thing more than doubt. Dogmatic denial is impossible to a consistent Kantian. In this way, also, he made the Idealism of Fichte a logical necessity. For the categories he declared to be subjective only. Among these he placed causality and reality. The denial of the former made his "things in themselves" useless. They do nothing; they do not even produce phenomena. Hence they account for nothing, and sink into metaphysical ghosts. By denying the objectivity of the category of reality, we are forbidden to call "things in themselves" real. They are then nothing. Phenomena are the only realities, and absolute dogmatism is reinstalled. In short, one cannot become a Kantian without a "thing in itself," and one cannot remain a Kantian with "a thing in itself." Reason will always revenge itself upon any theory which limits rational principles to subjective application, by denying the irrational reality outright. Such a thing is not merely the unknowable—it is more, it is the unaffirmable. It was Kant's subjectivism which produced the absolute philosophies of Germany. The later forms of phenomenalism have been constantly pressed with the same difficulty. By denying that phenomena are proper manifestations of things, and that things can be truly known through phenomena, they have made things unnecessary for the explanation of phenomena; and thus phenomena become the only reality. Consistent phenomenalism must lead to absolutism.

NOTE C. P. 152.

The statement that the reality of knowledge is independent of its extent, deserves further emphasis. It has been strangely enough assumed, by both believer and skeptic, that the reality of knowledge can be maintained only by proving that all perceptive beings must see all things alike. Of course such a proof is forever impossible, and the skeptic wins an easy triumph. But this question, also, must be ruled out as irrelevant. The point is not whether other beings see things as we do, but whether the powers and relations which we find in them are really there, independent of our thought. Touch is not contradicted by vision, though each gives some elements which are impossible to the other. The question whether angels or animals see things as we do, is a perfectly idle one. Sextus Empiricus based a skeptical argument on the fact that cat's eyes have oblong pupils, while men's eyes have round pupils. It will probably be impossible for us to tell how cats view things until cats become able to think or speak, or until we become cats without losing our human faculties. Both events seem quite unlikely, and the advance of knowledge in that direction is barred. The attempt to find how angels, or some hypothetical beings, may regard things, appears equally hopeless. Be it far from us to say what such beings might see and think. All such suggestions are irrelevant, unless it be claimed that their knowings contradict ours; and in that case we should ask, what ground there is (1) for assuming that these hypothetical beings are real; (2) for saying that their knowledge contradicts ours; and (3) for assuming that, in case of contradiction, these imaginary beings must be in the right? The last assumption is plainly gratuitous, for they would not contradict us any more than we should contradict them; and hence, after all, we should have to decide the question by appealing to our own reason. Although this fashion of appealing to imaginary beings, in the interests of skepticism, has the support of Descartes, it must, nevertheless, be regarded as unworthy a rational being, because it is both gratuitous and indecisive.

The fact that the reality of knowledge is independent of its extent also contains an explanation of the pretended antithesis of absolute and relative knowledge. This antithesis has no meaning from the side of the subject. For the knower there is either certainty or uncertainty concerning a fact or proposition; and he may either know it to be true or false, or he may believe it to be true or false, or he may be in doubt concerning it. These are the possible mental states of the knower, and for him the distinction of relative and absolute has no assignable meaning. We must, then, seek the meaning of the distinction in the object; and here we come upon the following fact: We know things only in relations either to ourselves or to other things. This perfectly true statement is, then,

illicitly transformed into another, which is entirely different, namely, that we know only relations. When something is known to exist as this or that, relations may also be known to exist between it and other equally known things; but that we should know the relations of essentially unknown objects is a contradiction in psychology. Knowledge may go deeper and deeper, but so long as the word represents any thing intelligible, it will always consist, not in being the thing known, but in forming conceptions about the thing. Such a deepening of knowledge would not displace what we know, but only extend it. Even in the realm of rational principles, it is possible that our knowledge does not reach the ultimate. They lie in our mind as mutually independent data. The law of identity, or of causation, carries with it no necessity that the mind should also have an intuition of space. The understanding is conceivable apart from the moral nature. This mutual independence in our experience leads the mind to surmise that in the ultimate ground of being there may be an interdependence of these principles, so that all may flow from one root. German philosophy has made great efforts to show such a relation, but the success has not been great. But if such a relation existed, it would not in any way affect the validity of rational principles: we should only have a deeper knowledge. Theoretical mechanics has advanced through successive generalizations until the whole science is reduced to an interpretation of a single principle; but no knowledge is disturbed by the advance. In like manner, if space were found to be only a form of manifestation, our knowledge of space would remain just as it is. The science of space relations would continue to be valid: we should only discover that there is something deeper than space, and not that space is delusion. The current thought that the ideality of space implies that space is merely a human delusion, is one of the many misunderstandings found in the popular speculations. That doctrine denies that God is limited in any way by space, as if space were a thing like other things; but it does not deny him a knowledge of space relations, as if something in the world of the thinkable were unknown and unknowable to the Source of all thought and knowledge.

Again, with regard to things, a deeper knowledge does not discredit real knowledge. If it should turn out that the chemical elements are compound, it would leave our present knowledge where it is. A profounder insight into their structure would not overturn their known laws. Where, then, is the opposition between absolute and relative knowledge? The true antithesis is that of more or less, and not that of relative and absolute. Absolute knowledge is greatly to be desired, and its unattainability is a great loss, no doubt; but still a large reward might be safely offered for any definition of it which would not reduce either to an unintelligible chimera or else to exhaustive knowledge. But no one ever claimed an exhaustive knowledge of any thing for any finite mind.

NOTE D. P. 190.

“The human mind is practical rather than speculative. It lives and acts and has experiences long before it speculates and theorizes. In its practical unfoldings it adjusts itself in a measure to the universe, but in a still greater measure, it adjusts the universe to itself. In so doing, it makes a great variety of practical postulates and assumptions which are not logical deductions, but a kind of *modus vivendi* which the mind has established with the great world of things. The mind does not ask whether it has a right to live, but it lives, and in living it develops a frame-work of principles which represent the conditions of its fullest life. It has not time to speculate—it assumes. It has not time to theorize—it takes for granted. The pressure of practical existence is upon it, and it must adjust itself practically before it can attend to speculative problems. Thus man did not begin by inquiring into the implications of ethical existence, and by settling all the metaphysical difficulties involved therein, but he began by being ethical, and by implicitly assuming all that that implies. He did not know that he had a right to be ethical, but found himself such. He did not resolve the metaphysical puzzle in the notion of freedom, but he found himself compelled to regard himself and his fellows as responsible, and hence as free. Likewise man did not begin by demonstrating the possibility and obligation of religion, and by proving that the object and relation which it implies exist, but he began by being religious and by assuming those objects and relations. They were implied in being religious, and he was as sure of them as he was of his religion. No more did man begin by theories of knowledge and by ranting all skeptics and agnostics; but he began by knowing as a matter of course. No one can hope to understand the mind who regards it as a logic machine. It is rather a living organism, with manifold interests and necessities; and without thought of logic it proceeds to assimilate the universe to them. The result is an outgrowth of beliefs which are the outcome, not of logic, but of life. They are not reasoned truths, but represent the tendencies of our nature, or a mental concordat of existence.

“These considerations, however, only refer to the origin of belief, and do not establish its truths. We may allow that belief has a highly complex genesis, which admits of no very clear presentation; but we must not affirm that therefore belief has no accountability to logic. That men do believe does not prove that they have a right to believe. Hence after the genesis of a belief has been described, its truth remains an open question. It is, therefore, the province of logic to go through the luxurious growths of credulity and cut down such as cannot prove their right to live. This brings us to the distinction between the causes and the grounds of belief, and raises the question, What constitute the grounds of belief?

“This question, also, can best be answered by observing the actual procedure of the mind. Beliefs fall into two classes, which are psychologically very different. Beliefs of the first class are those which are deduced from facts, either as their explanation or as their consequences. They are not knowledge, because they do not compel acceptance, but they may be rational, because the probabilities are in their favor. Scientific theories are examples, and so are the manifold assumptions and expectations which make up what we call common sense. A physicist believes in the ether, or a chemist believes in the atoms because the phenomena seem to call for the assumption. A man says, “I think it will rain to-morrow;” or, “I think there will be a financial crisis or a European war before long.” All of these beliefs have a double peculiarity. First, they are founded on objective facts, and are offered either as explaining the facts or as resulting from them. Second, their strength varies directly with the objective evidence. If new facts are found which do not fit easily into the scientific theory, doubt begins. If the clouds grow thinner or the barometer rises, we are not so firm in our expectation of rain. If we hear that the crops are turning out better than we expected, we begin to think of postponing the crisis. All such beliefs belong to the realm of probability, that is, our belief rises and falls with the amount of objective evidence. We take all the facts into account, and our belief is the resultant average. Beliefs of the second class are not founded on objective facts, but are subjective interests, and express only subjective interests or postulates. They are not inferences from given facts, either as their explanation or as their consequence. They are rather the implication of our nature itself, or its reaction against our total experiences. They are also psychologically different from the preceding class of beliefs, in that they are not matters of probability, and our conviction does not rise and fall with each new fact experienced, but only with the intensity of the emotion which produced it. In the realm of probabilities opposing facts weaken belief, but here they are set aside as something not understood, and do not weaken our faith.

“The belief in God illustrates both classes of belief, as it is really a compound of both. Theistic faith has a double root in our mental life. First, God appears as a hypothesis to explain the facts of experience, or to satisfy the demand of the reason for a sufficient cause. As thus conscious theism belongs to the realm of probabilities, and our faith should vary directly as the evidence. Second, God appears as the implication of our esthetic, moral, and religious natures, or as satisfying certain subjective interests, tendencies, and emotions. From this stand-point, our faith in God is less an inference than a volition; or rather, it is an act of pure faith, which varies with no estimate of probabilities, but only with the strength of the feeling which produced it. When these feelings are very strong the faith is called an intuition, and the proposal to prove the Divine existence by argument

is derided as needless, and perhaps resented as sacrilege. Every step toward argument is viewed as a step away from that being apprehended of God, in which only he can be fully known. Sometimes this exalted state of feeling is erected into a special organ, or faculty, which is the true medium of spiritual vision or of divine revelation. But apart from these extravagances, theistic faith cannot be understood without taking account of its double sense. Most writers on natural theology have theoretically recognized only the argumentative source of theism. They proposed to demonstrate the existence of God, or at least to render it rationally probable, by an objective consideration of facts. Their apparent success is largely due to a verbal identification of the being reached by their argument with the living God of Christianity. Where power and skill in a somewhat indefinite degree have been made probable, this has been viewed as a proof of the divine existence in a religious sense. The esthetic demand for perfection and the moral and religious nature come in so naturally and spontaneously to expand this pure result into a divine ideal that the flaw in the logic is overlooked. That this is so especially appears from the statement of the problems of evil and of the divine goodness. A purely objective study of the facts, without any admixture of subjective interests, would certainly stop short of the conception of God, as divine, self-centered omnipotence, and perfect holiness and goodness. Such a study would aim only to find a causal explanation of the facts, and it cannot be shown that only a perfectly good and all-powerful being would be a sufficient cause. The argument for the divine holiness and goodness is based partly on the happiness of sensitive beings, but mostly on the moral nature of man. These facts, it is said, demand a moral and benevolent cause. Unfortunately, the argument rests on picked facts, and ignores the rest. But over against the facts of happiness are the facts of misery, and these are neither few nor insignificant. They cannot be shown to be due to any eternal truths of reason, or to any ontological necessity. So far as we can see, they are contingent upon an order which might have been otherwise to advantage. Likewise over against the facts of man's moral nature are those features of the cosmic process which make against all our ideas of righteousness. If not positively opposed to morality, the world-order is at least awfully indifferent to our moral ideals. To such an extent is this true, that the common judgment of the race has been that a future life is absolutely necessary to serve the divine justice and the divine goodness. Manifestly, the divine goodness cannot be concluded from these facts, and yet they belong to the facts which must be taken into account to a purely causal explanation. If such an explanation only were needed, an epicurean indifference to finite well-being, or an element of moral caprice in the first cause, would be an adequate hypothesis. They are not rejected because they are metaphysically inadequate, but because they are esthetically and religiously obnoxious. We demand an explanation which shall satisfy

the conscience as well as the intellect. Accordingly, we interpret the first cause morally; and the facts which make against this view are set aside as something not understood. We believe in a solution whose probability we cannot now comprehend. Hence the chief strength of the argument for the divine goodness is devoted to showing that the fact of evil and suffering are not incompatible therewith. If we have the idea, we may hold it fast even in the face of the world's pain and sorrow and sin; but the positive sense of the idea is not to be found in any aetiological study of the facts of existence, but rather in the unwillingness to be put to any such moral and rational confusion as would result from allowing a fundamentally immoral, capricious, or malignant God. Hence the claim often made by Christian writers, that speculative arguments for the existence of God are religiously worthless, though exaggerated is not without some justification. The same fact appears also in the development of Christian theology. The necessity of finding a conception of God which should be satisfactory to our moral nature has been the great spring of theological progress. Our conceptions both of God and of human destiny have been greatly modified by this fact; and the result has been the abandonment of many views which were logical enough, but which did violence to conscience. These facts in the natural history of belief show that belief is by no means always born of a logical contemplation of facts with the aim of discovering either their causes or their consequences, but that it is often an experience of the entire soul in which each tendency of our nature aims to assert for itself its proper field and object.

“But these considerations only show that there are two sources of belief: first, the objective study of facts; and, second, the subjective interests and tendencies of the soul itself. They do not decide, however, their relative, logical worth. On this point, too, there is a very considerable argument among thinkers, that beliefs of the second class must be rejected as wishes turned into assertions, or as hopes which have mistaken themselves for truths. Sentiment of no sort must be allowed to influence us in deciding what to believe. There is still a difference, however, among those who hold this view as to what the facts are upon which objective beliefs shall be based. Some hold that the moral and religious nature is a fact which points to God as its only adequate explanation. That the conscience seeks after God as its implication and support proves nothing. That religion in man only implies an object, and falls into contradiction without it, also proves nothing. But the existence of conscience and religion demands an explanation, and this must finally be found in God. Others, however, will not allow such a suggestion until all the resources of the associated psychology have been exhausted; and as these are supposed to be inexhaustible, we may well believe that both conscience and religion have a much less august origin. Accordingly, they are unwilling to recognize any thing as ground-of-belief senses. These give us the

world of facts, of experiment, observation, and verification. Whatever can be deduced from them is knowledge; whatever they make probable is rational belief; whatever falls outside of these lines is fable, fiction, falsehood."—*Bowne*.

Having now found the differentiations between knowledge and belief, and having determined the grounds and relative value of each as to the validity of their contents, we are prepared to compare and test our religious beliefs, and decide how far they have a right to maintain their existence.

It is common among a certain class of minds to decry religious beliefs as "old wives' fables," and mere dreams of superstition and ignorance; and there is, I think, a general assumption among Christians themselves, in common with others, and even with theologians, that the religious beliefs do not rest on the same kind of grounds as ordinary rational beliefs do. They are supposed to spring up in the mind as a sort of spontaneous growth, without any exercise of the rational powers; or to be the irrational offspring of unsupported authority, and when interrogated they are supposed to be dumb as to the reason, or a reason which supports their existence; and, in the absence of any reason, to persist even against proof to the contrary. I think the manner in which the subject is sometimes treated even by theologians of repute justifies this view. There is a tacit assumption that the call for evidence is in a measure disloyal to faith. It is even sometimes assumed that to question is a sin; and it is boldly declared, that with regard to the most fundamental questions proof is impossible.

What are the facts in the case, and what is the true ground to be taken? There is scarcely a more important question before the age than this—precisely what is the present state of the religious problem? How do religious beliefs arise? Have they ground for continuance? Is there any thing in them which men of intelligence ought to respect? or, should they be treated with indifference or contempt, or be brushed away with a sneer? Has the reason a right to set up a demand for content in every case; or, may a belief exist of right without the consent of reason, or even where the reasons are adverse?

NOTE E. P. 194.

The common mass of unreasoned beliefs which appear among men in matters of daily life and practice for which no rational account can be given are not, therefore, to be accounted as irrational. They have a certain basis of reason. They are spontaneous outgrowths of circumstances and environments. The mind often moves along rational lines without apprehending the reasons of its own conclusions. There is a sort of insight natural to mind, which corresponds with instinct in lower forms of life, that goes directly and unquestioningly to determinations in matters of practical importance in common affairs, and that is almost unerring. The experience of ages creates maxims and rules of action and belief. Common beliefs become heirlooms which are handed along from generation to generation. Though accepted without formal proof, they do not exist without rational grounds.

NOTE F. P. 197.

Proof: That which is proven is true; but proof does not always carry the mind to the knowledge that that which is attempted to be proved is true. The proof offered is inadequate to establish knowledge or even certainty—that is, unwaveringness of belief. It may be adequate to produce a degree of conviction—the mind sees no escape from the conclusion, but it admits a possibility of the opposite. There is thus seen to be a difference in degrees of proof, as there is also a difference in kind. Proofs of one kind issue in certainty; of another kind in diverse degrees of probability. The mind acts according to its law or nature when it governs its conclusions by the kind and degree of proof which it possesses; and it is responsible for its conclusions, so far as to see that they are according to what to its best reason seems to be proof; and, yet further, it is responsible for the use it makes of its powers and opportunities in acquiring and testing evidences. If through neglect it acts without or against proof, or if it fails to use proper diligence to acquire and proper care in testing supposed proof, it becomes guilty of self-abuse.

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A LIST OF THE PRINCIPAL WORKS REFERRED TO IN THIS TREATISE.

- The City of God.** By *Alexander M. Fairbairn.*
Essays on the Pursuit of Truth. By *Samuel Bailey.*
Studies in Theism. By *Borden P. Bowne.*
Fleming's Vocabulary of Philosophy.
Day's Outlines of Ontological Science.
Outline of the Necessary Laws of Thought. By *William Thomson.*
Systematic Theology. By *Charles Hodge.*
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